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

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

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

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THE ROYAL NORTH BRITISH DRAGOONS (SCOTS GREYS) 1837

By M. A. Hayes

The frontispiece from a coloured copy water-colour drawing, by M. A. Hayes, of a party of the 2nd or Royal North British Dragoons, which was their official title in those days.

The scene is the Royal Barracks, Dublin, where the Regiment was quartered during 1887, and a detachment is shown parading in light marching order, probably for road escort duty.

The Greys were raised in Scotland in 1678, when two troops of Dragoons were levied, and added to the Regular Army. The traditional origin of the Regiment's name is somewhat obscure, but Cannon in his history of the regiment, states that "In the Journals of this period (1702), the regiment is sometimes the 'Grey Dragoons,' and on other occasions, the 'Scots Regiment of White Horses'"; from which it is evident it was then mounted on Grey Horses exclusively.

The Dutch Troop of Life Guards, which William the Third brought with him to England in November, 1688, was mounted on grey horses; this troop returned to Holland in 1699; and, it appears likely, the regiment took over their horses.

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THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

JANUARY, 1936

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE, AUGUST-NOVEMBER, 1918

By LIEUT.-COLONEL T. PRESTON, M.C., T.D., Yorkshire Hussars

PART VIII

THE CAVALRY CORPS WITH THE FIFTH ARMY, NOVEMBER, 1918

Since the middle of October the Cavalry Corps (1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, with Household Machine Gun Brigade and XVIII Corps Cyclists attached) had been in G.H.Q. Reserve and had been bivouacked in the devastated country south-east and north of Péronne, the 1st Cavalry Division being in the area Tertry—Monchy Lagache—Montecourt, and the 3rd Cavalry Division in the area Hennois Wood—Bertincourt—Ytres, with Cavalry Corps headquarters at Aizecourt-le-Haut.

After the Battle of the Sambre had been in progress a few days, the Commander-in-Chief decided to send the Cavalry Corps to the Fifth Army. The two cavalry divisions accordingly marched north on the 6th November, the 1st to Crèvecœur, Banteux and Bantouzelle (south of Cambrai) and the 3rd to the Marquion—Sauchy Lestrée area. This march was made in a deluge of rain; there was little or no shelter when the units reached their bivouacs; most of the horses were up to their hocks in mud, and in some cases saddles and equipment had to be dug out of the mud with spades before saddling up next day. The march was continued northwards on the 7th, and at noon the G.O.C. Cavalry Corps attended a conference at General

6th Nov.

7th Nov. Sketches 1 & 3

Birdwood's Fifth Army Headquarters at Lille, where the probable employment of the cavalry was discussed. The following Instructions, dated 7th November 1918, were issued by the Fifth Army staff :—

RÔLE OF THE CAVALRY CORPS

On a date to be notified later, the I Corps is to force the Scheldt between Antoing and Mortagne. III Corps will assist on left by clearing the enemy from the west bank of the Canal about Calonne.

It is probable that the enemy has made all arrangements for withdrawal and that the Scheldt is only held by small forces. His next stand will probably be on the Dendre, but there is no information as to the degree of resistance likely to be met with there. An opportunity to employ the Cavalry Corps as a whole will not, therefore, occur at all events until the passage of the Dendre has been forced.

The Army Commander therefore intends to press forward to the Dendre, drive in the enemy's advanced troops and force the line of the Dendre without delay.

The Cavalry Corps will detach one cavalry brigade to the III Corps, and of this brigade one regiment each to the I and XI Corps. They will operate with advanced guards.

The Cavalry Corps (less above) will be held ready to make the first advance, on orders from Army Headquarters, to a position of readiness on the line of the Scheldt about Antoing, as soon as the congestion on the river line has been relieved. Thence the Cavalry Corps will be prepared to move to the line of the Canal de Blaton between Ath and Stambruges, ready to operate towards Enghien if the necessary conditions occur.

As regards the last paragraph but one in these Instructions, General Kavanagh detailed the 9th Cavalry Brigade to act under the III Corps, the 8th and 19th Hussars to come under the I and XI Corps respectively. On the evening of the

7th November, Cavalry Corps advanced headquarters were opened at Seclin (six miles south of Lille), those of the 3rd Cavalry Division being at Sainghin (five miles south-east of Lille). The 1st Cavalry Division was at Cantin (six miles south-east of Douai).

Next day (the 8th) both cavalry divisions again marched north, and the completion of this move brought the Corps fairly well together in an area six to ten miles south-east of Lille. On this date the I Corps under Lieut.-General Sir A. Holland succeeded in crossing the Scheldt on a considerable front south of Antoing, whilst other Fifth Army troops got into the western outskirts of Tournai. **8th Nov. Sketch 3.**

Saturday morning, the 9th November, found the Germans in retreat all along the British line. The Fifth Army captured Peruwelz, Antoing and Tournai, whilst the Second Army crossed the Scheldt on its whole front and reached the outskirts of Renaix. During this morning the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General A. Burt) in accordance with orders received, left the Cavalry Corps for the Second Army; the brigade marched to Tourcoing, where it was split up, the 7th Dragoon Guards coming under the II Corps (with one squadron to the 29th Division) and the 17th Lancers under the XIX Corps, each regiment taking with it a subsection* from the 7th Machine Gun Squadron. The remainder of the brigade remained in Army Reserve in Tourcoing. **9th Nov.**

It will be remembered that since early September the 2nd Cavalry Division had been split up by brigades among the Fourth, Third and First Armies, mounted troops being absolutely necessary to them. The sending of the 7th Cavalry Brigade to the Second Army was a continuation of the same policy, and resulted in these four Armies having a cavalry brigade each, whilst the Fifth Army had the Cavalry Corps, which was now reduced to five brigades as compared with nine in August and fifteen at the Battle of Cambrai a year before.

This dividing up of the Cavalry Corps was doubtless unavoidable under the circumstances, but its result was to

* Another sub-section was sent to each regiment next day, so that each then had four Vickers guns attached.

leave General Kavanagh with so small a mounted force—compared to the total strengths of the contending armies—that it could hardly have inflicted a decisive blow, even if hostilities had not ceased two days later.

* * * *

9th Nov. Sketches 1 & 3.

Early in the morning, Brig.-General Legard's 9th Cavalry Brigade—less the 8th Hussars—marched across the Scheldt to Gaurain-Ramecroix where they went into billets, being now under the orders of General Butler's III Corps. A little later, Brig.-General Sewell's 1st Cavalry Brigade was placed on two hours' notice, and was to hold itself ready to operate towards Blaton and Sirault on the right flank of the I Corps, under whose orders it came in the evening.

In the afternoon, Sir Charles Kavanagh motored to Roulers to meet General Robillot, commanding the French Cavalry Corps with the Belgians, but there appears to be no written record of what passed at this interview.

At 11.30 p.m. that night, General Kavanagh telephoned to Major-General Sir John Davidson (head of the Operations Section at G.H.Q.) and said he considered that opportunities for cavalry action were being missed owing to the Cavalry Corps being too far back; so far, there had been no orders for it to cross the Scheldt next day (10th). The Cavalry Corps Commander next telephoned to Major-General Sir C. B. B. White, M.G.G.S. of the Fifth Army, saying that the area Bachy—La Glanerie—Nomain which had been given him, was much too far west; also that he understood the I Corps was not proposing to push the 1st Cavalry Brigade across the Scheldt on the morrow. The difficulties due to congestion on the roads were realized, but it was essential for the cavalry to cross the Scheldt on the 10th.

One cannot but sympathise with Sir Charles Kavanagh in his view that the cavalry were too far behind the front line. The leading infantry of the Fifth Army were well over the Scheldt everywhere, whilst the area Bachy—La Glanerie—Nomain was six to eight miles west of that river as the crow flies, and further still along the roads, which were very much blocked

by the guns and transport of the infantry divisions. Much of this congestion was due to the fact that, since the opening of the British offensive in August, our front had been steadily contracting as we advanced eastward. On 8th August, the British had held approximately 98 miles of front, but three months later this had narrowed down to about 65 miles. All the five Armies had been obliged, therefore, to dispose their troops in greater depth as their frontages became less.

* * * *

There will probably always be differences of opinion as to the correct position for a large cavalry force on the eve of an expected break-through. On the one hand the cavalry commander wants his troops to be as far forward as possible, so as to seize what may be a fleeting opportunity of passing through; whilst on the other hand the infantry commander who is responsible for making the "gap" often feels that an unwieldy mass of horsemen may get very much in his way, possibly mask his artillery, and even prejudice his chances of making the "gap" at all; hence he is inclined to ask that the cavalry shall assemble farther back than their own commander may think desirable. There had been just this difference of opinion before the Palestine break-through on 19th September, and although this operation had resulted in a brilliant success, many cavalry officers still consider that the Desert Mounted Corps should have been allowed to assemble further forward, as its leader wished.*

* * * *

Legard's Mobile Force on 10th November
(*Sketch* 1)

We left the 9th Cavalry Brigade at Gaurain-Ramecroix (about four miles south-east of Tournai) where they had arrived on the 9th. Early on Sunday morning, 10th November, Brig.-General D'Arcy Legard was ordered to assume command of a mixed force (drawn mainly from the 55th Division) and lead the advance of the III Corps towards Leuze and Ath. **10th Nov. Sketch 1.**

* See Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne's remarks, Cavalry Journal, October, 1922, p. 362.

The composition of "Legard's Mobile Force," as it was called, was :—

Advanced Guard .. (*O.C., Major F. W. Barrett, 15th Hrs.*)	15th Hussars, with 1 section 9th Machine Gun Squadron. Field Troop, R.E. 1 Section, Y Battery, R.H.A.
Main Body ..	A/275 Battery, R.F.A. 9th Machine Gun Squadron (less two sections). 423rd Field Company, R.E. 1 squadron King Edward's Horse, with cyclists. 2/5 Lancashire Fusiliers. A Company, 55th Machine Gun Battalion. 9th Cavalry Field Ambulance. 1 Section West Lancashire Field Ambulance.

It will be noticed that General Legard had only one regiment, the 15th Hussars, of his own brigade ; the 8th and 19th Hussars as already noted being away with the I and XI Corps respectively, each with a section of the 9th M.G. Squadron.

Passing through the infantry at Barry at 7.30 a.m., the leading 15th Hussar squadron (Captain H. F. Brace) pushed on to Leuze and reported it clear of the enemy half an hour later ; the inhabitants of the little town greeted our men with great enthusiasm. Riding on, the regiment had covered nearly eight miles since the start without meeting any resistance, until at 9 a.m. Brace's squadron was checked by machine-gun fire west of Ligne. With the help of 2nd Lieut. H. C. Mount's subsection of the 9th M.G. Squadron, Captain Brace brushed aside the opposition, and the regiment was clear of Ligne by 9.40. As it was evident that we were now definitely in contact with the enemy, the O.C. 15th Hussars decided to advance on a two-squadron front. On the right, Captain F. A. Nicolson's squadron pushed forward south of the main road to Villers-St. Amand, its right flank troop reporting machine-gun fire from Moulbaix

Chateau ;* whilst on the left, north of the main road, Captain Brace's squadron proceeded through Foucaumont. 19th Nov. Sketch 1.

At 11 a.m., slight opposition was met with east of Villers-St. Amand, and eight Germans were seen running away down the road towards Ath. A patrol consisting of Lieutenant Gilbey and six men was then despatched to find out whether the bridge over the Dendre opposite Maffle was intact and clear of the enemy or not. An hour later, Lieutenant V. Rathbone, King Edward's Horse, was sent to report similarly on the bridge at Arbre; both bridges were reported strongly held, and it soon became obvious that the Germans meant making a stand on the line of the Dendre.

By midday Captain Brace's squadron was held up by machine-gun fire about the 2nd kilometre stone on the Mainvault—Ath road. One troop under Lieutenant Haggas made a plucky attempt to gallop a farm, but most of the horses were hit including that of Haggas; he was rendered unconscious by the fall, and the severity of the enemy's fire made it impossible to move him until dusk. Lieutenant C. Eade's subsection of the 9th M.G. Squadron also suffered some casualties, losing one man killed and five wounded, whilst fifteen led horses were killed and wounded by shell-fire.

At 12.45 p.m. the 15th Hussars were disposed as follows:—

Right Squadron (Nicolson): One troop moving along the railway from Villers-St. Amand towards Ath. Two troops—dismounted—astride the main Leuze—Ath road just east of 54th kilometre stone. One troop in reserve, mounted.

Left Squadron (Brace): One troop in farm at 2nd kilometre stone, Mainvault—Ath road. Remainder of squadron half-a-mile south-west.

Reserve Squadron (Liddell) about 55th kilometre stone on main road, midway between Ligne and Ath.

The two guns of Y Battery, R.H.A., under Lieutenant Hope,

* This chateau was said to have been Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria's headquarters until a few days before.

were at this time in action against hostile machine-guns at the exit of the main road from Ath.

His cavalry being definitely held up, General Legard decided (1 p.m.) to use his Lancashire Fusilier battalion on the right flank, with the idea of securing the two bridges over the Dendre south of Ath. The issuing of orders and the moving up of the infantry, however, all took time, and the attack was not actually started for another two hours, from an assembly position just east of Irchonwelz. In the meantime the cavalry patrols were very active and kept sending in valuable information. They reported four enemy machine-guns in action just north of Ath; these were engaged by the guns of Y Battery, and about the same time (2 p.m.) Lieutenant Hope and the battery-sergeant-major were wounded, leaving the battery Q.M.S. in command of the two guns. At 2.45 Lieutenant Rathbone (King Edward's Horse) having reported the Arbre bridge held and partially destroyed, took up a position of observation north of Chièvres. He was ordered to withdraw, but actually stayed out all night, holding the bridge over the Hunelle river at Chièvres until relieved by cyclists later.

The infantry attack commenced at 3 p.m., and a quarter of an hour later Captain Nicolson reported that his right troop had worked up the railway to a level crossing just on the edge of Ath, where it found a barricaded bridge and came under fire from trench mortars, machine-guns and gas shells. Shells were also falling now on the Bois du Roy.

An airman's report received at 3.45 p.m., that the enemy was in full retreat, proved to be incorrect. At 4 o'clock the Lancashire Fusiliers' attack was not going too well and they were involved in house-to-house fighting, the Germans clinging stubbornly to the eastern bank of the Dendre. Shortly afterwards, the cavalry were ordered to billet in the Villers-St. Amand area, the infantry being responsible for protection during the night. The 15th Hussars record that it was a fine day and that plenty of water was found for the horses.

Here we will leave General Legard and go back to Cavalry Corps Headquarters.

The 10th November at Cavalry Corps Headquarters, and Plans for 11th

(*Sketches* 1 *and* 3)

General Kavanagh, it will be remembered, had been pressing on the 9th for his Corps to be allowed to move further forward, so that any opportunity for cavalry action might not be let slip. At 8 a.m. on the 10th November he spoke to the Fifth Army Commander, General Birdwood, about the necessity for crossing the Scheldt immediately, but it was some hours before this was actually possible; for example, the 6th Cavalry Brigade did not cross the river until 3 p.m., passing over it at Vaulx-le-Tournai and halting at Gaurain-Ramecroix. 10th Nov. Sketches 1 & 3.

In the meantime (9.15 a.m.) General Holland's I Corps had ordered the 1st Cavalry Brigade to seize the crossings of the Blaton Canal between Stambruges and Tongres, after which it was to hold a bridgehead position on the line Neufmaison—Chièvres. The 5th Dragoon Guards (with a section of machine guns and a section from I Battery, R.H.A.) accordingly started off at 10.30, followed by the rest of the brigade half an hour later; but so great was the congestion on the roads that the leading regiment did not cross the Blaton Canal at Stambruges till 5.5 p.m., and it was 7.15 before they gained touch with the infantry in the front line west of Neufmaison. By this time it was far too late to try and pass through, and Brigadier-General Sewell decided to billet the rest of the brigade at Basècles for the night.

He received the following orders from I Corps for next day:—

> "Cavalry Corps is advancing to-morrow on SOIGNIES and NIVELLES AAA I corps is to form bridgeheads covering BLATON CANAL and halt AAA 58th and 15th Divns. will to-morrow establish bridgeheads within their boundaries on general line NEUFMAISON — LES RUELLES—HOVES—ATTRE AAA 1st Cav. Bde. will advance to general line MASNUY-ST.-PIERRE—FROIDMONT—THORICOURT and cover bridgeheads of 58th and 15th Divns. AAA After reaching this objective 1st Cav. Bde. will come under orders of Cavalry Sketches 1 & 3.

Corps . . . Every facility is to be given to troops of Cavalry Corps to press forward."

General Kavanagh had at noon opened an advanced headquarters at the village of Genech (eight miles south-west of Tournai), the rear headquarters of the Corps remaining at Seclin, some nine miles further back.

During the evening of the 10th, various discussions took place between the Fifth Army and Cavalry Corps commanders and their staffs. At 5.30 p.m. Sir William Birdwood informed Sir Charles Kavanagh that the Blaton Canal crossings were now in our hands and that the Cavalry Corps could push on; but almost at the same time reports came in from the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Basècles and the 8th Hussars at Peruwelz that the crowded state of the roads made it impossible for them to get forward. Further north, the Ath bridges—as we have seen—were still in enemy hands, and this was reported by III Corps at 7.10 p.m.

The Cavalry Corps' plan for the morrow was to gain the line Soignies—Enghien, some eighteen miles beyond our then front line, the 1st Cavalry Division (1st and 2nd Brigades) operating on the right and the 3rd Cavalry Division (6th and Canadian Brigades) on the left; the 9th Brigade was to be in Corps reserve. General Kavanagh asked Fifth Army that the 3rd Cavalry Division might be given the use of the main Tournai—Leuze—Ath road, but was told a little later that, owing to infantry transport, only one cavalry brigade could use it. Cavalry Corps orders were issued at 7.45 p.m.

Sketches 1 & 3.

As darkness fell on the 10th November, the formations of the Cavalry Corps were disposed as under:—

Cavalry Corps advanced H.Q...	Genech.
„ „ rear „ ..	Seclin.
1st Cavalry Division	Maubray.
1st Cavalry Brigade ..	Basècles (under I Corps).
8th Hussars	Peruwelz (under I Corps).
9th Cavalry Brigade ..	West of Ath (under III Corps).
2nd Cavalry Brigade ..	Vezon area.

3rd Cavalry Division	Antoing and Gaurain-Ramecroix.
XVIII Corps Cyclist Bn. ..	Mouchin.
Household Machine Gun Brigade	Wahagnies.

The 7th Cavalry Brigade with the Second Army, 10th November
(*Sketches* 1 *and* 2)

We left Brig.-General Burt's 7th Cavalry Brigade billeted in and north of Tourcoing, and it will simplify the story to state here that only one regiment, the 7th Dragoon Guards, was used again before the Armistice. **10th Nov. Sketches 1 & 2.**

At 6.30 a.m., 10th November, A Squadron, 7th Dragoon Guards (Major W. F. Chappell), under orders of the 29th Division, began a march of some eighteen miles eastwards from Aelbeke to a point some four miles south-east of Renaix, where its patrols came in contact with the enemy in Leuze Wood at 3.30 p.m. An hour later, one troop was ordered to take Lahamaide village, some three miles beyond the wood, but was stopped on the high ground about La Vieille Maison. It therefore threw out a line of posts across the road at the 24th kilometre stone and remained in position for the night, squadron headquarters inlying picquet remaining at Point 135 cross-roads, just west of Hubermont Wood.

In the meantime the remainder of the 7th Dragoon Guards (under II Corps) had also been marching east, using roads on the left (i.e., north) of A Squadron. They made, however, a shorter march, halting at Haut—about five miles west of Renaix—without having met the enemy. Further still to the left, the 17th Lancers, under the XIX Corps, marched to Waermaerde on the Scheldt, arriving there at 1.30 p.m. and not moving again until after hostilities ceased.

The 7th Dragoon Guards on 11th November
(*Sketches* 1 *and* 2)

At 7 o'clock on Monday morning, 11th November, Major Chappell, commanding A Squadron, 7th Dragoon Guards,

received a report from his outpost troop that the enemy had retired. Half an hour later he despatched another troop to reconnoitre the main road to Lessines and hold the bridge over the Dendre.

Brig.-General B. C. Freyberg, commanding 88th Infantry Brigade, came to Major Chappell's headquarters at 9.35 a.m. to tell him that there would be an armistice at 11 a.m. He added, however, that he particularly wished to seize Lessines before that hour, and ordered the squadron to saddle up and push on at once. Two troops, as noted above, were out in front already; the remainder of the squadron saddled up and started off at a gallop, picked up the outpost troop and continued on through Lahamaide down the main road. After covering four more miles they came upon the reconnoitring troop, which was held up at the 34th kilometre stone (about a mile short of Lessines) by some machine-guns and snipers. After a halt of three minutes, Major Chappell sent on patrols down either side of the main road and followed with his squadron, as time was getting on. This bold manœuvre served its purpose and the enemy fell back; at the western entrance to Lessines 24 Germans, with a machine-gun, were captured by the Dragoon Guards who, riding on through the village and over the Dendre, picquetted the high ground to the east.

11th Nov. Sketches 1 & 2.

Thus, through the prompt action of this squadron, Lessines was captured a few minutes before 11 a.m. Three German officers and 103 other ranks were sent back under escort to 29th Division headquarters, many small parties of the enemy being found with the help of civilians. A little later, 41 Germans had to be escorted back to their own lines to save them from the fury of the Belgian inhabitants.

While all this was going on, the rest of the 7th Dragoon Guards were advancing nearly parallel to, and two or three miles north of, A Squadron. They were under the 30th Division, and Captain H. C. Scrubb (commanding C Squadron, which was doing advanced guard) had orders to seize the crossings over the Dendre at Les Deux Acren, about 1¾ miles north of Lessines. He was also to gain touch with A Squadron—acting under the

29th Division—on the right and with the 31st Division on the left. Should enemy opposition be encountered, a defensive position only was to be taken up.

The regiment started off, and was informed when passing through Watiripont—where 30th Divisional headquarters were located—that hostilities would cease at 11 o'clock. The march was continued for another eleven miles or so, and when the leading patrols of C Squadron were close to Ghoy village, they were fired upon from its eastern exit (10.50 a.m.). Major-General Williams, commanding the 30th Division, thereupon ordered the squadron to halt; it took up an outpost position on the rising ground west of Ghoy, with flank detachments in touch with the 29th and 31st Divisions on its right and left.

So ended the part played by the 7th Dragoon Guards—and for that matter of the 7th Cavalry Brigade—in the Great War.

The Cavalry Corps on the 11th November
(*Sketches* 1 *and* 3)

In the dark early hours of the 11th of November the staffs of the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions sent out their typed orders for the advance to the Soignies—Enghien line; these orders are historically interesting as being the last issued by the cavalry divisions before the Armistice, and are therefore reproduced in full at the end of this article.* Though not framed as operation orders would be to-day, they set out the commanders' plans quite clearly, and can easily be followed on the sketch maps.

In the 1st Cavalry Division, Major-General Mullens at the outset had only one brigade, the 2nd, at his own disposal, for it will be remembered that the 1st Cavalry Brigade was under the I Corps, whilst the 9th Brigade had just been earmarked as Cavalry Corps reserve. The 1st Brigade would, however, revert to its own division after reaching the Masnuy—St. Pierre—Thoricourt line, and as this brigade was on the right and the furthest forward, it will be as well to deal with it first.

The morning had dawned clear and frosty when, at 8 o'clock, Brig.-General Sewell met his C.O's at the 15th kilometre post

* Appendices 1 and 2.

on the Sirault—Belœil road, where it was explained that the brigade would advance on a two-regiment front, the Bays (Major R. M. Stewart-Richardson) being on the right, the 5th Dragoon Guards (Major J. Van der Byl) on the left, and the 11th Hussars (Major S. Yates) in reserve. The first bound would be the line Jurbise—Cambron-Casteau, and the second the line Masnuy—St. Pierre—Froidmont—Thoricourt.

The brigade started off; the second bound was reached by 11 a.m. without opposition, the only Germans met with being small parties in Masnuy—St. Pierre and Hubermont, who fled, pursued by Bays' patrols. Preparations were at once made to push further patrols on to the line Soignies—Steenkerque. On the Bays' left, the 5th Dragoon Guards had passed through the infantry front line (just east of Neufmaison) at 9.30 a.m. The regiment moved via Bauffe, Cambron-Casteau and Cambron-St. Vincent, getting in touch with the retreating enemy and taking several prisoners with no loss to themselves; A Squadron (Lieutenant E. O. E. Peel) rode on as far as Thoricourt.

11th Nov. Sketches 1 & 3.

It was midday before news of the Armistice reached the 1st Cavalry Brigade, whereupon the Bays and 5th Dragoon Guards took up an outpost line from south-east of Masnuy-St. Jean to Thoricourt, some 6½ miles from right to left. The main bodies of units were then located as follows:—

Bays	Masnuy-St. Pierre and Montignies-lez-Lens.
5th Dragoon Guards..	Cambron-St. Vincent and Thoricourt.
Remainder of brigade.	Lens.

The other two brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division never had a chance to come into action on the 11th. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade marched off from Vezon with the 9th Lancers as advanced guard, and heard of the cessation of hostilities at 10.40 a.m. It then halted just north of Basècles. The 9th Cavalry Brigade, which had spent the night just behind the infantry outpost line west of Ath, moved at 9 a.m. at a point immediately north of Maffle; at 8 a.m. "Legard's Force" had ceased to exist as such, leaving Brig.-General Legard in command

of his 9th Brigade only. Immediately after the Armistice, the 8th Hussars rejoined the brigade from Peruwelz, where they had been with the I Corps but had not been in action.

It only remains to record the movements of the 3rd Cavalry Division. Major-General Harman held a conference at his headquarters at Antoing at 6 a.m., and two hours later the 6th Cavalry Brigade, with the Royals as advanced guard, were on the move down the Tournai—Ath main road, with the line Chièvres—Ath as first objective.

About 10 o'clock the head of the main body had just reached the centre of Leuze when it was overtaken by a Cavalry Corps staff officer in a car, who handed to the Brigadier (Brig.-General Ewing Paterson) the official telegram regarding the Armistice.* The brigade dismounted and messages were immediately sent to the Royals and also to some 10th Hussar patrols who were in contact with the enemy north of Silly.

> "At 11 a.m., the actual hour when hostilities ceased, an impromptu ceremony took place in the market square of Leuze. An infantry battalion (a London Regiment) with its band happened to be there. Mounted men were summoned from each of the units present with the Brigade, and these formed three sides of a square, the infantry the fourth. In the centre of the square were the Mayor of Leuze, the G.O.C. 6th Cavalry Brigade, the band and the regimental trumpeters. The market place was full of civilians, and every window and door was crowded. As the last stroke of 11.0 died away, the trumpeters sounded 'Stand Fast' and 'Cease Fire,' and then as the infantry presented arms, the band played 'God Save the King,' followed by the Belgian and French national anthems. It was a memorable and intensely moving scene."†

The remainder of the 3rd Cavalry Division was at this time about two miles south of Leuze, marching between Willaupuis and Tourpes. If hostilities had continued a few more hours, it is certain that both cavalry divisions would have been engaged, but it was not to be; the War was over.

* Appendix 3.

† "History of the 6th Cavalry Brigade." By Lieut. J. B. Bickersteth, M.C., p. 119.

The November Casualties

The Cavalry Corps—through no fault of its own—never really came into action at all in the period November 1st–11th, 1918, except for the fighting in Legard's Force west of Ath on the morning of the 10th, when the 15th Hussars and their attached section from the 9th Machine Gun Squadron sustained some losses. The 2nd Cavalry Division, as shown in previous articles, was not with the Cavalry Corps but was split up by brigades with the Fourth, Third and First Armies. The November figures for all three cavalry divisions were :—

	Officers		*Other Ranks*		
	K.	*W.*	*K.*	*W.*	*M.*
1st Cavalry Division ..	–	2	2	20	2
2nd „ „ ..	1	6	8	101	3
3rd „ „ ..	–	–	1	–	–

The casualties of the 9th Cavalry Brigade in the same period were :—

	Officers		*Other Ranks*			*Horses*
	K.	*W.*	*K.*	*W.*	*M.*	*K. & W.*
15th Hussars	–	–	1	8	–	59
19th Hussars	–	–	–	–	–	1
9th M.G. Squadron ..	–	–	1	5	2	18
Y Battery, R.H.A. ..	–	1	–	3	–	7
Total ..	–	1	2	16	2	85

The Question of "The Gap"

Those of us who served in the Cavalry Corps in France will remember how, before every British offensive from Neuve Chapelle onwards, we were moved up in readiness for "the G in GAP" as the saying went: and many cavalry officers must often have asked themselves in later years, Was the "Gap" idea ever really a practicable proposition ? Was there an actual occasion when the Cavalry Corps might have ridden through a breach in the trench-lines, advanced—say—twenty or thirty miles and acted against the German communications ? Given better luck and better arrangements, could this have been done

at Loos, on the Somme, at Arras, at Cambrai? What would have happened if we *had* gone through? Would it have forced the enemy to withdraw for some distance? Would it have shortened the War? How many casualties would the cavalry have suffered? Was it ever possible to do in France what was done in Palestine in September 1918?

It will be attempted here, not to find answers to these and similar questions, but merely to point out some considerations which appear to have importance. One is that both Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig were cavalrymen, and it might be argued on the one hand, that they knew what cavalry could do and would not have contemplated (as they certainly did) passing a large mounted force through a gap without a reasoned expectation of success; on the other hand it might be urged that both Commanders-in-Chief had a natural and sentimental bias towards their own arm, wished to see it play a dominant and heroic rôle, and imagined that situations were more favourable for cavalry than was ever actually the case. There is nothing gained by pressing either argument too far, but it is fair to remember that the French Higher Command also contemplated an inruption of cavalry after a successful infantry attack, although Generals Joffre, Foch, Nivelle and Pétain were none of them cavalrymen. It is easy enough to be wise after the event and say that it was useless to have cavalry divisions waiting in readiness before each offensive; but the C.-in-C. and Army Commanders had to deal with each situation as it appeared to them at the time, and it was by no means impossible that there might have been some local or temporary collapse of the enemy's resistance which would have enabled the cavalry to act.

The plans for a cavalry break-through at different periods of the War may be briefly noted. For the Loos—Champagne offensive of September, 1915, "the (French and British) cavalry on the Artois front was allotted a line Ath—Mons in Belgian territory, as its ulterior objective. This constituted an advance of fifty miles due east."* There was probably never the least chance of this coming off, but there are two rather curious

* "Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1915." Vol. II, p. 137.

coincidences; first, that fifty miles was just about the distance covered by the Desert Mounted Corps on September 19th–20th, 1918, in Palestine; and second, that the Cavalry Corps was practically crossing the Mons—Ath line on Armistice Day.

In the opening attack on the Somme (1st July, 1916) it was similarly intended to pass cavalry through if the German resistance broke down. According to the Official History, the idea was—the gap having been made—for reserve divisions to wheel to their left, i.e., northwards, and take the enemy's line in flank and reverse, the cavalry to operate on the outer or right flank of the movement; but we now know that the enemy's moral at this period of the war was very high and that a real break-through in July 1916 was not possible.

The present writer ventures to suggest that twice in 1917—at Arras in April and at Cambrai in November—the Cavalry Corps might easily have scored striking successes, and that it was more bad luck than anything else that prevented them. Ludendorff admits that the German line was breached at Arras and that the situation was critical; but the British attack was hindered by exceptionally bad weather, and when the leading cavalry brigades advanced into the "gap" at Monchy, the mistake was made of allowing the infantry to sit still on the rest of the battle front, thus permitting the enemy to devote his whole attention—and artillery—to the cavalry.*

In the Cambrai surprise attack, one broken canal bridge at Masnières was the chief factor in preventing the 5th Cavalry Division's advance, and even so, some officers—notably Brig.-General R. W. Paterson of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade—have always been convinced that the operation on the east side of Cambrai could have been carried out, had the leading Fort Garry Horse squadron been vigorously supported.†

On the 8th August 1918, the cavalry did actually pass through the infantry and operated with success, but a wide stretch of impassable shell-cratered ground limited the depth to which they were able to advance.

* See "The Cavalry at Arras, 1917," "Cavalry Journal," Oct, 1931.

† See Cavalry Journal, October, 1923, p. 465.

General Sir George Barrow has rightly pointed out that

> "the proportion of cavalry employed in France in comparison with the total numbers engaged was so small that, apart from any other consideration, it is doubtful whether its action could ever have had more than a local effect after the operations of the first six weeks."*

These words are manifestly true, and it is instructive to compare the relative cavalry strengths in France and Palestine in September 1918 when, in the latter theatre, the mounted troops really did go through "The Gap." Sir Edmund Allenby had 4 cavalry divisions to 7 infantry divisions, as compared with Sir Douglas Haig's 3 cavalry divisions to 59 infantry divisions, and the strength of the hostile forces in each case is even more significant; the Turks had only 3,000 sabres and 32,000 rifles—equivalent to 1 cavalry and 4 infantry divisions—whereas on September 25th, 1918, the Germans had no less than 71 divisions opposite the British.

This point must never be forgotten when cavalry is considered as an offensive weapon; it must, like artillery, bear due proportion to the total size of the army of which it is part.

So much for large mounted forces or Army Cavalry; when we turn to Corps or Divisional Cavalry, the last three months of 1918 in France showed most emphatically how necessary was the mounted man for local reconnaissance and protection, and how neither the aeroplane nor the petrol-driven vehicle could replace him. Undesirable though it was to split up the Cavalry Corps, we have seen how this had to be done before hostilities ended, so that each of the five Armies might have at least a cavalry brigade.

* * * *

One final word. It may or may not be true to say that we should have defeated the Germans just the same in the autumn of 1918, even without our cavalry. But it is certainly true that, had it not been for that same cavalry, there would have been no autumn advance at all, for the Germans would have defeated us in the spring.

* "The Future of Cavalry," Cavalry Journal, April, 1929, p. 183.

APPENDIX 1.

SECRET. Copy No.

1st CAVALRY DIVISION ORDER No. 70.

Reference :—
TOURNAI } 1/100,000.
BRUSSELS }

11th November, 1918.

1. First Army report that Cavalry have reached western outskirts of GHLIN. Aeroplane reports that Cavalry are in the BOIS DE BAUDOUR approaching the railway. I Corps report that they hold NEUFMAISON, and that Cavalry and Cyclists are in CHIEVRES. Our troops were reported just west of ATH at 14.35 hours.

2. The Cavalry Corps (less 7th Cavalry Brigade and Household M.G. Battalions) will move to-day, 11th instant, with objective the line SOIGNIES —ENGHIEN.

3. The first bound will be the line MASNUY—ST. PIERRE—FROIDMONT—THORICOURT—SILLY, but Divisions will not wait for each other on this line, but will push forward to their final objectives.

Dividing line between Divisions :—ELLIGNIES STE. ANNE — CHIEVRES—THORICOURT—STEENKERQUE, all inclusive to 1st Cavalry Division.

4. (*a*) 1st Cavalry Division (less 9th Cavalry Brigade) will move as under, and pick up the 1st Cavalry Brigade which has already been ordered by I Corps to seize the line MASNUY ST. PIERRE—FROIDMONT—THORICOURT this morning, 11th inst. H.Q. 1st Cavalry Brigade are at BASECLES (billet 160 TOURNAI—MONS road).

1st Cavalry Division will move by any roads within its area.

(*b*) 3rd Cavalry Division will move at 08.00 hours. The main TOURNAI —ATH road may be used by this Division.

5. In consequence, the 1st Cavalry Division (less 9th Cavalry Brigade) will move as under :—

(*a*) 1st Cavalry Brigade will move to seize the line MASNUY ST. PIERRE —FROIDMONT—THORICOURT, under orders already issued by I Corps.

(*b*) Remainder of Division will move as under, Starting Point T-roads FF. of BRAFFE.

1st Bound—Line of BLATON Canal—LADEUZE—BELOEIL Stn. incl.

2nd Bound—The ATH—MONS Railway.

3rd Bound—The line MASNUY ST. PIERRE—FROIDMONT—THORICOURT all inclusive, with a detachment pushed out to the South to gain touch with our troops reported in BOIS BAUDOUR and GHLIN.

Advance Guard.—1 Regiment (with section Machine Guns attached) of 2nd Cavalry Brigade, until touch is established with 1st Cavalry Brigade.

Main Body.—To pass Starting Point 09.00 hours, order of march as under :—
1 Troop, 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Escort Troop.
Divisional H.Q.
1st Signal Squadron.
1st Field Squadron.

2nd Cavalry Brigade (less 1 Regiment and 1 Troop).
Section, D/108 How. Battery.
A.1. Echelon.
Light Section Reserve Park.

General line of advance of main body: BRAFFE—BASECLES—BELOEIL — WAUDIGNIES — BAUFFLE — CAMBRON CASTEAU — CAMBRON ST. VINCENT.

Advanced Regiment will push forward reconnaissances to ascertain the state of the Canal and Railway crossings between BELOEIL Station and HUISSIGNIES, both inclusive, and to gain touch with our troops reported in NEUFMAISON and CHIEVRES.

(*c*) 9th Cavalry Brigade will assemble at ATH at 11.00 hours and will come into Corps Reserve, reporting completion of concentration to Adv. Cavalry Corps H.Q. and 1st Cavalry Division.

6. No. 6 Squadron R.A.F. will detail a Flight to work with each Cavalry Division.

7. A.1. Echelon will accompany Units.
A.2 Echelon will move under orders to be issued by A.A. & Q.M.G.

8. 1st Cavalry Brigade will detail a Staff Officer to report at the Starting Point at 09.00 hours with a copy of the orders issued by 1st Cavalry Brigade for the carrying out of the tasks allotted to them by the I Corps.

9. The following will report at the Starting Point :—
(*a*) Divisional Gallopers from 2nd and 1st Cavalry Brigade with three orderlies each.
(*b*) Escort Troop (to be detailed by 2nd Cavalry Brigade).

10. Approximate Report Centres :—
So far as can be foreseen Divisional Report Centre will be :—
(*a*) T. roads FF. of BRAFFE.
(*b*) BASECLES Station.
(*c*) Cross roads 2 miles south of ELLIGNIES ST. ANNE.
(*d*) BELOEIL Station.

11. Cavalry Corps Adv. H.Q. will be established at the S. of STE. MARTIN ½ miles S.E. of the last E. in LEUZE, at 11.00 hours 11th inst.

12. ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. E. CECIL,
Lt.-Colonel, G.S.
1st Cavalry Division.

Issued at 04.40 *hours.*

NOTE.—BLATON CANAL is reported dry at BELOEIL, but an obstacle for Cavalry.

Copies to :—
Nos. 1—20 "Normal" Distbn.
21—25 Additional to 2nd Cav. Bde.
26 Light Section Res. Park.
27 Section, D/108 How. Bty.
28 3rd Cav. Div.

SECRET. APPENDIX 2.
Copy No.

3rd CAVALRY DIVISION ORDER No. 80.

Reference 1/100,000 { TOURNAI. VALENCIENNES. BRUSSELS. 11th Nov., 1918.

1. First Army report that Cavalry have reached western outskirts of GHLIN. Aeroplane reports that Cavalry are in the BOIS DE BAUDOUR approaching the railway. I Corps report that they hold NEUFMAISON and that Cavalry and Cyclists are in CHIEVRES. Our troops were reported just West of ATH at 14.35 hours.

2. The Cavalry Corps (less 7th Cavalry Brigade and Household M.G. Battalions) will move to-day, 11th, with objective the line SOIGNIES—ENGHIEN.

3. The first bound will be the line MASNUY-STE-PIERRE—FROIDMONT—THORICOURT—SILLY, but Divisions will not wait for each other on this line, but will push forward to their final objectives.

Dividing line between Divisions ELLIGNIES-STE-ANNE—CHIEVRES—THORICOURT—STEENKERQUE, all inclusive to 1st Cavalry Division.

4. (*a*) 1st Cavalry Division, less 9th Cavalry Brigade, will move at 08.00 hours and pick up the 1st Cavalry Brigade which has already been ordered by the I Corps to seize the line MASNUY-STE-PIERRE—FROIDMONT—THORICOURT this morning.

1st Cavalry Division will move by any road within its area.

(*b*) 9th Cavalry Brigade will be assembled at ATH this morning and come into Corps Reserve.

(*c*) 3rd Cavalry Division will move at 08.00 hours. The leading Cavalry Brigade and Batteries and A.1 Echelon will use the main TOURNAI—ATH road, and the head of leading Brigade will pass Y road ½ mile North of the 2nd R in BARRY at 08.15. All other troops will move South of that road.

5. In consequence :—

(*a*) 6th Cavalry Brigade, plus K Battery R.H.A. will act as advanced guard to the Division, and will seize objective as laid down in para. 2 above.
First bound as in para. 3 above.
Dividing line between Divisions as in para. 3 above.

(*b*) Canadian Cavalry Brigade will detail one squadron to act as left flank guard to the Division, general line of advance South of and parallel to TOURNAI—LEUZE—ATH—ENGHIEN road.

(*c*) Remainder of Division in order of march as under will move along general line VEZON — PONENCHE — WILLAUPUIS — TOURPES — BLICQUY—ORMEIGNIES—MAFFLE—GIBECQ—SILLY.
Escort troop as advanced guard.
Headquarters, 3rd Cavalry Division.
3rd Signal Squadron.
Canadian Cavalry Brigade (less 1 squadron).
3rd Field Squadron R.E. (less 2 troops).
S.A.A. Section D.A.C.

Starting point X Roads just N.W. of V in VEZON at 08.45.

6. 3rd Field Squadron will detail one Troop to report to 6th and Canadian Cavalry Brigades forthwith.



7. One Flight No. 6 Squadron R.A.F. will work with 3rd Cavalry Division and carry out reconnaissances as under :—

(i) Report position of our Infantry and enemy troops North of LEUZE —ATH—ENGHIEN Road.

(ii) Report on the advance of our own troops.

(iii) Report whether ENGHIEN is held by the enemy.

8. A.1 Echelons will be divisionalized at 09.30 at road junction ½ mile N. of 2nd R in BARRY, and will come under the orders of Lieut. MOTT, 3rd D.Gs. They will move forward from there to X roads ¼ mile South of railway station at CHAPELLE-A-WATTINES, park clear of the road and await orders.

Divisionalized A.2 Echelon and Light Section Reserve Park will move under the orders of A.A. & Q.M.G.

9. Cavalry Field Ambulances and Mobile Veterinary Sections will be divisionalized by and come under the orders of A.D.M.S. and A.D.V.S. respectively.

10. Divisional Report Centre will be at head of main body, moving as in para. 5(*c*) above.

11. ACKNOWLEDGE.

G. P. COSENS,
Lieut.-Colonel.
G.S., 3rd Cavalry Division.

Issued at 06.00.

Distribution—List "B", less 7th Cav. Bde., D.M.G.O., and plus Liaison Officer, 6th Sqdn. R.A.F., 1st Cav. Div.

APPENDIX 3.

TEXT OF CAVALRY CORPS TELEGRAM IN REGARD TO THE ARMISTICE.

TO { 1st Cav. Div.
3rd Cav. Div.

GC. 303 11

Hostilities will cease at 11.00 today Nov 11 aaa troops will stand fast on position reached at hour named aaa line of outposts will be established and reported to Corps HQ aaa remainder of troops will be collected and organised ready to meet any demand aaa all military precautions will be preserved and there will be no communication with enemy aaa further instructions will be issued aaa acknowledge.

FROM Cav. Corps.

PLACE

TIME 08.10 G. Reynolds, Major.

NOTE.

The author of these articles desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to the authors of the following books:—

"The Story of the Fourth Army." (Montgomery).

"Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches." (Boraston).

"History of the 6th Cavalry Brigade." (Bickersteth).

"The 10th Royal Hussars and the Essex Yeomanry during the European War." (Whitmore).

"The Oxfordshire Hussars in the Great War." (Keith-Falconer).

"History of the Northumberland Hussars Yeomanry." (Pease).

And several other regimental histories.

TWO CAVALRY RAIDS OF THE GREAT WAR.

By Major E. W. Sheppard, O.B.E., M.C.

Part III.—Conclusions.

Before considering the lessons to be drawn from the two raids described in the previous articles, it will be as well to glance once more at our official doctrine on the matter as laid down in "Cavalry Training."

In brief, this doctrine is that raids are of advantage only when their effect on the main operation may be counted on to be more valuable than would be the direct participation of the force concerned in the battle, either by inducing the enemy to detach larger forces to repel it or by serious interference with his supply of food, ammunition and other necessaries. "In any case," we read, "the probable gain must be carefully weighed against the exhaustion of men and horses which it is certain to entail." Then follow more remarks as to the possibility of small raiding bodies, by reason of their surprise and greater rapidity of action, being more successful than larger ones, and on the necessity for drastic reduction of transport and for living on the country where possible, and for unobtrusive reconnaissance of the proposed route by aircraft or agents beforehand so as to prevent unexpected delays to the force. And that is all the official guidance given us in the Manual.

Now from the events that have been narrated in the two previous articles can we learn more than this? Surely we can. Let us consider the first of the possible results which the Cavalry Manual tells us we may hope for from the raid—the detachment of proportionately larger forces of the enemy to

arrest or repel it. In the first episode, that of the French 5th Cavalry Division on the Marne, there resulted, as far as can be gathered from the information available, no such subtraction from the German forces engaged in the battle against the French Sixth Army; the raiders were engaged and held by the line of communcation troops alone. It is improbable that many of these were never intended for the battle front, or that, if any were so intended, their despatch thither was more than delayed. That the arrival of Lepel's detached brigade on the battlefield may have been delayed is arguable; but as no direct contact ensued between it and the French cavalry, such influence on its movements as was exercised by the latter's activities must have been moral rather than material, and as such falls to be considered later.

On the other hand, the appearance of Von Garnier's Cavalry Corps astride the rearward communications of the Russian forces in the Wilna salient certainly prevented the arrival of reinforcements which, in view of the difficulty actually experienced by the German infantry in driving the Russians from their position, might well have led to the attack being repulsed altogether. As it was, the German success was real, but hardly far reaching, and for the fact that it was not more important than it was the cavalry can in no way be held responsible. They played their role gallantly and effectively; but the heavy cost to them, and the paucity of results, certainly go to support the official doctrine that raiding is, as often as not, a game not worth the candle from the strategic point of view.

Let us now turn to the second of the possible gains from a raid, the interruption of the flow of supplies and ammunition to the hostile army in the full tide of battle. If this can be effectively attained, and if the flow be shut off and kept shut off, the result may well be far reaching, possibly decisive. Broadly speaking, however, this can be done only in two ways. If some important or far reaching destruction must be effected, if a big railway bridge, or a tunnel may be blown up, or a long stretch of line may be wrecked, the use of a railway may be rendered impossible for some considerable period. But military railheads are usually some way back from fighting areas, so that the

raiders would have to take a wide sweep to the rear. Moreover such large scale demolitions require a considerable bulk of explosives, which in turn require transport, and to overload the raiding force with transport may defeat its whole purpose by rendering it too slow-moving and too easily discoverable from the air. Only in exceptional circumstances, moreover, will the enemy be unable to make temporary use of alternative, though more circuitous, routes. In front of railheads, where road transport takes over, the possibilities of effective raiding activity will be yet more circumscribed. Demolitions hardly enter into the question; a skilfully executed surprise attack may achieve considerable, even startling results, against isolated and undefended lorry columns, but a complete blockage of hostile transport over a period long enough to cause serious shortage at the front can only exceptionally come within the bounds of possibility. Here again local defence, the use of alternative routes, and rapid counter action on the enemy's part will usually save a temporarily compromised situation, and not only defeat the raiders' purpose, but also cause them to pay over-highly for any initial success they may score.

In the two episodes under discussion, the French raid seems to have effected nothing more than a temporary check in the hostile forward traffic flow, and though this occurred at an important, even a vital, moment, there is no evidence to show that it contributed much to the decision of the German First Army to break off the battle of the Ourcq on the morning of September 9th. Here again Von Garnier exercised, as far as can be seen, the greater material influence; the interruption of rail traffic to the Wilna salient, at the very moment when its defenders were being subjected to a heavy converging attack from front and flank, made it clearly untenable, and must have played an important part in reconciling the Russians to its evacuation. Here was a case where the shortage of alternative routes for the stopped traffic endowed the action of the cavalry with an effect not to be reckoned upon in a theatre with a more extensive network of railways and roads. We may say therefore that it is in such undeveloped theatres that maximum results of this nature are likely to be achieved.

The principal lesson, however, of the two raids we have described is one not referred to at all in the official doctrine on the matter. We have seen that the raid of the French 5th Cavalry Division may reasonably be accounted a success, because it exercised at the psychological moment an influence—a moral rather than a material influence—on the mind of the German command, aroused in combination with other factors—with which, admittedly, it happened to fall into fortuitous conjunction—a sense of general insecurity, and so helped to bring about the decision of the First Army to retreat. In a word it was as "a blow at the hostile brain" that it was of value, a moral rather than a material blow, but none the less effective for that. Von Garnier's raid on the other hand, greater by far in its tactical and material results, had no such influence on the mind of the hostile command and thus failed of its main object; the material results achieved, set off against the material losses suffered, show no such preponderating balance as to prove it worth the undertaking. This must not be read as criticism of the rightness or wrongness of the decision to undertake it—in the situation as it existed at the time, the German High Command in the East was no less justified than was the G.O.C. French Sixth Army at the Ourcq in playing boldly for high stakes—but as a striking of the balance after the event, to help us to arrive at a true estimation of the value of the raid as an operation of war.

We may say then that such value will turn in the end on question whether great moral results in the way of disorganisation and demoralisation of the enemy, and above all of the enemy commander, are reasonably to be expected. In any given case there can of course be no certainty in the matter, any more than in any other operation in war, which is the domain of the unexpected, and where many well-laid schemes go astray. The point that needs to be stressed, and of which, as we have seen, the official view has taken no account, is that a raid should primarily be conceived of as a blow at the enemy's brain, planned and carried through with that intent. If such desired effect in the moral domain be achieved, the complete absence of material results will be of little importance; even

heavy casualties, or if the worst should happen the total loss of the raiding force, will have been well worth while for the benefit of the whole. When the situation is such that a reasonable chance appears of achieving such great results, neither the accompanying risks nor the unlikelihood of material profit should prevent an attempt being made to seize it.

The further question as to whether the mounted arm is best fitted to carry out such raids under modern conditions falls somewhat beyond our present purpose. This much may perhaps be said. The chief weaknesses of cavalry are their vulnerability to fire, especially machine gun fire, and their lack of striking power. Moreover in a well-roaded and easily traversed country their rate of movement is inferior to that of armoured fighting vehicles, who also do not suffer to the same extent from the weaknesses peculiar to cavalry referred to above. Under the normal conditions of European war, therefore, it may be said with some reason that if a raid has to be carried out which calls for high speed and where resistance is to be expected, armoured fighting vehicles will carry out the task better than cavalry could hope to do.

On the other hand it is difficult to foresee that, in the opening stages of a modern campaign at least, any belligerent is likely to be so well off in A.F.V.s that it can afford to detach any portion of them for subsidiary purposes, or risk using them up prematurely before the main battle is joined. It may well be therefore that no mechanical force is available to carry out any raid, and yet such an enterprise may seem to the commander well worth the risk of trying. If sufficient cavalry are at hand, it may be found possible to entrust the mission to them, instead of leaving them to remain standing idly, bridle on arm, in rear of the fighting front or using them in a purely defensive role to cover a flank. We may recall in this connection the dictum of the manual that the success or failure of a raid is by no means always dependent on the size of the force undertaking it, and foresee scope for useful, if dangerous, work under this head by small well-led fast-moving bodies of mounted men.

Apart from this possibility, every modern army, and our own most of all, has to face the fact that it may at any time be called

upon to undertake operations in undeveloped countries, where its armoured fighting vehicles may find their normal range of activity seriously curtailed by conditions of climate or terrain. In warfare such as this, cavalry may again come into its own for the time being, and a policy of energetic but judicious raiding may well be highly effective. The hostile lines of communication will be few and precarious—a single line of railway, maybe, or a motor road with many bridges and cuttings, where demolitions may be easy to effect but hard to repair, and their sudden blocking or destruction at the right moment will be of far reaching, perhaps of decisive, effect. Hostile air observation, if it exists at all, will probably be neither close nor continuous, so that the raiders will find it easier to avoid premature discovery; and their objectives, when attained, are likely to be found less heavily guarded and therefore the more easily to be secured.

In fact, in this type of warfare the chances in favour of a raid should usually be greater, the opportunities for it more frequent, and the fruits of success more far reaching; while in the normal course cavalry alone will be available or in a position to undertake such an enterprise.

This study of two little known episodes of the Great War and the lessons to be drawn from them will have served its purpose if it once more directs the thoughts of cavalrymen to the consideration of a field of activity in which, even under the hampering conditions of modern warfare, they may still find opportunity for useful and daring service, well worthy of their arm's historic traditions.

CAVALRY IN INDIA IN THE DAYS OF WELLINGTON AND AFTER

By Thistle

In the general opinion of the world, Wellington is not deemed to have been as great a general as Napoleon. Certainly he never achieved the same great successes either military or political, but it must be born in mind that he did not have the same opportunities. In spite of this he will, however, go down in history as the conqueror of the great Emperor of the French.

His first independent command was that of an army operating in Southern India in the First Mahratta War. Here he commenced his victorious career.

India has always been a country where cavalry has had a tremendous scope for action. From time immemorial, in that land it has ever been possible to raise quickly great numbers of light horse of an indifferent quality. Any ruler who has had the means to pay could hire, or failing even that, personnel could easily be recruited by liberal promises of loot.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the greatest power in India was the Mahratta Confederacy. From small beginnings the Mahrattas had conquered a great portion of India, and the descendant of Timur, who still nominally occupied the throne of Delhi, had become a puppet in the hands of the chiefs of the Mahratta Confederacy.

Originally the Mahratta army had been a purely mounted force. But their chiefs, about the end of the eighteenth century, with the increased revenue that success had placed at their disposal, raised large numbers of regular infantry and artillery. These were trained on European methods, and were officered by European adventurers.

Count de Boigne (a Sardinian) raised and maintained a most efficient regular army for the Maharaja of Gwalior (Scindia); but, fortunately for the British, he had retired with a fortune to Europe before the great struggle for the mastery of India commenced.

His successor, Perron, and the adventurers employed by the other confederate princes, were in no way to be compared with de Boigne either in ability or in reliability. In consequence in the struggle with the British, the Mahratta regular troops suffered from indifferent leading. Nevertheless, the Duke of Wellington wrote: "Their infantry is the best that I have seen in India excepting our own; they and their equipment far surpass Tippu's. I assure you that their fire was so heavy that I much doubted at one time whether I should be able to induce our troops to advance, and all agree that the battle (Assaye) was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India."

In connection with this opinion on the efficiency of the Mahratta regular troops, should be read the following, also written by him:—

> "Scindia's armies had actually been brought to a very favourable state of discipline, and his power had become formidable by the exertions of the European officers in his service; but I think it is much to be doubted whether his power, or rather that of the Mahratta nation, would not have been more formidable, at least to the British Government, if they had never had a European as an infantry soldier, in their service; and had carried on their operations in the manner of the original Mahrattas only by means of cavalry. I have no doubt whatever but that the military spirit of the nation has been destroyed by their establishments of infantry and artillery, possibly, indeed, by other causes; at all events it is certain that those establishments, however formidable, afford us a good object of attack in a war with the Mahrattas, and that the destruction of them contributes to the success of the contest; because, having made them the principal objects of their attention, and that part of their strength on which they place the most reliance,

they became also the principal reliance of the army; and therefore when they are lost the cavalry will not act."

The Mahratta regular battalions and batteries were not recruited from the Mahratta people, but from mercenaries of other Indian races. Wellington's opinion is evidently based on the fact that the value of the original Mahratta armies had been in the mobility of their light horse. As long as it retained its mobility it could not be destroyed except by other light horse of even greater mobility, but in pitched battles it was not a formidable foe. Tied to regular infantry and guns, this irregular horse lost fundamental formidableness. It did not really add to the strength of the regular troops it accompanied.

The Mahrattas, however, did not seem to realise their mounted hordes could not be assimilated in a regular army. In addition to their regular artillery and infantry they continued to maintain great masses of irregular horsemen. At Assaye there are stated to have been some forty thousand of these present, in addition to the twelve thousand regular infantry. At Argaum the force of the irregular horse was nearly as great as it had been before, showing it suffered little from the defeat at Assaye; although the regular Mahratta infantry in Southern India had been, to a great extent, destroyed at that battle. At the same time, in Northern India, there was also great numbers of Mahratta irregular horse. In the battle near Aligarh there were some twenty thousand present; at the battle near Delhi there was also a great number. At Lashwari some five thousand were present.

In May, 1803, Wellington (then Major-General Arthur Wellesley) entered Poona and re-instated the Peishwa on the throne. In the hostilities that followed in Southern India, he achieved three great successes, the storming of Ahmednagar and the victories of Assaye and Argaum.

The cavalry arm was mainly concerned with the two pitched battles, as it, except in the pursuit which followed Argaum, was made little use of in the other operations.

At the battle of Assaye the Kaiba River originally separated the two armies. Wellington found a ford which the enemy had

neglected to occupy, and took advantage of this to cross the river and so turn the Mahratta left flank. He used the Mongol (Hyderabad) and Mysore Horse to cover his own left flank, during this movement. Actually the Mahrattas showed how well trained and mobile was their army by carrying out a change of front without difficulty and forming a new line before the British could deploy. However, Wellington's manœuvre had the object not only of threatening the enemy's flank, but also of avoiding the formidable obstacle of Kailna river in his attack. Another advantage was that the position he gained was to some extent protected on each flank by the rivers the Kailna and the Juah. These streams restricted the field of manœuvre of the Mahratta cavalry, and caused the battle to take place in a comparatively small area, where the Mahrattas could not obtain any real advantage from their great superiority in mounted men.

The battle was begun prematurely by the British infantry advanced "picquets"; these, in consequence of being led against a wrong objective, were not only very severely handled by the Mahratta artillery, but also charged by the Mahratta horse. The British cavalry in a timely attack drove the attackers back, and gave the "picquets" time to reform; but the cavalry suffered very severe casualties in carrying out this task.

A general advance by the main body of the British infantry, resulted in the Mahratta regular infantry, after severe fighting, breaking and fleeing. A second charge by the British cavalry completed the victory, but the horse had by now suffered so many casualties, that no pursuit was undertaken.

Wellington specially mentions his regret at having to launch the cavalry so early in the day; he says that he had intended reserving it for a close pursuit at the close of the day, but that it had been necessary to order the early charge to save the "picquets" and the remains of the 74th Regiment from destruction.

The cavalry took an important part in this battle; and the mutual support of the two arms is well illustrated, not only by the charge at the beginning, which saved the infantry

picquets, but also by the final charge which completed the victory.

At the battle of Argaum, the Moghul (Hyderabad) and Mysore cavalry was placed on the left of Wellington's line; the regular cavalry was echeloned to the rear of the right flank. When the infantry attack commenced, Wellington himself led the regular cavalry against a large body of the enemy horse, which covered by a formidable rocket corps carried on camels, waited the British approach. Wellington halted his cavalry some six hundred yards from the enemy, and brought his galloper guns into action. He ordered the cavalry to charge as soon as the fire of the galloper guns took effect. By this combination of fire and shock, success was quickly attained; and the British cavalry drove the enemy's horsemen of the left wing from the field. Scindia's cavalry, which was on the enemy's right flank, attempted a charge on the left of the British line, but this was driven off. The fighting in this victory fell largely on the infantry, and the cavalry were comparatively fresh for the pursuit. This was carried out efficiently, being even continued by moonlight. As a result of this battle the Mahratta power in the Deccan was broken.

It should be noticed what an important part cavalry played in these actions, and how well the principle of the mutual support of arms was observed. It had the role of the "weaker cavalry" and carried it out admirably. It does not appear to have been called on to carry out long reconnaissances. Wellington relied for information on native intelligence agents, who were quite efficient. Incidently this bears out de Brack, who writes that it was the normal practice of the British cavalry to rely on agents for information, in preference to reconnaissance.

The cavalry of the army, when on the march, moved close to the column, supported by the infantry advance guards, flank guards, and rear guards. It carried out a close but fairly effective form of protective reconnaissance, but it did not attempt anything in the way of independent detached action.

Wellington's cavalry did not shrink from meeting the Mahratta horse in battle, even in vastly superior numbers. In

a general engagement, where it is supported by other arms, numerical inferiority does not make much difference, if superiority in training is marked. But it is a different and difficult task for a small force of cavalry to act independently against vast numbers of irregular horsemen. When regular cavalry operates independently against irregular cavalry, it is apt to be worn out by the lack of a proper objective. There is no formed body that it can bring to battle and defeat; it is continually harassed on the flanks and in the rear, and its communications are so interrupted that it has to depend on foraging for supplies. Unless superior in fire power and equal in mobility it can do little.

The Mahratta light horse was most formidable on detached duty, owing to its vast superiority in numbers, its independence of any organised system of supply, and its general mobility. In a pitched battle of all arms, regular cavalry can strike the enemy who are obliged either to fight or else flee from the battlefield. In case of a reverse the regular cavalry can rally under the support of its infantry, at night it can rest without interruption with infantry protection. It was perhaps difficult for the British cavalry (of which Wellington had only four regular regiments totalling about seventeen hundred), to work in advance of the army. Apart from other considerations the British cavalry of those days was not well trained in reconnaissance. It is true Wellington had, in addition to his regular cavalry, a large number of Mysore, Moghul (Hyderabad) and other irregular horse, which may have numbered ten thousand. But the discipline and training of these units was not really superior to that of the Mahratta cavalry. In fact, as regards the troops of the Hyderabad contingent generally, Wellington was full of complaints.

The auxiliary cavalry therefore did not possess those factors of discipline and training which could compensate for numerical inferiority. When these various circumstances are taken into account, it is perhaps not to be wondered at that little, is heard of cavalry reconnaissance in Wellington's campaigns, one may even think that Wellington was perhaps wise in retaining it for

local protective reconnaissance, and for use in pitched battles. However, in Northern India, Lake's cavalry was in the habit of acting more boldly, Lake, having learnt the use of the arm in Germany, had a bolder conception of its power of independent movement.

Lord Lake was very successful in his campaign against the Mahrattas in Northern India. By a proclamation he induced numbers of the European officers of Scindia's army to leave the Mahratta service, and so weakened the morale of their regular troops. He was a Guards officer of great experience, and had served in the wars on the Continent of Europe and against the rebels in America and Ireland.

He spent some considerable time in training both his British and Indian cavalry on Prussian methods. His experience in the Seven Years' War, serving under the Duke of Brunswick, had given him an acquaintance with Frederic the Great's system of instruction.

His cavalry consisted of eight regiments, three British and five Indian organized in three brigades. The senior brigadier exercised a command of all three brigades, but the cavalry was not organized as a division, and there was no divisional staff. In the preliminary actions Lord Lake himself generally assumed executive command of the cavalry. It is probable that he considered he knew more about handling it, than did the brigadiers. Of course when the main action opened, he had to return to the command of his main army. There were no horse artillery batteries, but each regiment had a couple of galloper guns attached to it. Lake took great interest in the training of these detachments. He is stated to have introduced and perfected the system of galloper guns from which British horse artillery developed.

The campaign was opened by an advance against the Mahratta force commanded by Perron. An action was fought under the walls of Aligarh on which the enemy's right rested; the guns of the fortress were thus able to take part in the action. A swamp made an obstacle in front of the Mahratta line and their left was protected by some villages. The Mahrattas had

present between four and five thousand regular cavalry and a larger number of irregular cavalry. About two thousand infantry also formed part of their army. The British attack on the enemy's left was made by the cavalry (in two lines), supported by the infantry. The obstacle covering the Mahratta front prevented their cavalry from acting effectively against the British flank. The Mahratta cavalry, despite its superiority in numbers, was shaken by the fire of the galloper guns, and a determined charge put it to flight. Perron, protected by his bodyguard, fled to Agra. The fortress of Aligarh, shortly after the battle, fell into the hands of the British.

At Agra, Perron found himself superseded; without the command of a large army he was powerless to dispute this decision. The command of the Mahratta forces passed to an ex-cook named Bourquin. This foolish decision further demoralised the Mahratta forces, and Perron with some of his best officers placed themselves under the protection of the British.

An action with Bourquin's army took place outside Delhi. The battle was opened by an advance of the British cavalry under Lake himself. This demonstrated in front of the Mahrattas and then, after suffering heavy casualties, made a feigned retreat to draw the Mahratta army out of its prepared position. In the fight which followed the British infantry defeated that of the Mahrattas; Delhi, with the last descendant of the Moghuls, passed into the hands of the British.

The high efficiency of the British cavalry is marked in this battle. To carry out a retirement in the presence of a superior force of enemy cavalry is a very difficult feat indeed.

Lake then besieged Agra which, after a stout resistance, fell into his hands.

The Mahratta had made the mistake of allowing their various armies to be defeated in detail, but they had still an army in being. It was commanded by a Mahratta called Abaji: the French officers, disgusted at their treatment by the Mahrattas and tempted by British offers, had now for the most part deserted.

An encounter took place near the village of Laswari. There were still available seventeen regular battalions of Perron's army, some four or five thousand horse with seventy-two guns. The three brigades of cavalry, under Lake himself, came up with these. The Mahrattas were occupying a defensive position, and Lake was afraid they might continue their retreat and escape. He therefore behaved with great boldness. In a preliminary action the British cavalry charged through the Mahratta position; this apparently so shook the morale of the army that it sent plenipotentaries to discuss a surrender. Actually this turned out to be a ruse, and the time thus gained was utilized to prepare a fresh position.

Then followed one of the most severe struggles that has ever taken place in India. In the end the army created by de Boigne was destroyed, but it did not perish without honour. Lord Lake in his despatch wrote "if they had been commanded by French officers the affair would, I fear, have been very doubtful." The British cavalry in this fighting again earned great honour and credit; it marched forty-two miles in less than twenty-four hours and was then hotly engaged from sunrise to sunset. It is however fair to mention the record march of the infantry. This covered sixty-eight miles in forty-eight hours, before going into action. Lake showed himself a cavalry leader and general of no mean ability.

The Gwalior Rajah was now thoroughly beaten, but the Mahratta ruler of Indore was still in arms. He had held aloof during the war with Scindia, but now in 1804 invaded Hindustan. The campaign really opened with Monson's retreat to Agra. Holkar then moved north and started ravishing British territory with his irregular mounted troops. Lake with a cavalry division of six regiments pursued the Mahratta mounted raiders, estimated at sixty thousand, for many days. On the night of the 16th of November Lake surprised the raiders in camp, and completely defeated and dispersed them.

Here again the value of cavalry is clearly shown. Infantry could do nothing against Mahratta marauders. Lord Lake

largely depended on his cavalry, and it took a principal part in all his victories.

The cavalry fighting of the Pindari or Second Mahratta war occurred at a somewhat later date. In this, a cavalry combat on a large scale took place at Ashtee (or Ashta) between a brigade (consisting of one British cavalry regiment and two Indian cavalry regiments with horse artillery) and some ten thousand Mahratta horse. A deep nullah separated the combatants, but about a quarter of the Mahratta horse (under their general Gokla) crossed this nullah, manœuvring in a complete circle across the British front, and attacked the right flank and rear. The death of Gokla (who was a leader of gallantry and distinction), was as instrumental as anything else in bringing about the defeat of this attack; but another contributory cause of failure was that the remainder of the Mahratta horse failed to support the flank attack. If it had done so it must have gone hard with the British. Gokla had fought with Wellington at Assaye and appears to have been the only Mahratta leader with any cavalry talent. This action is remarkable for the fact that leaving numbers out of consideration the advantage of manœuvre appears to have lain with the Mahrattas.

In the General Staff account of the "Mahratta and Pindari War 1817," the following commentary of a Colonel Blacker, who took part in the campaign is quoted on the tactics of the Mahratta horse:—

> "To an eye unaccustomed to large bodies of native horse, in solid though irregular bodies, they must appear a formidable object for the attack of a few squadrons; but a consideration of their composition removes the impression . . . An allusion has already been made to that want of sympathy between the parts of an irregular body which prevents them from depending on the assistance of each other. Its size prevents the attack of a small but compact corps from being other than partially received; and, as an equal part of an irregular body can never stand such a shock, the part menaced must give way. The body, i.e.,

(the native irregular horse) is thus broken and each part acts on the principle of avoiding an exposure to the sole and concentrated brunt of the action ; while the part immediately attacked flies. Did the remainder fall on the rear of the pursuers, the chase must be immediately abandoned ; this, however, would imply a degree of combination, the absence of which is supposed, and the facility with which regular squadrons divide, reassemble, charge, and halt, by a single trumpet sound, keeps each part of the enemy in that constant alarm of being separately attacked, which reduces its efforts to the object of self-preservation."

CHARGE OF 4TH AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE AT BEERSHEBA, 31*st OCTOBER*, 1917.

By Brig.-General W. Grant, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., Australian Military Forces.

On 31st October, 1917, General Allenby opened his offensive with an attack by XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps against the Turkish left flank at Beersheba. The plan provided for XXth Corps to attack during the morning the main Turkish defences between the Khalasa-Beersheba Road and the Wadi es Sabe, *i.e.*, from the west-south-west. (See map.) The tasks allotted to Desert Mounted Corps were to "attack Beersheba from the east so as to envelop the enemy's left rear" and "to seize as much water supply as possible in order to form a base for future operations northwards." A force known as Smith's Group contained the defences north of the Wadi es Sabe, *i.e.*, north-west of Beersheba, while 7th Mounted Brigade performed a like duty south of Beersheba and filled the gap between Desert Mounted Corps and XXth Corps.

Moves to assembly positions were made during night 30-31st October, and, although they entailed long night marches, morning found our troops facing Beersheba on three sides—only the north and north-east being open.

Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division left Asluj at 6 p.m. on 30th *viâ* Thallfa and Iswaiwan and by 8 a.m. on 31st, Divisional Headquarters were established at Khassim Zanna—a march of twenty-four miles. One Brigade of this Division—the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade—took a wider sweep to the east *viâ* Bir Arara.

By 8.30 a.m. the whole Division was in position with 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade on the right north of Bir el

Hamam, in touch with New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade at Bir Salim Abu Irqaiyig, and 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade in reserve behind the New Zealanders.

Australian Mounted Division left Khalasa on the evening of 30th October for Asluj, and then, following in rear of Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, concentrated at Iswaiwin by 9.30 a.m. on 31st—a march of thirty miles. One regiment of 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (11th Light Horse) was moved to the south--west covering the Division and linking with 7th Mounted Brigade.

7th Mounted Brigade reached Goz Itwail es Semin early on 31st October, having marched seventeen miles, and, between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m., gained touch with 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (Australian Mounted Division) on the right and XXth Corps Cavalry Regiment on the left.

A small force of Camel Corps and a few Arab scouts with machine guns and light automatics also left Asluj on 30th, and by the evening of 31st was across the Hebron road thus cutting Beersheba off from Jerusalem.

XXth Corps launched their attack during the morning of 31st October, and, although hindered by dust, had by 1 p.m. captured all the trench systems given as their objectives.

A little after 9 a.m. Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division launched its two leading Brigades to the attack, 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade directed on Bir es Sqati and New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade on Tell es Sabe. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade captured Bir es Sqati and got astride the Hebron road but could not get further. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade could make little progress against Tell es Sabe.

By about 11 a.m. the whole of the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade had been launched on the left of New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade to assist against Tell es Sabe, so that Australian and New Zealand Division were now fully engaged.

At about 1.30 p.m. Australian Mounted Division were ordered to send one Brigade to assist Australian and New Zealand Division. The leading brigade—3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade—was sent. This left only 4th Australian Light

Horse Brigade with the Australian Mounted Division, as 5th Mounted Brigade were held back at Iswaiwin as Corps Reserve.

Shortly after 3 p.m. the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade captured Tell es Sabe but could get no further. Ist Australian Light Horse Brigade on their left was ordered to push on to the final objective—point 1020 north-east of Beersheba to the Mosque—but they also made little progress.

4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, which I commanded, was resting and feeding horses behind the Khassim Zanna ridge, about six miles east of Beersheba and half a mile from Desert Mounted Corps Headquarters. One regiment of the Brigade—11th Australian Light Horse—was deployed to the south-west watching the left flank of the Division and linking up with 7th Mounted Brigade near Goz Itwail es Selim.

From a hill near Corps H.Qs. I had been watching Australian and New Zealand Division's attack for some hours. I could see transport moving north-east from Beersheba and I formed the opinion that the Turk was fighting to delay our advance until dark, when he would slip away.

At about 4 p.m. Major-General Hodgson, who commanded Australian Mounted Division, came up to me and said: "It is your turn to go in Grant. Come and see the Corps Commander." I went with him to Corps H.Q. and General Chauvel said: "Go right in and take the town before dark." At the same time he pointed out the direction of attack. The B.G.G.S. Corps (Brig.-General R. C. H. Howard Vyse) then pointed out on the map where Anzac Division were attacking and directed that the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade should move on the left of that Division, *i.e.*, south of the Khassim Zanna-Beersheba road.

Although the Corps Commander did not definitely use the words "mounted attack" all concerned knew that no cavalry obstacles existed in front of the Turkish trenches.

As time was limited quick decisions, verbal orders and a simple plan for a direct attack with quick fire support on the most dangerous opposition were needed. I therefore decided that a mounted attack was the only way to carry out the Corps Commander's orders.

I realised that I would have to act quickly as only a little over an hour of daylight remained. I pointed out that 11th Australian Light Horse were detached and I would consequently be one regiment short. I was told that 5th Mounted Brigade in Corps Reserve would send up the Warwicks to follow 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, in case I could not get 11th Australian Light Horse collected in time.

I then sent orders to 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment to concentrate and follow the Brigade, and I ordered the Brigade to saddle up and move forward under seconds in commands of regiments following guides whom I would drop to direct them.

I sent off the Brigade Intelligence Officer and his scouts to find covered ways forward. Then with the C.Os. of 4th and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiments, the Brigade Major and four orderlies, I galloped forward to reconnoitre a position of assembly and a covered approach to it. I had seen 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade shelled as they advanced down the ridge and I wanted to avoid the same fate. I dropped in turn three orderlies to guide the regiments forward.

After picking a position of deployment, about where the 1,100 ft. contour crosses the Iswaiwin-Beersheba road, I divided it, putting the 4th Australian Light Horse on the right and 12th Australian Light Horse on the left. I explained that I wanted a mounted attack and that the regiments were to advance roughly along the Wadi Shegeib Kebir right into Beersheba. Regiments were to be in column of squadrons at three hundred yards distance, the leading squadrons to be extended to four yards and reserve squadrons in line of troop columns. Men were to carry bayonets in their hands. (We had often discussed weapons for mounted attacks and I had decided that bayonets were best used that way as we had no swords. If the bayonets were fixed on the rifles there was a danger of a mounted man losing both.) One Sub-Section (two guns) of 4th Australian Machine Gun Squadron was allotted to each regiment and followed in rear for subsequent supporting rôles.

There was not sufficient time for reconnaissance and move-

ment of fire units to produce fire from a flank to assist the attack on the first objective, *i.e.*, the Turkish trenches.

Fire from artillery in rear of the attacking regiments would have been long range and owing to the pace of a mounted attack must have been stopped when most needed. The range was too great for machine guns.

Fire from flanking troops already in action, even if it could have been diverted from its own tasks, must have meant delay while it was being arranged.

No supporting fire was therefore put down on the objective, but available fire was used to stop enemy flanking positions from enfilading the attack. The available fire consisted of Notts Battery, R.H.A., and 4th M.G. Squadron (less one section).

Each troop had its own Hotchkiss gun which accompanied it, and two sub-sections of M.Gs. were also sent forward for close support and initial consolidation.

After getting their orders the two C.Os. rode back to meet their regiments, and as I saw, some distance to the left, a patrol of 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment, the Brigade Major rode over to send it off with an order to hasten the concentration of that regiment.

While he was away my orderly and I were fired on from a trench on Hill 1180, N.E. of Ras Ghannam at about 1,500 yards, giving confirmation that this trench might cause trouble as the attack passed it.

Just as the Brigade reached the position of deployment, I received a message from the Warwicks that they were not coming. I then rode over to 12th Regiment and ordered them to send their reserve squadron with the M.G. Squadron (less one section) which was to protect the left flank of the Brigade from the enemy on Hill 1180.

The regiments advanced from their position of deployment shortly after 4.30 p.m., moving at the trot, Brigade H.Q. following.

Two enemy planes passed over and dropped bombs and then returned flying low and using machine guns. Little damage was done except to horses of the Brigade Signal Troop. This resulted in difficulty later in establishing communications.

Enemy artillery opened rapid fire as we advanced, but most shells went over our heads.

The enemy on Hill 1180 opened M.G. fire on the flank of Brigade and our M.G. Squadron came into action against them.

Major Harrison, O.C. Notts Battery, was with me at point of Deployment, and I asked him to open fire. His guns were ready and he opened at once, and with his second shot found the target. The Turks then stopped firing, and M.G. Squadron and Reserve Squadron of 12th then pushed on towards Beersheba, following 4th and 12th Regiments.

The 11th Regiment had now arrived and I ordered it with Notts Battery and "A" Battery, H.A.C., to push on into the town.

When I received a report that the trenches in front of the town had been taken I ordered 4th and 12th Regiments to push right through the town and capture as many prisoners as possible. They captured 9 field guns, 4 machine guns and about 700 prisoners.

At about 7.30 p.m. I ordered 11th Regiment to go through the town and hold it against counter attacks from the north-west and south-west. This regiment captured a further 400 prisoners as they went forward.

I then withdrew 4th and 12th Regiments to re-organise, and afterwards established a line with 4th Regiment on right and 11th Regiment on left, with 12th Regiment in reserve. Both artillery batteries occupied positions to support the forward regiments. These positions were held until morning when 5th Mounted Brigade relieved us.

The enemy had not had time to destroy the wells and these fell into our hands.

The 4th L.H. Brigade had at the second battle of Gaza made a long dismounted attack with two regiments and had suffered nearly two hundred casualties without achieving any satisfactory result, and I was coming to the conclusion that better results might be achieved with mounted attacks provided there were suitable opportunities. On this occasion the Brigade had only 64 casualties, and it captured nearly 1,200 prisoners, 10 guns, 5 machine guns, and quantities of stores and animals.

1:125,000

from Hebron



were suitable opportunities. On this occasion the Brigade had only 64 casualties, and it captured nearly 1,200 prisoners, 10 guns, 5 machine guns, and quantities of stores and animals.

It is of interest to note that of the 64 casualties half were killed. These occurred in the hand-to-hand fighting about the trenches, while most of the wounded fell before the trenches were reached.

Surprise was a big factor in the success of this attack, and it was facilitated by the following considerations :—

(*a*) Although there had been one or two regimental mounted attacks earlier in the campaign, mounted attacks on a large scale had not been attempted and mounted attacks were not part of the regular tactics of the Australian Light Horse.

(*b*) Mounted Brigades had been launched into dismounted attacks all through the day and the Turks probably thought that any further attacks would be dismounted.

(c) The attention of the defenders was drawn to the dismounted attacks against Tel es Sabe, and the mounted attack was on them before they realised it. It was found after the attack that no rifle sights were below 800 metres.

(*d*) As daylight was drawing to a close the Turks probably did not anticipate any further attacks, certainly not a swift mounted attack.

(*e*) Some of the Turkish trenches were sited to face south down the Wadi Abu Shaii, and a mounted attack across the plain took these trenches partly in flank. The trenches were not wired.

There is little doubt also that the morale of the Beersheba garrison had been lowered by the success of XXth Corps and by the repeated dismounted attack of Australian and New Zealand Division, so that the troops still in position were hoping for darkness to cover their withdrawal. This mounted attack was, therefore, an example of the use of a mobile reserve to bring a dismounted attack to a definite decision and to hasten the ultimate intention of the defenders.

CROMWELL AS A CAVALRY LEADER

By Colonel Frederick Gilbert Bauer, JAG-Res.

(*By permission of "U.S.A. Cavalry Journal."*)

"Even when surrounded by all the turmoil of a cavalry fight, Cromwell never lost his presence of mind or his control over his troops . . . He knew when to dare, when to forbear."

I

It is unfortunate that there is so little in print which treats the battles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from the viewpoint of modern military science, for most of the great commanders of that period were not only well schooled in the art of war, but had had plenty of practical experience, so that their applications of military principles can teach us lessons which, in spite of the development of weapons, are far from obsolete, and a cavalry officer who wishes to learn how to use to the best advantage the peculiar characteristics of his arm can derive great benefit from studying how Cromwell led his Ironsides.

This paper deals only with Cromwell's career down to the close of the First Civil War in 1646, during which period he was a cavalry officer pure and simple, his command increasing from one troop at Edgehill to the entire cavalry of the New Model Army at Naseby. His later career is equally worthy of study, but then he was in chief command of a force of all arms and responsible for its proper tactical and strategic use, whereas in the earlier period, though his voice came to have great weight in the councils of war and he was the leading spirit as well as the ablest officer of the New Model Army, he was essentially a

subordinate, responsible only for leading his own troops, even when on detached service, and not for the strategy and tactics of the army as a whole.

II

Englishmen of Cromwell's generation had had but little actual war experience. Since the end of the Wars of the Roses in 1485 there had been no disturbance in England of sufficient magnitude to merit the name of war, and Scottish border wars ceased with the accession of James I in 1603. So well did the navy prove itself the first line of defence in 1589 that the land forces mobilized to meet the Spanish Armada had seen no actual service. Such experience, therefore, as the men who took up arms in 1642 possessed had been obtained in Ireland, in the (usually unsuccessful) expeditionary forces which the Stuarts had raised, or in the Thirty Years' War, which was then drawing to a close on the continent. The veterans of this war occupied in 1642 much the same position as that which the veterans of our own War with Mexico occupied in 1861. Indeed, except for the fact that the two parties were not divided on geographical lines, the military situation in the English Civil War closely resembled that in our own Civil War. The royalists, including most of the nobility and landed gentry and their retainers, represented the South, and the parliamentary party, including the great middle class and the towns, represented the North. Like the North they controlled the navy, the capital, the machinery of the central government, and the industrial, commercial and financial centres. Like the North also, they suffered in the early days from poorer cavalry, inferior generalship and political interference in military matters, until they took the one man whom the royalists had been unable to beat, and put him in virtual control, as the North did General Grant. Indeed, a careful comparison of the English Civil War with our own will show that the parallelism can be carried much further.

III

In 1642 England's military system was in a state of transition from the feudal array of the middle ages to the standing

army of modern times, which had its origin in Cromwell's New Model. Though the feudal system was not abolished by law until 1660, the growing power of the Tudor monarchy had led to the establishment of a county militia system under a lord lieutenant. This system was the model and parent of the militia system which prevailed in most parts of this country until after the War of 1812 and, having a territorial, social and political background, was of limited military value. In London and probably some other large towns the train bands were well drilled and equipped, but elsewhere they had little training and cut no figure in the war.

One survival of feudalism was that cavalry, not infantry, was still the basic arm. This was partly due to the inefficiency of the infantry, half of whom in 1642 were still armed with pikes 16 to 18 feet long, although by the end of the war the proportion of pikemen had dropped to one-third. The musketeers were armed with matchlocks, which throughout our period were fired from a rest, swords for close combat, and frequently "Swedish feathers"—iron shod stakes which were set in the ground at an angle to check a cavalry charge and hold the horsemen under musket fire. Wheel-lock and flint-lock guns were gradually coming into use but were not general in the infantry during our period. Infantry was drawn up in ten ranks, the pikemen in the centre files, the musketeers on the flanks, and when several companies were united in a regiment or brigade the formation was the same as that of a single company, all the pikemen being assembled in the centre and all the musketeers on the flanks of each unit, as will be seen in the picture of the Battle of Naseby. The interval between files and distance between ranks varied from one and one-half to twelve feet, three feet being the normal interval and distance in battle, which permitted each rank to fire in turn and retire through the interval to reload. Although the formation was unwieldy, it was capable of manoeuvre, as is proved by Cromwell's causing Manchesters' infantry to make successfully two ninety-degree changes of direction during the Battle of Marston Moor, in order to meet successive bodies of the enemy. Under a less capable leader than Cromwell, however, the infantry part of

a battle, after the first discharge of musketry, frequently developed into little more than a pushing contest.

Cavalry wore cuirasses of which the breastplate was musket proof and the back piece pistol proof and were armed with a brace of pistols and a long sword having a blade resembling that of our latest model cavalry sabre and a half basket hilt with an additional guard shaped like the f-hole in a violin. Although this sword is shown in all the pictures of the period, it must be remembered that these represent officers. In view of the close relations with Scotland, the unprecedented demand for weapons and the greater simplicity of manufacture and consequent less cost, it seems to me quite probable that a sword like the Scotch claymore, whose sturdier blade would have been more effective against men in armour, was used by many of the rank and file. Although it is commonly stated that there were no lancers in the English army at this time, this is disproved by a letter of Cromwell dated July, 1642, in the Squire Papers, probably addressed to some committee of the Eastern Association, wherein he speaks of having sent them "300 lances." In view of the fact that the pike was still the shock weapon of the infantry, it seems highly improbable that the lance, the chief shock weapon of medieval cavalry, should have passed out of use, particularly as it was still used in Scotland. Although Gustavus Adolphus had begun to use cavalry in modern fashion, troopers were in the early part of the war still armed with carbines, and mounted fire action was of frequent use. Indeed, one of Cromwell's great contributions to cavalry tactics was the development of shock action to replace mounted fire action.

Horsemanship had reached a higher degree of proficiency, but the charge was commonly made at the trot, and chief reliance placed on firearms, the sword being a weapon for individual close combat as in the infantry, a usage inherited from the feudal cavalry. The usual formation was in six ranks, and the charge was boot to boot. Cromwell himself was a great lover of horses and taught his men to give their mounts the best of care and to lie with them on the ground when necessary.

Each company of infantry and cavalry had its own colour, so when we read in the contemporary accounts of so many

"colours" of horse or foot, we must understand so many companies.

Artillery had progressed but little beyond the stage it had reached when Drake faced the Spanish Armada. The guns were elevated by means of wedges, and the windage between the projectile and the bore was so great that in open warfare the chief value of the guns must have been for moral effect upon raw or shaken troops. Artillery was, however, useful in breaching fortifications, as had been demonstrated a century and a half earlier in Ferdinand's war against the Moors of Spain, and even in the open field it did cause casualties, as witness the death at Marston Moor of Colonel Walton's son, whose leg was broken by a "cannon shot." In open warfare it was customary to place batteries of two or three guns in the intervals between the foot regiments.

IV

At the outbreak of hostilities parliament decided to raise 75 troops of cavalry of 60 men each, beside infantry and artillery, and Oliver Cromwell became captain of Troop 67, contributing largely from his own means toward its cost. His baptism of fire was at Edgehill in Warwickshire, October 23, 1642, where the two armies showed about as much military skill and discipline as was displayed at First Bull Run. Cromwell's part in the battle seems to have been small. He is named as one of a list of officers who "never stirred from their troops, but they and their troops fought till the last minute." How he learned to train and command his troop so that it escaped the general demoralisation which overtook the parliamentary cavalry we do not know. Viscount Morley (p.118) says that he had a Dutch officer teach him drill. This appears to be based on a statement in the Squire Papers that a Dutchman named Bose was drillmaster in the regiment which Cromwell later raised in the Eastern Association, and does not account for his military ability and intuition at the time of Edgehill—an abilty which not only enabled him to keep control of his troop but to discover the two great faults which appeared in that battle—the royalist's lack of control and failure to keep out

a reserve and the poor quality of the parliamentary cavalry. Where he obtained this insight must remain an unsolved problem. Born in 1599, his life hitherto had been that of a simple country squire. Since the English militia, like our own militia, was organised on territorial and social lines, the probability is that he had been connected with it, but, as stated above, it could have given him little military knowledge of value. Though there were English accounts of Gustavus Adolphus's campaigns and books on military science, there is, so far as I can ascertain, no hint in any contemporary document that Cromwell had ever read any of them. We have, therefore, the case, almost if not quite unparalleled in history, of a man forty-three years old, without previous military training, entering upon the profession of arms, and after a military career of but nine years, not only leaving "a name at which the world grew pale" as one of the great generals of all time, but having created the most remarkable army of modern times, an army which was never defeated.

V

Napoleon said that in warfare moral force is to physical as four to one, and Earl Roberts (Preface to *From Cromwell to Wellington*) said that Cromwell taught that the most efficient army is one of self-respecting men of exemplary character, well paid and well treated, for "History proves that there is no more potent force in war than a belief in the justice of one's cause and in its being favoured by the Almighty." Macaulay, by no means a partisan of Cromwell, is even stronger in his praise of Cromwell and his troops, saying (Hist. Eng. Chap. I):

> "Other leaders have maintained order as strict. Other leaders have inspired their followers with a zeal as ardent. But in his camp alone the most rigid discipline was found in company with the fiercest enthusiasm. His troops moved to victory with the precision of machines while burning with the wildest fanaticism of crusaders. From the time when the army was remodelled to the time when it was disbanded, it never found, either in the British Isles, or on the continent, an enemy who could stand its onset."

The dynastic wars of the continent had been fought by professional soldiers, many of them hired foreigners, who had little personal interest in their cause, except for the pay and booty it gave them. Their system of marches and leaguers was calculated less to win a decisive victory than to avoid a defeat, for, so long as they could keep the field, the longer the war lasted, the better for them. Cromwell's soldiers were citizens who wished to return to peaceful pursuits. To conquer a peace as soon as possible was their goal, and hence they sought rather than avoided battle and cheerfully risked defeat for the chance of a victory which would end or shorten the war. This was an advance over the prevailing tactics on the Continent, although here too Gustavus Adolphus had set an example, and marks the definite introduction into modern warfare of the doctrines of the offensive and the objective.

Cromwell's letters of the first year of the war (Carlyle, Letters XIII and XVI and Speech XI) show that he had not only learned the truth of Napoleon's maxim quoted above but had thoroughly grasped four great military principles of universal application and a fifth of importance under the conditions then existing:

1. The necessity of having officers who can command the respect of their men. ("If you choose honest men to be Captains of Horse, honest men will follow them.")

2. The superiority of intelligent soldiers of high character. ("You must get men . . . of a spirit that is likely to go as far as gentlemen will go—or else you will be beaten still." "A few honest men are better than numbers.")

3. The necessity of training raw levies before using them in the field. ("Some time they must have for exercise.")

4. The important part which the "cavalry spirit" plays in the efficiency of a mounted command.

5. The superiority of cavalry over infantry under such conditions as existed in the English Civil War.

VI

For some weeks after Edgehill we know little of Cromwell's movements, and our next glimpse of him is in his home district

where the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Hertford, Cambridge, and later Huntingdon joined to form the Eastern Association for the purpose of raising troops for their own defence and secondarily for general service. From the outset Cromwell, though not the titular head of the Association, was its leading spirit and was given command of a regiment of horse in its forces. His letters of this period show his ability as an organiser and executive under the financial difficulties which beset the parliamentary forces and his realisation of the importance of having men properly fed and clothed and promptly paid, if they be efficient soldiers.

On March 14th, 1643, he made a forced march of twenty miles with eight troops of cavalry and dragoons from Norwich to Lowestoff and summoned the royalist garrison to surrender. On this being refused, the Norwich dragoons captured two of the three pieces of artillery which defended the town and opened a way for the cavalry who entered without resistance. Herein may be seen the germ of Cromwell's method of capturing fortifications. Instead of resorting to the lengthy leaguers and sieges of the Thirty Years' War, he, whenever possible, depended on a sudden assault.

We next find him trying in vain to bring about concerted action with parliamentary commanders in Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Lincolnshire, to head off Newcastle's army, his acts showing that he well understood the principle of the objective and that the best defence of a territory is to meet the enemy and keep him from approaching it.

His entire regiment fought its first battle at Grantham on May 3th, 1643. He had under him " about twelve troops, whereof some of them so poor and broken that you shall seldom see worse," the royalists "one and twenty colours of horse troops and three or four of dragoons." " After we had stood a little above musket shot, the one body from the other, and the dragoons had fired on both sides for the space of half an hour or more, they not advancing towards us, we agreed to charge them. . . . They standing firm to receive us, and our men charging fiercely upon them, by God's providence they were immediately routed, and ran all away, and we had the execution of them two

or three miles." (Carlyle, Letter X. Lieutenant Colonel Baldock (p. 77) is of opinion that this action taught Cromwell the value of the offensive in a cavalry combat. At any rate, he says, Cromwell thereafter never hesitated but was always the first to charge. The fact that Cromwell's newly raised troopers in what, for many of them at least, was their first battle had routed a superior force of royalist horse gave him prestige and justified his views on the kind of men needed for the parliamentary cavalry.

His next important engagement was near Gainsborough, July 28th, 1643. We have three accounts of the battle, all wholly or partly written by Cromwell himself. (Carlyle, Letter XII and Appendix 5.) Gainsborough had been captured by the parliamentary forces through a surprise night attack, and in anticipation of a royalist attempt to recover it Cromwell hastened to its defence by forced marches, with a body of cavalry and dragoons, augmented by reinforcements on the way. About a mile and a half from the town he met the royalist advance guard of some 100 horse. His dragoons, who seem to have constituted his advance guard, tried to repel the royalists by mounted fire action, but the royalist horse charged them, whereupon Cromwell's cavalry charged the enemy advance guard and drove it back on the main body, which was posted on top of a steep hill, the only practicable ascent of which was by trails leading through cony warrens which covered the slope. Cromwell's troops made their way up under the enemy's fire, and on reaching the top found the enemy drawn up within musket shot, three regiments of horse in the front line and one in reserve. Before Cromwell's troops, who were disorganised by having had to fight their way up the hill through the broken ground, could be formed in line to attack, the royalists advanced against them. Instead, however, of waiting to receive the attack, Cromwell, without waiting to complete his formation, charged at once with such troopers as he had, he himself leading the right wing. For a time neither line gave way, but finally the royalists wavered, and Cromwell, seizing the fleeting opportunity, broke their line, and his men pursued them for six miles. Seeing the royalist reserve intact, however, he kept out of the pursuit three

troops of his own regiment and when the royalist reserve charged some Lincolnshire troops which had not joined in the pursuit, he fell on them in the rear and drove them all from the field.

Thinking their work done for the time being, the parliamentary forces exerted themselves in carrying into the town the munitions they had brought, when word came that six troops of royalist horse and about 300 foot were a mile and a half beyond the town. Having no infantry with him, Cromwell borrowed some from the garrison, and they with his cavalry beat back the royalist detachments, when they suddenly found themselves face to face with Newcastle's main army. which at once attacked and drove them back in disorder. Cromwell himself, who was in the town when this occurred, went out to withdraw the infantry but found the entire force being driven in, whereupon he rallied four of his own and four Lincolnshire troops under Major Whalley and Captain Ayscough, who "sometimes the one with four troops faced the enemy, sometimes the other . . . . they with this handful forced the enemy so, and dared them to their teeth in at the least eight or nine several removes —the enemy following at their heels; and they, though their horses were exceedingly tired, retreating in order, near carbine shot of the enemy, who thus followed them, firing upon them; Colonel Cromwell gathering up the main body and facing them behind these two lesser bodies—that in despite of the Enemy, we brought off our Horse in this order, without the loss of two men." Here, then, we have Cromwell, with tired troops and horses, disordered by a struggle up hill over broken ground, charging successfully a force already formed for attack, holding out a reserve from the pursuit and with it defeating the enemy's reserve, and later with two squadrons of four troops each, covering successfully the withdrawal of a repulsed force, retiring by echelon in the face of a body far superior in numbers, and bringing all to safety with only a nominal loss. The Command and General Staff School could hardly do better, and this feat is the more remarkable because, according to Sir John W. Fortescue (p. 32), the withdrawal by echelon is not described in any contemporary military textbook. Where did Cromwell get the idea?

October 11th, 1643, two cavalry forces of about equal strength faced each other on Bolingbroke Hill in Lincolnshire. Each was drawn up in three lines, Cromwell commanding the first line of the parliamentary troops, who were "extremely wearied with hard duty two or three dayes together." Both sides threw forward their dragoons, who dismounted and opened fire. Here as at Gainsborough Cromwell seized the initiative and charged the royalists, leading the charge in person, some distance ahead of his regiment.

His horse was shot under him, but a trooper caught him another, and he rejoined the fight. While the mêlée was going on, the parliamentary second line charged the royalists on the flank, and the entire royalist force, driven back on its reserve, broke and fled before the parliamentary third line could join in the attack and before the parliamentary infantry arrived on the field. Here we have an attack in successive waves, the first holding the enemy in place while the second strikes him in flank, a device which, as we shall see, Cromwell used elsewhere with decisive effect. This engagement, known as the Battle of Winceby, proved Cromwell a *leader* as well as a commander, his fearless exposure of himself in front of his men ranking with Washington's at Kip's Bay and Princeton.

VII

The first year of the war may be considered the training school period of Cromwell's military career. In it he had not only proved his ability as a cavalry organiser, leader and disciplinarian but he had shown himself the only leader on the parliamentary side who was uniformly aggressive and successful. England was wearying of the war, and the Puritan party demanded a more vigorous policy under more aggressive leaders. this at once pointed out Colonel Cromwell as a man for high command, and so when the army of the Eastern Association was reorganised in the winter of 1643-4 he was made Lieutenant General. This made him second in command under the Earl of Manchester and gave him direct command of the cavalry.

We now come to the first of the two great battles, Marston Moor and Naseby, which were to show Cromwell to the world as

one of the great cavalry leaders of all time. In September, 1643, Scotland and the Puritans of England had entered into the Solemn League and Covenant, in accordance with which a Scottish army, some 20,000 strong, under the Earl of Leven, entered England to assist the parliamentary forces. In the early spring of 1644 the Marquis of Newcastle had been shut up in York by a parliamentary force, and to relieve him and repel the Scottish army advancing under Leven, Prince Rupert, the king's nephew, was sent into Yorkshire. Neither the king nor parliament understood the principles of mass and economy of force, and both sent off on unimportant missions men who should have been sent into Yorkshire, where it was evident that the decisive battle of the campaign would be fought. Cromwell had thrown out a cavalry screen of nearly 7,000 men, behind which Manchester was slowly advancing to join in the siege of York, but on hearing of Rupert's advance he drew in his forces and took post near the village of Long Marston, five miles west of York. The parliamentary generals before York decided to raise the siege and join Cromwell, and accordingly the combined forces were drawn up on Marston Moor to meet Rupert and prevent him from making a junction with Newcastle. Rupert, however, retained them by a demonstration, reached York and persuaded the royalist commanders there to make a combined advance. The parliamentary generals decided to fall back to the line of the Ouse, and early on July 2nd the retreat began, Cromwell and Fairfax bringing up the rear, but before the rear of the column had started Rupert's advance guard reached Marston Moor, and the parliamentarians countermarched and formed line of battle.

The main features of the battle which followed are well established, but on those details which are of most value to a student of tactics the accounts differ. The combined labours, however, of Lieutenant Colonel Hoenig of the German Army, who has analysed the facts from a military point of view, and of Mr. C. H. Firth, who has re-examined and sifted the historical data, have given us a picture of the battle which may safely be accepted as correct, so far as the facts are ascertainable, and that version is the one here followed.

Marston Moor is between one and a half and two miles from east to west and a mile from north to south. The royalists were drawn up on its northern side, facing south, with Wilstrop Wood behind their centre. In their front was open ground suit able for manoeuvreing large bodies of cavalry, and somewhere near their centre was a piece of enclosed ground called the White Syke Close. Along the southern edge of the moor ran a ditch known as the White Syke Ditch, just north of and parelleling the road from the village of Long Marston on the east to Tockwith on the west, a distance of about two miles. South of the road the ground rose, and in a grain field on this hillside the parliamentary forces were drawn up facing north. There was a hedge between the two forces, probably on the edge of the ditch, though there is a slight discrepancy on this point. For offensive combat the advantages were all with the royalists, because the parliamentary forces, in order to advance, had to cross the ditch and hedge, which Rupert had lined with musketeers, and, in places at least, the ditch was too wide to be jumped, whereas the royalists had no obstacles in front and could attack the parliamentarians while the latter were disordered in crossing the ditch and hedge. That only the royalist left took advantage of this feature of the terrain was due to the fact that the parliamentary attack took the royalists so by surprise that the line had crossed the ditch before the royalists were in a position to attack.

As usual, both armies were drawn up with the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the flanks. The cavalry on the royalist right, commanded by Prince Rupert, was formed into two lines, 100 men in the first and 800 in the second. The exposed flank was guarded by a regiment of about 200, and Rupert's own regiment of 400 to 500 guarded the interval between the cavalry and the infantry centre. In numbers and formation the cavalry of the left under Goring was similar, except that there was no body corresponding to Rupert's regiment. On both flanks musketeers in companies of 50 were posted behind the first line of cavalry so as to be able to fire through the intervals between the squadrons—a device copied from Gustavus Adolphus which Rupert is said to have used also at

Naseby, though Rushworth's picture does not show it. The infantry was drawn up in three lines, with an advance detachment, or "forlorn hope" in front of its right where the ground was most favourable to an attack.

On the parliamentary right Sir Thomas, son of Lord Fairfax, drew up his cavalry in two lines, but the first line contained some raw levies, who did not behave well in battle. His reserve, which may have been posted in a third line, consisted of three Scotch regiments and some Scotch lancers. His total force was about 2,800. The infantry was drawn up in three divisions of two lines each, that of the Eastern Association under Manchester being on the left opposite the place where the royalist "forlorn hope" was posted. The cavalry of the left wing under Cromwell was formed in three lines, his own Eastern Association cavalry, numbering 2,000 to 2,500, forming the first two and three badly mounted Scotch regiments, numbering about 800, the third. On the exposed flank were Frizell's half regiment of Scotch dragoons and probably also the Eastern Association dragoons, making 800 to 1,000 in all. Cromwell's own cavalry was formed into squadrons of two or three troops.

The royalist army totalled 11,000 foot and 6,500 to 7,500 horse, the parliamentary army 19,000 or 20,000 foot and 7,000 horse.

For several hours the two armies faced each other without advancing, the artillery exchanging occasional shots and the Puritans singing the battle hymns of Israel's poet king and listening to exhortations of their chaplains. At intervals showers drenched the troops. At the end of the afternoon the royalist leaders made up their minds there would be no battle that day and began to relax. Suddenly, toward evening, the hour being variously stated at from five to seven o'clock, the royalists looked up to see the entire parliamentary line in motion against them, Manchester's infantry already crossing the ditch and Cromwell's horsemen moving around its west end.

Watson, Cromwell's scoutmaster, thus describes the attack:

> "We came down the hill in the bravest order, and with the greatest resolution that ever was seen (I mean the left wing of horse led by Cromwell) . . . Our front divisions of

horse charged their front. Lieutenant General Cromwell's division of 300, in which himselfe was in person, charged the first division of Prince Rupert's, in which himselfe was in person. The rest of ours charged other divisions of theirs, but with such admirable valour as it was the astonishment of all the old soldiers of the army. Cromwell's own division had a hard pull of it; for they were charged by Rupert's bravest men, both in front and flank; they stood at sword's point a pretty while, hacking one another; but at last (it so pleased God) he brake through them, scattering them before him like a little dust. At the same instant the rest of our horse of that wing had wholly broken all Prince Rupert's horse on their right wing, and were in chase of them beyond their left wing."

The "Full Relation" (p. 9) says that the dragoons "acted their part so well that at the first assault they beat the enemy from the ditch." Hoenig thinks that Cromwell had part of his cavalry cross the ditch and the rest go around it. Though there is no contemporary mention of such a manoeuvre, it will be noted that it is entirely consistent with Watson's account. If the attack of the dragoons preceded Cromwell's charge, it is hard to see why the royalists were so taken unawares. Royalist writers state that Lord Bryon, who commanded the regiment on the extreme right of their front line, attacked contrary to orders and was himself caught in the broken ground by the charging Puritans. However these details may have been, it is certain that Cromwell's charge broke Rupert's first line eventually, and the Prince, rallying what he could of them, attacked at the head of his second line. Though checked, Cromwell's men did not break, and just then the second line, under David Leslie, which had followed the first, echeloned to the left, struck Rupert's right flank, thus repeating the manoeuvre at Winceby. Though wounded, Cromwell kept the field and now led a charge which drove Rupert's men from the field. In his own words. "God made them as stubble to our swords." Here again we see his control of his men, for, sending certain squadrons to pursue Rupert's troopers, he held the main body in formation and faced to the east to assist the infantry.

Manchester's infantry, on the left of the parliamentary centre, crossed the ditch, which was more or less filled up in their front, and drove back the royalists opposite them. Lord Fairfax's infantry, next them on the right, advanced, but were driven from the field by Newcastle's Whitecoats. Their defeat and that of the cavalry on the parliamentary right uncovered both flanks of the Scotch infantry, who broke and fled except five regiments, who stood their ground and repelled three royalist charges.

On the parliamentary right wing things had gone even worse. With the exception of some 400 troopers, whom Sir Thomas Fairfax succeeded in forming on the open ground and with them routing a part of the royalist left, the entire wing was hopelessly routed. One division of Goring's men attacked the right of the Scotch infantry, and the rest either chased the flying parliamentary horse or set to plundering the baggage in the Puritan camp. When Sir Thomas Fairfax returned from the pursuit, he found royalist cavalry on the ground his own troops had occupied. His small detachment broke before them, and he himself, wounded, made his way across the field to report the disaster to Cromwell.

Cromwell and Leslie had reformed their men on the ground north of where the royalist right had been, and on learning of the disaster on the parliamentary right, Cromwell ordered the entire Eastern Association army to wheel to the right and advance across the field to the east, while he with the horse fell upon the troopers attacking the Scotch infantry and such others of Goring's men as had returned from the pursuit. The positions of the forces were now reversed, Cromwell occupying the favourable ground which Goring had held at the beginning and Goring's men advancing through the same "whins and ditches" which had broken up Sir Thomas Fairfax's formations. Disordered as they were, and on unfavourable ground, they were easily routed by Cromwell's disciplined squadrons, who now, in the words of the Full Relation, "set upon the reare of their foot and with the assistance of our main battell (The Eastern Association infantry), which all this time stood firme, we put them wholly to the route." Newcastle's Whitecoats stood

their ground in the White Syke Close until all were killed. The Puritans lost 1,000 killed, the royalists 3,000 killed and 1,600 prisoners. Lieutenant Colonel Hoenig says that no cavalry leader ever accomplished so great and varied tasks with so small as force as did Cromwell in this battle. He had defeated in succession all the elements of the royalist force, except the few cavalry routed by Sir Thomas Fairfax and the division of infantry defeated by the Eastern Association foot. It was after this battle that Rupert called Cromwell an Ironside or Ironsides—a name afterward used for his troops. It was his first major battle and established his men's reputation for battle efficiency and his own as the ablest troop leader on the parliamentary side. At Marston Moor Cromwell and Rupert faced each other, and the result showed Cromwell's superiority in troop leadership. Said Clarendon:—

> "That difference was observed shortly from the beginning of the war: that though the King's troops prevailed in the charge, and routed those they charged, they never rallied themselves again in order, nor could be brought to make a second charge again the same day, whereas Cromwell's troops if they prevailed, or though they were beaten and routed, presently rallied again and stood in good order till they received new orders."

VIII.

Marston Moor should have taught the parliamentary leaders the principle of the objective, for their victory forced York to surrender on July 15, but instead of combining to follow Rupert and attack the army commanded by the King in person, they divided to reduce minor posts still held by the royalists. In the south the King had been successful, and an Eastern Association force under Manchester met him near Newbury October 26, 1644. A turning movement was planned, but Manchester failed to do his part, and Charles, learning of the plan, escaped during the night. Cromwell charged Manchester with deliberately allowing the King to escape, and the charge is probably true, for it is in keeping with Manchester's utterances and other conduct. Cromwell's troops were nearest to the route by which the King

escaped, and the one serious error which can be charged against Cromwell in his entire military career is that he waited until morning before pursuing, by which time it was too late. Our knowledge of the details, however, is too scanty for us to pass a positive judgment.

Manchesters' repeated refusals to follow a more vigorous line of action to which he was urged by Cromwell led in the winter of 1644-5 to the latter charging him with disloyalty and incompetence and to the creation of the New Model—the beginning of the British regular army. Cromwell pointed out to parliament that if they would win the war, they must have a truly national army subject to them alone, "casting off all lingering proceedings like those of soldiers-of-fortune beyond the seas to spin out a war. . . . I do conceive if the Army be not put into another method, and the war more vigorously prosecuted, the People can bear the war no longer and will enforce you to a dishonourable peace." It is a pity that our own officials could not have studied Cromwell's remarks on this subject during our War of 1812.

The result of this controversy was the passage of the New Model Ordinance which provided that the regular forces should consist of 6,000 horse, 1,000 dragoons and 14,000 foot, with Sir Thomas Fairfax as Captain General and Philip Skippon as Major General, the office of Lieutenant General being significantly left vacant. The Ordinance required all members of parliament holding commissions to resign them within forty days. There was, however, no prohibition against their being reappointed, and in Cromwell's case parliament, realising how necessary he was to the cause, extended the period from time to time.

The arrears of pay due them and the uncertainty of their future while the New Model Ordinance was under discussion produced in the army a spirit akin to that which in our own army a century and a half later produced the Newburgh Addresses. Cromwell, however, insisted that in spite of grievances the men would remain true to their duty and that the change in officers would not demoralise them, and subsequent events proved he was right. Furthermore the King was in no

condition to take advantage of the conditions which existed, so the New Model Army was formed without any mishap, Cromwell with a cavalry force maintaining a screen between it and the royalists until it was fully organised and ready to take the field. More than half of its cavalry was drawn from that of the Eastern Association, which Cromwell had trained and led, so that it was not only strongly imbued with his spirit but was thoroughly loyal to him.

April 19, 1645, Cromwell with a brigade of cavalry arrived at Windsor for the purpose of resigning his commission in compliance with the Self Denying Ordinance. News reached parliament that Rupert, who was at Worcester, had sent a force to Oxford to bring the King and the artillery there to join him, and on April 23 Cromwell was hurriedly sent into Oxfordshire with a thousand cavalry to prevent this junction. At Islip Bridge the next day he charged and broke three regiments of the enemy, one troop of his old regiment successfully charging an entire squadron. He killed 200 and took 200 prisoners and about 400 horses. Some of the survivors threw themselves into Bletchington House which, on being summoned, surrendered without firing a shot, for which act the royalist commander was tried by court martial and shot. He undoubtedly deserved his fate, for Cromwell himself said in his report: "I did much doubt the storming of the House, it being strong and well commanded, and I having few dragoons, and this being not my business—and yet we got it." (Carlyle, Letter XXV.) It shows the reputation of Cromwell and his men that a summons to surrender and a threat of assault (which meant that if the assault were successful, the entire garrison could under the law of war at that time be refused quarter, as was later done by Cromwell in Ireland) was in several instances sufficient to bring about a surrender.

On the 26th he defeated in a meeting engagement a regiment of foot marching from Faringdon to Oxford, capturing 200 of them and killing or dispersing the rest. Three days later he summoned Faringdon House to surrender, but the commander refused. As Cromwell was in too much haste to await the arrival of infantry and artillery, he stormed it with cavalry

only and was repulsed with a loss of 14 killed and 10 captured. He had, however, checked the King's movement by defeating his covering forces and commandeering all the draft horses of the neighbourhood, so that the royal artillery could not be moved, Charles had to get some of Goring's cavalry to cover his junction with Rupert and so could not move till May 7.

The New Model was now ready to take the field, and after parliament had ordered a day of public prayer for its success Fairfax on April 30 marched from Windsor and two days later was joined by Cromwell at Newbury. Parliament had again lost sight of the principle of the objective and scattered its forces to besiege or relieve places of minor importance instead of uniting them to defeat Charles' army. By June, however, it saw its error, and a succession of successes on the part of the King impressed on their minds more than ever that Cromwell was the one man in the army who consistently won victories. Accordingly formal authority was given for his appointment as Lieutenant General, and on June 13 he rode into camp amid shouts of the soldiers: "Ironsides is come to head us." On the next day the New Model fought its first battle.

IX.

The village of Naseby lies in the centre of the watershed of England, near the northwest border of Northamptonshire. We fortunately have preserved to us both an account and a picture plan of the battle by John Rushworth, who was with the parliamentary baggage train at the time of the battle. This plan gives us an excellent idea of the terrain and the line of battle and is herewith reproduced. The view is looking about northwest from Naseby village in the foreground, but for convenience it will be referred to as though the north were at the top, like an ordinary map. The Hedgerows shown on the east and west were substantial obstacles, that on the east separating the clay moor of the battlefield from low land and cony warrens, so that neither flank was suitable for cavalry manœuvring. The ridge in the foreground rises to fifty feet and the Dust Hill ridge to thirty feet above the open moor, each with a gentle slope, and the entire field is about two miles square.

On the night of June 13-14, 1645, the King's main body lay at Market Harborough, eight miles away, with a rear guard at Naseby. During the evening Ireton with a cavalry force attacked this rear guard, which fled precipitately to the main body. The royalist officers felt great contempt for the New Model on account of the low social rank of many of its officers and the fact that many of its soldiers were new recruits, whereas the King's troops were veterans. Indeed, a letter of Cromwell written just after the battle shows that parliament had not much confidence in its untried army. The King accordingly, after holding a council of war, determined to turn back and beat the parliamentary force.

The New Model, which had bivouacked at Guildsborough, two hours' march to the south, reached Naseby about 5 a.m. and was drawn up on the ridge on which the village is located, while Sir Thomas Fairfax and Cromwell rode forward to reconnoitre. As they did so, the King's army came into view on the Dust Hill ridge, and they withdrew their forces about 100 feet behind the crest in order to conceal their dispositions from the royalists. Rupert, who also had ridden forward to reconnoitre, with his usual impetuosity decided that this movement indicated a retreat and sent word to the King to hasten his advance. The royalist army accordingly gave up its defensive advantage on Dust Hill and advanced into the open moor, and by ten or eleven a.m. the battle was on.

Rupert's haste had two unfortunate results for the royalist army: first, there was not time to bring up the artillery, so that only two of the King's guns got into action, a disadvantage which was offset by the fact that the parliamentary artillery was posted so high that the guns did little damage; second, it enabled the parliamentary horse to choose the meeting point, so that contact came while the royalist horse were charging up hill and the parliamentary horse down hill.

The dispositions of the two armies are shown in Rushworth's plan, although their initial positions must have been farther apart than there shown. The royalists are estimated at from 7,500 to 10,000, of whom half were cavalry, and the New Model had 6,000 cavalry and 7,000 infantry.

As the royalist lines swept across the moor, Okey's dragoons, posted in Sulby Hedges on the west, fired with effect on Rupert's cavalry, but they kept on and struck Ireton's troops on the slope of Fanny and Rudput Hills. For the moment Ireton had the advantage, but his charge was badly supported, and he had to divert some of his men against the royalist infantry, who were firing on him, so that Rupert cut his way through, Ireton himself being wounded and unhorsed. Here again Rupert's lack of discipline was shown, for his troopers continued the chase and attacked the parliamentary baggage train. Not until they were repulsed by its guard did it occur to their officers that their presence was needed on the main battlefield. This delay gave Ireton time to rally his troops.

In the centre each side fired one volley and charged. Only Fairfax's regiment withstood the royalist onset. Although the front ranks of the other four regiments broke, the leaders rushed up the second line, and a hand-to-hand fight with swords, pikes and clubbed muskets followed. Skippon was wounded but refused to leave the field or give over the command. Fairfax's helmet was struck off, but he declined the offer of another, and for three hours the battle waged.

The right wing under Cromwell, 3,600 strong, charged Langdale's 2,000 veterans without waiting. Whalley attacking in front and Cromwell on the exposed flank. Cromwell's right was echeloned to the rear more than is shown in the picture, and because of the longer route which Cromwell's men had to go and perhaps also because of their more unfavourable terrain, Whalley's attack was delivered first. For a moment he was checked, but while his men were engaged in a sword fight Cromwell struck Langdale's exposed flank, and Langdale's men broke and fled, part falling back on the reserve and part leaving the field "harder and faster than became them," says Clarendon. Never for a moment, however, did Cromwell lose control of his men. Designating certain squadrons to continue the pursuit and keep Langdale's men from taking further part in the battle, Cromwell led the rest against the royalist foot, which was having rather the better of its contest with the parliamentary infantry. Charles put himself at the head of his Guards and

what was left of his reserves and prepared to lead a desperate charge against the Ironsides, but a nobleman seized his bridle, saying, "Will you go upon your death." The Guards, mistaking the command then given, retired some distance from the field. The royalist infantry was now assailed in front, flank and rear, for Okey had mounted his dragoons and some of Ireton's men had reformed. The reserves were unable to stem the tide and one by one the regiments surrendered except Rupert's own, which like Newcastle's Whitecoats at Marston Moor, resisted charge after charge until they died where they stood, Fairfax killing the ensign and capturing the colours with his own hand.

Now came a lull in the battle while Fairfax and Cromwell reformed their men for a new advance. Their position was slightly in advance of that which they had occupied at the beginning of the battle. At this point Rupert returned from the chase and was allowed to rejoin the King in the rear, for Fairfax and Cromwell refused to hazard the completeness of their victory by allowing their men to attack his stragglers before they themselves were fully formed. With the remnant of Rupert's and Langdale's men and such mounted reserves as were still on the field, Rupert and the King formed a new cavalry line and prepared for a final charge. Opposite them the Puritans were forming their troopers, leaving a gap in the centre for the infantry. As soon as this came up, they charged, but the charge was never delivered, for the royalist horse broke and fled without awaiting it. Then and not till then did Cromwell let his men go in pursuit, the chase being continued for twelve miles. Of the royalist infantry scarcely a man escaped death or capture. All the royal artillery was captured and a large number of officers, leaving the King without the means to form and train a new army.

Here, as at Marston Moor, the better discipline of Cromwell's men was apparent. In the hottest of the fray he kept his forces in hand, so that they were ready for the rapidly changing situation on the battlefield. It also illustrates the characteristic method of attack which we saw used at Winceby and Marston Moor—striking with a part of the cavalry at the enemy's front

and when he is thus pinned down striking him on the flank with the remainder, thus using the mounted force as both a pivot of manœuvre and a manœuvering force. Lieut.-Colonel Cooper King of the British Army in "From Cromwell to Wellington," says that at Naseby all the points of good cavalry leading were shown: a bold charge with the *arme blanche*, the use of a second-line and reserve, the timely rally after the charge and again before the pursuit, and the pursuit of the foe to ruin; and Lieut.-Colonel Hoenig says ("Oliver Cromwell," vol. 1, p. 203): "There is scarcely a battle where cavalry has been used better than that of Cromwell at Naseby. The New Model Army had fairly won its spurs as a fighting machine and more than justified Cromwell's ideas in its organisation.

X.

Cromwell's next service was in the South where Goring was besieging the parliamentary stronghold of Taunton in Somersetshire. Parliament had by this time come to realise the principle of the objective and allowed Fairfax a free hand. He accordingly hastened South to engage Goring, who on his approach raised the siege and took position near Langport, on top of a hill with a stream and marshy ground in front. The ford across the stream was wide enough for only two troopers abreast, and the lane from the ford to the top of the hill was flanked by hedges and enclosures, which Goring had lined with musketeers. Intending to fight only a delaying action and withdraw to Bridgewater, Goring had sent all but two of his guns on before him. Fairfax began by an artillery preparation, which silenced Goring's two guns and forced his cavalry to move farther back, leaving the infantry unsupported. He then sent forward 1,500 musketeers, who drove in the musketeers with whom Goring had lined the approach up the hill, thus clearing the way for the cavalry. Cromwell then detached from his own old regiment a force of 120 under Major Bethell to charge through the ford and up the lane at Goring's cavalry, with 180 more under Major Desborough to follow in support. Bethel crossed the ford, charged up the hill and broke the royalist line. On being charged in turn by 400 of Goring's troopers, he cut his way back

to where Desborough was coming up to his support, and, wheeling about, they together charged the royalists, who, though superior in numbers, gave way. The parliamentary musketeers then came up and opened fire, and Goring's entire force began to run. Cromwell halted Bethel and Desborough until the entire cavalry came up and sent it off in an organised pursuit. Two miles farther back the royalist cavalry made another stand, but one charge of Cromwell's men dispersed them in flight towards Bridgewater, Cromwell pursuing them through the streets of Langport, capturing their two guns and 1,400 prisoners.

Fairfax then pushed on to capture the royalist stronghold of Bridgewater. The town is divided by the River Parrot into two parts, East and West. At dawn storming parties threw portable bridges across the moat in the East part and rushing over them, planted scaling ladders on the walls. On capturing these, they turned the guns against the town and let down the drawbridge, over which Cromwell's old regiment dashed into town and cleared the streets. The royalists in the West part of the town had been the object of a holding attack which prevented them from aiding their comrades in the East part, and after their own part of the town had been set on fire by shot and grenades they surrendered.

So far as can be learned from contemporary accounts Cromwell in his attacks on fortified places took four successive steps :—

1. Thorough reconnaissance and preparation of the necessary material (scaling ladders, portable bridges, etc.), this period in important cases ending with an exhortation to the troops by the chaplains;

2. Securing a foothold inside, either by escalade or by making a breach by cannonade, and sending a storming party through it;

3. Following up the storming party with an infantry support strong enough to hold the foothold gained;

4. Exploiting the success with cavalry.

These principles were further exemplified in the attacks on fortified places in the southwest of England during the late

summer and autumn and resulted in giving parliament a chain of fortified posts from the Severn to the Channel, thus cutting off the remnant of Goring's army from the rest of England and confining it to the counties of Cornwall and Devonshire.

XI.

By this time the country was thoroughly tired of the war, and the excesses of the royalists had led to the formation in some counties of bodies of "clubmen," who maintained a sort of armed neutrality and endeavoured to keep the troops of both sides out of their territory. Cromwell with a cavalry force was sent to disperse them. He began by showing them how their own best interests were bound up in the triumph of parliament, and his combination of tact and leniency where possible and firmness and force where necessary may serve as an example to all officers charged with supporting the civil power or quelling domestic disturbances. (See Carlyle, Letter XXX.)

Though the royalists had now no army in the field capable of meeting the New Model, they still held several strong fortifications, one of the chief being Bristol, near the mouth of the Severn, which had masonry fortifications with a strong castle in the centre and a line of earth-works outside, forming a first line of defence. It was held by Rupert with a garrison of 3,500 beside the local train bands and auxiliaries. In order not to leave so strong a post in his rear and to prevent the clubmen of the vicinity from joining Rupert, Fairfax suddenly invested the city on August 2, preventing any escape of the garrison. He had been informed that as soon as his army arrived a considerable part of the population would rise against Rupert, but this report proved false. Since the fortifications were so extensive that in some places they were necessarily thinly held, a general assault was decided upon, to take place at one a.m. Wednesday, September 10. The plan was to surprise the outer line by a night attack and then await daylight before attacking the city walls themselves. The attack was well synchronised and the outwork captured without much difficulty, except one redoubt where three hours' fighting took place. Cavalry in each case followed the storming party to exploit the success. On the north

side the attack on the city walls was successful, and two gates were captured. On the south side the walls proved too high for the scaling ladders, and the attack was beaten off, but at this point the garrison fired the town in three places, so Rupert sent to treat for a surrender, which was effected the next day. So unpopular had Rupert made himself by his plundering that the victors had to safeguard him and his men from the infuriated populace. Although Cromwell took an important part in this attack and wrote the official account, which parliament ordered to be read in all the churches about London, we unfortunately do not know just what his part was.

Cromwell was next sent with four regiments of foot and three of horse to reduce the royalist garrisons in Wiltshire and Hampshire. We have his own account of three of these: Winchester, Basing House and Langford House. At Winchester he entered the town and summoned the castle to surrender, but was refused. He then put his artillery in order for a bombardment, fired one round from his six guns and sent a second summons, which was likewise refused.

> "Whereupon we went on with our work, and made a breach in the wall near the Black Tower; which, after about 200 shot, we thought stormable; and purposed on Monday morning to attempt it."

On Sunday evening, however, the governor negotiated for a surrender. "The castle was well manned with Six-hundred-and-eighty horse and foot, . . . well victualled; . . . the works were exceeding good and strong. It's very likely it would have cost much blood to have gained it by storm. We have not lost twelve men." (Carlyle, Letter XXXII.) This is another case where the known reputation of Cromwell and his men produced results.

On October 14 he took by storm Basing House in Hampshire, which had successfully withstood all attacks during the entire war. The fortifications were nearly a mile in circumference, well manned, and had as Rev. Hugh Peters says, "provision for some years rather than months." Cromwell's account of the victory (Carlyle, Letter XXXIII), which also was ordered by parliament to be read in the churches, is interesting, not for its

meagre account of the military operations, but for the sound views which he therein sets forth on the true use of fortifications, pointing out that, unless a fortification is at a strategic point, it is an element of weakness rather than strength, because it uses for its garrison men who could be better employed in the field, and that the true place for a fortification is on the exposed frontier, to keep the enemy away from the district to be protected. Evidently his views had come to be respected both in and out of parliament, for Basing House was destroyed and in his report he says: "I believe the gentlemen of Sussex and Hampshire will with more cheerfulness contribute to maintain a garrison on the frontier than in their bowels, which will have less safety in it."

Three days later Langford House surrendered on his summons, although he apparently had only cavalry with him to enforce his demand.

We have little information of Cromwell's doings for the next three months, but on January 9, 1646, he was again in the field and surprised Lord Wentworth's brigade at Bovey Tracey. Here we have the only known instance of a lapse from strict discipline on the battlefield by the Ironsides. The royalist officers, who were gambling in the inn when Cromwell came upon them, at once threw their stakes out of the window and made good their escape while the Ironsides were picking up the money. In view of the fact that their pay was in arrears and their clothing worn out, their conduct is perhaps excusable. Wentworth's brigade, however, was scattered and 400 horses captured.

From January to April Cromwell was with Fairfax capturing what remained of the royalist forces and fortresses. After the fall of Exeter on April 9 he returned to his seat in parliament, which thanked him for his "great and faithful services." In June he went to Oxford to marry his daughter to Commissary General Ireton on the 15th and to participate in the negotiations leading up to the surrender of the city on the 30th. Tradition says that the leniency shown the garrisons of Exeter and Oxford was due to his influence with Fairfax.

With the surrender of Oxford Cromwell's career as a cavalry leader closes. When he next took the field in the Preston cam-

paign, and thereafter, he was in command of an independent army composed of the three arms, though Fairfax continued to hold the position of Captain General until June 26, 1650. The military principles by which Cromwell subdued Ireland and won Preston, Dunbar, and Worcester were those which he developed as a cavalry leader in the First Civil War and are summarised by Lieut.-Colonel Baldock (pp. 520, 516) as follows :—

> "Even when surroundered by all the turmoil of a cavalry fight Cromwell never lost his presence of mind or his control over his troops, and in conducting a campaign he never lost his grasp on the situation of affairs. With unerring judgment he suited his strategy to the conditions of the case. He knew when to dare, when to forbear. . . . Gifted with a marvellous military genius, teaching himself practically the art of war in the field, beginning at the lowest ranks and working steadily but rapidly up to the highest, he understood the new conditions, and stands out as the first great exponent of the modern art of war. His was the strategy of Napoleon and Von Moltke, the strategy which, neglecting fortresses and the means of artificial defence as of secondary importance, strikes first at the enemy in the field."

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CAVALRY BATTLE HONOURS

By Major T. J. Edwards, M.B.E., F.R.Hist.S.

Part IX.

Campaign against France in North Holland, 1799.

" Egmont-op-Zee," *2nd October*, 1799.

The opposition which revolutionary France raised against herself in Europe was gradually crushed until Great Britain was the only power which barred her tyrannical progress. Great Britain had the command of the sea and was thus able to restrict Bonaparte's devastating activities. This restriction was sorely felt and in 1797 The Directory made a determined effort to remove it by securing the co-operation of Spain and Holland in an assault upon our Channel fleet. The effort was in vain for Jervis and Nelson smashed the combined French and Spanish fleets off Cape St. Vincent* and Duncan defeated the Dutch off Camperdown (11th October, 1797).

Foiled on sea, Bonaparte turned his attention to the ruination of British trade in the East by the conquest of Egypt and India. He was not, however, moved entirely by patriotic motives for he had it as his ambition to outdo Alexander the Great. " Europe is but a molehill," he declared, " all the great reputations have come from Asia." Some of the older members of the government did not fail to observe the selfishness which lay at the bottom of most of the proposals of this very able and energetic young general, so that when he formally propounded his scheme The Directory readily approved it, many of whom were glad to get rid of him for a time. By the end of July, 1798, he had conquered Egypt, but Nelson's victory

* The honour " St. Vincent " is borne by the Welch Regiment in commemoration of the services of a detachment of the 69th Foot (now 2nd Battalion), which served in the fleet on this occasion (A.O.121/1891).

of the Nile on 1st August, 1798, shut him up in his conquest. He then tried to reach Turkey via Syria, but suffering another reverse at Acre he returned to Egypt. Leaving General Kleber in command he eluded the British fleet and regained France in October, 1799.

The successes of Jervis and Duncan and the absence of Bonaparte from France led the British government to decide upon attacking her on the continent, the capture of Holland and the restoration of the House of Orange being the objective. Sir Ralph Abercromby was appointed to command the expedition, the arrangements for which were badly mishandled by the government until, " Finally, they hurried the General and his 10,000 men out of England with no definite plan of action, but merely a hazy purpose that he should go to Holland and do something." (Fortescue.) Abercromby landed on the Texel on 13th August, 1799, and took up a strong position behind the Zype Canal. A month later the Duke of York arrived and assumed the office of Commander-in-Chief. In a despatch of 28th August, 1799, Abercromby wrote: " As we now have a secure port, I hope there will be no delay in sending us three or four regiments of light dragoons, as the want of cavalry is sorely felt." In response to this request the 7th Light Dragoons and a detachment of the 18th Light Dragoons were included in the reinforcements which arrived with the Duke of York. The Duke's force now amounted to about 48,000 of whom about 12,000 were Russians who were there in accordance with a treaty concluded with Great Britain a few months previously. Inclement weather, insufficient transport, fuel and stores, together with chaotic medical arrangements reduced the effectiveness of the force considerably.

General Brune commanded the Franco-Dutch forces in this area and had taken up a position with his right resting on Oudkarspel, thence south-westward to Bergen. Here he was attacked on the 19th September, but the behaviour of the Russians, who were on the right flank, nearly brought disaster to our force. On 24th September, 1799, three troops of the 15th Light Dragoons arrived with further reinforcements. On the 2nd October, another attack was made with Abercromby's

corps on the right flank; this corps included nine squadrons drawn from the 7th, 11th and 15th Light Dragoons.* A squadron of the 11th Light Dragoons was with the third column under General Dundas and two squadrons of the 18th Light Dragoons were with the fourth column under General Pulteney on the left flank.

The attack was successful this time but the only incident which has an interest for cavalry occurred on the right flank at the end of the day's fighting. The troop of horse artillery had been advanced to an isolated position without sufficient escort and General Vandamme, the French commander on this flank, noticing this weakness, put himself at the head of his cavalry and dashed at the guns. The battle which was petering out, blazed up afresh. The gunners stood their ground and fired into the advancing hussars, but they were eventually overpowered by vastly superior numbers. Some accounts state that all guns were lost, whilst others, that only two were taken: the point is immaterial for Lord Paget, placing himself at the head of the 15th Light Dragoons, galloped straight at the enemy and retook the lost guns after a hot pursuit in which nearly every French hussar became a casualty.

The 15th/19th The King's Royal Hussars, is the only cavalry regiment to bear "Egmont-op-Zee," the honour granted for this attack, it having been granted to the 15th King's Hussars under London Gazette dated 29th April, 1820.

Campaign Against France in Egypt—1801.

"The Sphinx superscribed 'Egypt.'"

In October, 1800, the British Government decided that the French force in Egypt should be expelled as it constituted a threat to our communications with India. Moreover, the restoration of Egypt to Turkey would provide a measure of security for British interests in those parts. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had just succeeded Sir James Stuart as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, was apprised of the government's intentions and concentrated his force in Marmorice Bay, in Asia

* It also included a battery of Horse Artillery which has become famous as the Chestnut Troop. It was raised in 1793 and was about to undergo its baptism of fire.

Minor (due north of Rhodes Island). Lord Keith commanded the fleet which was to co-operate with the army. There was some delay in setting out for Egypt, due to the non-arrival of some of the troops allotted to the expedition. Abercromby particularly requested that a detachment of the 11th Light Dragoons might serve under his command and accordingly four officers and 75 other ranks, under the command of Captain Lieutenant A. Money sailed to join him: they were, however, diverted and joined the expedition to Cadiz, proceeding to their original destination when that venture was abandoned. The 12th and 26th Light Dragoons* were both stationed in Portugal at the time and did not join the expedition until January, 1801. It had been arranged for the Turks to supply the horses for the British Cavalry, but they provided a very inferior type of animal, in fact the mounts supplied for the 12th Light Dragoons were so poor that the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mervyn Archdall, petitioned that his regiment might serve as infantry. General Kleber, the French Commander, had been assassinated in May, 1800, and was succeeded by General Menou, a most unpopular officer, whose well-known vanity and tactlessness occasioned a burst of indiscipline among his command when his appointment was announced.

The British force made a successful landing at Aboukir, east of Alexandria, on 8th March, 1801, mainly due to the energy and gallantry of Major-General John Moore, later of Corunna fame. As the French Commander in Aboukir Castle refused to capitulate the 26th Light Dragoons and The Queen's Regiment were ordered to blockade it which soon had the desired effect. On the 12th March, Abercromby moved his line forward and discovered the French advancing towards him as if for a general action. It halted, however, with its right flank resting on the eastern end of Lake Mareotis in order to cover its communications with Lower Egypt via the tongue of land which separates Lake Mareotis from Lake Maadieh. In this position Abercromby attacked it the next day, his plan

* 26th Light Dragoons.—Formed in 1795 under the Colonelcy of General Russell Manners; re-numbered 23rd Light Dragoons in 1803, became a Lancer regiment in 1817, and was disbanded in 1817. Served with distinction in the Peninsula and was present at Waterloo.

being to turn their right flank. The operation was successful and the French withdrew to a strong position three miles in rear. On the afternoon of the 18th March an unfortunate skirmish occurred in which the 12th Light Dragoons suffered undignified loss. While most of the regiment was away watering horses a strong French reconnoitring party approached the left of our position. Lieutenant-Colonel Archdall immediately collected about sixty men, and with a picket of about another twenty, advanced towards the party which numbered about one hundred hussars and infantry under General D'Estin. Archdall charged the infantry and scattered it, upon which the Hussars turned and fled with Archdall's Light Dragoons in hot pursuit. The French infantry, finding themselves neglected and practically free, took cover in an old earthwork and fired upon Archdall's party, inflicting severe loss. Archdall lost his arm, seven men were taken prisoners and several much-needed horses were killed. The affair annoyed the mild Abercromby exceedingly as will be seen from the following opening paragraph of a General Order issued the next day :—

> "The Commander-in-Chief trusts that the occurrence which took place on the left yesterday afternoon will serve as a warning to Officers commanding detached parties, not to precipitate with unguarded impetuosity into enterprises without object or without use. They will too well recollect that engaging rashly in such enterprises and advancing without proper support, or pursuing advantages beyond what the occasion demands or prudence warrants they risk the lives of valuable men and expose themselves to failure."

The next day the French attacked the British and a desperate action was fought in which Abercromby was actually taken prisoner by a French Cavalryman for a short time and in which he received the wounds from which he died on 28th March, 1801. General Hutchinson succeeded him and successfully brought the campaign to a close in the following August.

On the whole the campaign was an annoying one for the cavalry which took part, in that those which were mounted were, thanks to the Turks, badly mounted, and those which served as infantry were distributed among the various brigades

in such a manner that their services were swallowed up in the general body. The campaign is commemorated by the grant of a badge, viz., The Sphinx, superscribed "EGYPT" and was granted to the following Cavalry regiments:—

11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) by Horse Guards letter dated 27th October, 1802.

12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's) by Horse Guards Circular letter No. 170 dated 6th July, 1802.

CAMPAIGNS IN MYSORE, 1780-1792.

About the year 1774 the condition of British affairs in India was not a happy one, mainly due to the lack of co-operation between the three Presidencies and the existence of friction between the civil and military authorities. This resulted in a lowering of British prestige among the native rulers, a factor which the French were not slow to exploit with the object of regaining their position as the dominating European power in India. In this year the British Government passed an Act under which supreme power was assigned to Bengal with Bombay and Madras subject to her. A Governor-Generalship was also created, Warren Hastings being the first holder of the office. These measures secured some degree of co-operation between the Presidencies and it was hoped that the military forces would soon restore our lost prestige. Piecemeal operations, however, continued for some years without success and in 1779 Mysore, the Nizam's Dominions and the Mahrattas, a powerful confederacy, entered into an agreement to expel the British from India. When the news of this alliance reached Calcutta the Council became much alarmed and missions were at once despatched to Hyder Ali, the powerful ruler of Mysore, with the object of dissuading him from his purpose. These overtures proved fruitless and in 1780 Hyder Ali attacked the Madras forces under the command of Sir Hector Munro whom he defeated in a short campaign. This unpleasant result was largely due to the absence of cavalry in the forces of the Honourable East India Company whereas Hyder had at least 25,000 horsemen which included a body of French dragoons and hussars. This state of affairs was keenly felt by Sir Eyre Coote,

the Commander-in-Chief in India at the time, who pointed out in strong terms to the Council that the fruits of victory could never be attained for the want of a corps of cavalry. His appeal moved the Council to action who made an urgent demand on the Court of Directors in London to apply to the Government for the loan of a regiment of cavalry, and accordingly a Royal Warrant dated 24th September, 1781, was signed by George III, authorising Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart., of the 14th Light Dragoons, to form a regiment of light dragoons. The regiment was accordingly formed and designated the 23rd Light Dragoons, being re-numbered the " 19th " in 1786. It had a short life of 40 years, during which it gained honours as far afield as India and Canada, and which were inherited by the 19th Hussars. The regiment landed in India in October, 1782, thereby gaining the distinction of being the first British cavalry regiment to land in the country.* Lieutenant-Colonel John Floyd† was in actual command of the regiment. Sir John Burgoyne had but a short and unhappy time in the country. The Madras Government was dilatory in the matter of supplies; they appointed him Commander-in-Chief in supersession of Major-General Stuart, but Burgoyne would not recognise their authority to act in this manner whereupon they promoted Lieutenant-Colonel Lang of their own service to Lieutenant-General and gave him the Commander-in-Chiefship over Burgoyne: endless quarrels ensued ending in Burgoyne being arraigned before a court martial and being " most fully and honourably " acquitted of all the charges. Whilst preparing to return to England he died on 23rd September, 1785, at the age of forty-six.

To put an end to the friction between the civil and military authorities the British Government passed an Act placing the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in India in the hands of the Crown, so that when, in 1786, Lord Corn-

* The old 39th Foot was the first British Regiment to land in India (1757), a fact which was commemorated by their being granted the motto "Primus in Indis," and now borne by The Dorsetshire Regiment, their regimental descendants.

† Floyd was the son of an officer in the 1st Dragoon Guards who served at the Battle of Minden (1st August, 1759) and died a few weeks later. In recognition of his father's services, Floyd was given a Commission in the 15th Light Dragoons in 1759 when only twelve years old. The following year he served at the battle of Emsdorff (16th July, 1760).

wallis succeeded Warren Hastings as Governor-General he also combined with this office that of Commander-in-Chief.

Tippoo Sahib had succeeded his father, Hyder Ali, as Sultan of Mysore, and urged on by an implacable hatred of the English he made preparations for their complete expulsion from India. Although the Nizam and the Mahrattas had allied themselves to Mysore in 1779 with this object, a few years' experience of closer association with Tippoo opened their eyes to the fact that having once got rid of the English he would then fall upon them. In the interests of self-preservation they broke away from Tippoo and in 1788 sought an alliance with the English which Cornwallis would not entertain: later, however, when Mysore became more threatening to our interests, an alliance was effected. Tippoo sent a mission to France and received some assistance from a number of French officers.

In 1789 Tippoo took the initiative in warlike measures by attacking Travancore which, under treaty obligations, the British were bound to protect. This act led to war. Cornwallis began concentrating a force about 15,000 strong at Trichinopoly at once and placed Major-General Medows in command. The plan of operations was an invasion of Mysore from the south, via Coimbatore. The cavalry brigade, consisting of the 19th Light Dragoons* and four regiments of Madras Native Cavalry was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd, and it was the proud distinction of the 19th to demonstrate that British cavalry were superior to native horse. News of this concentration made Tippoo stay his merciless hand in Travancore and he turned northward to meet his most-hated foe.

Mysore is a high plateau 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea-level, fenced in by precipitous ranges of mountains on all sides except the north. Access to the country from the south was via the Guzulhutti (Gujelhutty) pass. Medows began his march in May, 1790, but heavy rains impeded progress and brought on sickness which reduced the effective strength considerably. As no opposition was met Medows deposited his siege guns and stores at Derapooram and continued the advance without them, but afterwards learning that Tippoo had left four thousand

* The 23rd Light Dragoons had been re-numbered "19th Light Dragoons" in 1786.

cavalry under Said Sahib as a corps of observation to the south of Coimbatore, he sent for them. It was feared that Said intended burning the town and to prevent this Floyd with his cavalry brigade was sent to occupy it on the 21st July, 1790. The operation was safely carried out and the remainder of the army moved to Coimbatore whilst Floyd was sent in pursuit of Said. At Demiacotta he surprised and captured a small body of horse about thirty strong, but being fired on from the fort he fell back a few miles. On 16th August he visited one of our posts at Occarro accompanied only by a corporal and six dragoons. On arrival he learnt that a body of enemy horse was lurking in the neighbourhood, so adding twelve men to his escort he sought them out, charged them and put them to flight. On the 20th August, Major Affleck of the 19th Light Dragoons, with two troops of his regiment and two of the 5th Native Cavalry, were equally successful against a body of Tippoo's horse. A few days later Lieutenant Bayly of the 19th accomplished a similar feat. This succession of victories in small skirmishes against great odds heightened the morale of the British troops whilst they clearly demonstrated that Tippoo's horse were no match against British valour and discipline. These successes eventually brought Medows to the foot of the Guzulhutti Pass, but the forces taking part in the campaign were widely scattered rendering concentration within a short time impossible. Tippoo was aware of this weakness and leaving Seringapatam on 2nd September with 40,000 men and a large train of artillery he arrived at the Pass on the 9th and on the 11th was posted opposite Floyd. Floyd immediately notified Medows and suggested that he should withdraw, but Medows would not believe that Tippoo was as strong as reported and he ordered Floyd to hold his ground on the Bhowani river opposite Satyamunglum. The next day Floyd reported that Tippoo's force had increased and that the Sultan commanded in person. He also sent Captain Child of the 19th with the picquets of the 19th and two native cavalry regiments to reconnoitre towards Poongar ford, ordering Major Darley with the 5th Native Cavalry to follow in support. Darley, however, took the wrong road and later Child, unsupported, was con-

fronted by a considerable body of enemy horse which had already crossed the river: he promptly charged it and despite his inferiority in numbers, drove them into the river where many were killed and drowned. Child then withdrew and joined Floyd, who with the 19th, went to Darley's assistance, he being surrounded by about 6,000 of Tippoo's cavalry. On seeing the 19th the enemy immediately withdrew, not being eager to meet their masters, although in point of numbers they had the advantage of at least ten to one. Floyd, however, went in pursuit and inflicted heavy loss. Two squadrons of the 19th charged a large body of the Sultan's Bodyguard, and getting entangled in an enclosure, killed about five hundred. The Commander of the Bodyguard was killed by a dragoon and the standard-bearer by a corporal who captured the standard. This done, the 19th returned to their camp only to be opposed by large forces from the north and west. Tippoo's artillery was too much for Floyd's eleven guns, although he maintained his position during that day. To add to his difficulties many of the native bullock-drivers deserted.

Floyd decided to withdraw upon Coimbatore during the night, but as it was first necessary to bring in the garrison at Satyamunglum he could not move until four a.m. the next morning, the 14th September. Tippoo soon followed in pursuit and his cavalry fell upon the baggage. During this raid Sutherland, surgeon's mate of the 19th, was killed. Owing to lack of gun bullocks Floyd had to abandon six of his guns, the remainder were saved by the officers giving up their private baggage bullocks for the guns. During the withdrawal the 36th Regiment (now 2nd Battalion, The Worcestershire Regiment) bore the brunt of the fighting, the cavalry being sent on ahead owing to the close nature of the country. Floyd was unable to take the direct line through Velladi in falling back on Coimbatore owing to pressure from the west, but took the line through Shawoor where a small successful engagement took place. Medows, however, was unaware that Floyd had taken the Shawoor route and had marched to Velladi to his assistance. As soon as Floyd learned that Medows had gone to Velladi he marched at once to join him, reaching camp on the evening of

the 15th September, after a peaceful march. Medows, however, had gone on to Demiacotta, but returned to Velladi the next day on learning that Floyd was there. The rest here was very welcome to Floyd's column which had had no food for three days. Floyd's losses during these operations were not heavy* but he inflicted heavy casualties on Tippoo, among the killed being his brother-in-law and many commanders.

Though Tippoo had gained a tactical success he was much depressed at the respect his troops had for the British and was much annoyed at seeing a handful of dragoons work havoc among ten times their number of his men. The distinguished conduct of the 19th gained for them a great reputation throughout the Native Courts of Southern India.

For a time Medows and Tippoo played the part, alternately, of pursuer and pursued, but in the middle of December Cornwallis arrived in Madras with the intention of taking command of the army in the field and ordered Medows to bring his force to Madras where it arrived at the end of January, 1791. Cornwallis's plan was to attack Mysore direct from the east instead of from the south as Medows had done, and in February he arrived on the plateau, thus carrying the war into the enemy's country for the first time.

Early in March Cornwallis besieged Bangalore. Floyd with the cavalry brigade consisting of the 19th Light Dragoons (now under the command of Captain Child) and five regiments of native cavalry, an infantry brigade and a detachment of artillery was given the duty of protecting an engineer reconnaissance. On their return to headquarters they crossed the rear of Tippoo's line of march against which Floyd led the cavalry at the gallop. The enemy's infantry broke and nine guns were captured, but Floyd was hit by a musket ball in the head and fell from his horse apparently dead.† To avoid trampling upon him the squadron immediately behind made a half wheel, a move which was mistaken by those in rear as a signal to retire and within a few moments the whole force

* The losses of the 19th Light Dragoons were:—Killed, 1 Assistant Surgeon and 5 troopers; wounded, 1 Quartermaster and 8 troopers; Horses, 5 killed and 3 wounded.

† The bullet had passed through his cheek and lodged in his neck, where it remained for the rest of his life. He died in 1818 at the age of 70.

was withdrawing, leaving Floyd for dead upon the field. Two men of the 19th, however, noticed that he was still alive and one galloped off and brought back a squadron of the regiment which escorted him out of danger. In spite of his wound he continued in command, but the oncoming darkness put an end to the fighting. The casualties to our cavalry were serious and the whole affair vexed Cornwallis very much. His A.D.C. writing of the affair afterwards said: "I never saw Lord Cornwallis completely angry before that evening." The losses included 270 horses which could be ill-spared at the outset of the campaign, because they could not be replaced. Bangalore fell a few days later being the first blow ever struck by any foe against Mysore since its establishment by Hyder Ali.

In the subsequent operations which concluded with the capture of Seringapatam the Cavalry were not called upon to perform anything but routine work.

By Army Order 136 of 1889 the 19th Hussars, which inherited the traditions of the 19th Light Dragoons, was awarded the honour "Mysore," which was granted "for the campaigns in Southern India during 1780-84 and 1790-92."

Second Mysore War—1799.
"Seringapatam."

The defeats and losses suffered by Tippoo in 1792 had the effect of making him hate the English all the more. His resolution to get rid of his most-hated foe hardened and he left no stone unturned in an endeavour to secure allies who would be willing to co-operate with him in this object. By 1796 he was induced to believe that the time had come to strike, being confirmed in his opinion by the French successes under Bonaparte. He dispatched an embassy to Cabul inviting the Shah to invade India and join hands with him. Another embassy was sent to Mauritius seeking aid from the French, but this produced only one hundred men for his service. In May, 1798, the Earl of Mornington, later the Marquis of Wellesley,* became Governor-General and he lost no time in bringing Tippoo to book on account of his intrigues. In order to obtain time to

*An elder brother of Arthur Wellesley, later the famous Duke of Wellington.

complete his preparations for another war on the English, Tippoo gave evasive answers to the letters sent him by Wellesley, but the Governor-General took prompt action to counter any moves by his wily adversary. A fresh alliance with the Nizam was concluded who promised material assistance, and when Tippoo despatched an embassy to France for assistance in February, 1799, war against him was declared.

General Harris was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, the native portion being drawn mainly from the Madras army. Major-General Floyd commanded the cavalry which was divided into two brigades—the 1st consisting of the 19th Light Dragoons and the 1st and 4th Madras Native Cavalry commanded by Colonel Steerman of the Madras Army: the 2nd consisting of the 25th Light Dragoons* and the 2nd and 3rd Madras Native Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Pater of the Madras Army. The total force amounted to 21,000 all ranks. The Nizam provided a further 16,000 to which the 33rd Regiment was added, the whole commanded by Colonel Arthur Wellesley. A force from Bombay, 6,000 strong, under the command of Lieutenant-General James Stuart, operated from Cannanore.

Harris crossed the Mysore frontier on 5th March, 1799, and was near Seringapatam by the 26th. Tippoo, however, wished to catch the Bombay force before it joined Harris's and with this object he left a small force to watch Harris whilst he led 12,000 of the flower of his army against Stuart. On the 16th March he surprised Stuart's advanced detached brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor at Seedaseer and would probably have annihilated it had not reinforcements arrived in time. Tippoo then returned to oppose Harris.

On the 27th March Harris advanced near Mallavelly (east of Seringapatam) with Floyd and his two cavalry brigades covering the front, when the enemy was discovered on the heights near the town. Wellesley, supported by Floyd, was ordered to attack his right flank, but on perceiving the dispositions for attack the enemy withdrew to another ridge. Harris followed

* Raised in 1794 by Major-General Gwyn; re-numbered "22nd" in 1802; disbanded 1820.

and in time came to grips with them: they delivered two very spirited attacks against our left and centre and no less than 10,000 infantry, supported by cavalry, advanced against Wellesley, and did not give way until quite near the bayonets of the 33rd Regiment. Then Floyd's cavalry crashed into them with " disciplined impetuosity " doing terrible execution. After this Tippoo withdrew to another position.

In his further action General Harris had to keep in mind the question of forage supply, a consideration which dominated all others in this campaign, for the number of beasts was enormous. Tippoo was aware of this and burned all supplies that he could not remove on the routes likely to be taken by his opponents. Harris therefore decided to approach Seringapatam from the western side and crossing the Cavery at Sosily he outwitted Tippoo who, expecting an attack from the east, had not destroyed the ample supplies of forage. The progress of the army was slow and it was not until the 5th April that it was in position against the western face of the city. Before commencing the siege in earnest it was necessary to await the arrival of the Bombay force and on the 6th April, Floyd was sent with a detached force, consisting of the 19th Light Dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry and six battalions of infantry, to make contact with Stuart. On the route the enemy's cavalry closely attended the column, but was unable to do any harm. The mission was safely accomplished and the two forces were united on the 14th April.

The matter of supplies became a matter of extreme anxiety and on the 19th April, Floyd was sent with the whole of the cavalry to hasten the arrival of convoys travelling via the Caveriporam Pass and here they remained during the remainder of the siege.

Under the London Gazette for 4th July, 1818, the 19th Lancers* and 22nd Light Dragoons were granted the honour " Seringapatam " and by Army Order 1 of 1913, the distinction was granted to the 19th (Queen Alexandra's Own Royal) Hussars.

* The 19th Light Dragoons had been converted to Lancers in 1817.

BIG GAME SHOOTING IN EAST AFRICA

Some Experiences with Buffalo

By Major L. P. Payne-Gallwey, O.B.E., M.C.,
7th Hussars

I have often heard it said that of all big game the wounded buffalo is the most dangerous. He certainly is a most awkward customer, as he has the disconcerting knack of circling round on his tracks and taking his pursuers in the rear. But what of the wounded lion. He is a very brave man who will follow up the wounded lion in long grass. And the wounded elephant, in certain circumstances, can be as dangerous as either of the others. I dare not express an opinion.

In this article I shall try to recount some experiences I have had with wounded buffalo.

The first two buffalo I ever shot I have recounted in a previous article in this Journal. They were both killed outright, each with one shot and gave one the necessary confidence for future occasions. As so often happens when big game shooting, they were the two best heads I ever shot, though I shot many afterwards.

In February, 1928, I was sent to command an outstation of the 2nd Bn. The King's African Rifles at Masoko.

A word about Masoko. Masoko is situated in the Southern Highlands of Tanganyika Territory, 12 miles south of Tukuyu and 25 miles north of Mwaya, the northern port on Lake Nyasa. It was once described to me by an Inspector General of the K.A.R. as "A little bit of Paradise in Africa."

I have seen a good deal of Africa, but no place has ever attracted me more than Masoko. You motor down from Tukuyu,



MASOKO GARDEN

MASOKO—THE FRONT GARDEN



MASOKO LAKE WITH THE LIVINGSTONE MOUNTAINS BEYOND

two thousand feet. Down hill all the way, through the most fascinating hilly, undulating country, for twelve miles until you turn into a square, stone built, Boma or fort, well and solidly built by the Germans before the war. In the centre of the Boma are some fine cedar and gum trees surrounded by grass, which is cut in the shape of the Iron Cross. You get out of your motor car and in through the officers' mess on to a low verandah. Not until then is the beauty of Masoko revealed. Then, in front of you, is one of the most wonderful views which one could wish to see.

From the verandah stretch green lawns with beds of roses, cannas, peach trees and flowering shrubs, down to a hedge of hybiscus and then a drop of 200 feet, where glistened the clear waters of Masoko Lake. A round crater lake, 800 yards in diameter, as clear as crystal, bordered with fine trees and tropical undergrowth. Thence, 20 miles beyond, the vast waters of Lake Nyasa. To the east the magnificence of the mighty Livingstone Mountains, 9,000 feet the highest point; and to the west, far in the distance, the hills of Northern Rhodesia. Such was our little bit of Paradise.

Big game shooting was to be had within a two hours' march from Masoko, and there were large herds of buffalo within easy reach. Many hunts did I have after them, and in this article I shall try to recount some of the most exciting.

There was one famous place for buffalo about 15 miles from Masoko. A group of salt water pools was a favourite place for them. The place was down on the flats near Lake Nyasa. On this particular occasion I had made my camp near to the salt pools at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and after tea I went out to try and shoot an Impala or Puku, which were numerous on the Mwaya flats close by. Contrary to my usual practice, I took only my .318 magazine rifle, accompanied by my orderly and a local native tracker. We hadn't gone more than a mile from camp and were in a small belt of jungle, when we heard the familiar grunt of buffalo feeding. I remember so well thinking that I wished I had brought my double barrelled rifle. We walked cautiously through the belt of jungle and

there in a clearing were a herd of about thirty buffalo, less than a 100 yards from us. There was a fair bull about eighty yards from me and I could not see another as good, as the herd was vaguely scattered. I therefore decided to have a shot at the bull near me, especially as he presented an easy target. I bowled him over with my first shot. The rest of the herd then galloped off in a mad fury, half right from the fallen buffalo. I followed, making for a large ant heap. When they had gone about 300 yards the herd suddenly stopped and I saw that their leader was a much finer bull than the one I had shot. The whole herd wheeled about and stood for a few seconds gazing in my direction. A fine sight with their heads up, waiting for the signal from their leader to charge back. Then like a charge of cavalry they galloped back towards us, magnificent and awe inspiring. I had reached the ant heap which gave one a certain amount of moral support. The herd looked as if they would gallop straight over it and us. My orderly kept shouting "Bwana, rapid fire," and did his best to demoralise me, but I was much too intent on the leading bull to be put off by him. Straight for the ant heap they charged and I was determined not to fire until he was within fifty yards, but just as they were about fifty yards away, they wheeled to the right and the old bull gave me a grand broadside shot. I fired; he carried on a few yards, and then we saw him roll over behind another ant heap. A lucky shot and a sigh of relief all round. We then walked up to the first buffalo, cautiously and from behind and I put another bullet in behind the ear, just to be quite sure, even though he appeared stone dead. We then approached the ant heap behind which the second buffalo had fallen. We got up to it and were amazed to find that there was no buffalo instead a large pool of blood. The worst had happened, I had shot him in the lungs and he now became a very different proposition, a wounded buffalo, instead of a dead one. How I longed for my double barrelled .475, but it was no use wishing for what one hadn't got; one thing was quite certain, the wounded beast had to be followed up. He couldn't be left to die without every effort being made to put him out of his misery. It was

now 6 p.m., and there remained barely an hour of daylight. He had crossed an open plain about half a mile wide, and then plunged into a large belt of very thick jungle. I hoped we might find him before he got into the jungle, but it was not to be. The jungle really was thick; it wasn't a question of brushing one's way through; half the time it meant crawling. What an opportunity and how easy for him to come round on his tracks and get in behind us. He was easy to track as blood was pouring from the wound and the ground was soft. It was stiflingly hot in that thick undergrowth, added to which intense fear made the sweat pour off me. I kept wishing I had the double barrelled .475 in my hand instead of the .318 magazine rifle. On we went; twice we put him up, and with a bellow off he crashed; though in the first moments we didn't know whether he was coming towards us or going away from us. Once I got a glimpse of him, when I ran up an ant heap and I fired a quick shot at him, but without effect. This went on for an hour, and the light was getting worse and worse, but on we went. My orderly kept urging me to leave him, which I was determined not to do as long as a vestige of light remained. Finally, we came to a particularly dense place, where we could hear him breathing. It was a question of crawling and with my rifle at the ready I wormed my way forward; but for the life of me I couldn't see him. Then with a bellow and a rush he was off. I didn't fire as it was quite impossible to make him out in the dark denseness of the jungle. To go on now was madness; if one did get a shot one couldn't be sure of it and one would only further wound this gallant beast; so disconsolately we retraced our steps to camp.

Next morning before it was light we were off to the place where we had last put him up. There, 500 yards from where we had last heard him, we found him, stone dead, near a pool of water. Poor devil he had had his last drink and then lain down to die. It was some consolation to have found him, and he had a fair head, 45 inches, but how much happier one would have been if one had finished him off the evening before. His head hangs in the Masoko Mess, on the verandah overlooking

the very country, which he must have grazed over so often.

A few weeks afterwards I had another exciting chase after a buffalo. I got a message to say that a herd of elephants were raiding native shambas (gardens), some 15 miles below Masoko. The messenger arrived about noon and by 2 p.m. I was off. We made camp in a deluge of rain about 7 p.m., and it was not until next morning that I saw the havoc this herd of elephant had created. Native huts pushed down, banana groves laid flat and lime trees pulled out by the roots. Complete ruin to the wretched native. I got into that herd of elephant that morning and shot two bulls, neither of them holding much ivory, but it scared them away from that neighbourhood.

Then that same evening another message came that another herd of elephant were raiding shambas some ten miles away. News travels quickly in Africa and they had already heard that I had shot two elephant that morning.

I ordered a move of camp next day to this area. We were off by 6 a.m. and by mid-day we were up with the herd. Again no good tuskers, but they, too, had to be moved on and again I took toll of two bulls. We got back to our new camp about 4 p.m. and I was having a cup of tea, my boots off and very weary, when a native came in to say that there were two lone buffalo grazing about half a mile away. I had been after these two buffalo before and was most anxious to get a shot at them. The native is a good sportsman and if he knows the Bwana is keen on shooting he will always bring him news. Not always for the reward he may get, but because he likes to see dangerous game killed.

I soon had my boots on and we were off. This time I carried my double barrelled .475 and my orderly carried the .318. As we went along I kept saying to myself, a right and left will be very pleasing; no wounded stuff this time. We came out of a belt of light bush into an open glade, where we picked up their spoor and for a moment the tracker was at a loss. Then I saw them to our left, about 50 yards away. Two fine bulls and they were grazing quite unsuspicious with their tails towards us. I moved to get the heart shot and

as I did so one of them also turned. An easy shot and I fired at his great neck. Almost instantaneously he fell and with a startled bellow the other dashed forward giving me only a quarter view of his body. A thud and a loud grunt; he stumbled, but didn't fall and off he went. I had killed with my right, but only wounded with my left. But surely with that heavy bullet in him, he couldn't go far. I went up to the fallen buffalo and put another bullet behind his ear. Then off we went after the wounded animal. He wasn't bleeding heavily, in fact blood spoor was light. I hoped it indicated that the bullet had lodged in some big muscle and that we should soon find him. A belt of thick bush gave hope that we should find him there, but he had gone through it and across an open plain. It was now about 6.30 p.m., only half-an-hour of daylight left to us. His tracks were faint and blood spoor light which made our progress slow. The chances that we should find him before dark were now small. Then as so often happens, for no apparent reason, we lost his tracks and the hunt for that day was over. On our way back to camp we passed the dead buffalo, now reduced to small pieces, as the natives from the village near our camp had wasted no time in cutting up the meat. I was a little disappointed with the head which though thick only measured 44 inches.

How one hates leaving a wounded animal and I didn't feel at all sanguine that we should find him next day, as the plain over which he had gone was dry and the blood spoor almost nil.

We were off next morning at dawn and for the first hour and a half we could make nothing of it. Then the tracker made a lucky cast. Some low-lying ground, where once had been a pool of water—we suddenly picked up his tracks. A little further on, a form of matted grass and a pool of half-dry blood where he had lain down. Our spirits rose. A few hundred yards ahead of us a belt of high pampas grass. Unpleasant stuff through which to follow up a wounded buffalo in, but undoubtedly we should find him there. Tracking now became easy, as the ground was soft and blood spoor more frequent. He took us into the pampas grass, high above our heads, very

thick and stiflingly hot. Most unpleasant from our point of view, ideal from his, as he could lay up anywhere and come up from behind without our knowing it.

Cautiously we pushed our way through and all of a sudden there was a snort and a rush. A black mass dashed away in front of us. He had been laying down and had left a pool of blood behind him. On we went very cautiously. Again we put him up and I took a quick shot at him without effect. What beastly stuff high grass is. One feels so shut in and helpless; nothing can be more unpleasant. Slowly we followed him and at last he took us out of the pampas grass into the open plain. What a relief to be out of that hot, stifling, dark atmosphere. But it was only a short way for his tracks led back again into the grass. For a short while we were at a loss as to where he had entered. My orderly and the tracker were ahead to my left, when suddenly, like a shot from a gun, out he came straight at me. I just had time to put up my rifle and fire. No time to poke or hesitate. A lucky shot right between the eyes and he fell not five yards from where I stood, a great black mass with those massive horns. It was all over so quickly, one hadn't time to be frightened, but what would have frightened me, if it hadn't happened simultaneously, was that my orderly, thinking that I must assuredly be trampled to death by this great beast, had fired my second rifle which he was carrying, and from the angle at which he fired the bullet must have been perilously near me. Luckily for him I was so relieved at having killed the buffalo, instead of being trampled on, that I let him off very lightly. The buffalo was a fine old bull, his horns measuring 46 inches. It was then about 9 a.m. and by 3 p.m. I was back again at Masoko.

My last buffalo hunt from Masoko I took a young subaltern with me, who had never shot one. We had news that a herd of buffalo were down on the Songwe River about twenty miles from Masoko. It was a large herd and I had been after them several times, but only once got into them when I got one bull out of them. We got into them this time down by the river. I pointed out a good bull and he took a shot. It wasn't

an easy shot, as the grass was high. He hit him all right, but rather far back and off they dashed into a large belt of pampas grass. Hateful stuff through which to follow up a wounded buffalo, but the herd had made a nice wide track and we were able to see a few yards in front of us. We hadn't gone more than three or four hundred yards when out he came.

The tracker who was in front precipitated himself with great dexterity into the pampas grass and my young friend tripped himself up and somersaulted himself into the grass, the buffalo missing him only by inches. I couldn't help laughing, it was all enacted so quickly and subconsciously. It was now my turn and I fired. My first shot must have gone over his head, but my second shot smashed his skull and down he came, much to the relief of myself and my young friend, who had picked himself up and was once more prepared to take an active part. His first buffalo had provided him with plenty of excitement and though by no means a record, it was quite a fair head, 45 inches. We finished up the morning by shooting a hippo and a good water buck, and were back at Masoko in time for dinner.

TALES OF TOMSK

By Siegfried P.

4. *The Tsar Monk.*

It was a hot Sunday afternoon in the summer of 1919. In the quarters of the British Military Mission at Tomsk, Siberia, all was still. Lieutenant Crawley gazed idly at the ceiling. He was lying at full length on his bed. The room was bare of furniture save four beds, two washing-stands and a number of trunks.

"Have you been to see the house where the Tsar Monk fellow is supposed to have lived, Railey?" he asked by way of making conversation.

Captain Railey was reading a magazine. He looked up, his mind still occupied with his story. "What d'you say—Monk fellow?" Crawley repeated his question. Johnson entered at this moment. He was a student of Russian affairs. "Oh! Yes. You mean the Emperor Alexander I. He gave out that he'd died from a chill. He had a soldier buried instead of him, took Holy Orders and came to live here."

Railey rallied to the occasion, as usual. "Rot! I don't believe a word of it. I remember reading something in French which Madame Parlovich lent me, proving the whole thing was bunkum. Fellows are too credulous. If I disappeared and went to Timbuctoo, I could easily pass as a Prester John with an endless life. Then there's the Wandering Jew, and I remember a Varsity chap spoofing every one that he was the Rajah of Bong and getting free meals on a battleship and the Freedom of Oxford or something of the sort. Anyway, I'm a modern. I don't believe in all this church business."

Railey spoke with gusto. Inwardly he was very uncertain in his doubting. He hated being indefinite about anything. His annoyance accounted for the inconsequence of his speech.

"You'd better be careful, Joe," smiled Johnson. "You get interpreter Jellybags to tell you the yarn about the Tsar Monk, and the good he did, and how he was able to convert unbelievers. A local legend has it that if a man openly denies his creed on a Sunday the Monk still exercises his power although he's dead. Same people say that he was really buried in a secret place in the forest. I know that some of the peasants are afraid of the dark round the town."

"They are everywhere," Railey put in, shortly. "It's robbers, not ghosts, whom they're afraid of. Anyway, it's tea-time. I'm going for a ride after tea. Miakiznak—what fool names Pelman did give our horses—is back from the horse hospital, and I think he ought to do me for that paper chase.

"Miakiznak means 'a soft sound-ending: see Russian Grammar, Page One,'" quoted Johnson.

"Huh! Sit on his head someone. You jolly well try Tveordiznak,* that brute of a brown. You'll have a hard and sounder ending, I hope; Russian Grammar and all."

The sun was low as two hours later Railey cantered up a woodland path. The leafy foliage was assuming a rusty red. Railey admired nature hugely, though he did not like to show it to others.

He reined up on entering a clearing and gasped. "By Jove! What a wonderful spot!" Leaning forward in his saddle he patted Miakiznak's warm neck, as he gazed about him.

Before him stood a rosy-hued chapel of noble aspect, round and buttressed, mellow in the light of the sinking sun. A semi-circle of sombre forest encased it, whilst as immediate protection it was surrounded by a "crown of thorns" as Railey recalled it always to himself—a zareba of brambles, which made access to the immediate precincts impossible. The precincts, too, were a tangle of weeds and bright wild flowers, delphiniums and dog-rose, right up to the huge wooden door studded with iron nails.

* Until Russian spelling was revolutionised, every word ended with either "tveordiznak," a hard vowel sign, or with "Miakiznak," a soft vowel sign. The former is omitted nowadays.

A casement of wrought iron high in the wall caught his eye as it strayed upwards. Above, a blue cupola bowed to the sky, a golden cross on high. Railey was overcome.

"I feel just like Sir Galahad and the Holy Grail somehow. I wonder what this place is. Funny thing that I've never seen it or heard of it before." He stared, open mouthed.

The shades of evening were long on the grasss before he pulled himself together, sighed, lighted a cigarette and strolled towards his horse cropping the short grass at the foot of a tree.

His back now to the chapel, a wonderful panorama spread before him in the setting sun. The slopes of the valley were olive green below purple woods. Hill and dale stood out in sharp relief. The sky glowed orange and mauve.

"It's very late—come on old man," he cried to Miakiznak. As they entered the forest path, a tall and gaunt figure, somewhat bent by age, caused the animal to shy. Railey reined up and gave him "Dobri Vecher" (good evening). The bearded face looked at him from the shade of the trees.

"What's that church?" Railey asked the man in his faulting Russian. The old man replied slowly in a tired but friendly voice. Railey seldom understood Russian, but it seemed easy to understand this chap.

"Some say that the Tsar Monk built a last resting place for himself in the woods to the glorious memory of his Saviour. It requires faith to believe legends nowadays. There is a tale, though, that some unbelieving sect settled hereabouts and used His church to build themselves a hamlet."

"I've seen no hamlet hereabouts—but how d'you mean used his church?" cut in Railey.

"You are a stranger, Barin (master), are you not? I must be going. Good night to you," replied the tall man without answering Railey's question. He passed on in the shadows.

"Funny looking sort of a dressing gown he has on as a coat," thought Railey. "I wonder what he meant."

* * * * *

"Confound it all—I must have dropped my cigarette case by that chapel," exclaimed Railey after fumbling in his pockets after supper in mess that night.

After parade on the following afternoon he asked Johnson to come along and "try out Tveordiznak against my soft steed. I can show you a wonderful church, and I must find my cigarette case."

They rode up the woodland path at a walk. "I met a curious old fellow here last night. Most interesting chap. Now you'll see something fine," Railey remarked as they emerged from the trees.

"By Jove, yes! Lovely, isn't it?" exclaimed Johnson. "What an ideal spot to build a house." He continued to expatiate on the site, paying no attention to his companion luckily.

Railey was white. Before him lay a semi-circle of forest, and in the centre an acre of brambles. A bank of delphiniums caught his eye and dog-rose in the thicket.

"What about your church? Let's have a look at it, Joe," broke in Johnson. "Hullo! Man—What's the matter?"

"Oh, I don't know. Must have been that red caviare for tea. I'll just get off for a moment."

He put his head in his hands as he sat down heavily on the grass. His eyes fell on the missing cigarette case.

Railey pulled himself together with an effort and automatically extracted a Gold Flake. "I'll be all right," he said gulping, as Johnson bent over him. "We'll cut out the church to-day. It must be a bit further on. I must have made a mistake. Places are very like each other in the forest."

Railey was very silent on the way home. He got Johnson to tell him all he knew about the Emperor Alexander I.

"Funny you're being so interested after all, Joe. I don't believe you mean half you say."

"You might take me along to the Cathedral next Sunday. I've never been, you know," was all Railey vouchsafed in reply.

He never mentioned the chapel again to anyone, and he never heard anyone else claim to have seen a chapel in the woods.

GROUSE AND BLACKGAME ON A ROUGH SHOOT.

By Richard Clapham.

If the bank balance won't run to a dogging or driving moor, you can have a lot of fun on a rough hill-shoot that holds a small stock of grouse and blackgame. A season or two on such a shoot soon convinces you of the truth of the old adage: "Half a loaf is better than no bread. As a matter of fact it is a great deal better, for although your thousand acres or so of heather-covered allotments and rough hill pastures are inadequate to provide sport for a team of guns, they afford plenty of scope for a single-handed campaign, with now and then a field day when a couple of friends join you.

On such ground, at any rate south of the Border, your grouse won't lie to a dog, except perhaps very early in the season, so it is not worth while keeping a pointer or setter. You kill most of your birds by walking them up, and stalking them round the knolls and hillocks, with an impromptu drive now and then when you can secure the services of a couple of extra guns, and enlist some of the family to help as beaters.

To the man accustomed to big days with grouse, a shoot of this kind may seem very small beer. There are compensations, however. If you live near your ground you can slip out for an hour or two at any time without making preparations beforehand, and you can choose your days according to the weather. While your bag may be a drop in the ocean as bags go, say fifty brace for the season, the getting of it will afford you endless pleasure, and teach you a whole lot about grouse. You will have to work hard, especially late in the season when birds are wild and strong; but after a tiring day you have the satisfaction of knowing that you have done it all off your own bat.

As our American cousins say: "It is not all of shooting just to shoot," and this is peculiarly applicable to your ground,

because you get in the way of examining the contents of the bag each day, and perhaps hold post mortems on the contents of crops and gizzards, notes on which are entered in your game book, together with records of plumage, weights, and other items of interest.

While grouse and blackgame form the mainstay of your shoot a mixed bag is always possible. The occasional woodcock turns up, and there is usually a covey or two of hill-partridges and a scattering of wild pheasants. Hares are present in fair numbers, and the low ground holds plenty of rabbits. The shoot is not particularly attractive to snipe, for although a few breed there, they leave soon after the shooting season opens. The same can be said of duck, only more so, as there are no pools or ponds to attract them.

You have to act as your own keeper, which means doing a bit of trapping, as well as shooting any feathered vermin, such as carrion crows and magpies, that nest on the grouse ground or its environs. In winter your small partridge breeding stock will be all the better if you put down some food for them, and if natural grit is scarce, your grouse will appreciate an artificial supply. Tunnel traps may be kept set all the year round, as stoats and weasels run the stone walls and are for ever encroaching on your ground, more especially if the surrounding country is unpreserved. Needless to say you must keep in with the shepherds and farmers, both of whom can be your very good friends, or the reverse.

A dog of some sort is practically indispensable for this kind of shooting. The choice rests between an active spaniel, not too small, and a retriever. The latter is perhaps to be preferred. Such a dog, when constantly out with you, is nearly as useful as a setter or pointer at scenting grouse, and he will show by his actions where they are. His chief work is, of course, to retrieve dead and wounded birds. Without a dog a percentage of runners are bound to be lost, no matter how well you mark their fall.

Some of your best grouse bags will be made in August and September, especially if the weather is hot. Later in the season, however, you will get better shooting, for walking is easier with

a touch of frost in the air and the birds are wilder and afford less easy chances. Your blackgame will be better left alone till the end of September or beginning of October, for there is no fun in mopping up the young broods that lie like stones. It is not until the latter month that the young blackcocks assume their black, or blue-black plumage. You may, of course, get chances at both old blackcocks and greyhens early in the season, which you will naturally take advantage of.

If your ground happens to be rough and steep, like mine is, your shooting friends may fight shy of a second invitation to join you. I have known this to happen more than once. There is a tendency amongst young fellows nowadays to take their shooting easily, and unless they are really keen, steep ground seems too much like hard work. In the north of England the land comprising a shoot of this nature is often in the hands of several owners, or tenants. In Westmorland, for example, many of the dalesmen hold their lands by customary tenure. They are known as "statesmen," otherwise the yeomen of old English song. Securing sufficient land therefore to make a worth-while shoot, means dickering with perhaps half-a-dozen people as regards rent. These farmers, who have owned their own land for generations, are for the most part good sportsmen, and once you have got to know them properly you will find no better friends. If you can rent areas of ground contiguous to each other so much the better. It means that you can have your little drives with some chance of success, otherwise you perhaps have the mortification of seeing your birds settle in "Naboth's vineyard," where for the time being they are safe.

By the end of your first season you will know every hole and corner of your ground, as well as the flight lines of grouse and blackgame when they are flushed at different points. Even when you are conversant with the latter it requires a great deal of finesse to drive the birds over a narrow front such as can be commanded by two, or at the most, three guns. On a regular driving moor, with plenty of grouse and a team of seven or eight guns covering a wide front, success is more or less assured provided the line of butts is properly placed with regard to the wind. You will make many mistakes when driving your small

GROUSE NEST AND EGGS

YOUNG GROUSE

WAITING FOR BLACKGAME.
AN IMPROMPTU DRIVE ON A ROUGH SHOOT

WALKING UP GROUSE ON A
ROUGH SHOOT

stock of birds, but sooner or later your lucky day will arrive and you will be amply repaid for your previous disappointments. Walls, peat hags, knolls, or rocks will serve you in place of butts, for it is not worth while building the latter.

To kill grouse by walking-up and stalking the likely places, advantage must be taken of every bit of cover in the way of knolls and gullies. Silence is also to be commended. It is most exasperating to be out with somebody who constantly talks, coughs, or clatters over stones just when you are approaching ground which usually holds birds. Believe me, treading softly has much to do with getting grouse or blackgame into the bag.

At a shooting school you can learn all there is to know about stance and foot-work, but I'm afraid when walking a steep hill-side you haven't time to practise it if you want to stop a brace out of that fast disappearing covey.

In the early part of the season grouse lie best during the heat of the day. In wild and windy weather you will find them on the lee sides of the knolls and ridges. Always work round a knoll rather than over the top of it. When shots are perhaps few and far between, it is sometimes difficult to concentrate as you walk your ground. Your thoughts switch on to other things and your attention wavers. As sure as this happens so surely will birds take you by surprise. This most often happens when you are walking what is usually an unproductive bit, and you possibly stop to light a pipe. Both grouse and blackgame have their favourite resting and feeding places, but there are occasions when you flush them in the most unexpected spots. For this reason it pays to be always on the alert.

Blackgame are warier than grouse but they do foolish things at times. If, for example, you spot birds on a hill-face and walk directly towards them, instead of making off along the face as grouse would do, they often fly straight out and come right over you. Many a wary old blackcock have I killed in this manner. Blackgame are more difficult to drive than grouse, and once they have made up their minds to go in a certain direction they will do so despite hell and high water. When you come to think of it, grouse are foolish birds in allowing themselves to be driven day after day over fixed lines of butts when they could

just as easily avoid them. It is this very foolishness on their part that provides us with so much good sport.

Except during an impromptu drive most of the shots you get on your rough shoot are of the going away variety. Now and again a bird may swing back with the wind and offer you a crossing shot, or a blackcock or greyhen may leave a hill-face and swing out and over you. Many snap-shots will have to be taken at birds dipping over ridges or flashing round knolls. You must be ready to shoot quick or you will miss a lot of chances.

If there are straggling larch plantations or coppice woods on the moor borders there you will often find the blackgame. They feed to a great extent in late autumn on tree and bush fruits, but they also haunt the heather ground and the pastures, where they search for sorrel leaves, hawk's beard, rush and grass seeds, caterpillars, etc. If there are mountain ash trees and the crop of red berries is a good one the blackgame will concentrate on them to the almost total exclusion of other food. They are nearly as keen on hawthorn berries. Heather appeals to them, but the examination of a large number of blackgame crops points to the fact that some birds eat far more of it than others. One often kills blackgame whose crops are empty of heather. A ghyll, the sides of which are studded with birch and rowan trees, is an almost sure find for blackgame.

With his blue-black plumage and curly tail there are few finer game birds than an old blackcock. The greyhen's brown dress is more prosaic, but she is quite as sporting a bird when she comes down-wind over you. It was formerly the practice to kill blackcocks only, but the sparing of greyhens only leads to a race of ancient and unfertile females which are better out of the way. Greyhens seen on the playing grounds from the middle of May onwards with blackcocks in attendance, can safely be set down as sterile, for at that time fertile greyhens are sitting on eggs.

When the bag is a small one you get into the way of examining the individual birds. By doing so you gradually accumulate a considerable amount of useful information. Perhaps you kill an extra heavy grouse, weighing 28 ozs. or 29 ozs. The record

weight for a grouse is 35 ozs. but you will be lucky if you kill one of 30 ozs. Then again you see the different types of grouse plumage: the red, the black, or the white-spotted, all of which are at their best towards the end of the season. There are few prettier birds than a cock grouse of the white-spotted type. Then there are crop and gizzard contents to be examined. In September you may find over 100 mountain ash berries in a blackcock's crop and 220 grains weight of quartz grit in the bird's gizzard to grind its food.

Towards the end of the season you may have difficulty in getting a team of guns together on a driving moor. Standing in a butt is apt to be cold work at that time of year and there are counter attractions in the way of partridges and pheasants. On your rough shoot it is different. Walking keeps you warm, no matter what the weather, and you make a practice of killing a brace or two on the tenth of December as a good finish to the season. Should snow fall before that date it pays to make a tour of your ground as you can then see what four footed vermin there is about and take measures accordingly.

While most of your shooting will be done with a twelve bore it is useful to have a .22 rifle. Both grouse and blackgame can be stalked and shot with it and rabbits provide endless targets. Grouse are little alarmed by the report of a .22, and even if a bird or two are knocked over the rest of the covey pay scant attention to their unlucky mates. In this respect grouse are much less sophisticated than most other birds.

Towards the end of the season, when the mornings are cold and frosty, you can try your hand at "becking" for grouse, otherwise calling them. In the north of England this used to be a common practice amongst poachers. Nowadays, however, little of it seems to be done. Becking is not necessarily poaching; for many a keeper used to kill a brace or two for the larder by this means. Calling grouse is usually done by means of a clay pipe-stem. The caller imitates the cry of the hen grouse, which may be written "youe, youe, youe." If the call is properly sounded a cock grouse is pretty sure to answer it. At the first faint streak of dawn it is the habit of the cocks to rise to a height of twenty feet or so and then drop while uttering

their cry "err-beck, beck, beck, goback, goback, goback." A period of dry frost is the best for becking. It means leaving your bed long before dawn, and when you have reached your ground you ensconce yourself behind the shelter of a peat hag or a stone wall. At that hour of the morning it is devilish cold, and a little drop of something in a flask is useful for warming your interior arrangements while you wait in absolute silence till your surroundings become more or less visible. Perhaps you hear a grouse begin to call and you reply, or you start calling and a bird answers you. Call follows call until a cock grouse draws closer and closer, finally "sitting up," as the locals say, on a knoll or other slight prominence within range of your hiding place. You then let drive and shoot your bird on the ground. A brace or two can sometimes be killed at the one spot.

There are many yarns concerning poachers who used to practise the art of becking in Yorkshire and the Lake District. On one occasion a well-known poacher set off to call grouse on a moor where the keeper was his particular enemy. The man arrived at his hiding place and began to call and was soon answered by a grouse. Just as he was about to shoot, and much to his astonishment, another gun went off and knocked it over. Recognising the shooter the poacher thought it best to slip away, and so made for home. A few hours later the keeper called at the poacher's house and started to pull his leg by asking: "What's matter thou isn't out this morning?" to which the exasperated poacher replied: "If thou'd been a minute longer lad, thou'd have seen whether I was out or not."

On another occasion a certain villager armed with a single barrel muzzle-loader shot his first grouse and after reloading saw the bird still standing there. Thinking he must have missed it after all he let go again, and once more it disappeared. To cut a long story short, the man fired no less than ten shots before the grouse fell for good. On going over to pick it up what was his surprise to find no fewer than ten birds lying dead in the heather. A party of grouse had been together, and as one ascended the knoll for a look round and was shot another took its place until the whole lot were accounted for. Grouse beck

better on some days than others. They will answer the call at any time during the season, but the last months of the year are the best.

On a rough shoot of the moorland type it pays to carry a light pair of field glasses with you. Hill ground affords a wide range of view and you can often pick up birds with the glass when spying. There are times, too, when you spot something that you are not quite sure of and the glass promptly settles the question.

At all times of year the rough shoot is a pleasant place on which to spend your leisure hours. There is always something to be done in the way of trapping, heather burning, etc., during the off season. In spring the curlews and lapwings are back in their nesting quarters, filling the air with their cries, and overhead you hear the drumming of snipe. From the playing grounds of the blackgame come the whirrooing love-calls of the blackcocks, reminding you at a distance of the sound of running water. If you leave your bed betimes and ensconce yourself near one of these playing grounds you will see the blackcocks showing off to the greyhens. They spread their curly tails over their backs, trail their wings on the ground, and step sedately along, calling as they go.

About the 20th of July you can walk round to see how your grouse have done. Choose a fine day with a breeze blowing and walk up-wind so that the young broods you flush swing back to right or left, thus minimising the chance of flushing the same brood twice. Granted the breeding season has been a good one, you will have ocular evidence that the birds are there, and when the long-awaited Twelfth comes round it is up to you to bring them to bag.

"*A GLIMPSE OF PERSIA*"

By H. C. Maydon.

More than half the joy of big game hunting comes from the exploring of new country. Any keen shikari will always have his ears open and his eyes skinned for new clues of game.

It was from hints given in his writing by Colonel Kennion, a name not unknown to travellers in the East, that sent us exploring for game in N.E. Persia, not so many years ago. My advice is that it is a fair land of adventure, but don't choose the winter months for your visit.

It was early January that our caravan reached Shahrud on the Teheran-Meshed road and bound for the far province of Bujnurd. We were tired and half frozen already, for we had trekked 300 miles with camel and horse wagon transport, and had explored all the detached group of hills at the northern end of the great salt desert. Wild sheep and ibex had been seen and several shot, but we had failed to find a real good head. That they did or had existed—the real big heads—was proved now and again by bleached trophies decorating some lonely tomb or the porch of a wayside caravan-serai. But no shikari—not even from the most infamous poachers—could show us such in the flesh. The edict against the universal carrying of fire arms was only just in force and every hillside had its sangar of stones, where the native gunner lay up for his meat.

And so in despair we turned our steps towards Bujnurd, a province which crowns the Elburz Mountains and, overlooking the Caspian, rubs shoulders with Afghanistan and Russian Turkestan. Fancy the thrill of it, on the borders of the forbidden lands!

Unfortunately we had been warned that official sanction was necessary to enter the unsettled country on the borderlands. After a long and impatient delay at Teheran we received the

hint that such sanction was more than doubtful. As we intended to go we thought it best not to wait for our rebuff but to play the idiot boy, disappear into the "Blue" and leaving no address, suddenly appear from nowhere. This accounts for our initial chukker far to the south; officially we were safely out of harm's way, lost and forgotten.

But we were forced to visit Shahrud—a semi-official town at the southern foot of the Elburz, both for re-provisioning and to change our transport from horse wagons to pack animals. No white man can go trekking in Persia without causing a slight stir of curiosity if not of suspicion. The common belief was that we were prospecting for oil—if not Bolsheviki in disguise—in any case we were not popular in the towns.

Our business done in Shahrud we had decided that to reach Dasht—our longed for hunting centre—we must pass through Nardin, at the head of the southern passes up to the heights of the Elburz. There is a direct road from Shahrud to Nardin but that was too obvious. We counted on the Shahrud authorities being too pre-occupied to ask questions about us from H.Q. at Teheran by telegraph, but they might do so by letter, and we might be overtaken and stopped on the main road.

So we gave out that we were bound for Sabsowar and Meshed and duly set off with pack camels. Half way to Sabsowar we went into a local and unhopeful shooting camp and after two days' delay suddenly jinked northwards and made direct for one of the little known nullahs, which drains down from the mountain tops.

Trekking in northern Persia on the main roads in winter is bad enough, for there is a blizzard blowing or a heavy fall of sleet or snow half the days in the week and nothing but a smelly, smoky, unfurnished hut to camp in by night. But trekking across country is the height of discomfort. There is practically no fire wood, fresh drinking water is scarce and the terrain nothing but a succession of isolated stony koppies, alternating with salt-rimed steppes with a crust of soft sticky mud.

Yet even trekking under such conditions has its compensations, if you are keen on poking about with gun and rifle and are blessed with the precious gift of imagination.

Half the lure of the East and more is its sense of freedom. Bar a special game reserve of the Shah's outside Teheran all the rest of the land is yours to hunt at your own free will. As you tramp ahead of your long column of pack animals, ponies or camels, you are ever alert for a likely group of hills to explore for ibex or wild sheep, or, for a way-side swamp that may harbour duck and snipe, or, for the call of francolin on the hill sides. Time and again when your larder is empty, and you have quartered the plains and hills in vain, comes, at sunset, the queer call of Imperial sand grouse and small flights of these birds pass low overhead, bound from the desert to nearest water.

As we neared the hills the sporting instinct of the local peasants improved. Beaters were to be had for the asking and men, young and old, keen to lead us to the haunts of game.

But leaving sport aside there are daily queer things to see and hear. Like India, it is a country that has lived and waned, and with its passing, history has left its land marks. Here and there in gorge and pass are ancient carvings and inscriptions, a ruined tomb or temple, a lonely cairn which may have dated since Alexander's day or when the Mongol horde broke loose and flooded westward.

And in every march there looms up by the wayside, or stands isolated grandly on plain or hill, the husk of an ancient castle, with crenellated walls, towers and turrets all complete. From afar they frown proud defiance and a power in the land, and, it is not till you approach that you will see that they are fallen into ruin, like chocolate castles melting in the wind and storm and summer heats. Climbing over the *débris* of a broken wall, from which long since the studded wooden door has been reft, you will find beyond the court a once impregnable keep, boasting banquet halls and stone chambers, dongons below, stables for many horses and maybe a swimming pool, where once was a garden where roses grew. Now all its grandeur has vanished with the men who built it, and their home is, at the best, but a shelter for goats and sheep.

But in Persia all this power that has been and has gone has been replaced by nothing. There are no railways nor roads worthy of the name, though jolting, groaning motor cars may

squelch by you in a spray of mud and reek of petrol. There are no factories nor prosperous towns. The farms themselves seem to lie fallow and derelict. Hotels are none but caravanserais, where in a bare, cell-like room you may overlook a seething courtyard, to which daily comes a string of laden camels or ponies, wayfarers as yourself. The atmosphere is still mediæval, but it lacks the clank and dash of armoured hosts and the spirit of the feudal barons in their once stately castles. It is a dead country, crushed by the distant hum of civilisation afar off, beyond the rim of the world.

Queer characters pass. A German lad on a motor bike—with no impedimenta save what he carried in a haversack—bound for Afghanistan to seek his fortune, a bourne whence no traveller returns. Swallowed in the mists of the unknown. What has been his fate?

A Russian royalist, broken and hunted, stranded in the mountains with the wreck of a motor car, his only possession, by which as a taxi-man he tried to eke his way.

An Armenian orange farmer on the shores of the Caspian, who gave us asylum two nights when we had lost our baggage train. Hardly a sentence between us in any *lingua franca* and yet the kindest host. Our bond the fact that we were English and a mutual dislike of the Soviets, just across the Caspian waters.

Another friend in need, the British representative at Barfurush, a Pathan from N. India, speaking only Pushtu and Persian. He was the leading spirit in a band of Indian settlers and farmers from N. India who had settled along the shores of the Caspian. When news of our advent came to him he called to offer his services. Wayside farms were thrown open to us as billets for the night.

Our benefactor rode at our elbow and for three days our route was lined with his countrymen to give us greeting, British visitors, their own Sahib—log, in an alien land. Such are the days to bring pride of one's race, when merely to say "I am English" opens doors and brings the smile of welcome.

Myself, one day lost temporarily and strayed from the snowbound track on the frozen sierras. Our wagons marching close

by, somewhere in the blizzard, bound for a village, whose name alone I knew. No wayfarers nor huts seen for an hour and an uneasy feeling beginning to stir its coils.

Suddenly the tramp of horses and from the mists emerges the winding column of a Persian Cavalry Regiment on the march. The most unlikely yet the most fitting wraiths of the storm. Yet should they not be clad in armour or bolstered in leather jerkins, pricked with the long lances of the Mongols?

As they clattered by me at the trot on a frozen road, from the tail dropped back a solitary subaltern and dismounting fell in by my side.

My knowledge of Persian being fragmentary we at last picked our way to speech in a medley of French and German. Hobnobbing thus and discussing all things from cabbages to kings, he led me finally to the village of my quest and there, on the mud verandah of a tea house, we sipped our sugary tea and awaited the arrival of my baggage wagons. Then in all friendship we parted.

To some of us the joy of life is foreign travel, just beyond the beaten track. What tales there might be to tell if only we had the trick of quick fluency in an alien tongue?

On the third day across the plains we hit the mouth of our nullah amid the foothills of the Elburz and began to climb gently up a broad and cultivated valley. The going was better, or rather less glutinously muddy, and there were wayside villages in which to camp.

At the end of the second day of the ascent our broad valley had narrowed almost to a gorge, nursing our little used bye pass, and we were half way up the mountains in a region of deep snow fields. It was good game country here and we halted for two days to try our luck. Our camp was sheltered in the gorge, but scrub for firewood was scarce and a raging blizzard finally drove us forward. I bagged a fine sheep here (Ovis Arkali, 35″) and picked up the heads of so many more, killed by accident, leopard or poacher, that I was able to hazard a guess at three varieties. The smaller and common Ovis Vignei, whose species stretches from Sardinia, across the Taurus and Persia, along the lower, southern Elburz and on through N. India, successively named

Mouflon, Gad and Oorial. The Ovis Arkali of N. Persia and Afghanistan. The Bokhara sheep, with a very fine and slender spread of horns, measuring to over 45″ and, in my belief, the first link of the Ovis Poli.

It was an arduous day for our camels that last day's march up the passes to Nardin, over snow and slippery rock. Nardin is perched on a grassy plateau at the very top of the Elburz and is nothing but a bleak village of stone huts encircled by the bare skeletons of poplar and apricot trees.

Unwarned of our intended sacrilege, and, glad enough perhaps of a stranger to break the monotony, the local Persian governor received us hospitably and helped us to change our transport to mountain ponies.

A three days' march across the mountain tops, hereabouts a succession of plateaux, with deep snow fields in the hollows, and, broken by a fruitless excursion after wild sheep, brought us to Dasht.

The memory of that last march into Dasht lingers for ever. For two months we had been trekking hard, mostly on our flat feet. We were bone weary. We had seldom been really warm since we left Teheran, and we had never seen a good warm sun. When it did deign to appear it was nothing but that feeble, watery affair that we know so well in England in the bad months. Firewood had been so scarce that we had had to be content with a hot bath once a week with luck. We had not been fortunate with our shooting and we were most uncertain what would be our reception at Dasht.

But now for the first time for weeks we could make out on the horizon a line of timber, the edge of a forest ahead. It was huge camp fires that we longed for and comfortable sites. As an old shikari wrote of Africa: "Trees are the natural furniture of camp life." As one pines for water in the desert so one pines for trees in the frozen wilds.

Dasht village lies at the head of a deep wooded ravine or cañon which drains down from the heights of the Elburz towards the Caspian Sea. So we felt at last that we had broken the back of the barren mountains and had opened the way to the warmer and densely wooded country which encloses the Caspian.

The last few miles were down hill along a broad shallow valley. The snow fields faded away, herds of goats, sheep and cattle appeared and quaint, little rough stone built villages tucked away in shelter.

Dasht itself was not imposing. It was the usual large straggling Persian village, but the chocolate-brown mud huts of the southern slopes had given place to well raftered, rough stone buildings. At a glance it was obvious that timber was cheap hereabouts.

The whole atmosphere was encouraging. The sun seemed warmer. Our eyes were glued to the heavy forest in the gorge a mile or so away and to the forest belt above us. On many a portal hung the weathered skulls and horns of fine wild sheep, Persian ibex and for the first time Maral stag. Our only misgivings were banished when we were ushered into the presence of the head man of the town, known by his courtesy title of the "Yuzbashi."

He was a tall, thin man, past his prime, with more than a touch of Turki blood in his veins. Both in looks and manner he much resembled a typical Pathan. Though we spoke bad Persian (we had long found that neither Urdu nor Arabic were of much avail) we had no difficulty with the Yuzbashi. He did the talking. He was the most voluble man we had met but also the most courteous. He was one of the very few that knew us for Englishmen at once, and as such deserving of the best. Almost his first act was to offer us his own house as our asylum, and having put his own servants in train to make us comfortable, he rushed off for something most important to show us. This something was an ancient chit, twenty years' old, a recommendation in English by that same Colonel Kennion, whose writings had sent us on our travels.

According to the Yuzbashi we were the first Englishmen who had passed that way in all those years. It says much for Colonel Kennion's prestige that his memory was still so brightly green that his countrymen might profit by it.

For two days we rested and revelled in hot baths, while a succession of local shikaris were summoned and their knowledge sifted. The Yuzbashi by his own account had been a keen hunter

in his youth, but those days had gone. Now he was very much the zealous feudal lord of Persia urging a constant guerilla warfare with the truculent Turcoman mountaineers, a constant thorn in the side of the Persians. I wonder? I have a sneaking feeling that the Yuzbashi was a clever enough man to play a trifle on both sides.

Down in the Caspian valley, not so many marches away, we were later to find a Persian town enmeshed with barbed wire entanglements and heavily defended by machine guns, the outposts of an army. We were to be greeted as mad and thrice fortunate refugees from the no man's land of destruction. Yet up there in far away Dasht, on the fringe of disorder, was naught but peace and quiet and calmly devised plans for hunting, where and when we listed.

The Yuzbashi had a penchant for old Bokhara rugs and our quarters were thickly strewn with them. He would show us his collection with animation, but he would not part with them for love or money. One thing only tempted him and that was one of D's rifles. A bargain was concluded, very much against the law I fear, and now one of D's most cherished possessions is a priceless rug from far away Dasht.

On the third day my preparations were complete for a final hunt before we left the heights for good. From my several interviews with shikaris I gathered that from one camp, with luck, one might see wild sheep, ibex, stag and even Persian tiger. Gazelle we had already seen in large numbers on our way from Nardin to Dasht, but so wild and unapproachable that we had voted against wasting time for them in that desolate country until the weather grew warmer. So that now we hoped that we had found the real paradise of game in Persia and that everything we wanted might be collected in this narrow area. Bujnurd proper lay two marches away further up the cañon to the S.E. of us.

A long day's march from Dasht with pack ponies brought me to the edge of the forest line. The trees here on the heights were all conifers and juniper, though lower down on the northern side came a belt of great English trees, oak and beech and chestnut, with dense low scrub and jungle as one neared the Caspian.

I chose a sheltered nook for camp at the head of a ravine. I had firewood in abundance merely for the trouble of dragging dead trunks a few yards. A little burn of crystal water had its spring at my tent door. Below me bare grassy shoulders and sloping dells led down to a broad valley, where, amid lingering patches of snow, green swards of new grass offered pasturage to the half starved herds. I had arrived opportunely. Now in early February the sheep and goat herds had not yet been driven to the heights in search of grazing. I had passed a few half ruined huts and stone kraals or sheep pens but no sign of humans thus early in the year.

Signs of game were encouraging. We had passed one great herd of wild sheep, some forty strong, and marked down their haunt. We had seen ibex among the rocky kloofs below and not far from camp. We had marked the fresh spoor of a solitary Maral stag in the snow on the forest edge. A native cattle herd at Dasht had reported the killing of one of his cows by a tiger quite recently.

These tiger, the skins of a dozen or more of which I examined before I left the country, are not quite the same as those of the Indian tiger nor are they as those of the "woolly" tiger of Manchuria. They are smaller on the average than the Indian tiger but their coats are longer and "woollier' and more rufous. The black stripes are sometimes almost lost and invisible in the longer tawny coat. Some are very handsome, others seem to lose their character with the invisibility of the stripes.

The shikari whom I had chosen, Mirza Khan, was a young sturdy man, keen as mustard, and far different from the average lowlander of the South. In appearance he and his kindred resembled the old Kashmiri shikaris I had known so well in the Himalayas. He had the same stocky build and the same light coloured and ruddy complexion. He spoke a trifle better Persian than I did, so we were well mated in a *lingua franca*. Like the best of his kidney he spoke little when there was game afoot, but unfroze and radiated cheerfulness when we discussed the day's adventures over a log fire.

We spent the first two days prospecting our ground on the chance of locating a real big head. A good sheep was what I

wanted particularly. This was hardly first class ibex country and a stag, if we saw one, would only be a stray beast from the true Maral deer country lower down the Northern slopes.

I had many herds of sheep to choose from, but I decided that they were all Arkali. The smaller Ovis Vignei prefer the lower Southern slopes or better still the detached hills. The Bokhara sheep appear to be very rare and local and to favour the long barren wastes half way up the mountains.

I finally shot three sheep, but none so good as my first on the way to Nardin. They were all very canny and needed careful stalking. The going was difficult owing to huge tracts of fallen timber, than which are few worse obstacles, and fields of soft snow.

The best heads I saw were included among the eight rams with the herd of forty I had seen on the first day. I stalked this herd on several occasions, but although I got near enough to see the eight rams clearly and to recognise several very fine heads among them, I was never close enough to make certain of a shot.

I was busy formulating plans for the future. How to outwit my herd of forty sheep and to bag a monster head. The best place to go for my stag. A jaunt to the far side of the great cañon beyond Dasht in search of good ibex ground up the side nullahs. Schemes for locating tiger and the possibility and value of tying up kills for them. A dash back for gazelle, only two marches away, if the weather improved.

Then fate intervened.

We had had a terrible two days' blizzard, with a heavy fall of snow, the last storm of the season my shikaris averred, but for me it chanced to be the last straw. A long suppressed chill overmastered me, broke down my strength and finally drove me out of Persia six weeks later, crippled with rheumatic gout.

My friends, keener on seeing new country than the shooting point of view, gallantly stood by me and had their work cut out to bring me back to Teheran.

So our adventure failed in the very mouth of its goal. But that we had found the heart of the best game country in the Elburz I am very sure.

FLY FISHING FOR SALMON.

By Colonel F. A. Hamilton, late 3rd Cavalry, I.A.

"I said to young Allan McIlveray
Beside the swift swirls of the North
When in lilac shot through with a silver ray,
We hauled the strong Salmon fish forth,
Said only 'He gave us some trouble
To land him and what does he weigh ?'
Our friend has caught one that weighs double,
The game for the candle won't pay us to-day;
We may tie up our rods and away."

Lindsay-Gordon.

I

It is evident from the above that, as a fisherman, the "laureate of the centaurs" was blasé and difficult to please. His friend had killed a heavier fish; the game was not worth the candle, he would go home. "Chacun a son gôut." Should he not rather have been content to have killed the strong salmon fish of the brilliant hue which he so cleverly depicts, "Lilac, shot through with a silver ray"; who but Adam Lindsay Gordon would think of it ? Should he not also have congratulated his friend on his success ? But then I am more easily pleased, and that is one of the few traits in the temperament of a fisherman which I possess. I do not for one moment pose as being an experienced fisherman; far from it; not even a good one. What is a good fisherman and of what sterling qualities must he be possessed ? A well known sportsman in the West Country once said: "To be a good fisherman you must be a very lazy man and very fond of smoking !" but then he was a mighty hunter of the fox and otter and possibly looked upon anglers with a jaundiced eye ! Be that as it may; after a day's hard salmon

fishing with a moderately heavy rod one feels as if one had been anything but lazy ! To be possessed of the fishing temperament you must be patient, hardworking, long suffering under adversity, philosophical, possess considerable powers of concentration and a natural flair for locating the great unknown in the icy depths of the crystal waters.

At the end of Hardy Brothers Anglers Guide for 1932 is "The Fisherman's 'If'" which puts the matter in a nutshell. It is by J. M. Fox and with many apologies I venture to reproduce it below.

THE FISHERMAN'S "IF."

With apologies to Rudyard Kipling.

If you can cast and not get tired of casting,
Although the fish won't rise as is desired;
If you can crawl along the bank in hiding,
With bended back, till you are very tired.

If you can wade with care—yet fill your waders,
And laugh it off and fish the whole day through;
If you can see fish caught when you can't catch them.
Congratulate with truth—and fish on too.

If you can keep your line greased and in order,
And wipe your rod and reel when they are wet,
And keep your tackle always as it should be,
And care for what you can afford to get.

If you can go and fish in lake or river,
For all your holiday's swift passing span—
And then catch nothing—yet return the wiser—
For life, as well as fishing, you're the Man.

J. M. Fox.

"Salmo Salar" the mighty Atlantic Salmon, is frequently described as the king of sporting fishes; he certainly merits this distinction, for his physical grace and beauty, his power and fighting qualities are second to none. Wherever he is to be found he commands the utmost respect. In Scotland, to him only, is given the proud designation of "A Fush." In Ireland he is no less revered. How well I remember the angry retort of an

Irish Railway porter at a wayside railway station many years ago, in County Wexford. My parent found a bundle of fish on his best leather suitcase. "Remove that stinking fish" said he. "It is not stinkin' feesh, it is goot sommon!" indignantly replied the porter. In England or Wales you have only to cross a bridge over a Salmon river, where some sportsman is fishing, to realise the enthusiasm of the crowd which collects, especially when the fisherman has succeeded in getting into a fish.

What is the great fascination of Salmon fishing. To my mind 25 per cent. lies in the glorious uncertainty of the unknown, 25 per cent. at least in the pleasant and peaceful surroundings. The murmuring, rippling waters racing to the sea through sylvan reaches, between sloping grassy banks;

"Made green with the running of rivers,
And gracious with temperate air."

In the remaining 50 per cent. lies the element of skill, sport and luck. This amazing fascination induces fishermen and women to return to the riverside day after day, year after year. It induces some of them to pay large sums for rods on some Salmon river to kill, if they are lucky, a very few fish, often so few that the cost of each fish averages out at a colossal sum. We know of one case in which the Lessee of a beat on a famous river killed his first fish after many months of hard work. On being congratulated by his wife he groaned "Ah yes, but it has cost me one hundred and fifty pounds my dear!" To which his loving spouse rejoined: "Well my dear isn't it lucky that you did not catch two or more fish!"

That the Salmon is no respecter of persons reminds me of the story of a certain ruling prince of India notorious for his conceit, intolerance and cruelty, who was staying with another Maharajah of a very different calibre, universally liked and respected, especially in the cricketing world. The latters' house was situated on the banks of a very famous Irish Salmon river. The illustrious guest expressed a desire to kill some Salmon and in due course repaired to the river accompanied by his staff, A.D.C.'s, Secretaries and other officials and equipped with Messrs. Hardy Brothers latest thing in rods and tackle. He was shown the favourite pool, his fly was tied on by an ex-

pert ghillie and all was ready for the capture of Salmo Salar. For ten minutes this Oriental potentate flogged the waters, but with no result. His staff were unctiously sympathetic, His Highness rapidly becoming "Most damnably annoyed" hurled expletives in his native tongue into the Irish water now much troubled by his futile and erratic efforts at casting, his curses were of no avail; as vain as the Norseman's reproof to the sea! He was not accustomed to being thwarted. In his Indian State men, horses and other animals had paid very dreadful penalties for not complying with his wishes and now to be ignored by a miserable fish! It was too much, he would go home and fish no more. So ended the Salmon fishing experiences of one of the brightest stars in the firmament of Hindostan. Referring to using bad language whilst fishing; a Scotch ghillie for whom I had considerable respect, once said to me after I had relieved my feelings in no uncertain manner on losing a good fish: "It's of no gude for ye to be cursin' and swearin' Sirr the fish can't hear ye!" On one occasion the same ghillie was doing boatman for a gallant Colonel, a first-class fisherman, but who was inclined to be somewhat mean with his whisky; a weakness of which Mack definitely did not approve. The rain came down in torrents; it was cold and soon they were wet to the skin. In his efforts to keep himself warm the Colonel drained his flask to the last drop, poor Mack got none at all. "Blast it my matchbox is wet" said the gallant officer vainly endeavouring to light his pipe. "Have you anything dry enough to strike a match on Mack?" "Try my tongue Sirr!" replied the now highly indignant ghillie! Mack was no mincer of words and was often very scathing and to the point in his remarks. On one occasion I had fished carefully down a favourite pool for some minutes but with no result though we knew that there was a good fish or two in it. Finally I ejaculated "Dash it I can't do anything with this B—— fool of a fish!" "The fush is no sic a fule as yersel, you've no fly on!" said Mack and sure enough I had cracked the fly off without knowing it. To my mind fly-fishing for salmon is, par excellence, the most scientific and sporting method of killing this noble fish. The following are a few hints based on my own experience which may be of use to beginners:—

The novice cannot be too careful to see that his tackle is in perfect order, and that he uses nothing but the best. Many a good fish has been lost through using faulty or cheap tackle.

Flies badly tied on, old casts, knots and other weaknesses all tend to inefficiency.

Salmon are all too scarce to allow of any carelessness in the matter of tackle. "Fisherman's knots and wrinkles" is a useful little book to have for reference.

The pattern of flies are legion but Jack Scott, Wilkinson, Thunder and Lightning, Durham Ranger and Silver Doctor are good for most rivers, unless of course some special local fly is used. The larger flies are for the spring months and should be fished slowly to enable the fly to sink well.

Test your line regularly and break off any worn or weak portions. The last few yards of line very soon weaken from friction and may just be the cause of your undoing.

Dry your line after use and rub in mucelin or some such dressing with finger and thumb for preference.

Keep a good line-winder or dryer; it will pay you in the long run.

Be very particular that your rod, reel, and line match one another, this is absolutely essential in fly-fishing.

Avoid unnecessary movements in the water or on the bank and do not allow your friends human or canine to walk on the skyline. Fish can see quite a long distance and are easily upset by moving objects.

If you stumble and fall into the water and get your waders full of water, do not try to fight against the stream, walk with it working in towards the bank keeping clear of the deep water.

Carry a gaff or wading stick or a combination of the two it acts as a third leg in difficulties, and wear brogues with straps not laces, the latter are dangerous, likely to catch in things.

For, as Lindsay Gordon writes :—

"There's danger even when fish are caught
To those whom a wetting fear
For what's worth having must aye be bought
And sports like life, and life's like sport.
It ain't all skittles and beer !"

Keep on persevering, the man who keeps his line longest in the water is often the most successful fisherman.

I never fished seriously for Salmon until a few years ago and am not in a position to teach others what may be learnt from experience and from the excellent works on the subject now in print. I refer to the actual art of fishing. Letters to "A Salmon fisher's Sons" by Chaytor is in my opinion as good a book on the subject as any and is really first class for a beginner. The Lonsdale Library is now available and has an excellent volume on Fly-fishing, and there is always Hardy Brothers Angling guide. The tyro cannot do wrong to send for one of these latter very useful little books which may be obtained free for the asking from that well known firm in Pall Mall. It will also put him right as to what tackle to use and Hardy's equipment cannot be beaten !

II

On the banks of a salmon river somewhere in the West Country, I have been flogging the water for a week without a touch of a fish and it is my last day. After fishing for two hours without success I stop for a sandwich. "I must kill a fish this afternoon S—." I say to the keeper, "if I don't take a salmon up to the house this evening I may not be asked to fish again; something has got to be done ! I think I shall try a smaller fly, this Silver Doctor is too big and bright with the river as it now is." "It would be no harm Sir, we'll try a small Jock Scott this time. I'll tie it on for you. There's a likely run over there at the bend of the river by the old alder where you might get into a fish, I'll row you across to the far bank, you can fish it more easily from there." We land on the far side by an old tree stump, tie up the boat and walk a hundred yards along the bank.

Yes ! It certainly does look a really likely stream. About 30 yards from the head of it is a large rock only just submerged, just the place for a fish to stop and rest before tackling the last heavy rapid at the head in his efforts to reach the smooth water beyond. My eyes become fixed with a kind of fascination in the rushing water whose swift flowing surface is unbroken except for a small breaker just over the rock. A feeling some-

what hard to define comes over me of anticipated pleasure mingled with respect for the power and strength of the unseen and unknown antagonist which I instinctively feel is lurking in the depths, with whom I long to try conclusions and to land safely on the sloping pebble beach on this my last evening on the river. "Start at the top by the boat and fish steadily down" says S— breaking in upon my reverie. "Don't use more line than necessary, just enough to get your fly well over to the far side of the stream. Let it come quietly round working the top of your rod a little to make your fly as attractive as possible. Keep your rod-point well out over the water so as to keep the line taut and get in touch with your fish and he may then fasten himself on without your assistance." A few short preliminary throws gives me the requisite length of line to reach the smooth black eddy on the far side of the stream. I then cast, at an angle of not more than forty-five degrees; once, twice, three times the fly performs its circuit and returns to my side of the stream unmolested; but the fourth time just as I am in the act of withdrawing the fly from the water for another cast there is an agitation in the deep, a slight splash as a back fin cuts the surface and then a pull which sets every fibre of my being in motion, a slight pause and I tighten bringing my line taut and my rod is bent in a delightful curve. A fish at last! Now for the struggle! He is quiet at first having scarcely realised the singular nature of the insect he has so ferociously attacked, and swims quietly round and round in short circles, perplexed no doubt, but so far unalarmed. I am only too thankful for a momentary respite. I take the opportunity to regain the bank and so get well over him on terra firma, a growing though scarcely perceptible increase of the strain on my rod betokens that he means business. It is bent still more until the reel, which I am careful not to touch, begins to give out its music. Whizz! up the pool he goes, the line scattering the spray from the surface in a small fountain. I am beset by a hundred fears lest there be some "little rift within the lute," lest my casting line should be defective, lest the line should foul the reel, lest the hook should be a bad one. All is well as yet, the first mad rush is over. He has taken out my line to the contents of 70 yards

but he is now in a safe place and rather inclined to slacken which gives me an opportunity which I eagerly seize of reeling up the line. But wait ! There is a limit to his kindness, no further will he oblige me; two rebellious kicks he gives and almost jerks my arms out of their sockets and then off he goes downstream. He is soon away under the far bank where he hesitates a moment, and then comes back into the middle of the stream, till it is all that I can do to wind him in fast enough before he gets me into trouble, for I must at all costs keep the line taut. I manage to get opposite to him and wait a few minutes while he remains sulking at the bottom, irresolute, what will he do next ? I keep the point of my rod well up and hold him hard praying that he is not up to some devil's trick, trying to grind my fly off on a stone or break my caste, but jerk, jerk, whizz, goes the reel as the line runs out again. I let it go not touching the reel handle which is moving at many revolutions to the second. The line is now deep in the stream, quivering and jerking, as the current dictates, creating movements which can only be caused by the struggles of a big fish. He now slackens his speed having felt the influence of a backwater which guides him in towards me. I wind in hard giving him the butt and taking my opportunity to take it out of him; for when he is not taking it out of you, you must punish him unmercifully ! It is largely a question of give and take. I have not seen him since the first rise and little of him then, but now he throws himself out of the water with a mighty splash I instinctively drop the point of my rod as I get a view of him ("lilac shot through with a silver ray"). Yes ! he must be at least 25 lbs. He now resolves on more active operations and rushes down the stream at an alarming pace to the opposite bank, to this I have no objection as I have a flat smooth grassy bank to run down until I get opposite to him once more. I now give him the butt unmercifully as he slackens and while I have the advantage of a short line. The fight has now lasted 35 minutes and my shoulders and back are aching. There is however no sign of submission on the part of my enemy, on the contrary he takes the offensive once more with a wild rush upstream which sets the handle of my reel going at a terrific pace.

He is welcome to do this as much as he likes for he now has the force of the water in his face in addition to the strain from the line. He will soon kill himself at this rate. At last I begin to feel that his strength is failing him and now, inch by inch, he comes back to me and drops downstream and as he does so the reel gradually gains on him till I have the satisfaction of seeing him just below the surface as he lies drifting sulkily down the stream. I feel a savage joy as I realize the growing weakness of my adversary. "Wind in now as fast as you can and keep your rod point well up" says S—. "Not yet he has still a kick in him" I shout, as out into the stream he goes again in a last despairing effort to free himself. And now feebler and feebler grow his short rushes, shorter and shorter grows the line till mysterious whirlpools agitate the calm surface and at last I feel that I can reel him in, even now much caution must be taken in towing him in to port for there are several things which may happen to rob me of my hard earned victory. S—'s son creeps up to the edge of the water and prepares to extend his gaff. I walk backwards towing the fish gradually nearer to the gaffer. Now is your time Joe you can't miss him shouts his father, but the boy slips over a stone and makes a futile effort to gaff the fish with a hurried poke which only has the effect of splashing the water about his nose. The fish gives a mighty roll and a flap of his tail, down goes the point of my rod to relax the strain until he is quiescent once more when I tighten on him and the boy makes one more attempt at him. "Now I shall have him, at last" think I but to my intense horror the rod springs upright in the air. The hold has broken. A feeling of despair comes over me. I drop the rod on to the grass and wring my hands in anguish. Then the fit passes and I stand gazing blankly at the water "Is it all a hideous nightmare." About 3 minutes ago I was almost in possession of a 25 lb. fish and now he is gone! Despondency descends upon me and is my companion for the rest of the evening. After a drink, a bath and dinner I think it all over. "How did it happen? Did the boy break the gut caste with his gaff? Very possibly but he had often gaffed fish before. Did I put too much strain on when I tightened on the fish after his final plunge? Possibly. Was

the knot with which the fly was attached to the gut, weak ? No, it was tied by an expert. Was the gut caste faulty ? It was a new one to-day. Did I pull him in too soon and before he was really dead beat ? Quite possibly, for he still had a kick in him though I didn't think it possible at the time. One thing is certain and that is that there should be no doubt in your mind that your fish is quite " hors de combat," He should be so beat that he turns helplessly on his back as you tow him into port. Then only can you be sure of him and that regretable incidents are reduced to the minimum. When you are towing him in it is as well to walk backwards up the bank and, if you like, keep the last two feet of line in your hand so that you do not keep too much strain on the fish and can ease him out quietly and quickly if he wishes to go. Nevertheless ! it was a grand fight ! I cannot complain, he lives to fight another day. Here's luck to him. Let's drink to his head, it must be sore ! " And that's another reason why I fill my glass again ! "

I was given another week in the following month. On the third evening I landed a good fish after a hard fight about a mile further up the river. Honour is satisfied. I am content and so is the ghillie who gaffed him like an expert.

I cannot end up without a short quotation from " Letters to a Salmon Fisher's Sons."

" It is our lost fish that I believe stay longest in our memory, and seize upon our thoughts whenever we look back to fishing days. The most gallant fish when eaten is forgotten, but the fish that, after a mad, glorious battle, has beaten us and left us quivering with excitement and vexation, is hooked and lost again in many a year to come ! "

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the Cavalry Journal.

Sir,—At the end of Colonel Maunsell's article on "Lake and Victory" (in the October Journal) he appends the following note:—"Soldiers Women—There is I believe, a book called 'The Adventures of Mother Ross' which purports to give the life of a woman accompanying Marlborough's armies, but I have been unable to lay hands on it."

I think that the late the Honorable Sir John Fortescue (who edited her life in 1928) would have protested at "Kit Ross" being included in the above category, for she was made of "sterner stuff."

In 1692, one Richard Welsh, who had married Christian (Kit) Ross some years before in Ireland, was enlisted, when drunk, in the Royal Regiment of Foot and subsequently found himself in Holland. The distracted Mrs. Welsh determined to follow her husband and, with her hair cut short and dressed as a man, she enlisted in the same Regiment. In the following year she proceeded to Holland, was wounded in her first action and taken prisoner.

On being exchanged, having lost sight of her husband, she joined the Scots Greys as a trooper in 1694. In 1704, while serving under Marlborough, she received a ball in the hip-joint at the storming of the Schellenberg, when the Greys suffered severely. The ball could not be extracted and her sex was not discovered.

Two years later at Ramillies she was wounded again, this time in the head which necessitated trepanning.

"Though I suffered great torture by this wound, yet the discovery it caused of my sex, in the fixing of my dressing, by

which the surgeon saw my breasts and by the largeness of my nipples concluded I had given suck, was a greater grief to me."

Discharged from the Greys (after serving in them for 12 years) "Mother Ross," as she was now called, discovered her husband, followed his Regiment as a sutleress, and was present on the field at Malplaquet when he was killed. Continuing to provide meals for soldiers, she married Hugh Jones, also of the Royal Regiment of Foot, but he was killed a year later.

She then returned to England, was received by Marlborough and the Queen, who granted her a pension of one shilling a day for life. She married again, a soldier called Davies, and later became a pensioner of Chelsea Hospital.

"Mother Ross" was buried with Military Honours in the churchyard of St. Margaret's, Westminster.

OSKAR TEICHMAN.

NOTES

MEMORIAL TO FIELD-MARSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH, EARL OF YPRES.

On Monday, 11th November, 1935 (Armistice Day), Sir Charles Wade, Bart., handed over to the safe custody of the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury Cathedral a mural tablet in memory of the late Field-Marshal Sir John French, Earl of Ypres. The Dean (Dr. Hewlett Johnson) dedicated the memorial, and after the service the Trumpet-Major and four trumpeters of the 15th/19th King's Royal Hussars (The Field-Marshal's old Regiment) sounded the "Last Post" and "The Reveille." Sir John French's son, the present Earl, then placed a wreath of Flander's poppies at the foot of the memorial.

Those present included: Lady Patricia French, Major Hon. Gerald French, Violet Lady Beaumont, Lady Brougham and Vaux, Mrs. Vyvyan Drury, Sir Charles Wade, Colonel H. M. A. Wardle, Sir Hugh Weston, Sir William Pulteney, Major-General Geoffrey White, Colonel Stanley Barry (representing the 10th Royal Hussars), Colonel and Mrs. Moloney, Captain Carr-Gregg, and Rev. and Hon. Mrs. Carr-Gregg.

The memorial tablet, executed in marble by the late Sir Walter Tapper, R.A., F.S.A., is on the wall near the entrance to the Warriors Chapel, in the vicinity of the war memorials of the 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards), 9th Queen's Royal Lancers and the 17th/21st Lancers.

* * * * *

EXTRACTS from the MINUTES of the ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the CAVALRY JOURNAL COMMITTEE, held in the Council Room of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, at 11.30 a.m., on November 19th, 1935.

Present:—Field-Marshal The Viscount Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.C.L., LL.D. (in the Chair); Lieut.-General Sir A. E. W. Harman, K.C.B., D.S.O.; Major-General T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.; Brigadier E. F. Norton, D.S.O., M.C.; Major-General J. Blakiston-Houston, D.S.O.; Brigadier C. A. Heydeman, M.C.

By kind permission of Kent County Newspapers Ltd.

1. Minutes of the last Meeting were read and signed.

2. The Statement of Accounts for the year was examined and passed. The Account showed a credit balance of £659 7s. 6d., a decrease of £80 12s. 9d., due, in part, to a falling off in revenue from advertisements, and in part to extra cost of the JOURNAL as compared with the previous year.

3. The Committee decided to terminate the present advertising contract and to engage Mr. H. Clayton as their sole advertising agent after the publication of the January 1936 number.

4. It was decided to continue the publication of a coloured frontispiece in the January and July numbers.

5. The appointment of Lieut.-Colonel Z. G. Burmester, O.B.E., as Editor for the next two years was confirmed.

6. The Committee passed a vote of thanks to Mr. G. H. Brennan for his assistance in providing coloured frontispieces for the JOURNAL.

7. A vote of thanks to Field-Marshal The Viscount Allenby for having kindly undertaken to preside at the meeting was proposed by Lieut.-General Sir A. Harman, seconded by Major-General T. T. Pitman, and carried unanimously.

* * * * *

CAVALRY FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION.

Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held at the Cavalry Club, London, on Wednesday, October 30th, 1935.

Present:—

Brigadier F. W. Bullock Marsham, D.S.O., M.C. (Chairman).

Surgeon Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Strachan, M.B. The Life Guards.

2nd Lieutenant P. S. Morris-Keating. The Royal Horse Guards.

2nd Lieutenant H. J. G. Weld. Queen's Bays.

Lieutenant B. M. Goddard. 3rd Carabiniers.

Captain W. Barnes. 5th R. Innis. Dragoon Guards.

Major C. H. Gaisford-St. Lawrence, M.C. Royal Scots Greys.

Lieutenant J. Pitman. 3rd K.O. Hussars.
Lieutenant J. A. Cooke. 9th Queen's R. Lancers.
Lieutenant K. E. Savill. 12th Royal Lancers.
Lieutenant J. E. S. Chamberlayne. 16th/5th Lancers.
Major T. G. Upton, Hon. Secretary.

1. The Minutes of the last General Meeting held on October 15th, 1934, were read and confirmed.

2. The Accounts for the season 1934-1935 were presented, examined and passed.

3. The Committee for the current season was elected as follows :—

Brigadier F. W. Bullock Marsham, D.S.O., M.C. (Chairman).
2nd Lieutenant J. V. F. Nutting, Royal Scots Greys, representing 1st Cavalry Brigade.
Lieutenant K. E. Savill, 12th Royal Lancers, representing 2nd Cavalry Brigade.
Captain W. Barnes, 5th R. Innis. D. Guards, representing Non-Brigaded Regiments.
Major T. G. Upton, Hon. Secretary.

4. The Draw for the season was made.

5. The Chairman proposed a vote of thanks to be sent to Captain H. S. Notley, 3rd Carabiniers, for his long (nine years) active help and support on the Committee of the Association.

6. It was decided to place an additional £50 on deposit (making £100 on deposit).

7. A discussion on the Balance Credit of the Association took place, and a recommendation was put forward by the Chairman that question of allocating a grant from the Association Funds to all Regimental Old Comrades Associations be considered at the next Annual General Meeting.

8. The question of playing one semi-final in the north was discussed and it was decided that both semi-finals would be played in the south this year as heretofore.

9. It was decided to reprint the Handbook.

10. The Hon. Secretary was instructed to endeavour to get Football Association Cup Final tickets for use of Old Comrades.



1.—St. George 2.—Wellington and Lord Cardigan 3.—Lady Godiva and Peeping Tom

1.—Oliver Cromwell, Sir Isaac Brock and Chief Lecumsch

2.—Bonnie Prince Charlie

3.—Washington, Sir Galahad and Napoleon

"CAVALCADE" AT CANADIAN NATIONAL EXHIBITION.

By Lieut.-Colonel R. S. Timmis, D.S.O.,
Royal Canadian Dragoons.

The management of the Canadian National Exhibition this year, Jubilee year, introduced a novel feature in the form of a pageant each night at the Exhibition Horse Show, held in the Royal Coliseum, Toronto. The Canadian National Exhibition is the largest annual exhibition in the world and takes place during the end of August and beginning of September, lasting two and one half weeks. The annual attendance is more than one and a-half million paid admissions. The largest daily attendance this year was a quarter of a million. Cavalcade lasted half an hour and included the following characters on horseback:—Alexander the Great on Bucephalus, Genghis Khan, St. George, Sir Galahad, Emperor Saladin, Richard Cœur de Lion, Joan of Arc, Charlemagne, Bonnie Prince Charlie, Oliver Cromwell, General Sir Isaac Brock, Chief Tecuensch, Napoleon Bonaparte, Duke of Wellington, Lord Cardigan, Don Quixote and Sancha Panza, Paul Revere, Lady Godiva and Peeping Tom, John Gilpin, Dick Turpin on Black Bess, General Washington, and Lawrence of Arabia.

All the male characters, except Sancha Panza and Peeping Tom, and the heralds and others were furnished by the Royal Canadian Dragoons, as were also all the horses except the greys. The greys ridden by St. George, Joan of Arc, Cromwell, Napoleon, Lady Godiva and Washington were loaned by the T. Eaton Co., of Toronto, and chosen from their 300 light van horses (light commercial horses as we call them). Great pains were taken to choose the men and horses to represent as faithfully as possible the characters as portrayed in the famous pictures of these characters; and expert artists were engaged to make them up.

The Pageant was a great success and doubled the nightly attendance at the show compared with previous years. The idea was strongly supported by horse societies, as it was staged to encourage interest in horses. This deserves the attention of all interested in the cavalry arm and the problem of obtaining sufficient remounts in time of war.

The photographs show some of the characters. A special stage was erected at one end of the arena, and each character made his or her first appearance on this stage, which was specially equipped with gorgeous lighting effects, accompanied by suitable music. A brief historical description of each character was announced over the loud-speakers. To quote from the programme:—"The era of Cavalcade is Time—from the glories of Ancient Greece and Macedon, of Alexander the Great, to that sad moment, a few short weeks ago, that wrote finis to the career of the illustrious Lawrence of Arabia—its background is the universe. Among the featured characters you will find men and women who have scaled the heights; heroes, whose bravery and fortitude are tradition; heroines, remembered for their fortitude and indomitable courage; warriors, possessed with a seemingly unconquerable desire to dominate the world; statesmen, to whom we owe an everlasting debt of gratitude for their efforts as saviours of civilisation. Christians, infidels, patriots, traitors, ecclesiastical dignitaries, together with cherished characters of romance and mythology —these are Cavalcade."

* * * * *

The undermentioned have became subscribers for 1936:—

The O.C. Cambridge University O.T.C., Cavalry Squadron.

Major I. C. Byrne, 14th P.W.O. Scinde Horse, I.A.

Brig.-General E. J. Stackpole, Jr., D.S.C., U.S. Army.

Captain E. C. Fleming, U.S. Army.

HOME AND DOMINION MAGAZINES.

The "Army Quarterly" for October, apart from its historical articles of the usual wide ranging nature, devotes a good deal of space to the O.T.C. and the Territorial Army. Captain Tuke gives us an interesting account of the Inns of Court O.T.C. Major Holland of the Cheltenham O.T.C. describes how at that school the main role of the Corps—the training of future leaders—is envisaged and undertaken; and Lieut-Colonel G. S. Hutchison stresses the idealistic aspect of the movement in a world where leadership is so distressingly absent and yet so needed. Territorial Army questions are dealt with by Lieut.-Colonel Preston, who expresses partial disagreement with the proposals for a two years' cycle of training in camp and repetition of tactical exercises put forward by Captain Latter in a recent number, while Major Bladon under the guise of letters from an old to a new C.O., gives some useful practical hints on the problems of a Territorial unit. The other articles in the issue range over varying subjects—biographical notices of Lord Byng and Marshal Pilsudski, an international code of war law for the air, order writing, drill, and the official establishment of tuition by correspondence for military examinations.

The October "Fighting Forces" also has an article on the O.T.C. which answers, and effectively, the arguments of some recent critics. There is a very lively and informing account of the Army manoeuvres, and two series of articles are continued —the historical one featuring an account by Lieut.-Colonel Burne of Spicheren, a little known but instructive battle of the war of 1870, and the "Perplexities of an Army Officer," dealing with the tribulations of the junior infantry officer—lack of time, lack of men, lack of training, and lack of proper equipment.

The "Royal Artillery Journal" seems to a layman rather a dull number for once. There is an interesting illustrated history of Gibraltar and an amusing account of Okehampton in the 'eighties, while Lieut.-Colonel Blacker narrates his experiences in the air attack on Everest.

The "Royal Engineers' Journal" for September has an article by Brigadier MacLeod, decrying the value of tanks as the main assault arm, and pleading for the use of extensive survey and lavish artillery bombardments as a substitute—all just as if we had never tried this device over and over again in the war without unduly encouraging results. Lieut.-Colonel Butler contributes an interesting personal narrative of the fighting in Portuguese East Africa in the last year of the war, and Captain Daldy deals with the question of bridging equipment to be carried in the field, with special reference to the requirements of tanks.

The "Journal of the United Service Institution of India" has an interesting comparison between the problems of Morocco and the North West Frontier and draws some lessons for application to the letter of Marshal Lyautey's methods in the former. Captain Harman deals in thoughtful fashion with the special problems of forest fighting, and "Nike" pleads strongly for a halt to be called in the growth of undue specialisation in sport in the Army, which he avers is turning games into a series of gladiatorial displays by players who are games experts first and soldiers last, if at all.

The "Canadian Defence Quarterly" gives us an account of the Canadian capture of Vimy Ridge in 1917; an amusingly destructive criticism of Mr. Beverley Nichols' anti-war book "Cry Havoc !", and a history by Colonel Pearkes of the services of British regiments in Canada—besides a selection of other varied fare.

The "Royal Air Force Quarterly" opens with an interesting theoretical discussion on the principle of war as applied to the

R.A.F. and there is likewise a topical description of Eritrea and a brief account of four R.A.F. peace-time stations—Malta, Singapore, Aden and Hong Kong. The lighter fare is well up to standard.

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The following Regimental and Corps Journals have been received :—

Journal of the R.A.V.C.
Faugh a Ballagh (Royal Irish Fusiliers).
The Wasp (Beds. and Herts. Regiment).
Royal Tank Corps Journal.
Gallop (Calcutta Light Horse).
Fifteenth Lancers.
Yorkshire Hussar Magazine.
The Goat (Royal Canadian Dragoons).

Also the Annual Report of the Imperial War Museum.

E. W. S.

FOREIGN MAGAZINES

The Italo-Abyssinian War is the most important subject discussed in the past quarter"s foreign reviews. There is a particularly good account of the Battle of Adowa of 1896 in the United States "Cavalry Journal." To those desirous of appreciating the difficulties and the peculiarities of the present campaign the study of this article, by Major Bernard Smith, can be warmly recommended. In particular he illustrates the risks encountered in this class of warfare, due to defective maps, to ambiguous place names and to the hazards of a night march. The present war has been brilliantly analysed and commented upon in the German "Militär-Wochenblatt" by Colonel von Xylander during the past six months in the course of some ten articles. In his writings will be found some invaluable data for understanding this strange campaign. There is, of course, no cavalry proper engaged therein, although there are said to be some 15,000 friendlies mounted on camels working on either side of the Danakil Desert. But the most instructive aspect of the Italian invasion is the combination of aircraft, tanks and armoured cars on the Somaliland front; here some useful deductions will no doubt be derived. Other journals offering further details of the war are the two Swiss papers, the "Monatschrift" for October and November, the "Allgemeine Militärzeitung" for November. Cavalry topics proper that have been dealt with during the past quarter are not of great importance.

The U.S.A. "Cavalry Journal" begins an account of a famous American cavalry soldier, Reuben Bernard. In a career comprising one hundred and three "fights and scrimmages" Bernard showed himself an adventurous soldier of the old school,

as well as a leader of resource. The present instalment begins with the Indian wars of 1856 and takes Bernard's life story down to 1862, when he was serving in New Mexico and there won his first commission in the Civil War. It is a brightly told tale and worth reading for its picturesque details, including the catch of a grey fox by Bernard by the simple process of riding him down after a long chase. This capture took place just as he received his commission. Captain W. W. Yale contributes a short article on training cavalry in which the writer condemns the accepted methods that end, during peace exercises, in mounted cavalry being seen attacking a dismounted group of opposing horsemen when the latter are entrenched and may even be superior in numbers. Speed alone is totally inadequate in such cases. True mobility is sometimes not properly understood; handiness, rapidity in deployment and quick grasp of a tactical situation are as valuable as speed. Training in dismounted work is thought just as important as in mounted action. Captain J. H. Doherty, of the Finance Department, contributes a valuable article, a parallel to which might well be compiled and kept in every British orderly room. It is entitled: "Death! Then what?" and describes in detail all the procedure necessary to be followed for the burial and disposal of the effects of a soldier dying when serving in peace. In particular it outlines all that should and can be done on behalf of the soldier's family and dependents in the way of insurance, pension, payment of money, sale of effects, etc. Specimen forms illustrate the article.

The French "Revue de Cavalerie" begins a series of articles by Captain Labouchère, well known to readers of these notes in the past, on "The Rôle of the Cavalry and its Tanks in the Battle of Amiens (8th-12th August, 1918)." This first instalment opens with a discussion of the whole conception of the battle; it treats of General Rawlinson's plan and his orders. Next the author considers the composition and task of the (British) Cavalry Corps and shows how it was placed and how it received the 3rd Brigade of Whippet tanks or 96 machines. Chapter II describes the first phase of the infantry attack together with its tanks. Then the action of the 1st Cavalry Divi-

sion is related, the work of each brigade and regiment being summarized, particular emphasis being laid on the movements of the tanks. The study is based on all the best known British writings on the subject, and is a well documented and serious piece of work. Lieut.-Colonel Chavane de Delassy opens the first part of a biography of Colonel de Brack, a very interesting character who commanded the Cavalry School at Saumur in the late 1830's. A brief anonymous article follows which deals with the capture of a party of armed brigands in Syria in May, 1929. These brigands, mounted on camels, employed military formation and tactics. They were very cleverly discovered and rounded up by a detachment of three "auto-mitrailleuses" (motor machine-gun cars—unarmoured) and one aeroplane; 45 out of 80 of the brigands in fact were captured. A most interesting little incident—quite well described.

The "Militär-Wochenblatt," No. 15, gives details of the new Italian "motorized division" as seen on the recent Italian manœuvres. This formation is quite distinct from the three "rapid divisions" already set up. The new "motorized" division is wholly conveyed in motor vehicles; these are neither armoured nor of cross-country type. The establishment is:—Headquarters; 2 infantry regiments of 3 battalions each; 1 machine-gun battalion; 1 tank battalion; 1 motor cycle machine-gun company; 1 motorised divisional artillery regiment; 1 engineer company; 1 signal company; some other ancillary units. The infantry is carried on 5-ton lorries holding 22 men and 1 driver each. As seen, a regiment had 40 lorries, that is 900 men. The artillery is conveyed on trailers and consisted (at manœuvres) of no more than 16 guns and howitzers. Mules to the number of 5 per trailer were carried behind some of the lorries.

This combination of infantry and lorries is criticised as being wasteful of transport. An instance is quoted where, at the manœuvres, two whole infantry divisions were standing idly in reserve, when the transport of the motorized division was waiting motionless in the valley whilst its own troops were engaged some distance away. These lorries should have been utilised

to move the reserve divisions. They are also said to have proved too large for Alpine communications.

The same German journal has some apposite remarks to make, in No. 20, concerning armoured cars and road obstructions. Such obstructions, it is believed, will form a conspicuous feature of any new European war. Yet it is obvious that the nature and value of these obstructions is as yet unknown because (*a*) there is no war experience available concerning their use; (*b*) at peace exercises such improvisations often consist of a cardboard placard or a whitewash line. In war there will be three kinds of such obstructions: Subterranean mines; light obstructions which may or not be connected with mines; heavy permanent obstructions. It is necessary to invent some system to represent these varieties during peace exercises. The writer emphasizes the need for leaving some statement (in a tin case) on the site of the obstruction which the advancing armoured car must stop to examine. The statement, moreover, should give details of work, material, etc., which the obstruction has absorbed. The site of visible obstructions should be represented by a belt of sand set across the road, which can thus be easily cleared for normal civilian purposes.

The Spanish "Revista de Estudios Militares" in its September number concludes the series of independent articles which it has been publishing on the subject of "light" divisions: this title being recommended for formations such as the "rapid" division of the Italian army, or the French motorized division. The summing up goes straight to the point. Spain is mountainous, poor in roads, poor in horseflesh and undeveloped industrially. A small number of mechanized troops are desirable. It is therefore recommended that the existing cavalry division of a strength of 5,240 men and 4,830 horses should be replaced by two light divisions composed of two light brigades apiece. Each brigade would comprise two cavalry regiments (each of five squadrons, strongly armed with automatic weapons) with cross-country transport. The divisional troops would be:—One group of two squadrons of armoured cars; one group of light artillery (composed of one detachment of three 75 mm.-gun batteries and

one 105 mm. howitzer battery per brigade); one motor-borne infantry battalion, one motor-borne group of engineers; ancillary services. This scheme would entail a reduction of horses from 4,830 of the existing cavalry division to 3,150 of the light division. The artillery would actually be reduced by four pieces, but the new ordnance would be of a more modern type, whilst a large increase in automatic weapons, infantry, mortars, etc., would take place. There would be no cyclists, the latter having little room for employment in Spanish territory which is poor in roads.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

"The British Cavalry in France, March and April, 1918," By Hermann Zimmermann, Captain and Squadron Commander "Gera" Regiment of Horse. (E. S. Mittler & Son, Berlin, 1935). 4 M. 50 pf. (Reviewed by Lt.-Colonel B. G. Baker, D.S.O., J.P., Beccles, Suffolk.)

The British Cavalry in France, March and April, 1918, published by Messrs. Mittler and Son, Berlin, at 4 M. 50 pf., is the work of Hermann Zimmermann, Captain and Squadron Commander in the "Gera" Regiment of Horse. Very good work it is too, not only carefully arranged and well written, illustrated by 20 sketch maps, but it is more, it is as one soldier talking to others, as horsemen to horsemen, and that is singularly refreshing these days. Captain Zimmermann gives us his reason for writing this book, it is quoted in the publisher's "puff" as follows: "the achievements of English Cavalry in France in March and April, 1918, have never been adequately appraised by British military experts." Perhaps this is because some of those experts did not begin life as soldiers and therefore knew not how to talk to soldiers. By the way, to the author as to most continental folk, whosoever speaks English or something like it, is English, not British. The finer shades, so to speak, Scottish, Irish, Welsh are not recognised abroad but by experts in such matters; no disrespect to any of those British nationals is intended.

Captain Zimmermann went to the work of soldiers to get his material, and at the end of his book makes his acknowledgments to Major General Pitman, Lieut.-Colonel T. Preston, Lieut. I. B. Bickersteth, the U.S.A. "Cavalry Journal" and the "Militär Wochenblatt," etc. He follows the operations day by day showing clearly the course of events, the doings of Cavalry

Divisions, Brigades, Regiments and even troops, calling the excellent sketch maps to his aid . Throughout the book you feel that he is enjoying the telling of this glowing story, that he regrets not having taken part himself in that stern task of stemming the advance of a victorious army, and he gives whole-hearted praise to those whose valour and resourcefulness made possible the stand of the British Army before Amiens. "Amiens lost and the war is lost" was the general opinion among those who knew, in March and April, 1918, and as Field-Marshal Earl Haig wrote in his despatches : "Without the support of mounted troops it would not have been possible to prevent the enemy from breaking through our long, thin front."

Captain Zimmermann throughout his book insists on the importance of using to the fullest extent the mobility of mounted troops. He notes that early on in the operations under consideration, on the 22nd of March, it became obvious how mistaken were the tactics, or was it policy, of keeping the cavalry brigades dismounted for so long a period. He points in particular to the distressed condition of the 4th Brigade's M.G. squadron that had been carrying its guns about for 24 hours; the carriage by hand of ammunition resulted in putting a number of those guns out of action. The Canadians, by the way, kept their munition packhorses with them. Then again, quoting Lieut.-Colonel Preston's statement that it took the Brigades two hours to occupy their position in the Mennessis-Bois de Frières line. "On horseback this could have been done in half an hour," says Captain Zimmermann. In the fighting about Noureuil on the following day the lack of mounted orderlies was painfully felt.

The author, though keeping to a sober account of the British cavalry's work in those days of "Sturm und Drang," can hardly suppress a glow of satisfaction at such gallant doings as attended the affair at Collézy in which the moral effect was all that a good cavalryman could desire, the spirit of our battered infantry revived, it advanced into a forward position, and the "opponent" was held up here for two hours. It is significant by the way, that Captain Zimmermann speaks of "opponent" but never "enemy."

While appreciating the author's estimate of Lieut.-Colonel Franks and his 19th Hussars on 23rd March, it is difficult to understand how he arrives at the following conclusion in the matter of General d'Arcy Legard's march from south of the Somme to Mariscourt. He asserts that this brigade had it been conveyed by motor transport instead of marching on horseback, would not have been able to fulfil its task as speedily and successfully as it did. The author does not give the reasons that brought him to this conclusion, which is a pity in these days of controversy, horse *v.* internal-combusion engine.

"Beale Browne's Column naturally interests the author considerably, and he also mentions Lieutenant Stourton's patrol of 8th Hussars who witnessed and reported the amazing sight of one and a-half companies of German Infantry marching along the road Morcourt-Cérisy without any of the usual precautions such as an advanced guard. Another feature of Captain Zimmermann's work is that he writes of "Militia" Cavalry, the reason being that there is no other possible translation of our word "Yeomanry" into German, and under that description Oxfordshire, Northumberland, Essex and Bedford horsemen come in for commendation in this book. Canadian Cavalry also have the place they well deserve in this account of a classic rear-guard action; their encounter with the 2nd Royal Saxon Grenadiers, the 101st Regiment, is described in a transcript from the "Militär Wochenblatt" of 11th February, 1927, an article contributed by one who evidently took a very active part in that pretty affair. Those Saxon Grenadiers, by the way, and there are two regiments of them, are surely amongst the world"s oldest regular troops; they were raised in 1620. And so the author takes you down that *viâ dolorosa* of the British 5th Army until sketch map No. 20 shows you the plan of the fighting round Villers-Bretonneux where the great German offensive came to a standstill.

The author concludes by giving a number of lessons derived from the actions during the period under observation. In this he pays a high tribute to British cavalry dismounted: "When attacked in front it never was broken, and relinquished its positions only when ordered and in consequence of the withdrawal

of infantry on its flanks." Again, "reconnaissance work by cavalry was excellent whereas that by aircraft proved inadequate."

The conclusions at which Captain Zimmermann arrives are worthy of careful study, his book as a whole is a work that should interest not only cavalrymen but those who are as yet not wholly obsessed by the spirit of the internal-combustion engine. The book might possibly pay for translation into English, it is certainly well worth it.

"From Russia's Armaments." By Three Swedish Officers. (Published in German by Ludwig Voggenreiter, Potsdam.)

After describing the radical changes that motorization has brought about in the Red Army of the Soviet Union, the publication goes on to say: "Motorization is not allowed to take place at the expense of cavalry. This arm will continue its important functions in the Red Army." Budjonny, the Inspector of Cavalry, declares in this connection that "the moment for burying the cavalry has not yet arrived. In the approaching war that will inevitably turn to civil war, and eventually into guerilla warfare, the well-found Soviet cavalry will assure the victory of the Revolution, thanks to industrialisation of the country and the collective system introduced into agriculture."

B. G. B.

"War Letters of General Monash." (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, and 37, Great Russell Street, W.C.1.) 8s. 6d.

Sir John Monash, G.O.C. Australian Corps in France at the end of the Great War, has already told in official form his story of the great part played by his Command in the decisive battles of 1918. Here we have his letters written to his family, telling in informal fashion his experiences from the time when he left Australia in command of the 4th Australian Brigade to the end of the war and the period of demobilisation.

The book is not of course in any sense a history; it is not even a connected story, for there are large gaps in the narrative, and much had of course to be suppressed or passed over lightly in the interests of wartime secrecy. But it gives us much else of

value—an admirable picture of the Australian soldiery at work; an idea of the difficulties and perils of modern warfare and of the stupendous tasks of command and organisation it involved; and finally of the great soldier and a most admirable and lovable character that all who came into contact with him recognised the writer to be. Sir John Monash's pride in his command and its splendid deeds—sometimes a little over-vehemently expressed to a British mind, but who could fail to sympathise with it ?—stands out in many a page of these letters, and no leader had more reason or justification for it. Some excellent photographs and a few sketch maps add to the reader's pleasure in the book.

"The Fencer's Companion." By L. Bertrand. (Gale & Polden). 2s. 6d.

This is an authoritative and severely practical little guide for teachers and devotees of the art of fencing, which has become so increasingly popular of recent years. All the various principles and movements are fully if briefly described, and a series of sketches and motion photographs give additional clarity to the verbal instruction given. It is a most useful little production, and very cheap at the published price.

"The Road to Glory." By F. Britten Austin. (Butterworth). 7s. 6d.

This is an historical novel in the strictest sense of the word and a very vivid and fascinating one at that. It is an attempt to give a picture of Bonaparte's first Italian campaign as seen through his own eyes; the military detail is accurate and painstaking—so much so that one instinctively feels the lack of a map to follow it all on; the portraits of Napoleon himself, his fickle and cold hearted Josephine and his refractory generals are lifelike, and the pitiful state of his ill-disciplined and suffering troops, his conquest of their admiration by appeals to glory and greed, and the great deeds he led them to achieve are admirably brought out. The story ends with the occupation of Milan and Josephine's belated arrival there to join her husband, and we hope the author will continue it in a future volume. No better portrait of Napoleon in fictional guise has so impressed us since

we read Tolstoy's gigantic and immortal "War and Peace," and while we do not suggest an odious comparison with that classic, it seems to us that on its own scale Mr. Britten Austin's Napoleon is not the less vivid and probably the truer to life of the two.

"Elegant Extracts." (Lovat Dickson). 8s. 6d.

This "duobiography," as the joint authors term it, consists of a series of letters exchanged over a period of twenty-five years (1900-1925) between two colonels Edmund Malone and George Hawes, who both embarked on a military career at the same time, but in different regiments, and met with very different fortunes in the course of their careers. Edmund Malone joined the Royal Fusiliers in India, came home to serve as A.D.C. in Ireland and went to civil life in 1913; he took part in raising the Ulster Volunteers and on the outbreak of war went to the Ulster Division, serving throughout the war as a regimental officer until, after becoming a casualty, he was detailed successively to the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office, and as King's Messenger. George Hawes saw Egypt, the Sudan, Bermuda, and South Africa as a peace-time soldier, then took a Territorial Adjutancy and went through most of the War as a Staff Officer, ending up on the Rhine. Later after marrying Millicent, Duchess of Sutherland, who writes a foreword to the book, he went to civil life, and saw much in Paris at the time of the Peace Conference and after. Their letters give intimate accounts of these very full and varied lives; noteworthy is the gradual broadening and mellowing of their outlook, the distaste for peace-time soldiering which came over them, their different viewpoints about the War, and their common dislike of post-war life in most of its aspects. This is a thoroughly readable and enjoyable book, a picture of two very pleasant people, and a fund of sidelights—favourable and unfavourable by turns—on the military life of what we must now call, alas! a past generation.

"The Crimea in Perspective." By General Sir G. MacMunn. (G. Bell & Son). 15s.

Sir George MacMunn here turns his attention from India to the Crimea, and in a nicely illustrated and adequately mapped

volume retells the story of that famous yet in many respects little known war. His main purposes seem to be to vindicate the fame of Lord Raglan—hardly perhaps necessary after Sir John Fortescue's classic history has already effectively done so—and to protest against the one-sided popular view which has concentrated on the ill-managed battles and our Army's sufferings in the fearful winter before Sebastopol and forgotten the splendid recovery it made, after this nightmare and the high degree of efficiency reached in the final stage of the war—which nevertheless saw more mismanagement at the Redan and elsewhere. The general public will no doubt find much to learn in the book; military men and historians will be less satisfied with it. In detail the author is not always reliable; surely at this late date none ought to follow Kinglake's contemporary example and misquote the famous order which led to the sacrifice of the Light Brigade. One is surprised to see too that nowhere in all his pages does Sir George mention the most striking lesson of the whole campaign—the extraordinary range of a British Army at the end of the long arm of the fleet. It was our sea power alone which enabled our small and absurdly inefficient army to strike so deadly a blow at the vital spot of the nation reputed to be militarily the strongest in Europe—the same nation which not fifteen years before had frightened the Indian Government into fits for fear it should overrun Afghanistan and sweep over the Himalayas into India.

"The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik." By G. F. H. Berkeley. (Constable). 15s.

This book, first published in 1902, has been reissued in view of the general interest aroused by the present Italo-Abyssinian War. It tells in detail the full story of the relations between the two countries from 1882, when Italy first set foot on the shores of the Red Sea at Assab, to her final abandonment of her claims to suzerainty over Abyssinia as a result of the disaster at Adowa in 1896. Mr. Berkeley knows his period, his authorities, and his country, and the tale he tells is a vivid and painful one. The chief impression aroused by its perusal is that Italy had nobody but herself to thank for her defeat. She wanted to

get her protectorate on the cheap, she would not pay the cost as estimated by the man on the spot, and when the inevitable disaster followed, she lost heart and threw up the game without an attempt to retrieve it. Baretieri, who got all the blame for the failure, seems indeed to have been an autocrat and ambitious, but on the whole rather the scapegoat than the true culprit; while the courage and constancy of the Italian officers and men in face of the heaviest odds and the most demoralising conditions merited more recognition than they got either at the time or since. As against the hesitancy and fumbling of his enemies, the enigmatic and portentous figure of Menelik stands out in huge relief—a savage, a scoundrel by our European standards, but by any standard a great ruler and a great personality. For an understanding of the historic background of the present conflict a study of Mr. Berkeley's book is of the utmost value.

"T. E. Lawrence." By C. Edmonds. (Peter Davies. 5s.)

All soldiers presumably have read Captain Liddell Hart's Life of Lawrence of Arabia, a definitive edition of which, we understand, will be published by the time this review appears; and most of us have read T. E. Lawrence's own masterpiece on the campaign which made him famous. For those who want something shorter this little book gives an admirable, yet in some ways unsatisfying, sketch, excellent on events and chronology, less good on biography, for the author frankly admits at the end of it all that "the inmost secret places of his hero's heart remained obscure," and that he "went to his grave without delivering any message." "The archtype of the Lost Generation, who never won through to a renewed faith or pointed out the true direction of the age to our aimless generation."

It is perhaps dangerous for one who like Mr. Edmonds never had the privilege of personal acquaintance with Lawrence to form any settled opinion about him, but he appears to have been all his life an honest, fearless seeker of the truth, in which quest it is of course not in mortals to command success, and rare for them even to deserve it. The last at least he did to the full. Some sketches of his various searches in the various departments of Truth's great treasure house Mr. Edmonds has at least given us;

as a narrative his book is admirable. For the man himself, however, we must still go to his own writings and those of others who knew him better, and understood him more sympathetically.

E. W. S.

"A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904." By Lieut.-Colonel Kearsey, D.S.O., O.B.E., *p.s.c.* (Gale and Polden.)

This is another volume in the series produced by this author, and has been written specially for the March, 1937, promotion examination. As a result, the account stops at August 24th.

It is certainly the best of the series yet produced. The causes of the campaign, the strategic conception and the details of the battles are clear, and the references to F.S.R. copious, while the maps are particularly good. The effect of the differences in morale and in the personalities of the commanders is also stressed.

To anyone requiring purely a "cram" book this should be of value.

"Practical Horsemanship." By Captain J. L. M. Barrett. (Published by H. F. and G. Witherby, Ltd., 326, High Holborn, W.C. 6s.)

This is a cheap edition of the author's well-known book (entirely reset), originally published at 12s. 6d. Of the many books which have been published on this subject, this is perhaps the most compact and will make a most useful present for any youngster. It is extremely well thought out, full of sound advice, and has the advantage of being written in language which is easily understood.

T. T. P.

"Everyhorse." A Selection of Studies, Grave and Gay. By Frank Hart. (Published by Country Life, Ltd. 10s. 6d.)

This is a typical Christmas book giving 'light-reading' sketches of the horse, from the day when he first became 'man's friend' to the modern time. The diverse uses of the horse for riding, driving, ploughing, hunting, are all lightly touched

upon. The joys and terrors of the roads, from the time they were but packways to that of the tarmac road are described. Verse and prose are intertwined. The author has added to the book a mass of clever pencil drawings.

"Just an Ordinary Shoot." By Major Kenneth Dawson. (Published by Country Life. 10s. 6d. net.)

This will be a deservedly popular book, especially with those soldiers who delight in shooting but who have not luck to possess a large shooting estate. Major Dawson states that his object is "to deal with the sport from the viewpoint of the owner or tenant of a few hundred acres of mixed shooting," and this object is achieved with great success. Not only is the book interesting but it is full of practical information on 'rough-shooting' and does not weary one with abstruse details of the management of a large estate. All forms of game and vermin likely to be met with and the methods—cunning and otherwise—to circumvent wary animal life, are enthusiastically described by the author, who considers that "the secret of enjoyment with the gun lies not in the actual shooting of the quarry but in the search for it." He has included interesting chapters on "Gun Dogs and their Care," and "Buying a Gun."

"Just an Ordinary Shoot" is a book which will appeal to all those sportmen who have not the chance, or desire, to participate in super-bags, but yet who want to know all about a minor shoot and the ways of game. Reproductions of etchings of bird life by Winifred Austen illustrate the volume excellently.

O. J. F. F.

The following have also been received:—

Haig, Volume I, by Duff Cooper. Faber & Faber. 25s.

Charles 1st and Cromwell. Peter Davies. 7s. 6d.

Four Horsemen Ride. Peter Davies. 6s.

Riding and Schooling Horses by Lt.-Col. H. D. Chamberlin. Hurst & Blacket. 10s. 6d.

Thompson's Elementary Veterinary Science, 5th Edition, by A. C. Duncan, M.R.C.V.S. Baillieri Trindall & Cox. 10s. 6d.

Table Badminton by E. E. Natali. Edward Goldston. 1s.

Printed by J. J. Keliher & Co., Ltd., Marshalsea Press, Southwark, S.E.

THE LATE KING GEORGE V

THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

APRIL, 1936

In Memoriam
G.R.

His life was gentle, and the elements
So mixed in him, that Nature might stand up
And say to all the world "This was a man."
"JULIUS CAESAR." Act V, Scene 5.

ON the 7th May, 1910, King George, on succession to the throne, assumed the rank of Field Marshal in the Army. As Colonel-in-Chief of The Life Guards, The Blues and the 10th Hussars, he made the Cavalry feel that they were represented in the highest position in the Army. They little thought that before the reign had run half its course, no less than six cavalry officers would reach the same exalted rank. It is not intended to give here any account of our beloved King's reign, or reiterate what has already been said of the nation's loss, but merely to put on record what must be the personal feeling of every individual member of the Cavalry of the Empire.

Those of us who remember the deaths of Queen Victoria and King Edward VII have vivid recollections of what the passing of a monarch meant to the nation, but the events of the sad week in January seemed to stir within each of us, feelings of some personal grief, as if some great friend or near relation had been taken from us. The introduction of wireless has, no doubt, done much to bring those of exalted rank into touch with those who serve, but there was something more than that behind the feeling of affection which all ranks of the Cavalry felt for their King.

Everyone who came in contact with His late Majesty was at once struck by the personal interest he took in the individual he was addressing. Many of us will

remember the farewell visits he paid to each regiment before they embarked for the Great War, how he walked down the ranks talking to individual officers and men, as if he had known them always, and so on through the messes, asking questions about all the objects of historical interest. Then again during the war, we remember the day when he visited the Cavalry Corps in France, and rode down the Meteren Road to Fletre, on both sides of which the brigades and regiments were drawn up. Though well behind the front line, the not too distant sound of guns made us appreciate the fact that this was the first time for over 100 years, that the British Army had seen their King on the field of battle.

Until His Majesty's illness in 1928, a horse was in daily readiness for the morning ride, and only a few days before his death, he was riding his favourite old white pony in the park at Sandringham. We have therefore selected a "mounted" portrait for our frontispiece which will be appreciated by those of us who have had the honour of being inspected by His late Majesty King George V.

*THE YEOMANRY AT GAZA II**

(April 17th-19th, 1917)

By Major Oskar Teichman, D.S.O., M.C., T.D.
Late M.O., Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars.

The story of Gaza II (and the two months following) is not a popular subject with military writers. Mr. Massey in his triology ("Desert Campaigns," "How Jerusalem was Won," and "Allenby's Final Triumph") does not mention Gaza I and II, and Colonel the Hon. R. M. Preston, D.S.O. ("Desert Mounted Corps"), commences his stirring narrative *after* the arrival of the new C.-in-C., when three Cavalry Divisions were available for duty on the wide-flung outpost line. At Gaza II nine mounted Yeomanry Regiments valiantly fulfilled the *rôle* which was allotted to them and during the two succeeding months, when the morale of the E.E.F. was low, they efficiently and cheerfully performed their arduous duties on the outpost line when only two Cavalry Divisions were available.

When the sun rose on March 28th the 5th (Worcester, Warwick and Gloucester Yeomanries) and 6th (Berks, Bucks and Dorset Yeomanries) Mounted Brigades found themselves on the edge of the standing corn on the Goz El Taire ridge, holding a defensive position some two miles behind the Wadi Ghuzze. Only some 48 hours previously the same units had left the ridge in the highest spirits and had crossed the Wadi unopposed before starting on their sixteen mile ride to Beit Durdis. It soon became apparent that the Turks had followed up our ignominious retreat on the previous day, to the Wadi banks, and had even crossed it (to a considerable depth) in places. Some sniping went on during the day, and Yeomanry patrols proceeding southwards came in contact with small parties of the enemy as far west of

* Including the period following up to the arrival of Sir Edmund Allenby.

the Wadi as Abasan El Kebir and Weli Sheikh Nuran—which pointed to the possibility of our being out-flanked if the enemy increased his numbers in this sector.

Meanwhile the 22nd (Lincoln, Stafford and East Riding Yeomanries) Mounted Brigade had moved across to the coast and had relieved "Money's Detachment"* in the sandhills, where it remained until the whole of the Infantry was across the Wadi.

On the following day the Imperial Mounted Division (3rd and 4th A.L.H. Brigades and 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades) was relieved by the 52nd (Lowland) Division, which had been in reserve during the Gaza fighting, and came down to the Wadi Selka near Belah for a well-merited rest on the sea shore. In the Yeomanry camps the wildest rumours were current—another attack was to be launched against Gaza during the next few days—the enemy's numbers had been largely augmented, and they were now two to one—the Turks would cut our long lines of communication near Rafa or El Arish (a wag pointed out that this might be to our advantage as we should then be cut off from our C.-in-C. at G.H.Q. in the Savoy Hotel, Cairo!). A confirmed pessimist remarked, looking at an ancient French battleship ("Requin"), a couple of monitors and a supply ship riding at anchor off the coast, that ships for another evacuation (*à la* Gallipoli) were at hand should the occasion arise!

Rumours are always thickest when troops are resting, and they were soon dissipated when the Yeomen returned to the outpost line two days later.

For the next fortnight the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades patrolled the banks of the Wadi Ghuzze from Seirat to Tel El Jemmi, while the Anzac Mounted Division (which included the 22nd Mounted Brigade) continued the line to Tel El Fara. The mounted troops suffered daily (morning and evening) from bombing, which, as we had no anti-aircraft guns and only antiquated aeroplanes to deal with the fast Halberstadt machines, was rather demoralising for our troops.

The enemy disputed all attempts by Yeomanry patrols to cross the Wadi, and the few possible crossings for mounted men were kept under close Turkish observation and accurate shell

* *Vide* The Yeomanry at Gaza I by the Writer (CAVALRY JOURNAL, October, 1935).

fire. It was felt that the enemy resistance had considerably stiffened since our evacuation of Gaza on March 26th. Not only had the Turkish morale improved, but actually their forces in men and guns had been largely increased.

Ever since the battle the enemy had been busy converting Gaza into a formidable fortress, heavily entrenched over a large area and thickly wired. It was no longer open to a cavalry raid by two divisions, but only a deliberate infantry attack well supported by artillery and assisted by cavalry held out any prospect of success. Actually the disposition of the Turkish forces precluded all chance of a turning movement by the cavalry round the flank; but the possibility of forcing a gap through which the mounted troops could pass was envisaged.

With Gaza as a strong point to protect their right flank on the sea, the Turks had linked it up with Hareira by a chain of fortifications and redoubts over fourteen miles in length; and Beersheba, although isolated, had been strongly entrenched.

In this way the terrain along the Gaza-Beersheba road about Sihan and the Wadi Baha, over which the Yeomanry had galloped freely during the First Battle of Gaza, had become a network of trenches and wire a few weeks later.

At this time orders were received from Desert Column to make a new type of (cavalry) stretcher and the saddlers in each unit got to work at once. This stretcher consisted of two light bamboo poles four feet long, joined by a piece of canvas three feet long by nineteen inches. When rolled up they were carried (by the four stretcher-bearers per squadron) attached to the scabbard, and they proved invaluable when full size stretchers were not available. Although not a "bed of roses" for a badly wounded man they were infinitely preferable to the usual horse-blanket.

Although, owing to improved morale, Turkish deserters were becoming rare, one evening while the Worcestershire Yeomanry was patrolling along the banks of the Wadi Ghuzze an Armenian M.O. who had deserted from a Turkish Battalion joined us. He had taken a degree at Harvard and told the writer that the enemy had a large force at Jaffa where they

anticipated a landing and subsequent advance on Jerusalem; also that two 15-inch guns had recently arrived at Gaza.

During this period a Yeomanry Squadron was sent to patrol the air-line between Belah and Khan Yunus every night as, owing to our exposed right flank, native spies often cut this.

Reconnaissances beyond the Wadi were carried out by Yeomanry Squadrons from time to time, in order to enable staff officers to get a view of the enemy's new positions. These expeditions started in the dark and commenced to retire soon after dawn, by which time the Turks had made it too hot to remain any longer. The most noteworthy of these was that carried out by C Squadron (Major Gordon), Dorset Yeomanry, which was detailed to escort some surveying officers to the Mansura Ridge. Passing through the infantry outposts just before dawn the squadron, in extended order, made straight for the ridge at a gallop, riding down a few enemy outposts before these could give the alarm. The surveyors followed at a more stately pace. After gaining the ridge a section sent on by Gordon unexpectedly rode right up to the Turkish trenches, to the mutual surprise of both. The section about-turned and regained the ridge mainly owing to the erratic shooting of the enemy. Meanwhile Major Gordon sent Lieutenant Lees out with his troop to watch the left flank while the surveyors made for Queen's Hill. In his efforts to protect them Lees got within 4,000 yards of the outskirts of Gaza and seeing a good target, opened with his Hotchkiss gun. Unfortunately the enemy retaliated on the surveyors, resulting in an immediate message "Survey finished" being received by O.C. Squadron. As a result of this survey two points, "Dorset House" and "Lees Hill," appeared on the new battle-map issued for Gaza II.

For a week before the Second Battle of Gaza the Yeomen were kept busy digging additional artillery crossings down into the great Wadi and up the opposite sides on account of the very precipitous banks, which were from forty to sixty feet in height. But before this work could commence each day a squadron had to gallop one of the existing crossings under shell-fire, drive off enemy patrols and provide protection on the further bank for the working parties. Unfortunately these

were observed from the air and suffered considerably from bombing.

One afternoon, after a particularly tiring day's digging in the fierce sun, gas masks were issued (for the first time since the primitive urinary cloths at Suvla Bay) to the 5th Mounted Brigade, and gave rise to the problem whether death was preferable by suffocation in them or by gas without them. The Yeomen carried gas masks in Palestine till the end of the war but never had occasion to use them. While undergoing gas instruction an enemy aeroplane flew over and dropped not the usual bomb, but a packet containing the identification discs of the killed and a list of the captured at the First Battle of Gaza.

A week before the Second Battle of Gaza the 5th Mounted Brigade lost the last of its original staff, Brig.-General E. A. Wiggin, D.S.O., who had led it since the days of mobilization except for a period when he was wounded at Gallipoli. "His fiery energy which never waned, even for a day, in the lackadaisical East was matched by the love everybody knew he had for his Brigade, and his departure was much regretted." An old 13th Hussar and Yeomanry officer, he understood the Yeoman's mentality and always had their welfare at heart. A scapegoat of Gaza I, he was succeeded by Brig.-General P. Fitzgerald, D.S.O., who lasted seven months.

On April 16th orders were received for the next battle, and we were informed that the enemy's dispositions were roughly as follows:—

> *Gaza*, 9,000 men; *Gaza-Sihan*, 5,000; 2,000 in the great *Atawineh Redoubt;* and 6,000 at *Hareira* and *Tel El Sheria.*

The strength of the enemy's reserve to the north and of the Beersheba Garrison was not known.

We gathered that our offensive would be carried out in two stages:—

> (1) A general advance by the Infantry to secure positions on the Sheikh Abbas and Mansura Ridges while the Cavalry operated on the east and south-east in order to prevent the enemy advancing from Hareira and Sheria.

(2) After a day's interval, a frontal attack by four Divisions, assisted by the Cavalry on the right flank.

The preliminary Orders (for April 17th) issued by 5th Mounted Brigade were as follows:—

"5th Mounted Brigade will take up the line Asseiferia to Khirbit Erk and with the rest of the Imperial Mounted Division will hold the Turkish Sheria force. The Anzac Division will go to Shellal and hold the Hareira force. 54th Division will attack Sheikh Abbas position at dawn with 52nd on its left and 53rd on sea sector, 74th (dismounted Yeomanry Division) in reserve. Every mounted man will carry five days' rations for himself and his horse. On the second day* there will be a general advance, the Imperial Mounted Division attacking the Atawineh Redoubt, with the 54th Division on its left supported by the 74th, after a general bombardment at dawn. Before dawn on the first day the Worcester Yeomanry will send out two officers' patrols who will gallop through the Turkish outposts and cut the telegraph wire on the Gaza-Beersheba road in front of El Munkheileh."

At 6 p.m. (April 16th) the Imperial Mounted Division (with the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades) left its bivouac at Belah and marched to Tel El Jemmi on the Wadi, where it spent the rest of the night.

An hour later the Anzac Mounted Division also left Belah and after an all night march reached the Shellal crossing of the Wadi at dawn. Here there was an enemy post with a machine gun on a conical hill commanding the crossing. The Division was heavily bombed from the air while it was crossing and suffered many casualties. Luckily a ton of gun-cotton on a wagon was not hit, or the result would have been disastrous to the Division which was watering in and crossing the Wadi at the time.

At 1 a.m. on April 17th (the first day of Gaza II) Lieutenants J. H. Parsons and R. M. F. Harvey (both of "D" Squadron, Worcester Yeomanry), each with five picked and well-mounted men, set out to cut the telegraph wire which was

* One day was to elapse between 1st and 2nd days.

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six miles distant from Tel El Jemmi and three-and-a-half to four miles behind the known Turkish outpost line. These patrols set out on different courses which had been carefully mapped out beforehand. The routes had been drawn to avoid the known Turkish entrenchments, impassable wadis, etc., and every portion of the journey out and back had been laid on a compass bearing. An error in judgment of pace or any deviation from the bearing to be followed would inevitably lead to discovery and failure.

For a time all went well with both parties, but suddenly Parsons bumped into the Turks and shots rang out in the darkness. Wherever he tried to find a gap he was met by an alert enemy, and as day broke he was forced to give up the attempt and extricate his patrol as best he could.

Harvey and his party were not discovered by the Turks until after they had attained their object; and then it became a matter of pace and good luck to get out. The journey "home" was done at a full gallop, the only casualties being one man and one horse wounded. The *Official History* commenting on this enterprise says:—"A patrol of the Worcester Yeomanry, under 2nd Lieutenant R. F. M. Harvey, succeeded in reaching the Gaza-Beersheba road north of Kh. Um Adra, between the Hairpin and Hareira Redoubts, and cut the telegraph line, dragging away over a hundred yards of wire a distance of a mile and removing insulators."

Meanwhile, leaving the 6th Mounted Brigade in divisional reserve at Tel El Jemmi, the 5th Mounted Brigade had reached the Wadi Sheria where it halted waiting for dawn. At daybreak it moved forward again and, coming under rifle fire, the troops dismounted and advanced on foot: the Worcesters at Magam with the Gloucesters on their left and the Warwicks at K. Erk. On this line the Brigade dug itself in and easily repulsed an advance by Turkish infantry during the morning, with the help of their battery, "B" H.A.C. Large numbers of the enemy could be seen massed on the Atawineh Redoubt and on Sausage Ridge, and by mid-day some of them advanced down the Wadi Baha, but were stopped by the Brigade M.Gs.

Meanwhile heavy firing could be heard to the north where the 54th and 52nd Divisions had gained their objectives at Mansura and Sheikh Abbas. During the afternoon the 6th Mounted Brigade relieved the 5th, which after watering returned to Tel El Jemmi.

The Anzac Mounted Division with the 22nd Mounted Brigade, which had crossed the Wadi El Shellal at 4 a.m. (April 17th), advanced during the morning towards the Wadi Imleih driving in the enemy outposts. While the two A.L.H. Brigades were in reserve and the N.Z.M.R. Brigade was watching the Shellal-Beersheba Road near Im Siri, the 22nd Mounted Brigade with the Staffordshire Yeomanry leading proceeded towards Hareira.

The Yeomen, accompanied by some armoured cars, came into action with scattered bodies of the enemy, and remained for some hours in close observation of Hareira. The enemy showed no disposition to leave his trenches, although the Staffords saw more troops moving up the high road from Beersheba.

At dusk both Divisions withdrew behind the Wadi to their respective stations at Tel El Jemmi and Shellal, leaving an outpost line on the further side between these two places.

Meanwhile the C.-in-C. had left the Savoy Hotel in Cairo and had established his Battle H.Q. in a railway train at Khan Yunus.

East Force (52nd, 53rd, 54th and 74th Divisions) H.Q. were set up at Belah, and Desert Column (Anzac Division, I.M.D. and I.C.C.) at Tel El Jemmi.

On April 18th the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades were held in reserve at Tel El Jemmi, while the 22nd was holding an outpost line before Shellal. In the afternoon G.O.C. 5th Mounted Brigade issued the following orders for the morrow :—

> "The Infantry will hold the line from Khirbit Sihan to the sea, and together with the Cavalry on their right flank will attack soon after dawn after two hours' bombardment, provided there is no fog. The Imperial Mounted Division will operate on the right of Sihan with the Fourth

Australian Light Horse Brigade on the left, the Third Australian Light Horse Brigade in the centre (Directing Brigade), and the Fifth Mounted Brigade on the right, the Sixth Mounted Brigade being in support; the Anzac Mounted Division will operate on the right of the Imperial Mounted Division. The direction of our attack will be 60°, and our objective is the Atawineh Redoubt on the Beersheba Road. "C" Squadron Worcestershire Yeomanry will advance before dawn and dig a special trench in front of the Wadi Baha on a ridge facing 60°. All ranks will carry gas masks. When the attack commences the Regiment will advance on foot out of the Wadi in front of Munkheileh, the front of the attack for the Fifth Mounted Brigade being from the H. of Munkheileh on the left to the R. in Rijl on the right. To commence with, the Gloucestershire Yeomanry will be on the right, the Worcesters on the left, and the Warwicks in support. The Anzac Division on our right has for its objective Baiket El Sana. All horses will be left in the Wadi, with the exception of those belonging to Squadron Leaders and pack-horses carrying ammunition."

The following orders from A.D.M.S., I.M.D. were received at the same time:—

"A Divisional Dressing Station will be established at a point half a mile west of Asseifera by 6 a.m. on April 19th. Six wagons from 5th Mounted Brigade F.A. will be attached to D.D.S. to evacuate wounded to Collecting Station at Jemmi. The remaining eight carts with mounted bearers will be available to collect wounded from R.A.P's. and will be at El Mendur by dawn on April 19th."

Each Yeomanry M.O.. was also supplied with two sledges drawn by a single horse and lead by a mounted man, which proved most useful when the ground was suitable.

At 10.30 p.m. "C" Squadron (Major W. H. Wiggin, D.S.O.), Worcester Yeomanry, rode out of the Wadi at Tel El Jemmi and proceeded by compass bearing in the dark to a stone building at Munkheileh. Major Wiggin's instructions were to

dig a special trench "in front of" the Wadi Baha on a ridge, opposite the Atawineh Redoubt, facing 60°.

Leaving the Squadron's horses in the Wadi Munkheileh* Major Wiggin led his men on foot a couple of miles to the 400 contour line of the Atawineh Ridge, and about 800 yards from the Redoubt (on the Gaza-Beersheba Road), sited the trench, as best he could in the pitch darkness. The ground was very hard and the work had to be carried out as silently as possible. The Squadron then returned to their led horses and subsequently rejoined the Regiment. This trench had been dug as an O.P. for our Battery ("B" H.A.C.), and next day was found to have been sited just short of the sky-line. Consequently observations of fire could only be carried out standing up, an impossible position owing to Turkish snipers posted in dug-outs on the opposite slope; and subsequently the open hill side was found to be preferable.

At 2 a.m. (on April 19th) the two Mounted Divisions left their bivouacs on the Wadi Ghuzze and moved out eastwards. At 4.30 the two Yeomanry Brigades of I.M.D. reached Munkheileh, and dismounted.

After about two hours artillery preparation, during which the Turkish artillery was silent, the I.M.D. advanced to the attack, after leaving their horses in the Wadi Munkheileh, on a front extending from the right of the Imperial Camel Corps at Sihan to the Wadi Baha. The 6th Mounted Brigade (Berks, Bucks and Dorsets) was left in Divisional Reserve at Munkheileh, the front consisting (from left to right) of the 4th A.L.H. Brigade., 3rd A.L.H. Brigade, Worcesters, Gloucesters and Warwicks (in support). The line advanced steadily for two miles under considerable artillery fire, and shortly came under rifle and machine-gun fire from the direction of the Atawineh Redoubt, which caused casualties and delayed progress. The advance was vigorously supported by the Division's Horse Artillery Batteries, "A" H.A.C., Notts, "B" H.A.C., and Berks. Owing to the sandy nature of the ground the sledges proved useful, and several casualties were brought back to the Wadi Munkheileh (where the 5th Mounted Brigade F.A.

*The name given by the Yeomanry to the North-Western part of the Wadi Baha, lying in front of Munkheileh.

was established) at the gallop, before the horses drawing the sledges had themselves been hit. As the advance proceeded the right of the 5th Mounted Brigade (Gloucester Yeomanry) was able to obtain some cover in the Wadi Baha.

By 9.30 a.m. the 4th A.L.H. Brigade in conjunction with the Camels had occupied Sihan, and the 3rd A.L.H. was approaching the Atawineh Redoubt. Meanwhile the Worcesters were lining a ridge in close contact with the same fortifications. Only some four hundred yards in front of this ridge enemy batteries were trying to subdue the fire of our horse batteries at Munkheileh, and shells just skimmed the heads of Yeoman lying in the firing line at the beginning of their flight, exploding eventually some two miles in their rear. Our own shells, from the guns in our rear, also passed immediately over us and exploded just in front on the Atawineh Redoubt.

In a slight depression behind the firing line the writer established his R.A.P., whence he actually saw an unfortunate Yeoman (who had inadvertently stood up) lose his head from one of the enemy's shells at the beginning of its course. Fortunately just behind this ridge a little nullah ran down to the Wadi Baha (which had steep banks), and by this route casualties could be evacuated to Munkheileh.

On the right of the Wadi Baha* the Gloucesters held a similar position opposite the Hairpin Redoubt on Sausage Ridge. This spur parallel to the Wadi Baha was a serious menace to the Worcesters, as the enemy on it was able to take in enfilade the attack on Atawineh. The Gloucesters reinforced by the Warwicks succeeded in driving the enemy off the lower slopes of Sausage Ridge, at the same time blocking the enemy end of the Wadi Baha with their machine guns. The fire from the Hairpin Redoubt continued to be very troublesome in spite of the fact that the Ayr and Somerset R.H.A. Batteries (of the Anzac Mounted Division) concentrated on it. Finally the pressure on the 5th Mounted Brigade was somewhat relieved by the arrival of the Wellington Regiment, N.Z.M.R. Brigade (on the

* In the Official Map (Gaza II, Operations of April 19th, 1917) the whole of 5th Mounted Brigade is shown on Right of Wadi Baha. This is an error, for the Worcesters were always on the Left, and never crossed.

right of the Gloucesters), who occupied the southern end of Sausage Ridge.

By mid-day the enemy's shelling of our reserves in the Wadi Munkheileh became very severe, our led horses, the 6th Mounted Brigade, Field Ambulance, and "B" Battery, H.A.C., suffering considerably. This battery located by enemy aircraft came under the accurate fire of two sections of Austrian 5.9 howitzers. Two of its guns and their crews were knocked out by direct hits; but the other two, hidden by dense black smoke, carried on gallantly. "B" Battery was the only one which had accurate observation over the front of the enemy attack, and it was imperative to keep the guns in action at all costs to save the hard-pressed 5th Mounted Brigade."* This battery was attached to the 5th Mounted Brigade from 1914 to 1918 (except at Gallipoli),and this was one of the many occasions on which the Yeomen were grateful to "B" H.A.C. officers and O.Rs. for their gallantry.

The Turks were now back on their main line of defence, and the most vigorous attacks could not shift them. A dent had been made in their line at Sihan, but all efforts to exploit it failed and our losses were piling up. At 1.30 p.m. the Turkish counter-attacks against the Infantry outside Gaza spread down the road, and the enemy in considerable strength and well supported by artillery fire swept forward on to the whole front of the Imperial Mounted Division. It brushed aside the right Brigade of the 54th Division, mowed down the Imperial Camel Corps and fell with full force on the 4th and 3rd A.L.H. Brigades. Standing in his R.A.P. under the ridge in front of the Atawineh Redoubt, the writer saw that the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade, which had incurred heavy casualties, was retiring. This left the 5th Mounted Brigade (actually the Worcester Yeomanry) "in the air." The left flank of the regiment held by "A" Squadron rapidly reformed its front and fixed bayonets to meet the attack of the Turkish Infantry which could be seen rapidly advancing through the standing corn. During the hand-to-hand fighting which ensued one of the Worcester Yeomanry stretcher bearers, who owing to his

* "H.A.C. in the Great War."

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duties had mislaid his rifle, was seen to lay a Turk out with a spade!

Eventually the advance was checked, but the Turks then opened such intense rifle fire that the defenders' numbers rapidly dwindled. Officers and men began to fall quickly, including Major St. J. Ffrench Blake ("A" Squadron), who was killed. The Worcesters were now being enfiladed and men in the R.A.P. were hit.

The situation of the regiment, indeed of the 5th Mounted Brigade, was very critical when an urgent message for help was sent to the 6th Mounted Brigade.

Looking south-westwards from the Atawineh Ridge across two miles of level ground towards the Wadi Munkheileh, the writer could see the latter enveloped in clouds of black smoke from the shells which were bursting over it. Suddenly he saw a sight which thrilled him: out of the wall of smoke which hid Munkheileh there emerged a mass of horsemen, which gradually opened out into extended order and filled the foreground. It was the Berkshire Yeomanry led by their C.O. (Lieut.-Colonel J. T. Wigan, D.S.O.), and "C" Squadron, Bucks Yeomanry. Disdaining to dismount, for they knew it was a matter of minutes, the Yeomanry galloped on, here and there a horse and rider coming down as they covered the two miles between Munkheileh and the Atawineh Ridge.

Dismounting, the Yeomanry came into action at once, and after driving in the first lines of the Turkish advance they effectively re-established the broken line. The situation was saved, but at a price. Amongst the killed was one of the most popular and brave officers (Major P. M. Wrougton) who ever commanded a squadron of the Berkshire Yeomanry, and amongst the wounded the C.O.* of the same regiment, shot through both legs. Many gallant Yeomen fell in this advance; the Bucks Squadron, only 50 strong, suffered 30 casualties. Those who survived have the satisfaction of knowing that their losses were not in vain, for they saved the lives of many of their comrades from the neighbouring counties (Worcester, Warwick, Gloucester) of the South Midlands.

* He subsequently became G.O.C. 7th Mounted Brigade.

While the Berks and Bucks Yeomanries were galloping to the aid of the 5th Mounted Brigade, the G.O.C. 6th Mounted Brigade (Brig.-General T. S. Pitt) had despatched his remaining regiment, the Dorset Yeomanry, to reinforce the hard-pressed 4th A.L.H. Brigade. The Yeomen galloped two miles across the open, dismounted and came into action on the right of the 4th A.L.H. Once again the situation was saved by a Yeomanry Regiment, for the Dorsets had checked the advance of the enemy through the gap between the 4th and 3rd A.L.H. Brigades.

Meanwhile the Wadi Munkheileh was rapidly becoming a shambles, owing to the continuous fire of the Austrian howitzers, and consequently the 5th Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance (or rather what was left of it) moved to the corner of the Wadi Baha where the cliffs afforded some protection, about two miles from the firing line. The Turkish guns now began to register this Wadi, and the evacuation of wounded along its bed, from the Worcesters on the left and the Warwicks and Gloucesters on the right, became a precarious proceeding. The light sandcarts conveying wounded, even if they escaped a direct hit, ran the risk of being buried under tons of earth as the cliffs collapsed from time to time.

About 800 yards from the Gaza-Beersheba Road the Wadi entered the front line, and here a pile of enemy dead testified to the shooting of Worcesters and Warwicks on either side.

The evacuation of wounded after reaching the field ambulances of the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades was none too safe as the A.D.M.S. of the Division had selected Asseiferia as D.D.S. This meant that they had to be evacuated parallel to the firing line (instead of to the rear) over a route which was being continually shelled, as along it were located our four horse batteries, led horses of some units, and our Divisional reserves.

We must now return to the 22nd Mounted Brigade (Lincolns, Staffords and East Ridings) which with the Anzac Mounted Division had left Shellal at 2 a.m., at the same time at which the Imperial Mounted Division had left Jemmi.

It was intended that the Anzac Mounted Division should be in reserve, and ready to despatch two Brigades through the "gap," when this matured. But Fate willed otherwise. Soon after dawn the Division was attacked at Baiket El Sana, and at the junction of the Wadis Sheria and Imlieh, by a considerable force of cavalry and infantry which was repulsed by the 1st A.L.H. Brigade.

Meanwhile two Turkish cavalry regiments and a large body of Bedouin attacked further south and drove in the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade which was scattered over a wide front. Brig.-General F. A. Fryer, who was guarding Shellal, then brought up his 22nd Mounted Brigade and engaged the enemy on the extreme right flank. At first there seemed some danger of the Turks gaining the Wadi Ghuzze while they were shelling our watering area at Hisseia, but for the time being our line was re-established. At 5.30 p.m., when the Imperial Mounted Division further north was being heavily pressed, a large force of Turkish cavalry and camel-men with several batteries of light guns advanced on the Wadi crossing at Shellal. Although small bodies got through to the Wadi banks (where they kept up some sniping until dark), the main attack was beaten off by the Lincoln, Stafford and East Riding Yeomanries and the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade.

The great counter-attack had by now spent its force as far as the Yeomanry was concerned, but on the left the battle raged with undiminished ferocity until darkness fell.

At 7.30 p.m. orders were received for the two Mounted Divisions to retire and occupy a line from Dumb-Bell Hill (on the edge of Sh. Abbas), through Munkheileh to the Wadi at Hisseia. This withdrawal was not followed up by the enemy to any large extent, but "A" Squadron, Dorset Yeomanry, were kept busy for some time covering the retreat of the 12th A.L.H. Regiment.

While the Berks, Bucks and Dorsets remained on the new outpost line the Worcesters, Warwicks and Gloucesters marched *viâ* Mendur to Jemmi, which they reached at 2 a.m. (April 20th) dead beat. A curious accident occurred during the march: a Yeoman with his horse disappearing into one of

the native (bottle-shaped) cisterns, which had collapsed at its neck.* On calling to the man below he replied that he was all right, and after giving his horse a feed he clambered on his back and was pulled up by his friends with the aid of a couple of head ropes. On the following day a working party dug the horse out.

At 6 a.m., owing to hostile pressure, the Imperial Mounted Division received orders to shorten the outpost line and to entrench further back on the line Dumb-Bell Hill-Mendur-Jemmi; while the 22nd Mounted Brigade and an A.L.H. Brigade of the Anzac Mounted Division rode off to take up a defensive line along the old Turkish position (of January, 1917) at Weli Sh. Nuran. An attack was expected from the south which might turn our right flank. This however did not mature, but enemy aeroplanes caused thirty casualties and killed a hundred horses when the troops had taken up their positions.

About mid-day the 5th Mounted Brigade at Mendur suddenly received orders to cease digging on the new outpost line, and scanning the plain below with his glasses the writer observed the enemy's cavalry and infantry advancing. In a few minutes the Brigade was mounted and galloping some three miles across the plain to reinforce the Berks, Bucks and Dorsets, who were patrolling between Munkheileh and Magam. The clouds of dust raised by the Brigade evidently impressed the enemy and conveyed the impression that a very large force of cavalry was on the move, as no counter-attack materialised.

It now became known that no further attacks were to be made on the Turkish positions. The Yeomanry and A.L.H. were to consolidate the line Dumb-Bell Hill-Mendur-Jemmi, and maintain the ground thus occupied against enemy attacks.

The Second Battle of Gaza was over, and had resulted in a serious check to the British arms. No fresh troops were at hand to restore the numerical balance, now heavily against the British, while the enemy, flushed with success adopted a policy of aggression unusual for him.

* The Writer saw a similar accident occur at the Battle of Beersheba, six months later, but in this case it was a motor ambulance.

For two more days the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades patrolled in the Munkheileh area before being relieved by two Brigades of the Anzac Division. Many Yeomen will remember the difficulty of watering at this time, as the wells by the white Mosque at Magam were always under enemy shell fire.

After two days' rest at Abasan El Kebir and Fukhari the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades returned to the outpost line, which had now been extended beyond Jemmi along the Wadi Ghuzze to Gamli; and for the next six months the Yeomen and Anzacs formed a cavalry screen on the right flank of the British position.

At first only two Cavalry Divisions were available, and the Division which was resting was kept at Abasan and Fukhari, so as to be near enough to support if required. By the beginning of July, with the arrival of two more Yeomanry Brigades from Salonika, the cavalry was reorganised into three Divisions, which allowed one in the front line, one in support at Fukhari and one resting by the sea shore. But before this occurred the cavalry had to put in two months of hard work.

The 5th Mounted Brigade and some of the A.L.H. Brigades had been continuously in the front of the advance ever since the Battle of Romani (August 4th, 1916) without any rest other than an occasional few days.

The depressing effects of Gaza I and II, added to a general weariness, lack of reinforcements, septic sores and dysentery, impaired the efficiency of the Yeomanry; but no rest could be given to them—rather, more work was piled on them as the heat (up to 110 in the shade, which was usually only that of the Yeoman's horse!) grew greater and the dust storms more violent. No tents were available even when "resting"; every officer (and O.R.) below the rank of Brigadier lived in a hole in the ground covered by a bivvy. Also the horses often had to be taken three or four miles to water and back twice a day. There was only one canteen, at Belah,* and this was often sold out. The writer has a note in his diary under May 5th:—

> "We have not seen our valises for six weeks and merely have the change we are able to carry on our horses, because

*Eight miles away.

all our transport has been taken by the Divisional Ammunition Column."

During May and June the cavalry was mainly responsible for the defence of the triangle formed by the Wadi Ghuzze, the Wadi Sheria and its confluent the Wadi Imlieh, and roughly a base line from Gamli to Irgeig.

Daily the Yeomanry and A.L.H., in turn, formed a series of observation posts as close to the Wadi Imlieh as possible. This wide-flung outpost line had to be withdrawn at night, and it often happened that the enemy occupied our day outpost line before the Yeomen reached it at dawn. Then would follow a skirmish which nearly always resulted at once in the enemy's withdrawal, but occasionally it would be necessary to send back for a couple of sections from one of our R.H.A. Batteries. Many ruses were employed to tempt the Turk into the open, sometimes by a Brigade and sometimes by only a Squadron or a few men.

Yeomen are not likely to forget Hill 630 at the northern end of the Buggar Ridge.* This hill commanded an extensive view over "No Man's Land," and the regiment on duty on this sector always had to detach a couple of troops to fight a miniature battle and eject the Turks every morning.†

In this way the Yeomanry and A.L.H. obtained a moral superiority over the enemy and made it dangerous for his patrols to push forward far enough to gain any useful information.

The British cavalry also carried out a series of more or less extended reconnaissances for the purpose of affording protection to Staff Officers and others when they rode out to study the scheme of future operations in the Beersheba direction. On these occasions our force varied from a regiment to a whole Cavalry Division with its guns; the Turkish cavalry being

* So spelt on the maps used at the time; the "Official History" has tactfully adopted the more euphonious name "Baqqar."

† It was on Hill 630, 5 months later, just before the attack on Beersheba,, that Major Lafone of the Middlesex Yeomanry gained a posthumous V.C. The Middlesex Squadron (only about two troops strong), after holding out for several hours, was overwhelmed by a Turkish Cavalry Brigade. The last message from Major Lafone contained the words: "I shall hold out to the last." When the garrison was reduced to 5, Major Lafone sprang into the open to meet the last charge and was ridden down. There were only three survivors.

sometimes forced back as far as their trench line outside Beersheba.

Divisional reconnaissances usually meant that a Division was out for two nights and one day without any rest, and entailed constant movement and skirmishes with the enemy—regiments often covering 80 miles during this period.

It may not be inappropriate to quote some extracts from the writer's diary showing the type of work carried out by a Cavalry Brigade (in this case the 5th Mounted Brigade) during this period.*.

May 22nd. In the morning orders were received for a raid on a Turkish railway on the following day :—

> "*General Idea*: To destroy the railway between Asluj and El Auja. (This was the line which the Turks had built southwards from Beersheba in 1915 for their attempt on the Canal. From its termination at El Auja a good road leads to the Maghara hills, and an enemy force in this district, although separated from our railway by some twenty miles of desert, might threaten our lines of communication south of El Arish. In November, 1916, our Brigade had been watching the Maghara hills for this reason.)
>
> "The enemy hold the line Bir Imleih-810-El Hatheira. The Imperial Camel Corps, one Squadron from the Imperial Mounted Division and two Squadrons R.E. will destroy the railway. The Anzac Mounted Division will proceed at 4 a.m. on the 23rd towards Khalassa, *viâ* Esani and thence to Goz Sheihili, to watch the approach from Beersheba.
>
> "The Imperial Mounted Division will attract the enemy at Beersheba from the raid on the railway, and at 4 a.m. D.H.Q. will be at Goz Lakheilat. The 6th Mounted, 4th A.L.H. and 3rd A.L.H. Brigades, in the above order, will hold the line 550-Siri-El Buggar-Rashid Bek, joining the left of the Anzac Mounted Division. The 5th Mounted Brigade will be in reserve at a point one mile south of Khasif at 4 a.m. on the 23rd. The Imperial Mounted

* *i.e.*, before the arrival of Sir Edmund Allenby and the formation of a third Cavalry Division.

Division will advance against the line Bir Imleih-820-El Hatheira-Yaia, the 6th Mounted and 4th A.L.H. Brigades being north of Fara-Beersheba road and the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade south of it. D.D.Ss. will be established on the east bank of the Wadi Ghuzze at Fara and Gamli."

At 7 p.m. the 5th Mounted Brigade left its bivouac at El Fukhari and marched nine miles to Gamli on the Western bank of the Wadi Ghuzze. The usual difficulties of a night march were increased by a *Khamsin* blowing from the south, which filled the air with impenetrable dust making it impossible to see. At Gamli the rest of the Division was assembled.

At 2 a.m. (May 23rd) we (Worcester, Warwick and Gloucester Yeomanry) crossed the Wadi and proceeded to our rendezvous one mile south of Khassif, two troops of "D" Squadron, Worcester Yeomanry, leaving to act as escort to a heavy battery at Karm. At 7 a.m. we heard the railway demolition party at work in the direction of Asluj. Some desultory shelling went on throughout the day, the 6th Mounted Brigade getting within three miles of Beersheba with little opposition. About mid-day our heavy battery at Karm opened fire on the railway embankment north of Beersheba. Karm appeared to consist of a few white houses, one of which was of considerable size and later became known as Karm Tower House. At a later date this place became a sort of No Man's Land, and was usually held through the day either by British or Turkish Cavalry patrols, whoever happened to seize it first in the morning. There was a particularly venturesome Turkish Squadron leader, who rode a white Arab pony and was well known to all Yeomanry and A.L.H. regiments as the "Squire of Karm." In spite of his white charger he bore a charmed life.

In the afternoon the Anzac Mounted Division (with the 22nd Mounted Brigade) covered the retreat of the railway raiding party, and later the Imperial Mounted Division covered the retreat of the Anzacs. At 6 p.m. the 3rd and 4th A.L.H. and the 6th Mounted Brigades having retired, our Brigade (5th Mounted) acted as rearguard. The Turkish Cavalry, emboldened by our retirement, followed us in the dark, shots

being exchanged until we had passed through our wire before the Wadi Ghuzze at 10 p.m.

There is a homely touch in the following extract from the very brief account of this day in the *Dorset Yeomanry War History*:

> ". . . . one of the horses wounded being Paleface, a Portman Hunt whip horse, who went right through the War without further injury."

While we were watering in the Wadi next morning enemy aeroplanes caused some casualties amongst the horses of the 6th Mounted Brigade. Later in the day the Turks dropped a message thanking us for destroying the railway, which they had intended to do and for saving them the trouble. (Actually this remark was not so fatuous as it sounded, as according to the *Official History* the Turks were about to pick up the rails south of Beersheba for use on the new branch railway from Et Tine to supply the front at Gaza.)

On May 29th the 5th Mounted Brigade, less the Warwicks, who were out at Ghabi digging trenches, left its bivouac at Fara and proceeded along the Beersheba road to Karm. Here we left B.H.Q., after the "Squire" on his white charger and a few followers had been seen to disappear over the sky line on the approach of the Brigade. The Gloucester Yeomanry proceeded to Sirri, while the Worcesters went on to Khasif below the Buggar Ridge. It was now light, and we could see parties of Turkish cavalry and infantry on the ridge a mile and a-half to the east. As we advanced brisk rifle fire broke out and the enemy could be seen running in and out of cover. Various points of vantage were seized at the gallop, and troops dismounted and came into action against the enemy. Gradually the Turks were forced to retire over the ridge while a reconnaissance by staff officers proceeded. Meanwhile the Gloucester Yeomanry were advancing in the same way on our left and the 4th A.L.H. on our right. Skirmishing with enemy's patrols continued throughout the day.

In the afternoon we retired by bounds, occupying ridge after ridge, the Turks following for a time. During this reconnaissance we suffered a few casualties and lost a few horses, but

only one Yeoman (a Gloucester) was killed. After riding some ten miles we crossed the Wadi at Gamli and reached our camp just as an enemy aeroplane had completed its usual evening's bombing.

As moonlight nights were coming on we deepened our dug-outs, as we knew that night air-raids would be regular. At this time we were getting rather tired of Fritz's attentions, as he used to come with absolute regularity at 8 a.m., 4 p.m., and sometimes again at 7 p.m.; it was particularly annoying as he practically always left unscathed.

On May 31st orders were received for the 5th Mounted Brigade to assemble at Gamli at 7 p.m. and move to Esani, which was said to be occupied by the enemy. Our Brigade was to take up a line north to south through Rashid Bek, the 6th Mounted Brigade continuing it northwards to Buggar. B.H.Q. at Tel El Itweil and D.H.Q. at Esani at 7 a.m. The Worcester Yeomanry was to reconnoitre the Wadi Imilaga from Esani to Maalaga.

Our Brigade marched at 7 p.m., after digging trenches all day, and halted at Goz Mabruk, the Worcesters providing advanced guards and outposts. Tel El Itweil was reached at midnight.

At 2 a.m. (June 1st) we forded the Wadi Shanag and negotiated its precipitous banks with the Gloucesters, our battery remaining with B.H.Q. at Tel El Itweil. The country on the eastern bank at first was wild and broken, but after proceeding for about a mile we found ourselves riding through undulating barley fields. We reached Rashid Bek, a large stone farm-house overlooking the Wadi, soon after dawn.

The 6th Mounted Brigade could be heard in action on our right, and a little later our outposts engaged the enemy on the Khabeira and Ajua hills.

Whilst this was going on an important reconnaissance was carried out by G.O.C. East Force and his staff. The enemy did not seem very enterprising, but a few were disposed of and some prisoners taken at the expense of only a few minor casualties to our Brigade. At mid-day the Warwicks, who had arrived from Ghabi, took over our line and we re-crossed the

TURKISH CAVALRY ON THE WADI IMLEIH

TURKISH MACHINE GUN COMPANY IN ACTION NEAR BEERSHEBA

Wadi at Esani. As the Gloucesters retired they were considerably harried by the enemy, who did not however attempt to cross the Wadi. The Brigade then assembled at Itweil and escorted the guns back to Gamli. We found on arrival that "Fritz," at his usual evening visit, had inflicted very heavy losses on the Bucks Yeomanry while they were watering.

It was a very unfortunate thing that when regiments were watering at the troughs in the Wadi they were absolutely at the mercy of enemy aircraft, and the latter knew from observation exactly when and where the various Brigades watered.

During the reconnaissance described above, the Dorset Yeomanry formed the advanced guard of the 6th Mounted Brigade, and by mid-day came under considerable shell fire and beat off an infantry attack from Beersheba. When the Brigade retired in the afternoon, "C" Squadron (Captain Lees) had to fight a rearguard action. The Turks pressed on and were kept at bay by Lieutenant Yeatman and his troop. Trying to cut off the Dorsets, the enemy put up a barrage through which "B" Squadron (Major Digby) galloped at the expense of 18 casualties. "C" Squadron escaped this ordeal as the Turkish gunners mistook it for one of their own squadrons.

For the next ten days the 5th Mounted Brigade remained at Fara, alternately digging trenches and doing outpost duty. One morning "Fritz" dropped a note offering to fight any five of our aeroplanes; and later on he dropped another note saying goodbye, adding that he had come down to Palestine for a rest cure and that he was now returning to France.

A Turkish cavalryman captured by the Worcesters told us that the three Cavalry Brigades with which we came in daily contact had their headquarters at Hareira, Beersheba and Khalassa.

On June 17th the writer rode out to see the new observation line which the Brigade was to hold during the coming week. The 53rd Division was at this time holding the line behind the wire east of the Wadi. It was decided that our day observation line was to be Dammath, Shawish, Goz Gelieb, Goz El Basal and Goz Mabruk. At night, with the exception of a few Cossack posts, we were to retire behind the wire, and seize the

observation posts at 3 a.m., displacing any Turks who might be there. In the distance the writer could see Bedouin getting in their harvest with Turkish patrols guarding them.

During the next week we had daily scraps at dawn, and sometimes one of our posts was rushed at night.

At Karm we found messages written during the night in charcoal on the walls of the White Tower House; these were in good English and told us that if we would surrender we would be well looked after. They also stated the number of our Gaza casualties and contained some uncomplimentary remarks about our Generals. At this time we were supplied with leaflets written in Turkish and including illustrations showing what a good time the Turkish prisoners were having in the P. of W. Camp at Cairo.

On June 23rd our new Brigadier conceived a brilliant idea of carefully throwing out a net composed of his Brigade by night, which could be drawn in at dawn containing all the Turkish patrols who were doing the same work as ourselves on their outpost line. The Worcester, Warwick, Gloucester and Bucks Yeomanry were detailed to take part in this operation, and the following orders were issued :—

> "The Worcester Yeomanry will spend the night at Maalaga (on June 24th), and then move to Rashid Bek at dawn between the Khabeira tracks, proceeding with Bucks on left and Warwicks on right to the Taweil cross-roads. A halt of ten minutes will be made on the Buggar Ridge, and then the force will sweep on towards Karm, joining the Gloucesters and the light-armoured cars who will have been holding the line 550-El Geheir—Imleih-720. B.H.Q. will be at Goz Lakheilat, and prisoners will be sorted out into their respective regiments at Karm by 10 a.m." (An officer was detailed for this duty assisted by the Brigade M.M.Ps.)

It all sounded so simple, and one felt almost sorry for the simple Caucasian Cavalrymen, on their scrubby ponies, who were to be ridden down and then herded up like sheep by the "flower of four English counties!"

At 8.30 p.m. we left Gamli and rode through Tel El Itweil to Maalaga, which was reached by midnight. On the way large bonfires were observed which the Bedouin had lit to warn the Turks of our approach.

Soon after dawn our force moved north-east, a squadron of Dorset Yeomanry proceeding to Esani, while we were accompanied by the Bucks and Warwicks. As we crossed the Wadi Imalaga our right flank was attacked from Ajua, and we could see a troop of enemy cavalry retreating over the sky-line above Rashid Bek.

After crossing the Wadi Esani we ascended through Khabeira over most desolate country, our rearguard being engaged from the east and using its Hotchkiss guns with some effect. On reaching the Buggar Ridge the whole force left-wheeled and advanced at a trot with drawn swords, the Warwicks on the right having joined up with the armoured cars and the Gloucesters, whose left had been resting on 720. The latter had joined up with the 4th A.L.H. who had come into the picture at Abu Shawish, and the "net" was thus complete. It appeared that the Gloucesters had already sustained considerable casualties from the Turkish guns across the Wadi Hanafish.

As we advanced, four regiments of Yeomanry with their drawn swords flashing in the morning sun, our trot became a gallop and we would doubtless have been a fearsome sight to any of the enemy who might have been caught in our net. When the net was eventually closed up it was not found to contain a single Turkish soldier, as the enemy had evidently got wind of our proceedings on the previous night and had retired to Beersheba before the cordon was completed. One Bedouin boy, apparently of very low intellect, was however captured and he was handed over by two stalwart Yeomen with drawn swords to the Brigadier at Karm; it was here that our prisoners were to be sorted out into their respective regiments! The day's work was a complete fiasco, but it showed our new Brigadier that the Turk was a wily old trout and that on account of friendly Bedouin assistance it was difficult to catch him napping. Most Yeomen who had been through the whole cam-

paign to date knew this already. However, it was a brilliant scheme and would have been a huge success if only the Turks had played the part allotted to them.

About this time, while the Gloucester Yeomanry were on the outpost line, a corporal and two troopers had the bad luck to be lured into a trap by a Bedouin. Suddenly they found themselves surrounded by two troops of Turkish cavalry which had been hiding behind a small hill. Two of the Yeomen had their horses shot and were captured, but the third managed to escape.

Two days later the Gloucester Yeomanry decided to have its revenge. During the night Lieutenant R. H. Wilson with a few O.Rs. occupied the stone hut on Hill 720 and sent his horses back to the night outpost line, some four miles distant. The party was armed with Hotchkiss guns, bombs and rifles. During the night the hut was converted into a miniature fortress, with the aid of sandbags, picks and shovels, as it was considered possible that the Yeomen might find themselves up against considerable numbers of the enemy. At 8 a.m. a single Turkish cavalryman approached the stone house without going inside. Seeing no mounted troops or led horses in the vicinity of Hill 720 he nonchalantly signalled all clear. A troop of Turkish cavalry rode up, and they were allowed to come within a few yards of the house before the Yeomen opened fire. The Gloucesters had had their revenge.

When our aeroplanes had the misfortune to be shot down in No Man's Land it devolved on the Yeomanry regiment on duty in that particular area to effect a rescue.

Late one evening O.C. Worcestershire Yeomanry received information that one of our aeroplanes had dropped a message stating that three of our machines had been shot down west of Khalassa and near Asseisi, and that they were in need of immediate protection, as hostile Bedouin and Turkish cavalry patrols were approaching them. The message stated that the pilots had made their escape to one of our posts at Basal.

In a very short time the regiment was mounted and, alternately trotting and galloping twelve miles across country, reached Asseisi by midnight. During our hurried journey we

saw the usual Bedouin warning fires. Our advanced guard bumped into some hostile Bedouin and a few Turkish cavalrymen *en route*, and a Worcester yeoman had the satisfaction of thrusting his sword through one of the enemy at the gallop. Soon after midnight two aeroplanes were discovered. The Bedouin had already started to strip these, but after a skirmish in the dark the Turkish patrols and irregulars soon took to their heels. At dawn some Australian transport arrived and conveyed the machines back to camp. On our return journey we burnt all the Bedouin houses to be seen, and also their stocks of corn and tibbin which had been placed there for the use of Turkish cavalry patrols.

A few days later, while the Gloucesters were holding the outpost line the Worcesters and Warwicks suddenly received orders to rendezvous at Gamli at 6 p.m.—destination unknown. On arrival we received the following orders:—

> "Proceed swiftly and silently across country 135° to Khalassa about sixteen miles distant. In this place lives a man called Luftie, who runs a Turkish Intelligence Bureau, whose agents operate between Khalassa and Khan Yunus;* in this way the Turks in Beersheba are kept informed of our movements and reinforcements which pass through Khan Yunus station. On arrival a cordon will be formed round the village, the Worcesters approaching from the west and the Warwicks from the east. Anyone trying to escape to be shot and all males to be taken prisoners. Luftie's house is to be demolished by our Field Troop R.E."

It all sounded like being an interesting night's work, but as one Yeomanry officer remarked: "We may be able to proceed *swiftly* but I doubt very much whether two regiments and a Field Troop R.E. will be able to accomplish the journey *silently*." And that as it turned out was the trouble.

It was in bright moonlight that our force set out accompanied by two Staff Officers, an Intelligence Officer, some native Sinai police, a "few" doubtful Bedouin and an interpreter.

After riding over some very rough country, our Column struck the Khalassa-Auja road and telegraph at 1 a.m. About

* On the British L. of C. near Rafa.

an hour later Khalassa was located and surrounded. A few shots were exchanged during this operation, but the only casualty was one of the writer's pack mules, shot through the head. When the village was searched it was found to contain only women and children. Squadrons were therefore sent out to scour the neighbouring hills, and brought in some thirty Bedouin soon after dawn. Luftie was not amongst the prisoners, and it is probable that he succeeded in escaping when we reached the Khalassa road. The Bedouin doubtless knew of our approach march long before we arrived, for it was quite impossible for some twelve hundred horsemen to advance over rough ground in complete silence. Khalassa by daylight was found to consist of a mass of ruins (once an ancient Christian town of some importance) and a number of stone and mud huts. One of these, reputed to be Luftie's, was blown up by our R.E.

At 6 a.m. we left with our prisoners and rode to Esani to water, burning the Bedouin tibbin, which had been stored for the Turks *en route*.

On arrival at Fara we heard the Hareira and Beersheba guns making more noise than usual, as four Cavalry Brigades were accompanying our new C.-in-C. on a reconnaissance of the Beersheba defences.

The Yeomen had heard rumours of a change in the High Command a few days before, but this (July 4th) was the first day that they heard of Sir Edmund Allenby's presence at the front.

The new C.-in-C.'s arrival acted as a strong stimulus to the Yeomanry and to all other formations on the Palestine Front. Seldom in the course of military history has the personality of a new Commander had such a marked effect on his troops—in this case men still smarting under the battles of Gaza I and II, defeats for which they knew that they and their fallen comrades were not responsible.

Sir Edmund Allenby (and his staff) eschewed Cairo and the flesh pots of Egypt, instead he made his H.Q. in Palestine only a few miles behind the front line. The Yeomen were quick to learn of this change in location of G.H.Q., and when it became known also that the new C.-in-C. was to be seen often on the


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outpost line their spirits rose a hundred per cent. The position of an M.O., who has been with his regiment for many years, enables him to gauge the feeling of the men possibly better than other officers. If he is lucky enough to have their confidence and respect he learns many things which are a closed book to others. And so the writer sensed the feeling of the men towards the new C.-in-C.

Few junior officers had ever seen our late C.-in-C., but within a few weeks of his arrival many of us knew Sir Edmund Allenby by sight. It was inspiring to watch him visiting the Yeomanry front line, his car dodging the enemy's shrapnel as it sped from post to post.

While watching the C.-in-C. riding about under fire during a reconnaissance a Yeoman was heard to exclaim: "Him is what I call a *man*!"

A new era had commenced for the Yeomanry in Palestine, and for the whole of the E.E.F.

The Writer has based the above account on his book, "The Diary of a Yeomanry M.O. (1921), but he wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the "Official History" (Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I), and to the Histories of the Worcestershire, Gloucestershire and Dorset Yeomanries in the Great War.

YEOMANRY AND TACTICAL EXERCISES

By a Yeomanry C.O.

The problem of how best to utilise the annual fortnight's training in camp must always be a difficult one for every Territorial commanding officer, and not the least important point he has to decide is how many days to allot to tactical exercises. T.A. infantry battalions often go to camp as brigades, and in that case the brigadier is largely responsible for the training programme; in the Yeomanry on the other hand, a brigade camp is a rare occurrence: each unit is nearly always "on its own" and can draw up its training programme with little prospect of having this altered by higher authority. The present writer proposes to discuss the question of how many tactical exercises (with troops) can be fitted into the fortnight, and how such exercises should be framed and conducted in order to get the best results.

Certain Yeomanry regiments never hold more than one tactical scheme, whilst others have as many as three or four each year; some commanding officers are perhaps inclined to carry on with the same sort of training programme as their predecessors, and are chary of—say—devoting three days to schemes when in previous years there has never been more than one. In framing the training programme, a C.O. must never forget that by far his most important task is the training of his officers—it is infinitely more important than that of the other ranks, though of course the latter must be taught all they can learn in the time. Further, a day's work which is planned to teach the officers certain lessons, will automatically teach the men something as well, whereas the converse is certainly not the case. To take an example: a morning is devoted to a tactical exercise framed to

teach officers the correct handling of an advanced guard squadron with machine guns attached. If all goes well, the officers learn something useful, and at the same time the men are gaining practice in handing over horses, taking up a fire position, getting the machine guns off the packs, etc. Supposing on the other hand this particular morning is left to squadron-leaders, who decide to practise dismounting for action and handing over horses; the men are certainly being trained, but the officers are only supervising and are, in fact, merely helping to teach the men what the permanent staff and N.C.Os. should be able to teach equally well. It is not intended to press this argument too far, or to imply that the training of the other ranks can be neglected; the *majority* of working days in the camp period should, in fact, be left to squadron-leaders for practice in drill, dismounting for action, formation of vanguard, and similar duties. But it *is* suggested that a regiment should set aside at least *three*, and if possible *four* days for tactical schemes in the second week, and that in each scheme different officers should be detailed as regimental and squadron commanders.

The next question is who should frame the exercises, and the answer is that they should be drawn up by the commanding officer personally, except very occasionally when he may ask his second-in-command to do so in order to give the latter officer practice in this form of training. In some Yeomanry regiments, however, it is customary for the adjutant to set the schemes, which in the writer's opinion is definitely wrong for several reasons. One is that an adjutant, although a Regular captain, has not necessarily ever had to set schemes in his own regiment, and there is no guarantee that he is qualified to do so when he goes to the Yeomanry. Another and more serious objection is that the officer who sets the scheme should make the criticisms afterwards, and if this officer is the adjutant the result may well be that he, a captain, finds himself criticising the action of a Yeomanry major. The present writer has actually seen this happen, and no matter how efficient the adjutant may be, it is clearly wrong for a C.O. to allow any officer to be criticised by one junior to him in rank.

A third reason why the framing of schemes should not be left to the adjutant is that his time in camp is already very fully taken up with his proper duties—supervising the permanent staff, dealing with the office work in the orderly room, and giving a helping hand in the training of troops and squadrons whose leaders need his assistance. He simply has not got the time to make the detailed examination of the ground—possibly several miles from the camp site—which is so essential to the framing of a good tactical exercise. It may further be noted that if the schemes are left to the adjutant to draw up, the other officers may get the impression—sometimes unfortunately true—that the C.O. is unable or unwilling to undertake the schemes himself. In this connection it is suggested that a senior Yeomanry officer should, *before* he succeeds to the command, get all the practice he can in setting tactical exercises with and without troops. It will be a great help if he keeps copies of all schemes set by his brigadier; he should also endeavour to be attached to some Regular unit or formation on manœuvres, where he will learn all about such things as umpiring and the co-operation of the different arms, as well as attending the conferences after the exercises and hearing how the various points are brought out. In addition, the Senior Officers' School now runs excellent little 14-day courses for T.A. officers where they are taught to set tactical exercises.

It may be permissible first to give post-war examples of "how not to do it."

In a certain unit for many years every scheme was set by the adjutant, duly typed out in the orderly room and issued to officers—or perhaps only to squadron-leaders—either the night before or on the actual morning of the exercise. No mention whatever was made of the lessons the scheme was intended to teach, for the simple reason that neither the adjutant nor the C.O. had thought of any particular lessons. They knew that as the exercise progressed, various points would crop up and sundry mistakes would be made, and these would be commented on afterwards. The written exercise, therefore, started straight off with the General and Special Ideas; the regiment was invariably divided into two opposing sides (two squadrons on one side

and the third squadron and the machine guns on the other), and the only umpires were the C.O. and adjutant—who wore one white armlet each and rode about together—and possibly some junior Regular officer who might be attached for the camp period. Such a person as a "director" was not thought necessary or mentioned, and with so few umpires the operations often got out of control to a ridiculous extent. Isolated troops fired "blank" at each other at a few yards' range, charged each other, took each other prisoner and afterwards had heated arguments as to who had won. Commanders would say: "I'm going to let C Squadron do a charge, they've been in reserve all the morning and must be very bored.

At the conference afterwards, the commanding officer would go through the various points he had noticed, for instance: "I was particularly glad to see that none of the men galloped down the roads. You all know how dangerous these tarred roads are, and what accidents there have been in former years. I am very pleased to see that the lesson has been learnt." (It may be remarked that although the particular troop which the C.O. saw, was proceeding at a steady trot, there was plenty of blood-curdling galloping by other men whom he did not see.)

The above example came under the writer's personal notice, and there is no reason to suppose that this particular regiment was unique in the matter of badly-run schemes. It simply boiled down to this—that neither the colonel nor his Regular adjutant realised that the purpose of a tactical exercise is to *teach officers tactics*, and that a scheme which did not do this was a wicked waste of time, already all too short.

A further instance may be quoted in another Yeomanry, where a mythical queen, travelling in a carriage and escorted by a squadron, was held up by an enemy consisting of the other two squadrons. Her Majesty, being in an interesting condition, could only proceed at walking pace, and her would-be kidnappers took full advantage of the fact that they had often camped on the same site before, and therefore knew the ground thoroughly—though for that matter the escort knew it too. The present writer, not having been there, would not like to assert

that the scheme meant a wasted day; at the same time the situation was one which could not possibly have occurred in real war, and would therefore tend to give young officers and N.C.Os. a very misleading picture of what war is.

In defence of these "comic" exercises it is sometimes urged that they amuse the men and prevent boredom. But the answer is first, that teaching the officers tactics is far more important than amusing the men; and secondly, that a well-run realistic scheme, inculcating valuable lessons for officers, will *not* bore the men *provided it does not drag on too long*. This latter point is important and will be dealt with later.

In some units there is a strong tendency to make all the exercises two-sided—that is, one squadron fights the other two, the leaders being free to do what they like within the limits of the scheme. It is suggested that where a regiment is camping by itself, one-sided exercises (in which the enemy consists of a "skeleton" controlled by the director) are preferable, for the following reasons:—

1. The director can control the enemy so as to bring out the lessons he wants to teach.

2. If the enemy consists of the permanent staff and trumpeters only, the rest of the regiment can act as a complete unit.

3. The umpiring is much easier—a decided consideration with Yeomanry officers who get little practice in umpiring.

4. When all ranks know they are only against a skeleton enemy, who is there to bring out certain lessons, they know they have to try and learn those lessons. In a two-sided exercise on the other hand, they often have the feeling that their object is to "beat B Squadron" by fair means or foul.

In "Training Regulations, 1934" (page 70) we read:—

> "In unit training a proportion of one-sided exercises will be needed, while in formation training the majority of exercises will be two-sided."

In the case of a Yeomanry regiment camping alone, most schemes should be one-sided for the reasons given above; but

when two or more Yeomanries train together, the opportunity should be taken of having two-sided exercises.

The peace strength of a Yeomanry regiment is so low that, after deducting umpires, enemy and their horseholders, not more than about 230 of all ranks will be available, and there is much to be said, in a one-sided scheme, for organising the regiment in two squadrons (each of four fairly strong troops) and having the third squadron imaginary. It is admitted that there are disadvantages in breaking up a squadron; on the other hand the advantages of two strong squadrons are considerable. They are more like what officers would have to handle in war, and the larger troops make duties such as vanguard, etc., much more realistic. Further, the fact that the third squadron is imaginary means that in the early stages of an exercise there are fewer people in reserve, and therefore fewer people doing nothing. Take, for example, an exercise in which the regiment is moving forward with one squadron as advanced guard: the vanguard troop or troops gain contact with the enemy and are held up; the remainder of the squadron, with possibly two machine guns attached, is put in, but the opposition is arranged by the director so that the second squadron has also to be used —perhaps to make some turning movement round the flank. Then, when this second squadron is well engaged, the exercise is brought to an end, after lasting, say, from 9 a.m. to 12 noon or 12.30. The lessons which the scheme was designed to teach have, it is hoped, been brought out; everyone has had something to do; and there has not been time for the men to get bored. Supposing four such exercises, each with two strong squadrons, are held during the fortnight's camp, it is possible for eight different officers to be given practice in commanding a squadron, whilst four officers can in turn command the regiment, and four more can in turn act as adjutant. It is sounder to use the real squadron-leaders as umpires for two reasons: firstly, because umpiring is difficult and needs the best officers; and second, because the junior officers gain valuable experience if allowed to command squadrons. If, for example, Major A. umpires his own squadron, he not only helps the director by "painting the picture," but can also slip in much useful instruction to his

officers and see how they shape when acting in more responsible positions.

The choice of the piece of ground on which a tactical scheme is to take place, is of course highly important: so much so that a Yeomanry C.O. should, when selecting the site for his annual camp (which has to be chosen months ahead) make sure that suitable country for schemes is available near the camp site. A case can be cited a few years ago of a regiment training just outside a country town, where for all practical purposes the tactical exercises had to take place along the roads. The country consisted of enclosed fields into which the troops were forbidden to go, and when one squadron executed a dismounted attack over a grass field containing a few cows, one of the latter subsequently "slipped" her calf and the farmer put in a claim which had to be paid. But the C.O. elected to camp in this very same place two years later, giving the time-honoured explanation put forward by so many Yeomanry colonels: "The men like it." This is often quite true, but the men would have liked another place equally well and perhaps better; whether men like or dislike camp depends less on the place than on the weather.

Camping too often on the same site also means that officers get to know the ground much too well to get full value out of tactical exercises, and one hears orders such as: "I want you to take your troop to that hill where you'll remember Sergeant A's horse bucked him off last year." One Yeomanry regiment, it is believed, goes to the same spot literally every year, and the various higher commanders are either powerless to prevent it, or else—more likely—they are too kind-hearted and look upon it as some odd regimental tradition, the breaking away from which might affect recruiting. Such a state of things is, of course, absolutely wrong, and the present writer is firmly of opinion that a regiment should never camp in the same locality oftener than once in four years at the most.

As a rule the C.I.G.S. lays down a particular phase of warfare, such as Defence, for special study by the Army each year, though not to the exclusion of other phases. It is sound for a Territorial unit to deal with, say, Defence in all its schemes

when it goes to camp, each scheme being on different ground, with different leaders and a different situation.

Let us now pass on to the actual preparation and conduct of a typical one-sided exercise with troops, suitable for a Yeomanry regiment in camp.

The first essential is that the C.O. should be absolutely clear in his own mind what he wants to teach his officers, and write the lessons down, quoting from the training manuals those passages which apply. For example, he might write :—

"OBJECT OF THE EXERCISE.

"To practise :—

"1. The issue of clear verbal orders.

"2. The handling of reconnoitring patrols.

"3. The use of machine guns in the attack."

"The officer ordering a reconnaissance will give full and clear instructions to the leader, preferably in the form of direct questions to which definite answers must be given."—("Cavalry Training," Vol. II, 17, 2.)

"The machine gun commander, accompanied by a range-taker and orderlies, should usually be well ahead of his guns."—(C.T. II, 64, 1.)

"Between 2,000 and 800 yards good effects may be anticipated from machine-gun fire; within 800 yards the greatest effect can be developed."—(C.T. II, 65, 2.)

It will be noticed that the actual passages from the books should be written down; it is little use telling officers to read the books, as even Regulars can rarely be relied on to do this. It will also be found that "Cavalry Training," Vol. II, contains more than enough "texts" for three or four schemes, so it is simpler to stick to this book.

A few days before the exercise, the C.O. should give his officers one or two lectures—unless he is certain that they are superfluous. In this particular case one lecture might be on "Reconnoitring Patrols," and another on "Machine Guns in the Attack." The lectures should be held in the ante-room after tea (after *lunch* is fatal as everyone goes to sleep), and officers should not have to take notes; the notes should be typed out in

the orderly room beforehand and a copy handed to each officer. Questions should be encouraged and the whole thing should be more of an informal chat than a lecture. Some reader may object that Yeomanry officers would dislike such after-tea instruction, but this is disputed; practically every officer is keen to learn, or he would not have joined the Territorial Army at all.

To return to our scheme. The C.O.'s next task is to select the ground, which must of course be such that the desired lessons can be brought out on it; if they cannot, then it is necessary either to find other ground that *is* suitable, or else think of other lessons that *can* be brought out on the ground available. To take an instance: the leading points of a vanguard troop are, in the scheme, to be held up by fire on reaching a certain bend in a track. The troop leader's correct action is to pin the enemy in front, and try and work round one flank or the other. But if there is a fence or other obstacle, or cultivated field, which prevents him actually making any such outflanking movement, then this particular bit of ground is unsuitable for that particular lesson. Officers in a tactical exercise must take the ground as it is, or the exercise does no good. To let the scheme go on till the vanguard troop is held up and then tell the troop-leader: "Of course in real war you could work round on the right, but you mustn't do so now as we can't ride over that wheat field," is definitely harmful and shows up the scheme as being a thoroughly bad one.

Assuming, however, that the ground is all right, our C.O. proceeds to fix the exact spot where the first shot will be fired. It will save time if he takes with him the officer who is to control the "enemy," as the latter will then know how many men are needed, where to place them and when they are to open fire. As mentioned earlier, the permanent staff and trumpeters are quite enough to act as enemy in this kind of exercise. To mark the first enemy position, one man (with rifle and blank ammunition and perhaps a machine-gun rattle) could be hidden in the probable direct line of the regiment's advance, whilst another man could be, say, 200 yards on one flank. These, if the umpires "paint the picture" properly so as to bring out the desired lessons, should hold up the first patrol and give its leader

something to report on. Later, the vanguard troop is similarly held up; the advanced guard squadron-leader makes a personal reconnaissance, issues his orders and puts in his machine guns and one or more of his remaining troops. This could result in the first enemy falling back and allowing the regiment's advance to continue, the second squadron perhaps taking over the duty of advanced guard.

A mile further on, this squadron in its turn comes under fire from, say, two different points at once. The squadron-leader rides up and has a look, decides on his plan and gives his orders to his troop-leaders. This second squadron then carries out its task—successfully or otherwise as the director thinks fit—and the exercise then closes down.

The commanding officer having visualised the scheme proceeding on some such lines as the above and settled on the positions and actions of the "enemy," can return to camp and work out the written part of the exercise, comprising:—

(*a*) The object of the exercise, with appropriate quotations (see page 195).

(*b*) The narrative.

(*c*) The opening situation, leading up to a problem or problems.

(*d*) The regimental orders which get the troops on to the ground at the proper time, and provide for such details as umpires, composition and distinguishing marks of "enemy," number of rounds of "blank" to be carried, whether haversack rations and feeds are to be taken, probable time the scheme ends, etc.

With regard to the narrative, the undesirability of the "comic" story has already been alluded to. Care should be taken to stage an episode such as would happen in war, and best of all, one based on something that really did happen in the Great War. It must be borne in mind that in war a cavalry regiment never wanders off on its own; it is either part of a cavalry brigade or divisional cavalry to an infantry division. In the scheme therefore, the cavalry brigade or infantry division must be mentioned and must be there in the spirit, even if not in the flesh.

The value of a tactical exercise depends very largely upon the umpires. A Yeomanry regiment normally goes to camp with one lieutenant-colonel, four majors, its own adjutant (a Regular captain) and another Regular major or captain attached for the fortnight. It is suggested that, except for one major who acts as O.C. regiment in the scheme, all the above should be directors or umpires, thus ensuring that the best officers available would be so used. In the particular exercise we are dealing with, these officers' duties would work out something like this :—

Lieut.-Colonel A.—Frames the exercise, and acts as director. Stays most of the time with Major X. (commanding the regiment in this day's scheme), takes written notes of all orders issued by X., rides off to any important point, collects reports from the umpires, and conducts the conference afterwards.

Major B.—Stays most of the time with Lieut. Y. (commanding leading squadron). Takes notes of all orders Y. issues and sees how they are acted on. When Y. details a vanguard troop, B. goes on with its leader, paints the picture, and gets in touch with Captain E. (see below).

Major C.—Goes mainly with the second squadron, taking note of all orders and how they are acted on, but if this squadron has nothing to do at first, C. may be used to act as umpire with any officer's patrol sent out by the O.C. regiment or the C.O. first squadron. He will similarly discuss the situation with Captain E.

Major D.—Goes as umpire to the machine gun troop as his primary task, but until that goes into action, is available for other umpiring duties.

Captain E.—This is the Regular officer attached for the training. He can well be used to control the enemy, combining this with noting the behaviour of patrols, or the vanguard troop, when they come under fire. As noted above, he discusses this behaviour with the other umpires, Majors B. and C.

Captain F. (Adjutant).—Stays most of the time helping and teaching Lieutenant G., who is acting adjutant in the scheme. Can be sent off on other umpiring jobs, and also

takes notes of anything that happens at regimental H.Q. when Lieut.-Colonel A is absent.

With these six officers controlling the operations and painting the picture, it will be found that ridiculous or unreal situations rarely occur; and that at the end, the director will have a complete record of all orders issued, and of what happened as a result of those orders.

Umpires' horse-holders should be cut down to a minimum, as of course men on this duty are getting little or no instruction. To distinguish them from combatants they should not only wear white armlets but should also parade without arms. Three horse-holders should suffice, as an umpire can often manage without one or can hand over his horse for a short time to any man near by.

Although Chapter VIII of "Training Regulations, 1934," lays down the duties of umpires very fully, it does not mention that an umpire can greatly help the director by guiding a junior officer who is obviously going wrong. This guidance should not be in the form of a direct solution, but should rather draw out from the junior the line of thought which will lead to correct action. It is far better to prevent a young officer making a "bloomer," than to let him make it and then bring it up against him at the conference afterwards.

Another point not mentioned in Chapter VIII is that umpires should not bother about what we may call "domestic details," such as No. 2 Troop sitting on their horses unduly long, or Corporal Brown leaving his rifle in the bucket after dismounting. Allusion to such matters is apt to draw men's attention away from the main lessons the scheme is supposed to rub in.

When Lieut.-Colonel A. considers that all the lessons he wanted to teach have been brought out, he orders the "Cease Fire" to be sounded and arranges for his final conference. "Training Regulations" say (p. 78):—

> "Where small forces are concerned this conference may be held on the ground . . . . the proceedings will be more instructive if the director is the only speaker."

The present writer has often, however, seen these very sound hints disregarded: some C.Os. are apt to hold their conferences

in the mess-tent after lunch (when everyone is somewhat sleepy); and in a two-sided exercise the commanders of the two sides are sometimes asked to explain their plans in turn. This wastes a lot of time, because, human nature being what it is, each commander is liable to try and show how sound his plan was, rather than stick to the lessons the scheme was meant to bring out. It is far better for the director to do all the talking; after stating the objects of the exercise and the opening situation, he can continue like this:—"B.'s plan for carrying out his task was to advance on a two-squadron front (correct me if I'm wrong, B.) and then to," etc.

The director should not only give his reasons for stating that such-and-such a course of action was right or wrong, he should encourage officers, however junior, to say straight out if they differ from him, and give their reasons. The matter can then be argued out, and misunderstandings cleared up, which is much better than a young officer leaving the conference and thinking, "I still don't see why I was wrong, but I couldn't say anything."

It is suggested that N.C.Os. and other ranks should not attend the director's conference. Although they would doubtless derive benefit from it, it is not a good thing for them to hear their officers criticised, perhaps unfavourably. Lieut.-Colonel A. must feel he can make his points quite freely and frankly with his officers, without any risk of Sergeant X. telling his friends afterwards that "The Colonel didn't 'arf give it to Mr. C."

The conference, then, should be for officers only, on the ground if possible, the regiment being sent home under the R.S.M., leaving only the officers' horse-holders. In this connection it may be noted that, when the country permits, the exercise can frequently be framed so that the regiment moves or fights *back towards camp*, thus shortening the distance home when it ends. It is sometimes even possible to end up so near camp that the officers' horses can be sent home too, the officers themselves walking back after the conference. Later, squadron--leaders should have a chat to their men—or anyhow to their N.C.Os.—about the scheme.

It does more harm than good to hold a tactical exercise in bad weather. Men get fed up and lose interest, and the director therefore should not hesitate to postpone or close down the scheme if the day turns out wet, except, of course, when a senior inspecting officer is due to arrive or is present. It is difficult to dry the men's clothes in camp and the less they get wet the better. If the rain is not too heavy, the C.O. may decide to turn the exercise into one without troops, the officers putting on their mackintoshes and either riding or motoring, whichever is most convenient.

To sum up :—

(1) During a Yeomanry camp there should be at least three, and possibly four, tactical exercises with troops.

(2) They should be set and directed by the commanding officer, not by the adjutant.

(3) The situations must be such as might or did happen in real war. Comic situations are undesirable.

(4) One-sided exercises are preferable when a regiment is in camp by itself.

(5) Some exercises work out better if the regiment is organised in two strong squadrons, with the third one imaginary.

(6) Different officers should be detailed to act as regimental and squadron commanders, and as adjutants, in each scheme.

(7) Camp sites should not be chosen in places where the ground is unsuited for tactical exercises.

(8) A regiment should not camp oftener than once in four years in the same place.

(9) When writing out the exercise, the C.O. should start with the lessons he wants to teach, and the quotations from the manuals which bear on them.

(10) In a one-sided exercise, the permanent staff and trumpeters are generally enough to act as enemy.

(11) There should be at least 5 umpires, the most senior officers being detailed.

(12) The exercise should not go on too long, and should be put off if the weather is wet.

(13) Much of the value depends on the effectiveness of the criticism afterwards. Only officers should attend the final conference.

In conclusion, the writer ventures to give a few brief outlines of typical schemes which he himself has found to work out satisfactorily. In the examples below, (1) is the phase of warfare; (2) the lessons to be taught; (3) a rough idea of the narratives; and (4) the probable action of the O.C. regiment.

EXERCISE I.

(1) *Reconnaissance.*

(2) Issue of clear instructions to patrols.

Handling of patrols. Writing of messages.

(3) 2nd Division, with Blankshire Yeomanry as divisional cavalry, is following up a retiring enemy. G.O.C. Division tells O.C. Blankshire Yeomanry "Your task in general is to cover the advance of the division, and in particular to report whether there are any enemy in the following areas"—naming various villages, river bridges, etc., at varying distances ahead. The cavalry might be asked whether a certain prominent feature was the enemy's flank or not.

(4) O.C. sends out, say, three officers' patrols and then advances with rest of regiment on a one- or two-squadron front.

EXERCISE II.

(1) *Advanced Guard.*

(2) Handling of advanced guard squadron and vanguard troop.

Machine guns with the advanced guard.

(3) 2nd Division is moving towards an advancing enemy and wants to seize certain important high ground. G.O.C. tells Blankshire Yeomanry to push forward to the high ground, report whether clear or not, and if possible hold it until infantry come up.

(4) Same as in Exercise I above.

EXERCISE III.

(1) *Attack.*

(2) Issue of orders. Personal reconnaissance by leaders.

Use of covered lines of approach. Machine guns in the attack.

(3) 3rd Cavalry Brigade is attacking enemy position (high ground, village, or wood). The two leading regiments cannot get on and brigade commander decides to use Blankshire Yeomanry in brigade reserve, to turn enemy's flank.

(4) O.C. confers with Os.C. other two regiments, makes personal reconnaissance with his squadron-leaders and machine gun officer, issues his orders, and starts moving against the flank in question.

EXERCISE IV.

(1) *Defence.*

(2) Machine guns in the defence. Defence in depth.
Retention of a mounted reserve.

(3) As in France in March, 1918, our Army is retreating, and a gap has occurred between the V and VII Corps. The V Corps' right flank is said to be at A, but the whereabouts of the VII Corps' left flank is unknown. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade is sent up to locate and fill the gap, the Blankshire Yeomanry being leading regiment. (NOTE.—In the exercise the gap might be, say, 1,000 yards.)

(4) O.C. sends out patrols to try and locate flanks of two Corps and meanwhile disposes rest of regiment so as to meet any enemy advancing through the gap. On learning where flank of nearest infantry lies, he uses regiment to prolong their line, watching remainder of gap with standing patrols.

EXERCISE V.

(1) *Withdrawal.*

(2) Occupation of successive positions.
Use of machine guns. Issue of clear orders.

(3) Blankshire Yeomanry is acting as rearguard mounted troops under rear brigade of 2nd Division which is withdrawing, followed by a superior enemy force. The regiment is ordered to hold three successive positions, 2 to 3 miles apart, and is given an hour up to which each position is to be denied to the enemy.

(4) O.C. disposes regiment with two squadrons in front and one in reserve, and sends out patrol to report on enemy's advance. He also keeps in touch with his own retiring infantry.

THE CAPTURE OF SEMAKH, 25th SEPTEMBER, 1918.

ACTION BY THE 4TH AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE.

By MAJOR K. A. MCKENZIE, D.S.O., Australian Staff Corps, late Brigade Major, 4th A.L.H.Brigade.

THE first stage of General Allenby's pursuit of the Turkish Army in Palestine in 1918, ended with the Battle of Megiddo when the Desert Mounted Corps gained possession of the general line Beisan—Nazareth—Haifa.

The next objective was Damascus, to be occupied by a converging movement of 4th Cavalry Division via Deraa and of the Australian Mounted Division and 5th Cavalry Division via Tiberius and across the Jordan at Jisr Benat Jakub.

The Australian Mounted Division was ordered on 24th September to advance to Tiberius.

In the course of the retreat of the broken Turkish Armies Liman von Sanders had endeavoured to organise some resistance on a general defensive line from Derra down the Yarmuk Valley to Semakh thence to Tiberius and Lake Huleh in order to gain time for the organisation of the remnants of his army from Palestine and the recovery of stores and munitions at Deraa for the defence of Damascus.

Liman von Sanders issued orders for the defence of Semakh which he regarded as the essential link between the two main sectors of the defensive line. He left a number of German machine gunners to ensure stubborn resistance, and he entrusted the command of the Semakh garrison to a German officer.

The advance to Tiberius was to be carried out by the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade via Semakh and by the 3rd

Australian Light Horse Brigade via Nazareth. Reports from the Air Force and from the Central India Horse at Jisr el Majamie both showed that Semakh was held by the enemy. These reports indicated that stores were being evacuated, but gave no definite information regarding the strength of the garrison.

4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (commanded by Brigadier-General D. Grant, D.S.O.) arrived at Beisan at 13.45 hours, 24th September, and there received orders to capture Semakh at dawn on 25th September.

The Brigade (less 4th Australian Light Horse Regiment and five troops 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment) moved from Beisan at 16.30 hours, halting at 21.00 hours, at Jisr el Majamie, which was held by the Central India Horse.

At this time the Brigade Commander was informed that 15th Australian Light Horse Regiment (5th Australian Light Horse Brigade) was marching from Jenin to reinforce the Brigade, but would not arrive until after daylight on the 25th September.

It was left to the discretion of the Brigade Commander to attack with the troops at his immediate disposal or to await the arrival of the 15th Australian Light Horse Regiment. He decided, in view of the task to be undertaken, that delay was unwarranted. Either the garrison would escape with valuable stores and cause considerable damage to communications, or the delay would enable the Turks to improve their defences and offer greater resistance in daylight. He therefore timed the approach march to place the Brigade south of and within attacking distance of Semakh before dawn.

Information supplied by officers of the Central India Horse showed that the village and station buildings lay at the northern end of a plain 2½ miles wide, generally quite flat and without cover, but with no observed obstacles to mounted movement. Some slightly undulating ground existed 3,000 yards to the south east of Semakh. A local inhabitant estimated the garrison at 120 Turks and Germans with not more than four machine guns, but we found later that this was a serious under estimation. It was also known that at least one field gun had been in action against patrols of the Central India Horse.

As the Brigade Commander decided to deliver a surprise mounted attack under cover of semi-darkness, no further detailed reconnaissance was made preparatory to deployment, except that the Brigade approach was covered by the normal Advanced Guard dispositions.

Assisted by guides from Central India Horse, the Brigade crossed the bridges over the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers at 02.30 hours., 25th September, and advanced northwards on the eastern side of the railway. Initial protection west of the railway was given by a squadron Central India Horse.

11th Australian Light Horse Regiment was ordered on gaining contact to attack Semakh mounted from a south easterly direction just before dawn supported by the Machine Gun Squadron—the 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment (less five Troops) was retained in Brigade reserve.

After crossing the bridge over the Yarmuk River the Brigade deployed into column of squadrons each in line of troop columns, and moved parallel to the road east of the railway line; the 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment, with one section (4 guns) of machine guns attached, were leading with C Squadron as Advanced Guard, followed by Brigade Headquarters, Signal Troop, Machine Gun Squadron (less one Section) and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment (less 5 Troops). The Bearer Division of the Field Ambulance with Camel Cacolets followed the Brigade, but ambulance wagons and all other Brigade wheeled transport except machine gun limbers remained at Jisr ed Mejamie with orders to move at daylight to Semakh.

On approaching Semakh the Machine Gun Squadron was ordered to move forward to support 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment.

At 04.25 hours, when it was still quite dark, hostile machine gun and rifle fire was opened along the whole front of the Advanced Guard Squadron. The four advanced machine guns immediately came into action near the railway whilst the 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment (less C Squadron) swung off to the right so as to charge from the south easterly direction.

As soon as the 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment had cleared their front, the eight reserve machine guns also came

into action in line with the advanced guns. The M.C. Squadron had then six guns in action on each side of the railway line, and these distributed fire along the enemy's line.

A and B Squadrons of the 11th Light Horse Regiment charged mounted with drawn swords in two lines of half Squadrons with about 200 yards distance between lines. As they charged they yelled, which enabled the machine gunners to know their whereabouts and when to cease their fire, as it was still dark.

These Squadrons broke right through the enemy's line and rode on to the east of the railway buildings; two troops swung round the west of the buildings and entered the village. The railway buildings were found to be strongly held so the two Squadrons dismounted, left their horses in a wadi near the pump house, and attacked on foot. In the meanwhile C Squadron of the 11th Light Horse Regiment, which had formed the Advance Guard, detached one troop to act as escort to the machine guns, and the remainder moved to protect the right rear of the two charging Squadrons, and took up a position on Hill 377, watching the railway to Deraa and the road to Sumra. At 05.15 hours they were sent to assist the other Squadrons in the village. C Squadron of the 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment was also sent in on the left flank to the west of the village and took part in clearing it, and in the attack on the railway buildings.

It was apparant to our Machine Gun Squadron that the most effective enemy fire was coming from machine guns and automatic rifles firing south along the railway towards Jisr ed Mejamie.

Six guns on the left were detailed to keep down the enemy's fire on their immediate and left fronts, and the six guns on the right to search the road, railway line and railway station. When the 11th Regiment reached the latter our machine gun fire was concentrated on two enemy machine guns and one automatic rifle on the railway line, and these were soon put out of action. The machine guns were then advanced, one detachment covering the advance of the other, and eight guns took up a position on the west of the village and covering Lake Tiberius and the beach

front. The other four machine guns were then galloped through the village to the support of B Squadron, 11th Regiment, who were engaged with an enemy field gun and machine guns about 500 yards to the east of the engine sheds. These they silenced.

When dawn appeared about 04.50 hours the enemy had taken up a stand in the village and the station buildings. He was fighting in a most determined manner with automatic rifles and bombs, besides rifles, and here most of the casualties occurred. The fighting ceased at 05.30 hours, when all the garrison of the railway buildings had been killed.

Several of our casualties, including one officer, were caused through the treacherous use of the white flag. In one case a trooper walked up to and was shot within two yards of the white flag by an enemy standing just behind the man who held the flag.

When the enemy's fire first started it passed over the heads of the advancing troops and fell amongst the remainder of the Brigade, which then moved eastwards to a point of cover just south of Hill 377.

Of the two motor boats at Semakh, one escaped and the other was fired on by a Hotchkiss rifle and burst into flames and eventually sank. A Turkish officer swam ashore from the burning boat and was captured.

At 05.30 hours the 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment (less two Squadrons) was ordered to advance eastwards along the railway line up the river Yarmuk. At 06.40 hours this regiment reported that 12 enemy cavalry and 25 infantry were halted south of Kefr Harib, and also that 60 Germans were holding a redoubt covering the approach to El Hamme Station, where there was an engine and tender.

At 07.30 hours the 15th Australian Light Horse Regiment and A Squadron of the 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment arrived, the latter having marched 50 miles in 24 hours. The Squadron Central India Horse reported that they had moved to Kinnereth without meeting opposition.

The 12th Australian Light Horse had secured the first bridge over the Yarmuk River east of Semakh, when orders were received from the Australian Mounted Division that the Brigade was not to advance up the Yarmuk but was to protect the bridges

then held, as the whole Division was to move up the west side of Lake Tiberius.

Enemy Casualties :—

		Total.
Killed	about	100
Captured (including wounded) :		
Germans : 7 officers, 143 other ranks		150
Turks : 16 officers, 198 other ranks ...		214
		464

Material Captured :—

1 Field gun, 77 m.m. with 200 rounds.
7 Machine guns.
3 Automatic rifles.
2 Locomotives with tenders.
8 Carriages.
12 Goods wagons.
1 Aeroplane (damaged).

Light Horse Casualties :—

Killed : 3 officers, 14 other ranks.
Wounded : 7 officers, 54 other ranks. Total 78.

NOTES :—

(1) The captured field gun was later manned by Light Horse personnel and used to shell enemy posts on the heights east of Semakh.

(2) The engine was repaired and with a truck was manned by Light Horse personnel and despatched with platelayers from the regiments to repair the line from Jisr ed Mejamie to Beisan with a view to meeting the breakdown train from Afuleh to enable casualties to be evacuated by rail.

(3) Light Horse casualties mostly occurred in the fighting on foot in the village and at the station buildings.

(4) It is considered that if the attack had been delivered in daylight the casualties would have been much heavier. Most of

the enemy fire was high, due probably to lack of observation and to the presence of tall thistles which covered the flat ground south of Semakh.

(5) The element of surprise which was hoped for was absent as the enemy anticipated the attack. From information supplied from prisoners, the Commander of the garrison appreciated that as there had been a patrol near Semakh on the 23rd September and a squadron had been driven back on the 24th September, an attack early on the 25th September was probable.

(6) Prisoners also stated that Liman von Sanders had inspected Semakh on 23rd September and had ordered the garrison to hold the place to the last. This, together with a very liberal issue of "arak," accounted for the stiff opposition put up by the garrison.

(7) Before committing the Brigade to this form of attack in the dark, the Brigade Commander satisfied himself that, as far as he could estimate, no obstacles to mounted movement existed until the immediate vicinity of the village was reached. Mobility combined with concealment was, therefore, used to cover the open ground exposed to enemy fire.

(8) The factors necessitating the holding of Semakh by the Turks, together with the risks which have to be accepted by a Cavalry Commander in the pursuit fully justified the form and timing of the attack.

(9) The Official History of the War states :—

> "Had the attack, unsupported by artillery fire, been made by daylight, its losses would certainly have been more severe; indeed it may be doubted whether it would have succeeded at all against defenders prepared to resist to the last."

(10) The capture of Semakh broke the last link in the Turkish line, causing his further withdrawal to Damascus by two separate routes through Deraa and through Jisr Benat Jakub.



AN ATTACHMENT TO GERMAN CAVALRY

By Captain E. R. Sword, 4th Queen's Own Hussars.

It was decided early this year that an exchange of officers should take place between Great Britain and Germany. I was lucky enough to be sent on attachment to the Cavalry, and, late in April, duly joined the 15th Regiment at Paderborn, in Westphalia.

Cavalry regiments are now generally known by the name of their permanent garrisons. The Paderborn Cavalry Regiment is commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Graf von Rothkirch und Trach, who had led the first show-jumping team at the Cavalry School after the War. He had been to the Italian and French Cavalry Schools, and his style of horsemanship was noticeably reflected in Paderborn.

The regiment consists of a Headquarter Squadron, four sabre squadrons, and a fifth squadron which comprises nine heavy machine guns and two close support 7.5 cm. howitzers. The Headquarter Squadron was in the process of re-organisation during my attachment, but it will very likely include a troop of three 3.7 cm. anti-tank guns, as well as sapper and signal troops. When I left, the regiment, including its transport, was almost entirely horsed.

Sabre squadrons comprise H.Q. and three troops, each of which includes three groups of four sections. There are four men in a section, and the first section in each troop carries a Dreyse light automatic, not unlike our own. It is carried in a bucket. No spare barrel is used.

Rifles are supported partly in a shallow bucket and partly by a sling, which is always worn in the same position mounted and dismounted, so that the man has his hands free when on foot.

A sword is carried, but is little used except for ceremonial purposes. Steel helmets are worn on all mounted parades.

I found myself attached to the 4th Squadron, commanded by Rittmeister Freiherr von Nagel. He was formerly a prominent member of the German Show-Jumping team.

The first time I went on parade I found the band had been detailed to play us on to the training ground. As the Squadron Leader and I rode on to the middle of the barrack square he suddenly halted and called out loudly "Heil Schwadron." The squadron as one man shouted back "Heil, Herr Rittmeister." We then rode round and any faults were taken down by the squadron sergeant-major in an enormous book which he carried on his chest, buttoned inside his tunic. Practical considerations are the ruling factors in equipment and turn-out in field uniform. Their turn-out in walking-out dress was immaculate.

The horses were smaller than ours, and looked hard and well, and had good coats. They never clip them, and horse-rugs in the stable are forbidden. About seventy per cent. of cavalry horses come from East Prussia. They look well bred, but are inclined to be temperamental. The remaining thirty per cent. are mainly Hanoverians.

I went round a Hanoverian centre at Celle, from which stallions are sent to stations round the provinces to serve mares brought in from outlying farms. Much is being done to improve the Hanoverians, which are as a rule heavier and less excitable than the East Prussians, though they are reputed not to stand up to work so well.

I found that stable management in the 4th Squadron varied considerably from our own. Horses were watered partly from rather small troughs and partly from buckets. Feeding was centralised under a sergeant, assisted by a corporal. He wheeled a trolly down the centre of the stables, which were longer than ours, and tinfulls were shovelled out according to the scaled requirements of individual horses.

In the stables the horses were divided into groups of about fifteen, under the supervision of a "group leader," who was usually a corporal. The groups did not necessarily correspond to the organisation of the troops, and in fact N.C.Os. might have

4th SQUADRON, PADERBORN CAVALRY REGIMENT

RITTMEISTER FREIHERR VON NAGEL ON WOTAN

THE OFFICERS' MESS,
PADERBORN CAVALRY REGIMENT

quite different commands in the field. Troop leaders had little or no responsibility in the stables, and the squadron leader dealt direct with the S.S.M., forage N.C.O., and stable group leaders on all matters of stable routine.

The only officers in the squadron apart from the squadron leader (who is never above the rank of Rittmeister, or Captain) were two second lieutenants, one of whom had only been commissioned a few days. Under the new organisation officers have to do six months' service in the ranks, followed by nine months at one of the war schools (Kriegschulen), which officers of all arms attend. They then do a specialised cavalry course of six weeks before getting their commissions. Promotion is on a general list, common to all arms.

The attitude of the officers towards the men succeeded in combining strict discipline with a sense of humour. The officers with whom I came in contact came from much the same type of families as our own. They were smart and well turned out.

Long working hours, particularly since the introduction of short service, give few opportunities for recreation. Polo is practically non-existent in Germany to-day, Hamburg being the only club still in being. There, they cannot usually raise more than two chukkers. Hunting animals is now forbidden, so that drags only are possible.

Officers usually had to find their own quarters, and there was no room for all the bachelors in barracks. The officers' Mess was an old Bishop's Palace, and is a particularly fine old building. I found that the Mess was not so much used as is usual in England, owing to the squadrons often being so widely separated. The 4th Squadron's barracks were several miles from the Mess.

The squadron leader dealt personally with all matters of interior economy, with which troop leaders had little concern. There was little "crime" in the squadron, and officers had wider powers of punishment than our own.

All offices were on a generous scale, and all had separate telephones, which of course saved a great deal of time and shoe leather. Barrack rooms usually accommodated ten men in iron beds arranged in two levels, one above the other. Each man had a hanging cupboard, which he had to keep locked up. The

squadron canteen was run regimentally and was often used by officers of the 4th squadron. There was a N.C.O.s' Mess for sergeants and corporals. The men's Messing was supervised by the Regimental Paymaster, and cooks and Mess orderlies were civilians. The food cost the men more than with us, and there was less of it. It was plain and well cooked.

The old twelve-year system had been replaced by single year voluntary service in October, 1934. Conscripted recruits were not due till October, 1935. The men were intelligent and were always well disciplined and wide awake.

There was no "Training Squadron" in the regiment, all training of recruits being decentralised to squadrons. From the commencement they undergo a syllabus embodying every form of training and instruction, including "square" and "riding school." Much use is made of sand-tables, and lead soldiers are invariably used to illustrate formations.

The 4th Squadron did the greater part of its training in the Senne area, which consists of sandy undulating ground, with fir and pine trees, not unlike the country round Aldershot. It is used by all arms, and includes artillery and battle practice ranges. The squadron was doing troop training during my attachment, with occasional squadron schemes. There was little ceremonial drill of any kind, nearly all movements being confined to the manœuvres of shallow columns. They did not split them up into bodies smaller than a "group" (sixteen men), who usually moved in half sections.

I noticed that a great deal of attention was paid to verbal appreciations of the ground and of the situation. Every officer, N.C.O. and man was continually being called on to give an appreciation, with the result that they were automatically able to sum up situations surprisingly quickly and accurately.

Much emphasis was laid on the use of ground and concealment, and particularly on camouflage. This had been brought to a high pitch of efficiency. On several occasions I saw defensive positions from the enemy's direction, and was rarely able to locate the troops. Every rifleman was usually protected from view by some form of cover, either natural, or by an arrangement of branches, etc., which he had collected. The anti-tank guns

were particularly efficient at concealment, and the gun and crew were covered with a multi-coloured sheet, which was in turn covered with leaves or branches, according to the country. In a defensive position silence was insisted on, and maintained. A minimum of sentries were employed but every man knew his exact position, which was not occupied until the last moment. In general, I noticed that each individual problem was treated on its merits, and originality was encouraged.

Remount training was decentralised to squadrons. A horse remained a remount for two years and was usually ridden in a snaffle for the first eighteen months. The German horses have less natural balance than our own and require more schooling. They were well and quietly ridden, and in fact the standard of horsemanship generally was high. The troop horses were handy and jumped well, though I noticed that they did not like ditches as a rule. Much attention was paid to riding school work and "dressage" and show-jumping competitions were frequent. A forward seat was always employed for jumping, and the regiment was very successful in the competitions I saw. Rittmeister von Nagel had a grey called "Wotan," the winner of many international events. On one occasion in New York he refused an offer of £2,000 for him. Eventually, after competing three times in the winning team for the Coppa Mussolini in Rome, Freiherr von Nagel decided to give the horse to Hitler. Hitler's answer was to present the horse to Germany, with the request that Nagel would look after him. He is now known as "Deutschlands Wotan." He is a grand horse, and though getting on in years he helped the German team to win the International Competition in Aachen this June.

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I left for Hanover on 20th May and found myself attached to the third group of the Cavalry School, which is commanded by Lieut.-General Freiherr von Dalwick, and is organised in four groups, of which the first is now non-existent. It used to be responsible for the training of aspirant cavalry officers in the building which is at present occupied by the War School.

The second group is commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel and is sub-divided into an officers' and a N.C.O.s' wing. The first

is commanded by a Captain, assisted by a second Captain. In it there were three rides, one of ten first year student officers, one of five second year officers, and one of N.C.O.s. Officer students (at present only cavalry) do a two year course. The first year's training of the officers was carried out on trained horses, and the second year on remounts. The N.C.O.s did only a year's course.

The N.C.O.'s wing was commanded by a Major, assisted by three Captains. It is being considerably enlarged to keep pace with the expansion of the army.

I found that there was very little tactics taught and not much importance was attached to the use of the sword. Attention was concentrated on training equitation instructors.

The third group was commanded by a Colonel and was entirely specialised and officered by graduates of the school. It was divided into four stables of which the first, the "Military Stable," was commanded by a Captain with six officers and had about thirty horses. This stable specialises in "Military" Competitions, which involve a three day test of each man and horse, including "Dressage," a ride which takes in the steeplechase course, and several miles of road work, a cross-country ride, and show jumping. This stable has recently had many successes in Budapest and Berlin.

The second stable specialises in high-school work and is commanded by a Major with four officers, and usually has about thirty horses.

The third stable is concerned with racing and drag-hunting and is commanded by a Major, with two officers, and has about forty-five horses. It controls the Cavalry School Drag and the Racing stables in Hanover and Berlin.

The fourth stable of the third group specialises in Show-jumping and is commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel with five regular officers and three reserve officers. It has about seventy horses, all of which are trained entirely for show-jumping. They have been very successful lately, particularly on the Continent, where competitions are usually held in the open. They also had several successes at Olympia and Dublin this year.

The fourth group is commanded by a Major with two officers, and concentrates on instruction in all forms of driving of horse-drawn vehicles.

Training in Hanover itself was rather hampered by lack of suitable ground, though as much as possible was made of land leased for a few weeks near Helstorf, not far from Hanover. This consists of undulating heather-covered ground with small trees and copses. It was used this year for the first time by the Cavalry School and no other arms train there. It is ideal for training young remounts and numbers of natural looking jumps had been put up.

Owing to the climate a large amount of work in winter has to be done indoors. The riding schools are exceptionally well equipped and large, one being over a hundred yards long. In the summer much use is made of open-air manèges.

The officers' Mess was run on informal lines, members being as a rule free to dine when they wished and uniform was rarely worn in the evening. The "population" there is of course a rather "floating" one, and often includes attached officers from other countries.

Specialisation is the key-note of the establishment, and there can be no question but that the results achieved are of a very high order.

A large contingent from the Cavalry School moved down to Aachen for the International Horse Show, which luckily coincided with the end of my attachment. Everything was run on the most efficient lines and the size and variety of the obstacles were impressive. On one occasion three horses in an ordinary competition had to jump off clear rounds, which included a wall 6 ft. 8 ins. high. There were also several banks combined with tricky ditches and fences up to nearly 6 ft.

Both here, as in Hanover and in Paderborn, I met with the greatest kindliness and hospitality. I was much struck at the same time by the sense of humour and charm of manner of the Germans with whom I came in contact. They could not have done more to make my attachment pleasant and interesting.

THE CONQUEROR OF GOLCONDA

By Major E. W. Sheppard, O.B.E, M.C.

To any Englishman well acquainted with the early history of our Indian Empire it must always be a matter for surprise that so entrancing and romantic a story should be unknown to the great majority of his fellow countrymen. Heroic struggles against overwhelming odds—stubborn defences of crazy mud forts by tiny garrisons—extraordinary marches in the heat of tropical summer—astounding victories over hosts of myriad hard-fighting enemies—all these abound in these early wars of "John Company"; and the men who performed these wonderful feats have, it might be supposed, established by their achievements an irresistible claim on the grateful memory of those after-generations which have entered into their labours. But as a matter of sad fact their deeds and they themselves alike have been almost entirely forgotten; and a race whose ancestors accomplished perhaps the most splendid and profitable conquest to be found in the history of war knows little or nothing of this magnificent feat of arms, and enjoys its fruits while still oblivious of its circumstances and neglectful of the memory of its heroes.

Of these heroes none is perhaps less deserving of such a fate than the conqueror of Golconda, Colonel Francis Forde, of His Majesty's 39th Regiment of Foot, whose career we propose briefly to outline in this article.

Of Forde's early life little is known; even the date of his birth is uncertain. He was the second son of Matthew Forde, of Seaford, Co. Down, member for Kirkpatrick in the Irish Parliament, and of Anne, daughter of William Brownlow of Lurgan, and at the time of his first appearance in history was a

captain in the 39th Foot (now the 1st Dorset Regiment), which, under command of Colonel Adlercron, landed in India in September, 1754, and was quartered at Fort St. George, Madras, till 1756. Forde obtained his majority in November, 1755, and the first three years of his tour of duty in the East seem to have been spent in the ordinary course of regimental routine. The open struggle between the French and British East India Companies, which had been all but decided in favour of the former by the energy and ability of Dupleix, had died down as a result of the conclusion of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and the subsequent recall of the great French Proconsul. French prestige in India was then high, considerably higher than that of the British; the whole of the Deccan was under the virtual control of Bussy, their able representative at the court of the Nizam of Hyderabad; and they had found in the internecine quarrels of the native princes of South India ample opportunities for undermining the influence of their rivals and enhancing their own. The British saw themselves compelled in self-defence to pursue a simliar policy; and it was in an ill-starred enterprise to assist a friendly Indian chief, the Nawab of Arcot, against a rebellious subordinate, that Forde had his first experience in independent command.

The episode need not long detain us. The governor of Nellore, a city on the coast some ninety miles north of Madras, having refused to pay the tribute due to his brother and overlord, a force of 500 men was sent to assist the Nawab of Arcot's army in reducing him to terms. The city was invested on April 27th, 1757, and after a week's siege a storm was attempted, but was beaten off, the British contingent, which led the assault, suffering considerably. The news that a French force had taken the field on the side of the rebels caused the Madras Government to abandon all idea of continuing the operations against Nellore, and the troops were therefore withdrawn to reinforce the garrison of Conjeveram, a town some forty miles south-west of Madras. Forde remained in command of this place during the short and indecisive campaign of forty days which now ensued, and was still there when orders were received from home recalling the 39th Foot from India; most of the men

were allowed to enlist in the East India Company's Service, but the majority of the officers departed for England. Forde was one of those who decided to stay behind, and he apparently remained in charge at Conjeveram until the arrival of a French fleet with a strong body of troops at Pondicherry early in September caused the Madras Council, in anticipation of a threatened attack, to call in his force. No sooner had it arrived under the walls of the city, than a new sphere of activity offered itself to Forde.

The commander of the troops in Bengal having died in October, the Council at Calcutta, apparently at the instance of Clive, wrote inviting Forde to take the vacant post. A long correspondence followed: he was eager to accept it, but considered that in justice to himself he should be paid the sum of £5,000 as compensation for the loss of his King's commission, which he would of course be compelled to resign on taking service under the East India Company. The Council declined to pay more than half the amount asked, and after negotiations had gone on for some four months and had been all but broken off, Clive, who seems to have set his heart on securing his protégé's services, stepped in and paid the balance of the £5,000 from his own private purse—he even offered to increase the amount should Forde desire it, but the latter, having fixed on what he considered a just figure, honourably refused to accept more. The matter was thus settled, and on March 6th, 1758, Francis Forde assumed command of the East India Company's troops in Bengal, with the rank of Colonel and a seat on the Council as third member. What reasons Clive had for his interest in the young officer and his urgent desire to secure his services as his chief military subordinate are not ascertainable, but, as we shall see, no selection could possibly have been better justified by subsequent results.

It was not long before an opportunity was offered for Forde to prove the accuracy of Clive's high estimate of his abilities. The French force which had landed at Pondicherry in the autumn of 1757 was now campaigning in the Madras territory under the leadership of Count Lally, the supreme commander

of all the French troops in India; he did not, however, deem himself strong enough to attack Madras itself without further reinforcements, and, acting in virtue of the full powers conferred on him, sent to Bussy at Hyderabad, ordering him to move to Madras, bringing with him all the troops he could. Bussy, fearful though he was that his departure would be the signal for the collapse of the French ascendancy in the Deccan which he had so laboriously erected and so long maintained, had no choice but to obey. He marched therefore as ordered, and on his way collected the greater part of the garrison in occupation of the territory known as the Northern Circars.

The Northern Circars, to which the first European explorers in India had given the name of Golconda, lie along the shore of the Bay of Bengal, from just south of the River Mahanadi to just south of the Kistna, a distance of some four hundred and fifty miles, and stretch inland an average distance of one hundred miles. The French held them under the suzerainty of Salabat Jung, the Nizam of Hyderabad, and collected and enjoyed the use of their revenues. Bussy, when he passed by on his way to join Lally, left in charge of the province an officer named Conflans, who had just arrived from France, knew little or nothing of the country and the people, and was, as events were to show, quite unfitted for his responsible position. No sooner had he entered upon his new duties than his troubles began. Ananda Raz, the Rajah of the coast town of Vizianagram, seized the chance of shaking off the French yoke and making himself an independent prince; early in June he marched on and took Vizagapatam, a town hard by his own, drove out the French garrison, and sent letters to the Madras and Bengal Councils, offering them the town, and suggesting that they should send a force to assist him in conquering the whole province. Madras had of course no troops available for such an enterprise; opinion at Calcutta also was at first averse to accepting the proposal, but Clive saw in it an opportunity for an expedition which promised not only to be profitable in itself, but to prove an effective counter-blow to the French attack against Madras. The despatch of a force was therefore decided on, and Forde was placed in command of it.

The troops allotted for the expedition, consisting of five hundred Europeans and two thousand Sepoys, with fourteen guns, were embarked on four ships in the Hooghly early in October, 1758, and landed at Vizagapatam on the 20th; thence they moved forward twenty miles to Kasimkota, where the Rajah's army was encamped, and effected a junction with it on November 3rd. Conflans, with all the French forces available for service in the field, had taken position on the east bank of the lower Godaveri covering Rajahmundry, and there awaited attack. But Forde was as yet unable to oblige him, for Ananda Raz, who had been cheerfully lavish of promises while the British were at a distance, now they were at hand showed a decided reluctance to fulfil them. The British commander, who had relied on him to provide at any rate the bulk of the funds necessary for carrying on the campaign, found himself drawn, much against his will, into long-drawn-out negotiations, which were only finally concluded early in December. Thus it was not till December 3rd that Forde was able to commence active operations against Conflans. The two little armies came face to face some forty miles east of Rajahmundry, the French numbering some five hundred Europeans and six thousand Sepoys with forty guns, the British and the Rajah's troops about eight thousand with eighteen guns; but of these latter Forde could really rely only on his own two thousand four hundred men. Each commander thought the other's position too strong for direct attack, and set to work to manoeuvre him out of it. Accordingly on the morning of December 9th, Forde, leaving the Rajah encamped in face of the enemy, led his little army by a circuitous and concealed route round the left flank of the French towards the village of Condore, which lies on the left bank of the Kistna about forty miles above Rajahmundry, with the object of falling on their rear and cutting them off from that place. Meanwhile Conflans on his part had secretly brought forward some guns to a position from which he opened fire without warning on the Rajah's camp; Ananda Raz's men in wild confusion bolted off at top speed to rejoin Forde, who hearing the noise of cannon, halted and waited for his allies to come up. The two forces together then continued their march to Condore,

where they halted. Conflans, having followed them up and observing that they seemed unwilling to push their turning movement beyond the village, concluded that the moment had come to offer battle, and hurried his troops into line. The European battalion with thirteen guns on each of its flanks formed the centre and mainstay of his front, with on its left a body of native horse; each wing of the army was composed of a contingent of three thousand Sepoys with six guns. Forde, observing the enemy approaching, in his turn drew out his line to meet them. He too formed his European regiment in the centre, with three guns to its right and seven to its left; two bodies, each of nine hundred Sepoys, formed on either wing, while Ananda Raz with his motley host was left to secure the flanks and rear of the line.

About a mile south of Condore the two little armies came into touch with one another. The French, advancing hastily and impetuously to what they fondly imagined would be an easy triumph, espied before them in the centre of the enemy front a line of red coats, in which they thought to recognise the core of the hostile army, the British European battalion, but which was in actual fact a Sepoy unit lately issued with new scarlet uniforms. Straight at them they rushed, and only halting to fire a scattered volley, charged down upon them with the bayonet; and in an instant the red line shivered and broke up into a herd of flying men. After them they pressed, when suddenly there emerged from behind a field of high-standing corn another and more solid red line—the real British battalion this time—which moved steadily and majestically across to block their path. The eager Frenchmen halted and strove to reform their disordered array; but it was too late. The British had formed fronts at close range; a flicker of fire ran down their line, a storm of balls whistled through the French ranks, and then through the smoke shone the gleam of bayonets coming forward to the charge. Conflans' men did not wait for it, but turned tail and fled for the shelter of their guns, which they had left far behind in their impetuous advance. The gunners valiantly strove to cover the retreat and hold off the British, who, bringing forward with them the Sepoy battalions on their

flanks, were hard on the heels of the flying French infantry. It was of no avail; the line of guns was over-run, the artillerymen were scattered or taken, and the whole array, dissolved into a rabble, streamed back across the plain, hoping to find safety behind the entrenchments of their camp. But entrenchments now, as so often before and since, proved useless without valiant men to defend them; and before Forde had had time to reform his line for the attack, his enemies had begun to dribble out from the rear. Conflans himself led the way on a fleet horse, galloping forty miles before he halted at Rajahmundry, and when the British swarmed over the entrenchment, only a few gallant defenders remained to put up a hopeless resistance for the honour of French arms.

Thus was won the brilliant little victory of Condore, in which Forde, without any assistance from his ally, totally defeated a far superior enemy force, inflicting on them close on two hundred casualties, and capturing thirty guns, fifty wagons, a thousand draught bullocks, and all their tents, camp equipment, and baggage. These were the material fruits of his success, but even more important were the moral results, which so paralysed all hostile resistance that he was able to pursue his advance unmolested and unopposed right up to the walls of the French capital of Masulipatam.

Great however as these results were, they might have been greater still had not the old difficulty about funds and the sluggish inertness of Ananda Raz kept the English army halted in the neighbourhood of the battlefield for nearly two months. A flying column had indeed been sent off on the trail of the routed enemy, and had secured Rajahmundry and the passage of the Godaveri, the French offering no resistance, but retiring in haste, leaving behind them the only five guns they had brought away from Condore and all their remaining stores, ammunition, baggage, and bullocks. It was not, however, till January 8th, 1759, that the whole army could resume its advance, and by that date Conflans had somewhat recovered his lost courage and made preparations to defend his capital. Moreover he had detached a corps of observation two thousand strong to hang on to the flank and rear of the British, delay their advance and hamper

their siege operations. In the first of these objects it was not successful; Forde, passing by Ellore and Narsipore, which the French evacuated on his approach, and suffering only a momentary delay by reason of the sturdy resistance put up by a tiny garrison at Concale, arrived before Masulipatam on March 6th, and Conflans, abandoning the town, threw himself with all his troops into the fort, which was at once invested.

The fort of Masulipatam was strongly situated and highly defensible. Its southern side, abutting on an inlet of the sea, was unassailable; its eastern, northern, and western sides were fortified by a curtain wall with eleven bastions and a ditch, and were further surrounded by wide treacherous marshes, the only reliable passage over which was the road leading from the town to the great gateway, solidly defended by an outwork, The garrison numbered over three thousand men and had at its disposal sixty guns of various calibres. Nevertheless, Forde did not hesitate to open the siege. Three batteries containing ten guns and two mortars were erected on the sandhills some six hundred yards distant from the east wall of the fort; fire was opened on March 25th, and though the French had twenty-eight guns available to reply to ours, and our batteries were also taken in flank from an enemy work erected on the south shore of the inlet mentioned above, a breach was made after ten days' bombardment, and appeared practicable for a storming party.

All this time, however, the situation of the British had been rapidly drawing to a crisis. Shortage of money was still so acute that the troops' pay was much in arrear, and so serious had been the discontent that they at one time threatened to abandon the siege unless they received what was due to them, and were only appeased by Forde's promise that the full plunder of the city on its capture should be theirs. News now came in that the French corps of observation had moved forward by way of Ellore across the Godaveri, and had taken Rajahmundry in Forde's rear, and further that Salabat Jung, the Nizam of Hyderabad, to whom Conflans had written immediately after Condore, begging for assistance, was marching down the Kistna with a large army and was now only three days' march away. This news so terrified Ananda Raz that he set off for home

with all his troops, and was only induced to return by the urgent representations of Forde that he could not hope thus to escape and that only victory at Masulipatam could save him. The British commander at the same time sent an envoy to Salabat Jung, hoping by a pretence of negotiations to gain a little time; but the Nizam, though agreeable to treat, none the less continued his advance. To crown all, on April 6th the artillery officers in charge of the batteries reported that only two days' ammunition supply remained.

In this fearful predicament, Forde had to choose between the only two possible courses of action—to throw up the siege, desert his ally, abandon his guns, baggage, and stores to the enemy, and re-embark his force—in a word, to lose everything, including honour, except his own and his men's lives; or to stake his all on a single throw, and storm and capture Masulipatam before it could be relieved. He weighed the chances and decided for the latter. During the whole of the 7th the fort was subjected to a furious bombardment, and the first stroke of midnight was appointed as the time for the assault.

Three columns were to take part in it. Against the south-west corner, where the ditch was passable, a force of fourteen hundred Sepoys under Captain Knox was to deliver a false attack; the Rajah's army was to distract the attention of the defenders of the outwork before the great gate; while the main attack was to be carried out by a force of three hundred and forty-six Europeans and fourteen hundred Sepoys against the breach in the eastern wall. The night was dark, and the track through the marshes hard to see and bad going; nevertheless Knox's and the Rajah's men, after a long and toilsome march, reached their positions and got into attack formation up to time. Meanwhile as the hour of midnight approached, the main column, silently assembling opposite the breach, was still waiting for its leader, Major Callender. The minutes passed, and there was still no sign of him. Captains Fischer, Yorke, and Macleane, the leaders of the storming parties, determined to lose no more time and led their men forward across the marsh, but scarcely had the advance begun than the din of firing broke out on the far side of the place, and the night sky was shot with

a myriad flashes. Plunging on with all possible haste, though up to their knees in mire, the soldiers reached the ditch, waded through it, and began to ascend the wall. The enemy above, espying them, opened a scattered fire which served rather to inflame their ardour than to delay their progress, and were in a few moments swept off the breach and scattered or taken. The stormers, dividing into two columns then turned outwards and moved along the walls, Yorke leading the left column, Fischer the right. Yorke's men had hardly begun their advance when they saw an enemy detachment marching through the street below them; thus caught in a trap, it was easily induced to surrender and the men composing it were sent up to the breach as prisoners. The march was resumed; the garrisons of the next two bastions were rapidly overwhelmed and captured; but before the column reached the third bastion, some men in rear raised the cry "A mine! a mine!" and the next instant Yorke found himself deserted by all his following save two little black drummer-boys, who remained beside him, sturdily beating the "Grenadiers' March." He turned back to the breach, where he found his men in extreme confusion and about to continue their flight, from which he was only able to deter them by a threat to shoot the first man who attempted to leave the fort, but only some forty could, after much appealing, be induced to go forward again with their commander. The delay proved disastrous; the little band, on approaching the bastion from which they had so needlessly fled, were met full in front by a volley of grape-shot, which desperately wounded Yorke, killed his two plucky little drummer-boys, and cut down half his following; the rest fell back on their supports, who had now rallied and established themselves solidly in their gains, and the French made no attempt to pursue them.

Meanwhile, Fischer, moving to the right from the breach, had met with little resistance and had made his way from bastion to bastion till he arrived at the great gate, where some of the enemy reserves had collected to meet him. A charge scattered them and enabled him to reach and close the gate, thus cutting off the retreat of the French in the outwork, whose attention had been effectively distracted all this while by the

noisy if not very formidable attack of Ananda Raz's men. At this moment the lost leader, Callender, suddenly appeared, no one knew from where, and placed himself at the head of the column, where he was immediately killed by almost the last shot fired in the fort. Conflans, in fact, completely bewildered by the various attacks made by the British, knowing that half his garrison was taken prisoner or out of action, and having no more troops in hand to restore the situation, sent a message to Forde, who had mounted the breach with his reserves, and offered surrender on honourable terms. Forde sent back to demand surrender at discretion, and that instantly, and so cowed was his opponent that he conceived himself to have no choice but to comply.

Thus fell the fort of Masulipatam, with which the British secured, at a cost to themselves of only two hundred and eighty-four casualties, no less than three thousand prisoners—a total in excess of their own strength—one hundred and twenty guns and a large quantity of other booty too various to enumerate. With the capture of the town the brilliant little campaign was over. Salabat Jung made haste to grant to the victors terms very different from those he had doubtless intended to extort, and on May 12th a treaty of alliance was signed with him, excluding the French for ever from the Northern Circars, giving to the British a strip of land eighty miles long by twenty miles wide around Masulipatam, and conferring the rest of the province on Ananda Raz. The French corps of observation was hurried out of the country; a body of reinforcements, arriving by sea a few days after the fall of the fort, sailed off again without venturing to land; and Forde and his heroic little army were left for a space to enjoy the leisure they had so gallantly won.

Before six months were past Forde himself had returned to Calcutta, where more work was awaiting him. The Dutch government was at peace with England; but peace in Europe did not necessarily, as the history of the past twenty years had shown, mean peace in the East, and the Dutch East India Company, which had long looked with a jealous eye on the splendid successes of their British rivals, conceived that the time had now come for it to assert itself and to secure some of the spoil.

In Bengal our supremacy had been unquestioned since the fall of Surajah Dowlah at Plassey and his supercession by the pliant Meer Jaffier; but the latter had now begun to chafe under his humiliating position as a British puppet and it seems certain that he himself connived at the Dutch schemes, and that a strong party at his court, led by his son, openly encouraged them. In any case a squadron of ships of war from Batavia, carrying Dutch troops, suddenly appeared at the mouth of the Hooghly in October, 1759, and after some pretence at friendly negotiation adopted an openly hostile attitude, committing acts of aggression against British shipping and property, and landing their troops on the mainland, with the object of advancing up country, either to unite with the garrison of Chinsura, their factory near Calcutta, or to attack that city direct.

Clive and his council were not dismayed. The only three ships they had at hand were sent down river to deal with the Dutch squadron, which they attacked and destroyed in a dashing little fight. Knox was placed in charge of a hastily-collected force and ordered to block the direct route up the Hooghly to Calcutta; and Forde was given command of a little army of three hundred and seventy Europeans and eight hundred Sepoys for operations against Chinsura. He crossed the river at Seranpore on November 22nd and marched against the Dutch factory. The garrison which had moved out to meet him lay in wait for him on the outskirts of Chandernagore; but scarcely was their ambush disclosed by their opening fire than his little band rushed upon them, routed them out from the houses in which they had lain concealed, captured their guns, and chased them hot-foot back to Chinsura, within the walls of which they were only too glad to find refuge.

No sooner was this little engagement successfully concluded than news reached Forde that the Dutch force from Batavia had now declared its purpose and was marching on Chinsura. He felt that he could hardly take upon himself the responsibilty of attacking the troops of a state with which Great Britain, so far as he knew, was at peace without some authority for doing so, and sent off to Calcutta to ask Clive for orders. It was evening when the messenger arrived and Clive was en-

grossed in a game of whist. He took a pencil, scribbled a note on the back of a card—the nine of diamonds—"Dear Forde—Fight them at once; I will send you the Order-in-Council to-morrow," and resumed his game.

On receipt of this message Forde moved out and took up a position to receive the Dutch attack. His right rested on the village of Badara, his left on a grove of mango-trees; his front was covered by a broad and deep ditch, and four guns swept the open plain before him. He had a handful of horsemen on each of his wings, and a body of native cavalry in Meer Jaffier's pay was with him—but on which side it would eventually fight, it probably did not itself know! Presently the Dutch force, fifteen hundred strong, more than half being Europeans, came in sight; their commander, Colonel Roussel, a French soldier of fortune, seeing the British before him, halted and formed his battle-line, which delivered a volley and charged. Just as it was about to close with the British, the front rank of the Dutch suddenly espied the ditch in its front and drew up short on the bank; those behind, following hotly on, pressed into it and in a moment the whole dissolved into a confused mass. Then the British fire opened, swept the Dutch line from end to end, and shattered it into a struggling and disordered crowd. The little handful of cavalry charged forward on the flanks; the native horsemen perceiving which way the tide was turning, streamed after them, and before their onslaught the Dutch force broke into fragments and scattered to the four winds. Not twenty of them survived to reach Chinsura. Roussel and five hundred and sixty of his command fell into British hands as prisoners; the rest were either killed or wounded; and as against this annihilating loss, Forde's casualties did not number ten all told. It was the most complete and bloodless victory ever gained even by British arms in India, and the result was quickly seen in the abject surrender of the Dutch, who confessed their responsibility for the aggression, paid lavish compensation for the damage done by them, and were forced to sign a treaty which for ever placed it out of their power again to menace our supremacy in India.

Little more remains to be told. For all these splendid services rendered to his employers and his country Forde was to

reap nothing but insult and ingratitude. He found on his return to Calcutta that his appointment to the command of the Bengal forces had not been confirmed by the Court of Directors of the East India Company at home, and that Colonel Eyre Coote, one of his former comrades in the 39th Foot, who had been junior to him in that regiment, had been given the post he himself had held for close on two years—years so gloriously full of splendid successes. The great things Coote himself was later to achieve in India cannot be held to excuse the injustice of this treatment of Forde, whose military record was at this time far superior to that of his supplanter. Clive, who disliked and distrusted Coote, strove by every means in his power to have the appointment cancelled and Forde's confirmed in its place; but he was unsuccessful, and he and his subordinate finally took ship for England in February, 1760—Clive to return to India once more some years later and set the seal on the great career which had exercised such a decisive influence on the fate of that country—Forde, never to set foot on her shores again.

Nine years later the East India Company recalled him from the private life to which, it seems, he had retired, to render one more last service. Our fortunes in India had fallen to so low an ebb, and such disgrace had overtaken British arms in the unhappy First Mysore War against Hyder Ali, that it was decided to send out a committee of three supervisors with very full powers to carry out a searching enquiry on the spot. Forde was appointed one of the members of this body, and after a lengthy dispute with the Government as to its powers and terms of reference, set sail from Portsmouth in the "Aurora," on September 3rd, 1769. The vessel touched at the Cape on December 27th—and that was the last that was ever seen or heard of her. Somewhere in the depths of the great ocean which takes its name from the country in which he had accomplished such brilliant feats of arms, is the last resting-place of that great soldier, Francis Forde. It seems a hard fate that the same ingratitude and neglect which pursued him throughout his life should have attended him after his death, and that his name should have accompanied those of too many of our Indian heroes into unmerited oblivion.

THE SUDAN HORSE

By Captain J. P. Stanton, Royal Scots Greys.

Ranging across Africa from the Gold Coast to Somaliland are sundry native forces, regular, irregular and semi-irregular in character, which are led by officers seconded from the British Army. They provide both in fact and in fiction an admirable refuge from the incubus of boredom, bills or a broken heart, although in fiction the order of precedence is usually reversed.

One of these forces is the Sudan Defence Force, whose general nature is that of a strong internal police, but whose components vary widely in accordance with the peculiar circumstances for which they were conceived. The extent of the vast area for which it is responsible is to be seen from the map.

At Shendi, 120 miles north of Khartoum and on both river and railway, is stationed The Sudan Horse; the mounted mobile reserve, ready to proceed to any part of the Sudan at forty-eight hours' notice.

* * * * *

When joining, the Sudan Government offers a choice of the all-sea route *viâ* Port Sudan, or alternatively that by the Continent and Egypt and, unless one is leaving England under protest with a fixed pre-determination to be miserable until return, the latter is by far the most interesting way and offers an opportunity to pick up an Arab pony or two in Cairo to form the nucleus of a stud.

In Egypt, a solitary, inarticulate to the inhabitants save through the medium of an exasperating and loquacious interpreter, feels the helplessness of childhood again upon him. The Cairene façade resembles that of any vivid Southern Con-

tinental town and the number of persons anxious to supplement their livelihood at the expense of the visitor is incredible. When Arabic has been learnt and these can be dispensed with, the complexion of the place alters and a variety of diversion and hospitality is to be enjoyed.

A rather dirty train journey, mostly by night, lies ahead up the Nile valley to Shellal. There are frequent stops and each station seethes with a vociferous, harsh-speaking mob. Vendors of water, milk, eggs, cheese, sweets, bread, and of newspapers in all languages, invoke the passengers to trade. There is, of course, also the large floating majority who have come for a "buck" on the train.

A stroll upon the platform catches the animation of the scene. At the station entrance all is quiet outside. There is the usual row of dilapidated cabs, each with its complement of sorry horses, "bones astare from pol to croupe." Whips crack these hungry-looking conveyances to life at the hazard of a fare. Presently the bell clangs to signify the departure of the train.

At Shellal the dust of Egypt is shaken from off the feet and indeed from all the rest of the body. From here a comfortable Sudan steamer plies the intermediate journey to Wadi Halfa, and, having been accepted until now either as a Levantine trader or as an unusually soft-witted tourist, the Ego is smugly gratified to receive the recognition accorded to a Government official.

The ruins of Philae fade in silhouette into the limbo of memory. A sense of great peace supervenes from the loneliness and quiet splendour of nature on the grand scale which surrounds. The Eastern conception of Time and Space imposes itself; for whereas the West joins issue with these problems the East accepts their infinity. The West concerns itself with the progress of man's evolution; the East accepts the ultimate insignificance of his oblivion.

Follows two days peaceful cruise up the muddy waters of the Nile, flanked by towering rocks and undulating, orange coloured sand-dunes. There is a fringe of scattered villages, date palms and cultivation on either bank. The scene palls but the evenings with their classical sunsets are a new delight.

They will be mellowed further in company with (more than likely) Caledonian fellow passengers routing nostalgia with their well-known National spirit. Throughout the Empire the ubiquity and consequence of Scotland's sons is excelled perhaps only by that of her more liquid products.

Temples are visited *en route* and the philosopher, whilst enjoying the beauties of their execution, may derive reassurance from a study of their mural decorations that the civilisations of our predecessors were no less deplorable than is our own. In the morning Wadi Halfa lustres emerald from a setting of golden desert.

For two nights and a day a white train pants bravely across a pale, barren, wind-swept desert; the monotony is unbroken save by its lights and shadows and by occasional scrawny camels and voracious goats competing to extract nourishment from some unyielding thorn-bush; whilst nearby a farouche Arab family crouches in the shade of its ragged tent. The bleak little stations, dotted down the line at sparse intervals, serve only to accentuate the general grimness of the vista.

Doubt descends in speculating upon this venture. Visions of "White trash," "Mamby-pamby," "Gin at reveille" prance in a now suspicious imagination. Gloom supersedes glamour; nostalgia the quest of adventure!

Upon arrival at Shendi such misgivings are dispelled by seemingly quite normal, amicable and even healthy-looking individuals in welcome. The platform is crowded with Arabs and here and there a jet-black Sudanese. Old women squat selling native cloth and baskets and food. An orderly sees to the baggage.

At the end of the platform the following possibilities present themselves :—

1. A "cast" army Ford van. About 9 years.
2. A "T" model Ford. About 19 years.
3. A yellow buggy.
4. Several excellent type children's ponies dressed up as troop horses.
5. A score or so of donkeys.
6. A few mule carts.

In accordance with the disposition and whims of these several means of transport, progress is made to the Mess. A welcome stretch of green rises from the dusty yellow surroundings of the neighbourhood and the grey mud houses of the town slip behind. Careful aim is laid and the conveyance rockets between two narrow, white gate-posts and arrives panting (whatever its nature) within the cool, blossom-scented fragrance of shadowed lawns.

Shendi.

The British officers' Mess at Shendi comprises a commanding officers' house, a Mess building with spare rooms, and officers' quarters about 80 yards distant. An engine pumps water from a well and it is this, an institution of the last 10 years only, which has made possible the present changed character of the place. Where previously a shambles of untidy sand-heaps, blotchy mud walls and shimmering desolation mocked the shelter of the buildings, wide stretches of green lawn fringed with flowering shrubs and scented with roses and herbaceous plants now surround the whole, whilst trees and close-clipped hedges, matured with such quick growth as is possible only in tropical and semi-tropical countries, give shade and shelter.

Within the garden there is a very good tennis court and a swimming bath, and there is a squash court in the stable yard about 150 yards away.

Not far distant is the native officers' Mess and within a few hundred yards lie the squadron lines and offices.

The river flows a mile to the north.

* * * * *

The Sudan Horse is an irregular Arab force. That is to say, although provided with clothing and equipment, the men are responsible for their own feeding unless ordered away on patrol, in which case they receive a scale of rations in grain and meat and salt. Properly speaking they are responsible for their own housing also, but it has been found preferable for them to be concentrated within the vicinity of their squadrons.

There is a Headquarters, and three squadrons mounted upon Sudan countrybred horses and organised upon an inde-

pendent squadron basis, mobilised. Each squadron is able to proceed self-contained, but for water, for six consecutive days.

In the selection of British officers (Commanding Officer, 2nd in command, and three squadron leaders) preference is given to applicants of the Cavalry and R.H.A. There is no British N.C.O. personnel.

A squadron comprises a British officer 3 native officers, one of whom is second in command, approximately 160 other ranks, 170 horses and 70 mules. The native officers are consistent in their loyal support, whilst amongst the N.C.Os. and men are to be found many types in exact facsimile to those within the ranks of the British Army. The horses range from 14 to 14.3 h.h. and are strong and hardy with good bone, though they are mostly cow-hocked. With an average man, in full marching order they carry a little over 20 stone. They make good polo ponies and some of them can gallop. The mules are used for the pack transport. They are Abyssinian and about 12 h.h. and they have the humour and pluck of the born campaigner and his aptitude for foraging.

The squadron is divided into 5 troops one of which is a machine-gun troop (2 guns), commanded by a native officer, whilst the other four are grouped in pairs, respectively under the remaining native officer and the Sol (a sort of W.O. Cl. I). There is the usual S.S.M. and S.Q.M.S., and also an interpreter, whose duties are confined to the burlesquing of official correspondence and the ill-treatment of the office typewriter.

A few of the native officers speak a little English, but apart from these and the interpreter, no one else. Nor will they try, and an appeal made to a servant in English for the most banal of domestic items will be ignored with the same unruffled composure as will the most highly coloured sample of Billingsgate invective evoked by one of his more preposterous absurdities. There are few more distressing reactions than that imposed by linguistic impotence upon the new arrival during the first few months of his attachment. This feeling of ineptitude is in itself a potent incentive to the speedy acquisition of the Arabic tongue.

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Polo is the major amusement, and there is no where else in the Sudan where such facilities exist for its enjoyment. It is played all the year round, and there are twelve full-size, good surfaced grounds for winter play besides a number of others which are used in the summer. All are, of course, sand grounds. Native officers and Sols all play, are mad keen, and some are very good. A light-weight can mount himself well on local ponies, but heavy-weights require Arabs. In either case no one who makes his own ponies will normally lose money over them.

Besides local tournaments there are five or six others in Khartoum and Wad Medani, which usually coincide with race meetings at these places.

There is no big game shooting in the district, but a surfeit of this is to be had for the stalking when on patrol in the South. On the other hand, there is good sand-grouse shooting from the sandbanks of the river, quail in the cultivation close by, whilst teal, duck and geese are found in the large irrigation basins before these dry off.

Annually a combined Horse Show, Polo Tournament and Gymkhana Race Meeting is held, when hundreds of Arabs and all the hotch-potch of horseflesh from the Province foregather. About 400 horses, all ages from foals to elderly, angular grandmothers, come in, and whilst classification and judging take place there is a squealing, kicking bedlam.

Under a Government breeding scheme two stallions stand with the Sudan Horse; at present an English T.B., and an Arab, and the results are encouraging and very interesting to follow. Much is demanded of them when some of the mares and the iron rations upon which their progeny subsist are taken into consideration.

Usually five or six teams are entered for the polo which is followed with enthusiasm if sometimes with bewilderment, by the natives.

The races are the real attraction, however. There is a Tote, and no finish ever summoned greater animation than that when the hurroosh of thin-necked, rib-staring entries, ridden bare-backed, passes the winning post in the big race. Two

camel races, a donkey race, and three or four horse races draw crowds and provide a pitch of excitement rivalling that of the classics. Notables deck themselves in their Sunday best; desert tribesmen, making a grand-stand of their camels, regard the proceedings with the well-bred detachment of their mounts, whilst nearly 2,000 rabble line the adjoining railway embankment, to the distress of the station-master, who, invariably during the afternoon, appears before the fire-box of a shrieking engine, like a Viking at the prow of his galleon, and, waving a red flag, beseeches a clearance of the line.

After the races a tea-party is held for local notables. Bearded Sheikhs and portly 'Omdas vie with each other in the assimilation of cakes and sweets and sickly lemonade. Much dignified conversation passes and the party disperses with complimentary exchanges set to an accompaniment of musical indigestion.

To the South.

The hot hours of day have passed as the flames of sunset smoulder into an ash-grey twilight. The stars peep timidly from the falling curtain of the night. Within the shadows of the banks dim animal wraiths flitter and disappear. Constant is the stamp and reek of horses, and the minor wail of some obscene Arab song; the rhythmic chug of the paddle-wheel and ripple of the river as the barges are forced onwards against the stream.

Two more days to Malakal!

* * * * *

An uncleared track, flanked by yellow, spiky grass ten feet high, and a silent, sweating column winding in single file. The plod of horses and tinkle of accoutrements; the squawk of cranes.

Days of it! Coma!

* * * * *

A red opaque river flows through an open green grass plain backed by dense woods and alive with ostriches, tiang, cob and water-buck. In the distance a grass fire five miles long throws up billows of white smoke into the toneless azure of the sky,



1—Transport to the South.



2—The Mess Garden.

3—A Musical Ride.

and by night lights it as the reflection from some vast city. The hewing of wood and cutting of grass for shelters: a patrol headquarters is bustling into being.

Very distant is the chaos of civilisation, its achievements and its entanglements. Space, crude nature, and man very small!! The primitive setting of the eternal problem.

* * * * *

We are on reconnaissance. From the air I have seen a pool 35 miles away which makes this possible, otherwise there is no water for three days in this direction. Setting forth upon a compass bearing instead of taking a native guide I am soon to curse myself for nit-wit, for the going is appalling. We fight our way through patches of dense undergrowth and the surface of the ground is chequered with fissures so that the soil crumbles with every step of our stumbling progress.

Next day at noon we strike the pool, a stretch of thick pea-green water about 50 yards in diameter and surrounded by short rank grass. Men and animals drink thirstily, for the latter have not watered for 30 hours. There are a few naked tribesmen living on the fish in the pool and such game as they can kill, and an hour before sunset a large herd of tiang and some roan antelope come boldly down to drink, ignoring our presence. One of the roan is a magnificent beast, with horns sweeping back above his mane, and almost meeting at the points.

The astonished tribesmen tell of another pool a day's march in our direction, though they think it may be dry at this time of the year.

In the night there is a terrific storm, so that next morning we have to wait until the ground dries a little. When we are able to start some of the tribesmen accompany us as guides. Still the going is terrible, though we now follow a faint track. The cracked plain is open and brown with here and there a scraggy, stunted tree or patch of scrub with no living thing, so that we seem to make no appreciable progress towards the misty range of mountains, our destination. We camp upon the site of a deserted rain-season village, and not a sound stirs the solitude.

On again in the morning at dawn, the great plain grows tawnier. The cumulous cloud masses of the previous day have gone, and a hot sweat reeks upon us, until, presently, our weary way leads to a wood of bright green foliage, very pleasant to see. The ground in this wood is covered with crimson, plush-like beetles, about the size of a scarab. Then we strike a dry Khor, and after some searching find a little muddy water in a pool and, having drunk and watered, the tribesmen leap in with their spears, and in a short time have a haul of some twenty long-whiskered, evil-looking mud fish upon the bank. From here I take a bearing on to a peak, which is recognisable from a somewhat unenlightening map. We break into thickly wooded country, and the ground is scarred with the huge tracks of elephant, whilst their spoor in some cleared space indicates where a party meeting has been held.

The men want meat. No meat, they say, has passed to their stomachs for two days, and how can a man do hard work like this on flour? Duly chastened, I promise them a crocodile or water -buck (both equally inedible) when we get back to the river, and that evening, with an orderly and empty pack-horse and leader we ride out to a flank of the column. There are definite signs of game, and giraffe, oribi and reed-buck have already made their appearance.

Presently, as we approach a clearing, my orderly gets excited.

"A bustard!"

"Where?"

"Over there" (an indication with the chin).

I gaze "there" intently, to no purpose.

"Where?" I repeat pleadingly, my inferiority welling to the surface.

"There, behind that tuft of grass, you can see the white of his neck."

Yes; he is there crouching. I ride out to the left, the others following, and when about 100 yards away, dismount and approach at an angle. Eighty, seventy, sixty yards—he's alarmed, and about to rise. I aim and fire. He tries to rise, but fails. My orderly gallops to him and, after an unseemly

struggle, cuts his throat. He is a big bird, 6 ft. 6 ins. across his wings.

A couple of miles further on, a good reed-buck shows up. There is more cover again now, and I stalk him to within easy distance and bag him. He is quite dead, but the orderly gallops off again and slits his throat in accordance with the laws of the Prophet.

We are late into camp and the nearly full moon is shining through the tree tops before I finish dinner.

Wandering round the animals, in pyjamas and mosquito boots, I am comforted that we reach water and grass to-morrow, for the horses, previously in "hard" condition, show decidedly angular and wasp-waisted as I shine the torch over them. They have had no bulk food for two days, and only two waterings in 60 miles or so of "going" so atrocious that an average of more than three miles an hour has been impossible. They have cleaned up their feeds but regard with disgust the coarse, dry, yellow tufts of rubbish that is the best we have been able to collect for them. On the other hand the mules, true philosophers that they are, on the principle of "half a loaf . . . . " are making the best of a bad job.

Near by the men squat grouped, chatting and laughing over their cooking-pots, seemingly quite undaunted by fatigue. Joining one of these I am just in time to catch the tail end of a yarn about one of the wives who had refused to give her husband any dinner one evening after he had come back "happy" from drinking merissa (native beer) in the town.

"Peace be unto you," I say.

"Welcome; come and have a bite," and the circle makes room.

"Thanks; I've dined."

"No matter, have some more. We've seen your miserable little meals." This from the section cook, also farrier.

"Very well. Praise be to God."

"Praise be to God," in chorus.

I squat down and take a dip into the common stew of meat and kisera (a native biscuit). "It's very good."

"Of course, I cooked it," says the cook.

"And I shot it," I retort, "and you've taken more than your share, you scrounger. There's enough for twenty men here."

"By God, no; one man could eat all this and 'Osman Suleman says he wants a double allowance after the abuse you gave him to-day for leaving his rasp behind," joins in another to the general mirth.

"My God, 'Osman, you expert. What a farrier!"

"Never mind, I made as good a job of the foot with my meat knife."

"Well" (rising), "mind the hyeanas; after all that dinner you'll be worth taking. Have you heard how your child is since we left, 'Atari?"

"Not a word. The doctor wanted him in hospital, but I made arrangements with a Fiki" (a holy man).

"Oh, well; we had better send a wireless when we get back to camp. Good night, you bandits."

"You are our father. God bless you."

Lying in bed, a hush of well-fed fatigue falls about the camp fires. My own pony, standing gaunt in the moonlight a few yards away, crumples up with a weary groan. Overhead some rebel of the firmament, impatient of his constellation, plunges madly to extinction, trailing a vaporous incandescence in his wake. Suddenly my blood runs cold, for the forest echoes to a reverberating roar followed by a succession of short, diminishing growls. A lion, saying his grace, challenges the wild and the stillness lends weird proximity to the utterance. Recovering from the first effect of this disturbance and comforting myself that he is likely at least a mile away, I call to the sentries to keep the fires alight and sleep soon effaces drowsy speculation.

The hours pass, but so immoderate is my slumber that it seems only a few moments later I am wide awake, tensely alert. The camp fires are out. A light breeze has arisen and the grey light which precedes the dawn is showing to the east. My pony stands with ears pricked, for Birnam Wood may or may not have come to Dunsinane, but here assuredly a range of phantom hills comes crashing into our camp.

Very leisurely, their trunks swinging to and fro and snapping any obstruction in their path, a herd of elephant saunters past in single file; five of them, not 40 yards away.

I am just reflecting that they might well have sauntered on to me, when an oath rings out followed by a savage half bark, half snarl, and the camp is astir. A hyaena has claimed the leavings from the reed buck and pandemonium reigns.

The herd crashes off into the jungle, the pettish plaint of jackals dies away and the last spectral shades of night dissolve, as dawn suffuses the paleing velvet of the sky.



LAKE AND VICTORY.

By COLONEL E. B. MAUNSELL, late 14th P.W.O. Scinde Horse, I.A.

PART IV.

Re-assembly of the Grand Army—General outbreak of disturbances—Situation at Muttra—Sackville Browne's flight—Holkar occupies Muttra—Concentration of the Grand Army at Agra—Lake honours Monson's Detachment.

MONSON'S misfortunes bore the usual fruit in India. Every turbulent chief raised his head, looking forward to a return of "The good old rule, the simple plan, let him take who may, and let him keep who can." It must be remembered that, but for a brief five years when de Boigne was subadar of Hindustan, the whole country had been in chaos. This short interval was alluded to by peace loving folk as "The Golden Age" for as long as thirty years after this great man had quitted India, and many of the measures now in existence were brought about by de Boigne and his French officers. Under Perron things had relapsed, for this adventurer concerned himself rather with the gathering of adequate revenue for his troops than with the administration of order. "The highways were deserted, and the people walked by byways."

Prominent among these chiefs was the Begum Sumru, "Zeen ul Nissa" or "Ornament to her Sex" as her Moghul title ran. Her activities were at once tackled by the astute Ochterlony, Acting Resident at Delhi, who had, incidentally, been approached by her Commander-in-Chief, Saleur, a septuagenarian Lorrainer, backed by his Second-in-Command, Koine, a Pole with a view to getting them out of the possibility of having to fight against the British—both officers had unpleasant re-

collections of Assaye nine months before. The Begum, after the comic opera mode of the East, produced "irrefutable" evidence that her sincerest wishes were for the good of the benign British, and that the sundry letters intercepted between her and Holkar were vile forgeries. Ochterlony's views on the lady were that she was both canine and feminine, for like Sir Charles Napier, he did not mince his words in demi official correspondence.

Officially, she was "Zeen ul Nissa."

Ochterlony knew the native, if ever man did, and scented trouble the moment he learnt that Monson was falling back. When he heard of the disaster on the Banass, he called in all his detachments. The commanders had been warned previously and marched forthwith. The upshot was that Burn, who had been causing the Sikhs about Saharanpore to feel the weight of his arm, moved into Delhi by forced marches, and two battalions, late of Peron's service, commanded by adventurers, also came in. A further step was to impress coolies to improve the tumble-down defences of the Imperial City. Thanks largely to these measures Burn and he were able to put up the famous defence a few weeks later.

Until the Banass disaster, things remained quiet externally but this brought matters to a head, and disturbances broke out in the conquered territory, though not extending as yet to the Ceded Provinces of Corah, Allahabad and Rohilkand. Skinner had been directed to convoy treasure from Delhi to Muttra, where a force, under Sackville Browne, was assembling to move down to Monson's assistance. On reaching the Jumna, some 300 of his men, one quarter of the corps, refused to cross. Fortunately at this juncture a company of the 15th N.I. came on the scene, or the treasure would have been looted and the corps dispersed to the four winds. Amid terrific shouting, abuse and threats, the 300 made off towards Hattrass, to join the shifty Dairam. A free fight now occurred, Skinner, screaming with rage, having his mare injured, but most of the mutineers got away. This mare, incidentally, recovered and was kept as a pet at Hansi for many years. One morning, neighing loudly, she ran up to Skinner's bungalow, and dropped dead.

Skinner duly crossed the Jumna and joined Sackville Browne. At Muttra there was the "Fog of War" with a vengeance. Rumour piled on rumour, but all testified to the enormous force Holkar was advancing with. Monson's whereabouts were unknown, though the last heard of him was at Rampura. A couple of days later, however, a foraging party of Skinner's corps, some ten miles south of Muttra, came upon three panic-striken sowars of Frith's Hindustani Horse, their ponies foundered. They gave, in incoherent detail, news of the disaster on the Banass. They were, as usual in such affairs, "the sole solitary survivors" of the force which had been destroyed before their eyes. They were, however, soon followed up by a continuous stream of other "sole solitary survivors," including infantry sepoys who gave much the same tidings. That evening was heard a distant booming of cannon, showing that all was not yet ended. At intervals, throughout the night, and following day more stragglers dribbled in, all bearing evil tidings, and now commenced a stream of miserable wretches "naked as they were born, with noses and hands off." In one or two cases, even, there were miserable men who had been forcibly circumcised, but who had found a camel or bullock to carry them in.

One of the most curious revelations of this retreat, as witnessed by James Skinner, is his account of a large body of sepoys, drawn from every unit in Monson's detachment and including sundry native officers carrying their battalion colours, marching in to Muttra in comparatively good order, but under a sergeant-major and without commissioned officers. This stout-hearted man although in a state bordering on prostration from fatigue, fever and bad food, had rallied the men a few miles from Biana. The officers, judging from Don's account, had, for the most part made for Agra rather than Muttra, deeming that it was hopeless to wait any longer. It is on the cards that the sergeant-major, like most of his class, was unable to ride, and, perforce, accompanied the sepoys on foot. Skinner tells us that the man received no reward or mention for his service, and it is true that such despatches as are available make no note of him. The incident, however, confirms what so many

of us have experienced in heavy fighting or desperate situations, namely that Indian soldiers will rally to any stout-hearted white man, and that, too, not infrequently in preference to their own people.

The situation confronting Browne at Muttra was one of difficulty. Behind him flowed the Jumna, passable, not by a bridge, but by ferries, and the river was running like a mill race. To withdraw behind it would be fraught with as many dangers as had confronted Monson on the Banass, and the rear might well be overwhelmed. Holkar's horse were here, there and everywhere, burning and destroying, and it was impossible to ascertain his real fighting strength as represented in infantry and guns. As to what had become of Monson and his detachment was unknown, though, in strict point of fact, that officer was nearing Agra. The reports indicated that Holkar had reached Fatehpore Sikri, twenty miles from Agra. Now Muttra was thirty miles distant, and what was serious was that Gow Ghat, seventeen from Fatehpore Sikri, was closer to that place than it was from Muttra, and it was a strong defensive position if Holkar succeeded in getting there. In other words, Muttra and Agra could be, to all intents and purposes, cut off for any forces unable to cross the Jumna. Browne was no Napoleon, though a very brave man, and the situation appalled him, and it would appear that he even went so far as to thinking that he might be overwhelmed if Holkar fell upon Muttra.

On the other hand, he had a fine force under him, consisting of one regular native cavalry regiment, the 1st, and five excellent sepoy battalions, with Skinner's irregulars in addition. There was a great accumulation of supplies, brought together for the relief of Monson, and there were some 10,000 Brinjara bullocks to carry them. A Clive, Lake, Wellesley or Burn, indeed, might have ventured on an offensive.

The spirit of the troops, despite the wild rumours, was admirable, and, there is but little doubt that had there been even half a British battalion present these commanders would have attacked. The mere moral effect of its presence would have reacted both on commanders and sepoys alike. As it was, the sole British rank and file were confined to the few gunners and

to the sergeant-majors and quartermaster-sergeants of the sepoy corps.

No orders having arrived from Lake, Browne had recourse to that futile institution, a "Council of War." This must not be confounded with "conferences" such as so often preceded operations in the Great War, where the views of individuals are taken. The practice was for Councils to vote, and there is a very apt saying, "Councils never fight"—they always "vote cautious." Commanders have sometimes shirked responsibility on the score of such voting. In this case, the point at issue was whether to stand fast at Muttra or fall back on Agra and risk the flank march. The voting was even, bold and able officers voting on either side, so Browne gave the casting vote, for Agra. Skinner, although he knew more of the situation than any man present and was the chief intelligence agent, had no vote. He did not hold a commission, whether from the King or from the Company—the Company's officers held both.

At this juncture it would appear that orders arrived from Lake to fall back on Agra, but the actual wording is not known.

At any rate, Browne interpreted them as orders to quit forthwith, or "run away" as indignant officers put it. He was seemingly obsessed with the danger at Gow Ghat and imagined that, if he could reach the place by hook or by crook, with his force in any order at all, he would be safe. Skinner had quitted the Council and had settled down in camp when he was startled by his brother Robert galloping up to his tent and stating that the troops had marched, that a picquet of Skinner's corps had deserted and that a whole troop of the First Native Cavalry had gone off as well. The desertion of Skinner's own people is quite possible, for the irregular corps at this juncture were going over to Holkar right and left, but that of regulars is most unlikely. We hear nothing of it in officers' journals, though the outspoken Pester would, most certainly, have told us. There was but little love lost between "regular" native cavalry and "irregulars," and great jealousy existed until the Mutiny. From the 1820's on the irregular officers were drawn from the Company's infantry or artillery, but not from the cavalry. As

the position and emoluments were great no inconsiderable soreness resulted.

Hastily saddling up, Skinner reached the camping ground, where he found confusion indescribable. The whole of Muttra bazaar riff raff were plundering right and left, while officers' orderlies and servants were doing their best to get their masters' kits on the move. The heavy and cumbrous tents were abandoned, as well as stocks of wine and provisions accumulated by unfortunate individuals for the expected march south to relieve Monson. The rage of some subalterns of the 2/15th Native Infantry, the present Q.V.O. Rajput Light Infantry, at losing a whole pipe of Madeira is on record.

An enterprising wine merchant who had come up from Calcutta lost the whole of his stock, though as he was an arch profiteer, he met with but little sympathy. It would seem that Holkar, whose particular tipple was cherry brandy, collared the lot within a week, and this had unexpected results, as we shall see. At first sight, however, the loss of the supplies accumulated and the desertion of most of the Brinjaras with their bullocks was the most serious.

Skinner did not catch up the tail of the column for nearly a couple of hours, though, from the disorder prevalent it was difficult to say where the tail really was, such was the straggling. He found Sackville Browne just short of Gow Ghat, and told him that there were no signs of Holkar quitting Fatehpore Sikri, whereat Browne said he would halt at the Ghat. No halt was made, however, and Colonel Ball, a good hard fighting old soldier, lost his temper and told Browne that the mode of retreat was a disgrace to the British arms. It was not until the tomb of Akbar was reached that a halt was called, the column straggling in in such disorder "that one thousand resolute men would have destroyed us" as Skinner says. The following day, September 10th, another muddling withdrawal took place. An officer of the 15th tells us: "And a fine march we had of it. The force reached Agra excessively fatigued after a march of five and a half hours. As the distance is under seven miles I leave it to the imagination how it was conducted."

Skinner concludes his observations on Browne's manoeuvres with the words "The very thieves threw stones at us."

In the meantime troops were concentrating on Agra from all over the Doab. The 4th Native Cavalry, an excellent regiment, with Macan in command, crossed the Jumna on September 12th, and Macan took over command of the whole. Three days later he moved the force out to Secundra. This measure had considerable moral effect, for it showed Holkar that he was not afraid of him. "Had there been more Macans many a disgraceful thing would have been avoided" is Skinner's comment.

Pester and Skinner both give us details of how Macan, hearing that the 2nd Native Cavalry had had trouble with some men who burked at crossing the Jumna, assembled his native officers and warned them that if anything of that type occurred in the 4th he would at once put the offenders to death, if necessary with his own hand—and he would have done so. The Colonel of the 2nd, one Gordon, had to leave the army as soon as Lake investigated the case. He was given command of a Reserve Brigade—the equivalent of the Belem Light Infantry in the Peninsula, Stellenbosch in South Africa or a Yeomanry Brigade in England during the Great War. None the less, such was the fatuous seniority system of the Company's service that, in 1805, he was given the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which he commanded for no less than fourteen years.

Gordon, moreover, became a major-general in 1813, and, six years after he had left India for good, a lieutenant-general. In 1804 he had been in India for twenty-six years, seemingly without having gone home.

The crisis, as usual in India, was finding out the weaklings, and among them was the officer commanding no less a place than the fortress of Aligarh, one Captain Wood, who had the newly raised 1/22nd N.I.—known to fame in the Great War as the 6th Jats. This officer had evidently taken over from Sackville Browne, about mid-August, but had omitted to fill his ration magazines, contenting himself with buying from day to day from the neighbouring town of Coel.

The increase of the disturbances in the Doab eventually resulted in his being shut in—or, at least, he was afraid to force

his way out to forage. On Lake receiving one of his bleats for assistance, the fiery Commander-in-Chief sent him such a stinger that Wood's courage was aroused, and, by a bold sortie, rationed himself up sufficiently to obviate any further risk. We have a very curious confirmation of this by Pester, after the fall of Deeg. Lake observed to him, anent the removal of grain from the place, "No, we had nearly lost Aligarh through our magazines being empty."

This Wood must not be confounded with Colonel Mark Wood, an officer then at Barrackpore, who had, serving under him, a young officer named William Nott, the son of a small farmer and inn keeper, who was destined to keep the British flag flying at Kandahar in the dark days of 1841-1842. Mark Wood was an offensive, useless creature nicknamed The Royal Bengal Tiger, for tiger shooting was his sole claim to fame. As a commander in the Gurkha War he proved useless—as Fortescue puts it "Hard to kindle, aspen rather than oak."

Nott had just undergone appalling hardships through his ship falling into the hands of a French privateer and his being embarked, with many others, on an Arab dhow, short of water and provisions.

At this juncture there was another officer who was to become famous in Afghanistan, who also had recently landed in India, George Pollock, the son of a successful saddler at Charing Cross. Pollock was en route for the Grand Army, which he joined just before the Battle of Deeg. Curiously enough, the first time these two officers met was under the walls of Kabul. Pollock had just left Woolwich, where certain of the Company's cadets for the artillery were educated prior to the opening of Addiscombe.

The tales of Monson's retreat created a very vivid impression on Pollock. Thirty-eight years later, when detailed to take command of the Avenging Army, he was confronted with the task of restoring moral to Wild's brigade of Bengal sepoys who had met with a check in attempting the Khyber. There were 1,700 men in hospital out of 4,000, the majority skrimshankers. What was worse, the tone among the British officers was execrable, some actually preaching, at the very mess table, that

it was their duty to prevent their men making another attempt. Pollock, a quiet, but resolute officer, took things gently, seeing that an attempt to force the pace would meet with disaster. He repeatedly stated : " We must, on no account, show the sepoys that we mistrust them, as Monson did." Gradually, moral was restored, and, on the arrival of reinforcements, but, above all of a stiffening of British troops " who, alone, wanted to fight " he forced the Khyber, the sepoys now full of dash, and joined Nott under the walls of Kabul. In 1804, on the other hand, although Monson's people had suffered, both in battle and in hardship, immeasureably more than Wild's in 1842, moral was easily restored. The British officers were young, hard and virile, the discipline was very severe, and no man had greater influence over sepoys than Lake. Had not the Lal Paltan witnessed his aplomb, almost at their very head, at Sarsni, Delhi and Laswari ?

It is the fashion to suppose that pusillanimity was chiefly the prerogative of Indian officers. The Royal officers, except in the cases of Monson and Murray, were but seldom in isolated situations, dependent on their own judgment. When they were, there were every whit as many failures. In the case of the Company's officers in 1804 failure was probably more attributable to too long period in India than to actual age, for none were over fifty. It has repeatedly happened in India that officers, first class men in their youth, have deteriorated when once they passed their forty-fifth year, or thereabouts. Good men under Lake failed lamentably eleven years later in the Gurkha War. By the Sikh wars and Mutiny, the age of senior officers was seldom less than fifty-five for commands of battalions, and numbers of generals were nearer seventy than sixty. The experience of the Great War tends to show that, even now, the age limits for commands in India are too high, though, in a good climate, like Europe, they may be suitable enough. On the other hand, age must not be confounded with virility, for, with youth there is apt to be an arbitrariness not calculated to make for harmony—Marlborough did not become really famous until fifty, while Wellesley's objectionable characteristics may be partly accounted for by too rapid rise.

Turning now to Holkar. We have the comic interlude so usual in Indian affairs. Holkar's spies had warned him that Browne was striking camp at Muttra, whereat Holkar, deeming that this could only have been for the purpose of a "beat up," struck camp and cleared off in the opposite direction. Finding nothing had happened, he retraced his steps and occupied Muttra without opposition. Certain officers had built bungalows in the place, and there was a fine house, very probably that owned by Robert Sutherland, the adventurer which the British Political Officer, Mercer, had lived in. Holkar promptly made himself comfortable therein, with innumerable sisters, cousins and aunts, whose household manners were appalling, for Mercer, when he came to reoccupy it, found the walls all squirted over with betel juice.

Now the shrine of Bindraband, at Muttra, is famous as having been the site where the Hindu god Vishnu disported himself in the Jumna with a large number of voluptuous and charming milkmaids. A visit thereto is stated to infect the pilgrim with that feeling usually associated with the advent of spring. At any rate, it appears to have had this effect on Holkar. His needs were ministered to by numberless ladies of fashion from all parts of Hindustan. Burn's picquets, on the Muttra road outside Delhi, for some days on end, were edified by the sight of the Mistinguettes, La Goulues and other beauties passing through from the West End of Delhi City, en route for Muttra, heavily guarded by their bullies, for their jewels were of immense value. The officers of the 1/14th Native Infantry are stated to have been curiously keen on going on picquet.

Certain "slap up" ladies even subsidised our irregular horse to convoy them—on pretence of foraging—when they would meet their swain's scallywags a few miles out and proceed to Muttra under the new escorts !!

In addition to these charmers, Holkar's minions came upon the stores of wine brought up from Calcutta by the "saudaugor," or merchant, including cherry brandy "*ab lib.*" The upshot was, that Holkar commenced a feast of gaiety which lasted, almost without a break, for the next three weeks. In this interlude the Grand Army completed its concentration, the defences

of Delhi were improved and a certain quantity of supplies were accumulated. Despite the delay, however, so crumbly were the bastions at Delhi that Burn found that the act of firing guns therefrom brought them down in great flakes and he had to construct special works in lieu.

With Holkar's occupation of Muttra a great number of boats came into his possession. The incompetent Browne had omitted to secure them and have them floated down to Agra. As a consequence several bodies of horse succeeded in crossing the Jumna —we may assume that they were local sportsmen returning for a visit to their ancestral homes and ladies. These gentry corrupted the morals of the district, and disturbances spread. The Civil Authorities, who had been charged with the onerous tasks of collecting supplies and transport found nothing doing, "unless at the point of the bayonet, without which no man would furnish his quota." The only reliable source from which they could be obtained, indeed, was Rohilkand, across the Ganges, and on the Ganges the boats had been carefully collected at points where there were British garrisons.

Even round Agra, with the troops concentrating, Wemyss, who had been appointed to the Collectorship, at the modest pay of Rs. 3,000 per mensem, found he could get little or nothing in without considerable display of force. About Mainpuri, on the other hand, things were evidently pretty normal. Cunningham, Agent to the Governor-General, still had his wife with him, and her quitting, for her relatives, the d'Oyleys, at Calcutta, in mid-September was not, seemingly due to the disturbances but owing to the fact that her husband had just succeeded in purchasing a fine pinnace for Rs. 4,000, the modern equivalent of £500, a sum which would purchase a very decent yacht.

Cunningham was a believer in doing himself well and had large stocks of champagne, claret and hock. Officers passing through to Agra from Futtygarh or Cawnpore found, after the custom of the day, open house. Pester, Hearsay, the half-caste, and another officer all retired to their palanquins "very high" on quitting the place for Agra. They had an escort of thirty levies and marched, or, rather, were carried, all night.

There was some excitement among officers at Agra as a duel had occurred, an unfortunate Major Wade having been shot in an affair "over a pretty wife." Duels were by no means common in Bengal, though officers in the Madras Presidency appear to have been more quarrelsome. Pester, though his journal covers, in great detail, five years, mentions only two. The officers of the Royal, as distinct from those of the Company, appear to have been more given to fighting than the latter, and this may be attributed largely to heavy drinking over the mess table, for sepoy corps had no messes for the most part.

Lake, with the three dragoon regiments, the Experimental Horse Battery, the 76th and the flank companies of the 22nd, had marched from Cawnpore on September 3rd. The country was water-logged, the nullahs all in flood and metalled roads were non-existent. Furthermore, the baggage cattle were, for the most part, in poor condition as they had barely commenced to recover from their deadly hot weather marches, which had, it must be remembered, only ended eleven weeks before. Although there had been much sickness in the British troops, Lake was surprised at there not having been more. We must recollect, in this connection, that in Bengal the men were dry nursed to a degree which would appear almost ridiculous at the present day. Every man had a charpoy. The tents, though not, in point of fact suited to great heat, were enormous, being pitched by special followers, and the men were waited on, hand and foot. It is evident that the sickness in the British soldiery of the Bengal Army was not nearly as great as that among those of Bombay. The casualties in the 65th, with Murray, were simply enormous, though the country marched through was cooler and healthier. When the Bombay Force reached Bhurtpore the following February the Bengal officers were astonished at the small amount of baggage carried. Dry nursing undoubtedly paid, and, thanks to carefully regulated marching, Lake reached Agra on September 22nd, with the troops fitter than when they had started.

Two days before the European troops had arrived at Agra a large body of enemy horse had established themselves within a mile or so of the picquets. Macan was not the type of com-

mander to tolerate their annoyance, and had moved out with a proportion of cavalry and infantry to engage them, which he did, to great effect, inflicting many casualties. Lake's orders, sound enough, however, forbade any extended offensive until he himself had arrived. The affair had great moral effect, for the sepoys at once sensed that they had a man in command, and their tails began to curl in the air.

One of Lake's first actions was to inspect the men of Monson's detachment, who had not yet moved out to Secundra. They were being re-armed, uniformed and equipped, in so far as local resources permitted, and the men were in great need of rest and good food after their hardships. Passing the time of day with them, after the manner which made him so beloved of all ranks, he followed this up with an honour, the like of which was not seen until nearly a century later, when the Dublin Fusiliers were placed at the head of the troops marching into Ladysmith. The line of encampment at Secundra had been laid out with gaps for new arrivals to occupy. Between the 76th and the cavalry, on their right, who camped nearest the Jumna, was space for a weak brigade. Lake informed the three battalions which were specially deserving of the honour, the 1/12th, 2/12th and 2/21st, that they were to have the light companies of the 22nd Foot, and then form the Reserve Brigade, which was to be attached to the cavalry. In other words, they were the "Light Division" of the Army, and they were to occupy the space aforesaid.

Furthermore, in taking up their position in the line, they were to march down the front of the whole encampment in order that the troops should see brave men who had done their duty under dire stress. He wrote at once to the Governor-General "The sepoys have behaved most gloriously and have shown the greatest devotion to the service." These words of praise came, it must be remembered, from the Colonel of the First Regiment of Guards, a man whose war experience had started in the Seven Years War and who had fought in America and in Ireland in addition.

What wonder, then, that the sepoys shouted and threw their shakoes in the air, vowing that, for such a sahib, they would go through fire and water.

We can watch them march down the line, tall thin Hindus, many grey with fever, with dirty red coatees, stained with mud and sweat, moving, not with the cadence of British soldiery, but in indifferent step, with their muskets perpendicular, at the "support," the fifes squealing and the drums beating the Grenadiers March.

We can see the troops in camp run out to watch, while the guards turn out, and the drums beat a ruffle. Tails were now curling over the men's heads.

The Grand Army was now concentrated, and, in the "brigading," certain reshuffling took place. Thus, there were only two brigades of cavalry, each of four regiments, in lieu of three of three. The two corps of Monson's detachment which had shown disaffection were not included in the army, while two newly raised battalions were. The former were to make good at Bhurtpore within the next few months.

The proportion of British officers with sepoy corps, despite sickness and battle casualties, would appear still to have been higher than would be the case at the present day. The 3rd Native Cavalry, for instance, had marched from Bareilly with at least ten, and the infantry battalions were equally well off. This factor should be noticed, for the fighting now to occur was on a scale so severe as not to have had its equal until the Great War.

The supply factor held things up, and, until sufficient could be accumulated to enable the army to reach Muttra, thirty miles off, it was obviously absurd to attempt a march. In the meantime, life in the army was pleasant enough.

The nights were getting cool and the rains had practically ended. Curiously enough, there was a certain amount of feminine society in Agra Fort. Thus, Blair, the Commandant, had his wife with him, and she acted as fairy godmother to sundry young officers. This lady's grave can be seen at Bath, where she died, as Lady Blair, some years later. Her experiences would have been of interest to listen to.

There was also a bride and her sister, "a fine buxom lass, but like so many women in this country speaking broad Scotch" is the disgusted comment of John Pester, who hailed from

Zumerzet. Many of the officers of the day, it must be remembered, spoke their county dialects rather than the King's English as now accepted. The great majority, both King's and Company's were the sons of the country gentry and had only been educated in the local grammer school. As late as sixty years ago members of the big county families in Devon "spoke Devon." As to when the present mode of speech came in we are uncertain. The ladies did not accompany the army in the field, but a "chere amie" did, and poor girl had a terrible time in the deadly hot weather campaign of early 1805. Pester does not give her name, but General MacMunn is of opinion that this is the "beloved friend" whose grave can be seen as one enters the main gate of Agra Fort.

Turning now to estimates of Holkar's strength. It is interesting to contrast Lake's ideas with those of the timorous Monson, for, taking the normal experience of Oriental war, Holkar's horde, by very dint of its success, would have swelled to twice its original strength, for all the chiefs in the district would have joined the stronger party as is the way of the East. The numbers estimated had actually shrunk, the only serious diminution not being in the number of guns, which were now deemed to number about 150 as against 175 of two months before. The infantry battalions were reckoned at twenty-four, reinforced by sundry masterless men and from old sepoys from Perron's Brigades, all of most indifferent discipline and of low morale, as indeed, proved to be the case. Curiously enough, the number of horse was under-estimated, being reckoned at only some 10.000, for there must have been at least 30,000 on occasion.

It is as well to appreciate the extreme difficulty in estimating strengths with hordes like this, for the numbers rose and sank at the whim and caprice of the sundry chiefs, racially different and many of different religions, the chief binding factor being the hope of loot—and Muttra was being sucked dry as it was.

Lake writes: "They are a most despicable set, and will prove I think, an easy conquest. They are in a strange state and some are making proposals to come over to us, but I have little faith in anything they may say." There is a curious resemblance

between this statement and the report sent in before the bloody battle of Laswari.

It is as well to remember that not merely Lake, but Arthur Wellesley, had regarded Perron's Brigades as easy prey, but changed their minds after they had encountered them.

A year later, Lake confessed he had underrated Holkar's ability as a commander. "The discipline of the army was by no means respectable, nor could much be apprehended from the plan of action it was likely to pursue. The exertions, however, it had made in marching such a distance, with such celerity, and its having brought forward so great a train of artillery at a period when the rains had broken the roads and made the rivers difficult of passage, afforded evidence of a greater degree of efficiency and enterprise than would have been expected, and rendered it difficult to estimate what they might venture to undertake or accomplish."

By the end of September sufficient supplies had been accumulated to enable the army to get as far as Muttra, and a day or so beyond. In other words, a week's rations. Holkar's infantry and guns were in position just south of Muttra, behind a jheel as usual and very strongly posted, while the horse, for the most part, were at Gow Ghat, some eight miles from Secundra. It was hoped that a general action would be brought about, when the supply situation would solve itself.

In the event of battle being shirked, however, it was desirable to quieten the Doab with a view to facilitate the collection of supplies therein and enable convoys to pass through without molestation. Skinner, accordingly, was directed to recross the Jumna and join a Captain Worsley, who had a couple of battalions with him, and carry out punitive operations. This Worsley did, and in a most efficacious manner, for numerous local leaders of society had their necks lengthened by several inches or their backs scored by the cat o' nine tails, and it was even possible, for a short time after his visit, for British officers to travel with little or no escort. Worsley, it is to be noted, was only a captain, yet he commanded a force a modern lieutenant-colonel would be glad to have. He had twenty-three years' service, for promotion then ran by regimental rise to major, and



then by a general list. The purchase system did not exist in the Company's service. He was rewarded by being given the command of the Muttra Bridgehead, or Advanced Base, during the siege of Bhurtpore, and here he displayed his energy and ability to the full.

The Grand Army was to march on October 1st, in one long column, with the baggage on the right, protected by the Jumna. The staff work was not too good, for the Reserve Brigade, of Infantry, was to march immediately in rear of the cavalry of the advanced guard, with the main body of cavalry almost immediately following.

The "army," a total of eight regular cavalry regiments and twelve infantry battalions, would form a column about two miles long. The guns marched in two columns, one comprising those which formed part of units, that is to say, the gallopers and the battalion guns, and the other, termed "guns of the line," being the guns unattached. Further in still came the bazaars and baggage, a huge mob including probably a couple of hundred elephants, five thousand camels and thirty or forty thousand bullocks and ponies, plus goats, dogs and athletic hens, honked along by some fifty thousand followers of every type, sex, race and age.

This menagerie was controlled by a red faced, burly and blasphemous "ranker" officer, assisted by a couple of hundred of Hearsay's irregular horse, yclept "baggage police," who yelled and walloped louder than anyone else and who were not above looting broken down carts under guise of assisting them. A very great proportion of the followers were armed with swords and spears, and fights between them were so usual as to pass unnoticed. For the first three days or so the Baggage Master would bellow himself hoarse and, by the end of the trek, be in a state of prostration from having wielded his hunting crop. Some sort of discipline would then become more or less evident.

In the Army orders (*vide* Journal of Army Historical Research, Spring Number, 1934) great stress is laid on control of this baggage. We also notice stress on "safeguards," in other words, picquets for the protection of property, and emphasis is laid on their instantly putting any man, British or

native, to death if caught plundering—there was no preliminary court martial.

The mode of flank protection is also of interest, for it was from the flanks that danger was expected and experienced. On occasion the picquetting system was used, as now. Otherwise, "flankers," four men per troop, armed with carbines, and the same number per company were to be detailed, and these were not to proceed more than two hundred yards out. Each cavalry regiment or battalion was to detail a British officer to command. Thus, the twenty-four cavalry flankers, amounting to what was about half a troop, were a collection from the six troops, and the forty infantry from ten companies, when, to modern ideas, complete units might have been better detailed.

The system had its parallel in the employment of a number of flank companies in lieu of a complete battalion.

Such, however, was the custom of the day, and had been the custom since the days of Marlborough, therefore, why change? Finally, a most important series of selections had to be made for Prize Agents, though, as it was to turn out, the only "prize" that was to come into the hands of the army was a small amount after the Battle of Deeg. This was effected by vote of officers, there being separate agents for the King's troops, the Company's artillery and the Company's infantry—and our friend John Pester, a young subaltern, was elected for the last named.



THE OLD CAVALRY CANTONMENT

By Colonel F. A. Hamilton, late 3rd Cavalry, I.A.

"It matters not how I became
The friend of those who lived there then,
I now can scarce recall the name
Of this old Station; long years ten—
Or twelve it may be—have flown past
And many things have changed since last
I left the spot for years fly fast
And heedless boys grow haggard men
'Ere they the change can ken."

—*Lindsay Gordon.*

About five miles from Secunderabad, and four from the Cavalry Brigade Station at Bolarum in the Deccan, is situated an old deserted Indian Cavalry Station called "Bowen Pillay" which, being interpreted, means the village called after one Bowen.

Until a few years ago a Cavalry Regiment had been stationed there (as far back as 120 years). The bungalows are old fashioned, having a special ladies' annexe, and are built to keep the heat out. The mess is a very well built house with a fine old ball room of dark polished teak, on which up to forty couples could take the floor. I rode over there one day and went into the Mess. It was just as it had been on the morning that we left it in 1922—the little heap of chalk in the corner of the room, left after a never-to-be-forgotten night known as "the death of the 8th," on which the whole of the Station were entertained at a dinner and dance, our last bust up before amalgamation with another Cavalry Regiment.

Bowen Pillay is full of ghosts—not the ghosts we read about in books, or hear about on winter evenings over the fire, in a darkened room. They are the ghosts of memories—happy or otherwise. Memories of friends with whom we lived, and memories of horses we rode in hunts, and in races, and on the polo ground—memories of a pleasant and happy life, spent with the above mentioned. To ride through it now makes one feel sad and lonely.

The old lines had fallen to pieces, and the old seven foot mud wall which surrounds the horse lines. How well I remember "Mir Afzal," a young bay horse not yet six years old, getting loose and jumping out over that same wall! He afterwards made his name as a show jumper and steeplechaser. He was only destroyed a month ago; almost blind. He was a marvellous performer for his size, and I think he was one of the few horses that might have jumped the entrance to the old well at Bowen Pillay.

But I have never told you the story of the old well at Bowen Pillay. There is an old well near the lines, broad and deep, the old-fashioned type, not often seen in these days. About thirty steps go down to it, each 11 feet long, and on each side of this very steep staircase rise two thick walls, 2 feet wide, which rise to about 3 feet 6 inches above the level of the ground, causing a very deep chasm between them. The total width of the structure is 15 feet.

If one thinks it out, even if one doesn't actually see it, it is easy to realise what a colossal leap would be required to jump across this obstacle. I once took a riding party to see it. A young Captain, who fancied himself as a mighty hunter in the Shires, said, "I don't consider that such a very big jump; you would think nothing of it in the Shires." "Perhaps," said I, "but in the Shires you ride big thoroughbred hunters, whereas the man who jumped this over 100 years ago did it on a small Arab or country-bred horse." I'd like to have seen this young fellow jump it, even on the best horse in the Shires. In addition to the width which I have described, there is the take off and the landing to be considered, making it up to at least 18 feet.

I will now try to tell you the story of the well. About the year 1805, when Sir Arthur Wellesley, after Duke of Wellington,

was C.-in-C. in India, one of the Madras Cavalry Regiments was stationed at Bowen Pillay. The Adjutant, Lieutenant Moore, was a very fine rider. He owned a somewhat excitable young horse which took a lot of managing at first. One day Lieutenant Moore was returning from parade when his horse ran away with him, and, before he could be stopped, cleared the whole entrance to the well in one stag-like leap. He did it so easily that his lion-hearted master made a habit of jumping over it on his way back from parade.

The C.-in-C. paid a visit to Bowen Pillay and inspected the Regiment. He had heard of this famous jumping feat. He inspected the well and expressed a wish to see the Adjutant and his horse jump the entrance. Now, quite unknown to the C.-in-C., the Adjutant was suffering from an attack of fever. His horse had also been off colour.

Moore insisted on rising from his bed, and, having dressed into uniform, took his horse out and rode down to the jump. No one knows whether it was the effect of the fever on Lieutenant Moore, or the fact that his horse was off colour which caused the accident. The horse hit the far wall and fell with a terrible crash, breaking his back. Moore sustained mortal injuries and died soon afterwards. His last request was that he and his

horse should be buried side by side where they fell. This wish was granted, and there the two graves are, with suitably inscribed monuments and neat railings around them. These are carefully kept up now, thanks to the energy of certain officers. So ends the story of a gallant officer and his horse.

"What game was ever yet worth a rap
For a rational man to play,
Into which no accident or mishap
Could possibly find its way."

—*Lindsay Gordon.*



THE HUNTING CHEETAHS OF KOLHAPUR.

By Colonel F. A. Hamilton, late 3rd Cavalry, I.A.

I once paid a visit to Kolhapur in the Deccan where I saw many things of interest, including the Maharaja's hunting Cheetahs.

I was shown into a long room built very much on the same lines as a barrack room.

There was a long line of charpoys or Indian beds, on each of which was a hunting cheetah. Each cheetah had two attendants who were continually petting and making much of their charges.

These attendants live and sleep on the floor beside the charpoy.

There were, in all, some 30 to 40 of these graceful creatures, very much of the feline type, and built for speed; long in the leg, and longer in body than the average Indian panther, with small beautiful heads and eyes almost almond shaped which gave them a cruel yet fascinating expression. It was a wonderful sight ! They are African, and much resemble those depicted in scenes, such as the meeting of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, and such like episodes of ancient history.

We were warned not to go near them because, even though they appeared to be quiet and happy and well under control, their claws and teeth are complete, and they know how to use them should they get annoyed. These cheetahs have non-retractable claws as in the dog tribe, as opposed to the Indian cheetah which has cat-like retractable claws.

Each cheetah has a webbing belt round his loins to which is attached a leash, and by this means the animal is controlled.

Many of them had leather hoods, like masks, over their eyes, on the same principal as the hoods worn by hawks used for hawking.

When the hood is on, the cheetah can only see downwards and not to the front, or to the side.

The name, sex, age, and other details of each animal are painted neatly on a board near his bed. The room is wonderfully clean and comparatively free from smell.

The keepers are fine looking men who seem very fond of their charges.

I will try to describe a cheetah hunt as it is done in Kolhapur.

His Highness the Maharaja, who is a great sportsman, drives a brake with a team of four very fast and useful looking horses.

Two guests sit beside the Maharaja and the remainder on the body of the brake, sideways, as on an Irish Car. Just behind them on a platform are the masked cheetahs and their attendants, almost uncomfortably close to the guests.



"---- with incredible swiftness"

A herd of black buck are seen, and then the fun begins. The Maharaja puts his team into a gallop and drives the brake across country as fast as his horses will move; over the valley, over the level, manoeuvring for a position from which the cheetah will be able to spot the quarry when he is unmasked.

This drive alone is thrilling enough for most of us !

As soon as the brake is within 50 to 100 yards of the buck, the cheetah is unmasked and slipt after it.

The cheetah appears to pick up or view the buck very quickly.

By this time the brake is within about 50 yards of the buck, and then follows the quickest thing in chases that it is likely to be one's lot to see.

When the cheetah is loosed on to a herd of buck he selects one victim, and, normally, pursues this one victim alone, ignoring all other buck.

He covers the ground with incredible swiftness, and with a lightning bound strikes at his prey. If he succeeds, the buck goes over like a shot rabbit with the cheetah's teeth firmly fixed in his throat; a veritable grip of death !

The only means of making him let go is as follows :—

The keeper comes up and cuts the buck's throat just above or below the place where the cheetah has gripped him. Some of the blood, and a portion of flesh is put into a large wooden ladle or spoon, and is offered to the cheetah who relaxes his hold and



—"laps it up"—

readily laps up the hot blood, and devours the meat. His mask is then replaced and he returns to the brake with his attendant.

Should his strike be unsuccessful he becomes very fierce, and often his own attendant finds the greatest difficulty in approaching him. The ladle and some meat may have to be produced as a compensation before he will allow himself to be approached.

The actual hunt only lasts a few minutes and is most thrilling.

Cheetahs have been known to take a solitary buck, on which they have been slipped, clean through another herd, which they

have completely ignored in order to pull down their original quarry.

Cheetahs very seldom kill a doe, and if there is one buck and 10 does, they will try to kill the buck.

In Kolhapur only is a brake-and-four used for this form of chase.

You will ask how the cheetah is kept fit when not used for hunting ? In very much the same way as the whippet in England is kept fit by his miner owner. A cloth is waved by his keeper towards and on to which the cheetah gallops and springs, to be rewarded with meat and blood from the wooden ladle. These ladles are large and about 2 feet long; they are kept spotlessly clean.

On State occasions the cheetahs wear full dress coats and hoods of red, heavily embroided in gold.

TALES OF TOMSK

By Siegfried P.

3. *Hippodrome—1919*

Hippodrome is the Russian for racecourse. Every town of any size in the old Empire had one. Race meetings were held every Sunday throughout the summer. More interest was taken in trotting races than in galloping. Certainly in Tomsk one was lucky to see one riding race in an afternoon, when there would be perhaps five trotting contests. The trotters were fine specimens of American and Russian breeding: browns, blacks, and bays of 16 hands and over. These colours predominated in the order shown. They gave excellent sport, and stakes were high even in the third year after the Revolution.

The Hippodrome at Tomsk was an oval of about six furlongs in circumference. The large wooden grandstand, with its totalisator and buffet, was packed with people every Sunday afternoon, from its 2 rouble seats for the proletariat to its 20 rouble seats in the boxes.

There is much excitement to be obtained from a trotting race. The drivers are perched on their diminutive seats low between the great spidery wheels of their light sulkies, or Americankas as their chariots are called in Russian. The drivers' feet are spreadeagled out in front of them, resting firmly for support on the shafts. Their arms are outstretched holding the reins of their often fractious animals, their long whips ever ready. There is often great difficulty for the starter in getting his gate away fairly. Time and again he will recall them after a false start. Once away a horse will often complete a full circuit of the course before it can be controlled by its driver. After a false start the drivers will turn behind the line and try to come in again with a flying start as they see the flag descending. At the

corners and the start there often looks like great danger that a sulky will be overturned. On the dirt track a deal of dust, or mud on wet days is thrown up by the horses. The riders wear great goggles and sometimes "Lenglen" visors to protect their eyes, and even so it is often difficult to see; but the Tomsk drivers were either very skilled amateurs or professionals, thus there was seldom an accident. The trotters go at an astonishing pace. The likely winner will often spoil his chances by breaking from a trot into a gallop. They fling their legs out in front of them with the automatic regularity of great pistons, but when the pace gets too hot a slight mistake or loss of balance will throw them out of their habitual stride and they are cantering despite all bearing and check reins.

The British Military Mission, however, soon tired of trotting races. One likes what one is accustomed to. So one Sunday they asked permission to stage an officers' race besides. The British Mission had three Russian horses in their stable and six Canadian mounted police horses. None of these were race horses but they would give good sport between themselves. Several Russian officers also entered, and there was a great race, catch weights, over a mile and a quarter. Russian officers won 1st and 3rd place. The Mission horses had been distributed according to the weight of their riders, or probably the result would have been different. The Russians were exuberant.

As Pelman dismounted in the paddock a small wizened man with beaked nose and shifty brown eyes approached him and in faulty French demanded if M. le Capitaine would ride his horse in the great "stakes" on the following Sunday—the great "byega," galloping (lit. running) race of the year. Pelman asked to see the horse. It was not there. It was away at a training establishment in the country. It was nevertheless an admirable horse, "Irlandais et 'Pur Sang.'" So Pelman, flattered that this dilapidated Armenian Supply Officer should have picked on him to ride his horse, agreed, even though he could have no trial: "No, the horse would only arrive in Tomsk on the following Saturday evening."

The day dawned gloriously fine. The Mission loved their Sundays, the innumerable feast days and fast days, saints' days

of the Russian Orthodox church during the fleeting summer days. In the bad weather, at the equinoxes when snow began to fall or began to melt, the many holidays palled; but in high summer, even though Red ruin approached and all thoughts should have continued tensely to concentrate on training for war, the Mission were willing enough to fall in with custom. Even if they had wished to work, no one would have agreed to break the sacred holiday ritual. Pelman revelled in the glory of the green forest as he sang blithely to himself riding before breakfast through the glades where dog rose, maple and lilac bloomed beneath great conifers and wild strawberries peeped crimson in the short turf. There were few birds to emulate him, for bird life is scarce in these immense regions of woodland wrapped in ice for half the year. After breakfast he attended a martial church parade in the great cathedral square, where choirs of lusty soldiers accompanied the chants of gilded clergy throwing incense as they carried round a holy relic. He then hailed a "drosky" and passing from the cobbles of the main thoroughfares was rumbled through leafy side streets rutted and pot-holed, the dust of the previous day now a sea of mud from a shower during the night, to the Hippodrome.

The morning was being given over to a charity fête. Foot races were being run. A British Achilles-like sergeant fainted heroically after a great battle in the half mile with a stripling of 17 years, young cannon fodder in training. A tug of war followed. Football was in progress at one corner of the great ground enclosed by the track. Pelman wandered off to a merry-go-round; stood enchanted before a lucky dip ruled by a lovely girl in a cream and red shirt; had his fortune told in a dim tent by a dark virgin with a heavenly voice and a red "Sarafan" over her head. She held his hand softly over the cards, and told him that he would shortly meet again a dark virgin whom he had but shortly encountered for the first time. The seance was brought to a conclusion by another damsel breaking in with "Next, please! you cant' keep one young man all day, Marusia!"

Pelman, strolling slowly over to the luncheon buffet, admired the admirable legs of a local beauty which wisely and economically were bare beneath her Paris frock and above her American

shoes. After eating three hot patties washed down by "Kvass" in company with a young Russian officer from the cadet school where the Mission had its work, Pelman selected a comfortable seat in the grandstand and relaxed in the sun. He smoked a cigarette and watched the breaking up of the fête and the beginning of large sport. One band marched off, another military band marched in. Hungarian waltzes stirred him happily. The great space before him emptied. Dark forest hemmed in the wooden palisades of the course, green outlines and dark silhouette.

The first trotting race came round on its first lap and woke Pelman from reverie. It finished in a tremendous tustle between an American bay and an Orloff grey which won on the post.

A hurdle race, an unusual event, was the next on the programme. A Mission horse was in for this. It refused half way round. Its rider, who had lunched too well, spent the next ten minutes flogging it in his efforts to get over. He dropped his cap once and his whip twice, dismounted and mounted oblivious to the jeers of the crowd, and finally had to be led away protesting in order to allow of the next race, another trotting event, being run. Pelman now wandered off to the paddock to find his owner. It was not until the parade for the next great race that he found him. The little man apologised that he had been supervising the preparation of his horse and pointed out a great raking chestnut who was being led round the ring. The horse looked fit and better than any of the other competitors excepting a small brown thoroughbred mare about which he had already heard much. She was an out-an-out favourite and was being ridden by a certain popular Russian cavalry captain, renowned as a great cavalier. The mounting bell brought the rider into prominence. He was riding in his very smart cavalry tunic. Pelman had discarded his to ride in a cream shirt. Colours or uniform were worn at will. Carefully examining his saddle and girths Pelman rode out of the paddock on to the course. The horse felt good until he started to trot off to the post—dead lame! Ashamed, he turned back to the paddock where the owner watched. "Lame, of course, he's always lame.

I did not tell you, no. He has laminitis. He will warm up. Of course you must ride. No, no one will stop you. You do not like riding lame horses. But you must now! Think of the money on; 10,000 roubles. My friend, you must," he begged piteously. "Gallop down, he warms up.—You will not notice it.—Now remember my instructions." Pelman left him and a torrent of words explaining once more how the race was to be run.

His conscience smiting him, Pelman cantered off to the post, and certainly the lameness was not then apparent. The six horses got away to a good start, and in spite of the Armenian's instructions Pelman went off at a great rate. For one reason he wished to evade the dust and minute stones which the horses flung up behind, and also he felt that his horse must forget any pain in the hoof in the excitement of pace. A mile and a quarter race; after the first round Pelman led by about three lengths from the Russian Captain, another six lengths dividing two and three. Pelman steadied his horse. The Russian Captain crept up. Two furlongs from home they were neck and neck, Pelman then brought pressure on to his horse. He moved ahead and was leading by a neck as they came into the straight. Then his chestnut appeared to flag. The Russian brought out his whip, and his knee drew level with Pelman's A furlong to go and the chestnut flagging, and out came Pelman's whip. Both horses swept on, and then a miracle, the Russian suddenly slipped away. The brown's head came back to Pelman's knee and then disappeared out of the picture, and Pelman galloped past the post to an unpopular victory. The grandstand was shouting and yelling apparent disapproval. Peasant and merchant, drover and aristocrat were all displeased. Pelman drew up and awaited the loser. The Russian came on cursing. His saddle had not been properly girthed up and had slipped back; otherwise he swore that he would have won. Pelman sympathised, but did not entirely agree that he would have won. He could not argue, however. He would let the disgruntled backers show their disapproval of their popular Captain, who had let them down by not taking the trouble to examine his girths, so certain was he of victory.

Even Katharina, a beautiful friend of Pelman, was too

furious over her lost bet, and her compatriot's horse management to enthuse over her English friend's victory—so Pelman foregathered with a gallant Italian of superb mien and accoutrement. The Italian was profuse in his friendship, and as a reward Pelman introduced him to the wife of a rich manufacturer and race horse owner who had favoured the Italian Adonis with a glance.

Some of the owners had a habit of supping at the course buffet on these warm evenings with music and vodka and fair women. It was extremely pleasant. Pelman, however, had to return to duty. His Italian friend met him smilingly six days' later, his arm in a sling. "The little lady invited us all to her house at 3 a.m. on Monday morning as they wished to close the race club restaurant," he said. "We had all drunk a great deal. I do not know what I said, but the pretty lady, she threw a table knife at me. I put my arm up so. The husband, he agreed with his wife, and his friend too, that I should not stop longer. A very strange party. You will dine with me to-night. To-morrow we will go to the races? Yes?"

SPINNING WITH A FIXED SPOOL REEL

By Richard Clapham.

While there has been a great revolution in fishing gear since the time of W. C. Stewart, in no department of angling is this more noticeable than spinning, especially spinning for salmon. Time was when the fly-fishing enthusiasts looked upon spinning for salmon as little better than poaching, even when practised in water quite unfit for fly. The old-timers never dreamt of taking salmon in low water, whereas to-day with the fixed spool reel and thread-line, low water and a bright sun are in no way inimical to successful spinning.

The spinning tackle of a generation and more ago was coarse in the extreme, and included a heavy rod, thick line, wire trace, and a bait bristling with hooks. An ordinary revolving drum reel was used, the angler pulling off line and coiling it in his left hand. The rod, 16 ft. or more in length, served indiscriminately for fly or minnow.

To-day, since the advent of really light spinning tackle, plus the knowledge that it can be used to kill salmon—and kill them as quickly as with the old-time gear—the art of spinning has made its appeal to many anglers who would otherwise have passed it by.

Spinning with an ordinary Nottingham reel, the inertia of which has to be controlled by a finger at the critical moment, requires infinite practice in order to prevent the line from overrunning. An overrun means a "bird's nest," otherwise a most intricate tangle. There are now various revolving drum reels on the market which are practically fool-proof in this respect, as well as fixed spool reels, the latter being simpler to use than the revolving drum type. The original fixed spool reel was invented by the late A. Holden Illingworth in 1905. It was a trout reel to be used in conjunction with a thread-line. I think

the majority of experienced spinners will agree that the No. 3 Illingworth is one of the simplest and most efficient spinning reels that have ever been placed on the market. Ostensibly for use against trout, it has successfully accounted for heavy sea trout and salmon, and is to-day used by many people for that purpose. There are now several types of fixed spool reels from which the prospective spinner can make a choice. After using one or two of these I personally pin my faith to the Illingworth, which has always stood me in good stead. Light spinning naturally appeals to ladies, many of whom are experts with the short rod, fixed spool reel and thread-line.

Given a light 7 ft. split bamboo spinning rod, an Illingworth No. 3 reel, gut substitute line, and natural minnow enclosed in a celluloid scarab, and you have an outfit with which you can handle anything from a ½ lb. trout to a 20 lb. salmon. While fine silk or flax line can be used on a fixed spool reel, both absorb water, particularly the flax, and this reduces casting distance to an undesirable extent. Gut substitute on the other hand is lighter in proportion to thickness, does not absorb water, is wonderfully strong, and in the thinner sizes will cast a bait to a surprising distance.

Gut substitute varies a good deal in quality and as yet there is no standard of size or breaking strain. Personally speaking I use a line of approximately 7 lbs. breaking strain for all my fishing, including sea trout and salmon. The thicker the line the less distance can you cast a light bait. A size or two's difference in thickness and weight of line reduces the casting distance to a surprising extent.

The Illingworth reel is provided with a slipping clutch which enables various strengths of line to be used. The tension can be regulated to suit the strength of line by means of a regulating arm. Using a fixed spool reel one cannot reel in fish as one does with a revolving drum reel. The way to recover line is to pump, i.e., drop the point of the rod and wind in quickly, repeating this every time the fish stops running. Using a sound line of 7 lbs. breaking strain a fish can very quickly be mastered. Not long ago I killed a 7 lb. 6 oz. salmon in 3½ minutes. When all is said and done it takes a large salmon to pull 1 lb. for 30 or 40

yards. When fishing for trout in lakes or tarns where long distance casting may be an advantage, a line of 3 lb. or 4 lb. breaking strain is suitable, as the thinner the line the further can you throw a light bait. Thin lines can, of course, be used for sea trout or salmon, as the slipping clutch on the reel takes care of them, but using them means that little or no tension can be applied and the time taken to land a fish is excessive.

The beauty of the thread-line outfit lies in the fact that the whole thing is featherweight, and you can go on casting throughout a long day's fishing without the slightest feeling of fatigue. Not only that, but the outfit is capable of dealing with big fish and mastering them in really quick time. Fixed spool reels can be had in salmon size to take heavier and stronger lines, but for all-round fishing the trout size does everything that one asks of it. Using a salmon size reel with a thicker line, heavier baits are necessary in order to make long casts, and such baits are inimical to success in low, clear water.

When it comes to baits one has the choice between the natural and artificial; personally speaking, I much prefer the natural. Artificial baits are legion, the Devon type being the most popular. A small gold Devon often kills quite well when the water is on the thick side. For all-round spinning from trout to salmon I have always found the natural minnow very hard to beat. A small sprat also makes a useful salmon bait.

There are many spinning tackles on the market, the best in my opinion being the celluloid scarab. The latter protects the minnow, so that, barring accidents, a couple of baits with reverse spins will last for a day's fishing or even longer. The lead is pushed into the minnow, the nose of which is bound to the lead with a few turns of fine wire. For this purpose 5 amp. fuse wire is useful. It costs 1d. per spool. The minnow is then placed in the scarab or celluloid envelope, the latter being bound round with the same wire. The hooks consist of two small trebles attached to a loop of stout gut. The loop is then slipped up the channel in the scarab and through the hole in the lead.

The trace is made of two 16 inch lengths of gut substitute the same thickness as the reel line. These lengths are joined

together by a swivel. There is another swivel at the end next the reel line, and a loop is tied at the opposite end which is attached to the gut loop of the tackle.

Swivels should not be too small, otherwise they do not do their work properly and are apt to break. The gut substitute must be well soaked before knotting. There is now a substance on the market for smearing over knots to prevent them from slipping.

In the scarab tackle the lead is in the bait itself, and this is a great aid to accurate casting. When the lead is on the trace it is impossible to drop the bait exactly where you want it. Fish will sometimes run at a lead and the fewer gadgets you have on the trace the better. The same applies to an anti-kinker. When the water is high or coloured a heavier lead should be used than when it is low and clear.

To avoid line twist it is better to spin with reverse spin baits and change them frequently. All scarabs can be had with reverse fins. The fault with most of the artificial baits is that their fins are far too small, the result being that when they are drawn out of the current into more or less dead water at the side they stop spinning. The same thing applies when fishing a lake. It is when a bait is just entering the dead water near the river bank that fish often take. If the bait stops spinning at the critical moment the fish refuse it.

Scarabs can be had in all lengths from 1½ inches up to 5 inches. Personally I use the 1½ inch size for all my fishing with the fixed spool reel.

Theoretically fresh minnows are better than preserved ones, but I have never found that the latter are any less killing. A reserve stock of minnows can be kept in formalin. I have known a minnow, the mummified remains of which had been in a scarab for nearly three weeks, kill over forty sea trout.

When setting out for a day's fishing it is well to carry plenty of spare tackle in the shape of scarabs, hooks, and leads, not forgetting wire. The Illingworth reel is a simple and fool-proof instrument, the chief wear and tear being taken by the lifter-pin. Occasionally the latter will break or wear short, so a spare one should be carried in the reel case. It is advisable to also carry a small oil bottle and a tiny screw-driver to fit the screw-

1—Sea Trout from Tidal Water.

2—Spinning for Sea Trout in the tidal reaches of the river Leven.

3—A 7 lb. 6 oz. Salmon killed in tidal water with an Illingworth trout reel and thread-line.

Photos—Richard Clapham, Troutbeck, Windermere.

head of the lifter-pin. All other screws can be loosened by means of a coin when necessary.

As the gut substitute line is subject to a good deal of friction when casting, it is well to test it for a yard or so above its connection with the trace and cut off a length if it shows signs of weakness. A weak place is generally marked by a white spot, at which place the line will bend sharply, knuckling over like a flaw in an ordinary gut cast. Regular soaking in glycerine will keep a line soft and supple and greatly prolong its life. Knots in the trace should be tested at intervals, particularly that which joins the line to the trace.

Very little practice is necessary to enable one to become proficient with a fixed spool reel. A light bait can be cast to an almost incredible distance, while extreme accuracy is also possible. Accuracy is essential when spinning in rocky rivers where you have to drop the bait into circumscribed spots. Both trout and salmon have their particular lies which it is essential to cover with the minnow. For trout, upstream spinning is a very deadly method.

Light spinning beats fly-fishing hollow when it comes to killing big trout. In lakes like Windermere for example, the minnow is very deadly in March and April. Big perch often take the minnow well, and it kills pike with any other bait. When spinning for pike a fine wire trace is better than one of gut substitute. When a fish is hooked the minnow is free to slide up the trace and thus does not act as a lever to help the fish to get rid of the hooks.

On hill-tarns the thread-line outfit is a great asset. You can cast long distances from the shore and get out to where the bigger fish are, thus covering a very wide extent of water. Although one hesitates to recommend the regular use of the minnow in rivers where during part of the season trout rise well to fly, there are times when it comes in very handy to get rid of big cannibal fish that are better out of the water. In most rivers there are lean and lanky customers which prey upon their smaller brethren to the exclusion of almost all other kinds of food.

Some of the best sport is to be had with sea trout, which, when conditions are right, take the minnow extremely well. Salmon, too, can be killed in the clearest of water. At one time it was considered necessary to fish with a heavily leaded trace in spring in order to get down to salmon. In the light of modern understanding this has been proved to be fallacious, for as long as the air is warmer than the water salmon will come up to the bait. Fresh run fish, be they sea trout or salmon, take the minnow far more readily than when they have been in fresh water for some time, and light tackle is therefore much more likely to tempt the dour ones than the old-fashioned gear with its heavy lead and large minnow armed *cap-à-pie*. The less a fish sees of your gear beyond the minnow the better chance you have of getting into him.

Sea trout are hard fighters but it is surprising how soon they can be subdued by means of a thread-line outfit. The same may be said of salmon. Many people seem to think that light spinning gives no control over a big fish, but don't you believe them.

It is a thrilling experience, after your tiny bait has travelled like a bullet to its distant destination, to feel the sudden pull of a big sea trout. For a moment or two he runs hard in an attempt to get rid of his unwelcome meal, then the pressure begins to tell and he is soon drawn shorewards to be finally enveloped in the folds of the net.

One last word of advice. When fishing water where sea trout are your objective and the occasional salmon is to be met with, always carry a big net on a long handle. It is quite easy to lose a fish if your net is on the small side and its handle short.

ARMY RE-ORGANISATION.

THE War Office announces the following important re-organisations in the Cavalry and Infantry involving conversions of regiments of both arms.

I. (*a*) The conversion of the existing Cavalry Division (which consists of two horsed brigades and divisional troops) and the Tank Brigade into a mechanized Mobile Division. The latter will consist of two mechanized cavalry brigades, each consisting of two motor cavalry regiments and one cavalry light tank regiment, the Tank Brigade, and Divisional troops.

(*b*) The conversion of the cavalry brigade in Egypt into a mechanized formation consisting of one armoured car regiment, one motor cavalry regiment, and one cavalry light tank regiment.

Under this scheme the mechanized cavalry units will eventually be divided into three types: (i) cavalry armoured car regiments, (ii) motor cavalry regiments, and (iii) cavalry light tank regiments.

The organisation of the armoured car regiments will be unchanged; that of the motor cavalry units will consist of headquarters, headquarter squadron, and three mechanized squadrons, each consisting of three troops of three sections; and the cavalry light tank regiments will probably be equipped similarly to a light tank battalion of the Royal Tank Corps.

The following regiments will be converted:—1st King's Dragoon Guards; The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards); 3rd The King's Own Hussars; 4th Queen"s Own Hussars; 7th Queen's Own Hussars; 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars; 9th Queen's Royal Lancers; 10th Royal Hussars.

The order of precedence shown above will not be the order of conversion. The conversion will be undertaken in two stages: first by completing the 2nd Cavalry Brigade at Tidworth and the brigade in Egypt; secondly, by mechanizing the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot. Dates are not yet settled.

The cavalry regiments which are to remain horsed will be employed either as divisional or army troops, as circumstances require.

II. The conversion of the Infantry battalions of the Regular Army into machine gun battalions and rifle battalions, in order to provide infantry brigades consisting of three rifle battalions and one machine gun battalion each.

It has been decided to convert two battalions of Foot Guards and thirteen regiments of the Infantry of the Line into machine gun units. The remaining Guards battalions and Line regiments will be "rifle" battalions.

The organisation of the machine gun battalions has not yet been finally decided; but the intention is that these units, besides containing machine-gun companies, will contain anti-tank gun and mechanized reconnaissance companies. The rifle battalions will consist of :—

One headquarter company, including a mortar platoon, and a light machine gun platoon.

Four rifle companies, each including four rifle platoons of three sections each. The rifle sections will be trained also in the use of the new light machine gun.

The units selected for conversion to machine-gun units are the following :—

Foot Guards: 3rd Battalion, The Grenadier Guards; 3rd Battalion, The Coldstream Guards.

Infantry of the Line: The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment); The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers; The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment); The Devonshire Regiment; The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own); The Royal Scots Fusiliers; The Cheshire Regiment; The Royal Welch Fusiliers; The Gloucestershire Regiment; The East Surrey Regiment; The Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own); The Manchester Regiment; The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's).

It is hoped to convert all battalions at home, with the exception of those due for service abroad, in the course of the winter of 1936-37. Battalions abroad will be converted later; and the re-organisation will not be extended to India before 1939.

The manner of applying this policy of re-organisation to the Territorial Army is under consideration.

The object of these two schemes of re-organisation may be stated very briefly as follows :—

I. The Cavalry Division as hitherto organised lacks the speed, wide range of action and striking power required of mobile troops under modern conditions of war in which mechanized troops are employed. In addition, the Tank Brigade will require under certain conditions the co-operation of equally mobile troops who can act in areas and under conditions unsuitable to tanks.

The proposed Mobile Division is so organised as to afford this co-operation.

II. The new organisation for Infantry Brigades is aimed at the following objects :—

(1) To reduce the size of the Division, and to increase the proportion of supporting arms as compared with riflemen.

If the re-organisation of the Division were based on twelve infantry battalions of the existing type, the provision of the necessary support would make this Division unwieldy and would involve the formation of new units.

(2) To obtain a better tactical co-ordination of infantry weapons.

By grouping certain supporting weapons and activities in a separate unit (the machine-gun battalion), they can be applied with greater economy, flexibility and concentration.

(3) As a corollary to (2), to simplify the adoption of certain modern developments in armament and equipment within the infantry brigade.

The armament and equipment of the infantry are becoming increasingly complex by the development of anti-tank guns, armoured machine-gun carriers, vehicles for motor reconnaissance, and so on. To distribute equipment of this nature in small quantities throughout all battalions would lead neither to economy nor to efficiency.

(4) To simplify the training of Infantry and the supply of reinforcements in war.

THE BREN LIGHT MACHINE GUN

PUBLISHED BY PERMISSION OF THE WAR OFFICE.

AT the beginning of the Great War the only machine gun in general use was a weapon weighing, with its mounting, somewhere about 100 lbs. or more, and capable of prolonged fire at a high rate. Such weapons were the British Maxim and Vickers, the French Hotchkiss and the German Maxim. They were intended to be used in more or less fixed positions in support of the rifles which, in our army at any rate, formed the main source of infantry fire power at that time. Under the trench warfare conditions which so soon set in, the weight and bulk of these heavy machine guns were not serious objections, and their capacity for sustained fire was an advantage. They dominated the battlefield and it was obvious that they must become the mainstay of the defence. To meet the demand for more machine guns the Lewis was brought in to supplement the Vickers which could not be produced in sufficient quantities.

The Lewis was altogether different in character from the Vickers. It was air-cooled and was fired from the shoulder on a low bipod rest. It was also magazine fed, and weighed, complete, about 30 lbs. It was therefore essentially a more mobile weapon than the Vickers, although it had not its capacity for sustained fire. It was a weapon capable of being employed alongside the rifles or as a susbtitute for them under open warfare conditions, i.e., it could be taken forward in the attacks, and a Lewis gunner could go practically anywhere that a rifleman could go. It was, however, still not possible to carry it by hand for long distances without fatigue.

The German version of this type of weapon was the so-called light Maxim. The French produced a gun called the Chauchat. All the above were light machine guns with characteristics different from those of the heavy machine guns in use hitherto.

Their advent in theory released the heavy machine gun for use in the rôle for which its characteristics made it suitable. In practice, however, the reliability of the light machine gun was not sufficient to justify this.

Reproduced by courtesy of "The Engineer."

THE BREN LIGHT MACHINE GUN

PUBLISHED BY PERMISSION OF THE WAR OFFICE

It was obvious that if the light machine gun could be still further lightened and its mechanical reliability improved, the fire power of the infantry, under all conditions, would be enormously increased. A single light machine gun served by two men is the equivalent in fire power to 20 men armed with rifles; the limiting factor in multiplying the number being ammunition supply only. On the assumption that the target for these guns would continue to be the unarmoured man, the logical conclusion was to increase the number of guns to saturation point. Experience showed that a section of about six men can supply and keep in action for the requisite period of time one light machine gun. The main duty of four of these six men is carriage of ammunition. Fewer men per gun or alternatively more guns per section means either loss of mobility by reason of the greater ammunition load per man, or loss of capacity to sustain fire in sufficient volume. Saturation point is therefore approximately one light machine gun per six men. The latest experimental organisations have reached or are approaching this proportion. War experience having led to this conclusion, peace brought with it a period of renewed activity throughout the world in the field of light machine gun design.

Vastly improved and lighter light machine guns were produced and tried out all over the world. All had similar characteristics, a weight complete of about 20 lbs., feed from a magazine holding 20 to 30 rounds, air cooling, generally, with some form of quick-change barrel and much simpler mechanism. Most of them were operated by gases taken from the barrel. An attempt was made by the old-established firm of Madsen to combine in one weapon the functions of both the light and heavy machine gun. They proposed to achieve sustained fire by the process of ringing the changes on a series of quick-change air-cooled barrels. The light gun when used in the heavy rôle was mounted on a tripod weighing very little more than the gun itself. Stability was ensured by the use of spring buffering and the form of the tripod with two widely spread legs at the rear. This attempt led to a great advance in the design of equipment of this kind, but has not enabled the light machine gun to compete with the heavy gun in its own field. Belt feed, water

cooling and heavy barrels have advantages where sustained fire at high rates is required, and these features are incompatible with a really light and mobile weapon. It is therefore likely that the two types of gun will remain in use. For certain purposes, notably use by cavalry, however, a light machine gun mounted on its light tripod can give sufficient sustained fire.

British trials of light machine guns to replace the Lewis began in 1922, but did not result in the adoption of any new weapon, although a modification of the light Browning was recommended should the need arise. A new series of trials was started in 1930 in view of the very rapid strides made in design, and one of the guns selected for trials was the Z.B. made at Brno in Czechoslovakia. This gun had already gained a very high reputation among those who had tried it, and very little experience showed that this reputation was well founded. It had qualities which made it altogether outstanding. The change over from the nitrocellulose propellant, for which the gun had been developed, to cordite, brought with it certain troubles due to the heavy metallic fouling caused by this powder. This entailed certain modifications to the design. The British rimmed cartridge also caused a certain difficulty in the feed to and from the magazine. The gun modified to meet British requirements was called the Z.G.B. The trials were concluded in 1934, and in 1935 the gun was finally approved for adoption under the name Bren, a word formed from the initial letters of its birthplace Brno and of the British factory at Enfield, where it will be made.

The chief qualities of the Bren light machine gun are low weight, i.e., 21 lbs. complete, as compared to 31 lbs. for the Lewis, extreme steadiness when firing, almost complete immunity from the effects of fouling, dirt and dust, great freedom from breakage and stoppages, and the ability to maintain a high rate of fire for relatively long periods.

Its main features, which render the gun unique, are the system of buffering the moving and recoiling parts, and the arrangements for the collection and disposal of metallic fouling in the gas system.

Note.—The full details of the action of the gun which are outside the scope of this journal, will be found in the manual when published.—Ed.

NOTES.

9th Queen's Royal Lancers.

We would like to congratulate Major C. W. Norman, a former Editor of the Journal, on being selected for Command of the Regiment.

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Polo.

At Meerut the 10th Royal Hussars won the Indian Inter-regimental Polo tournament, the highest achievement in Army Polo in India. They beat the 19th K.G.O. Lancers in the final. This is the eighth time they have won the Indian Inter-regimental tournament.

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The Officers' Association.

The 16th Annual Report of the Officers' Association has been received. A full description is given in the report of the excellent work being done by the Association.

To mention only two activities :—

The Employment Bureau : During the year work has been found for 463 ex-officers, an increase of 83 over last year, making a total of 7,217 since April, 1925.

Families and Clothing Branch : During the year 1,121 children were assisted with school fees at a cost of £24,478.

Clothing Store : 3,055 parcels of clothing were received during the year, but the calls on the Store are enormous, and the assistance given to ex-officers and their families was of the greatest value.

The articles of clothing most frequently required are suits, underclothing, shirts, socks, shoes and overcoats.

All clothing should be addressed to: The General Secretary, Officers' Association, 8, Eaton Square, S.W.1.

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The undermentioned have become subscribers for 1936 :—

Lieut.-Colonel P. V. Harris, 17th/21st Lancers.
Major T. B. A. Evans-Lombe, 8th Hussars.
Captain R. W. Verelst, 11th Hussars.
Captain D. Forster, 11th Hussars.
Captain M.A. Fremantle, (late) 11th Hussars.
Captain L. H. S. Groves, 14th/20th Hussars.
Captain A. J. L. Hopkins, Royal Army Pay Corps.
Lieutenant A. V. C. Robarts, 11th Hussars.
2nd Lieutenant P. Arkwright, 11th Hussars.
2nd Lieutenant D. P. J. Lloyd, 11th Hussars.
President Officers' Mess, Hodson's Horse, I.A. (Second Copy).
Major C. F. L. Stevens, M.C., Hodson's Horse.
Captain Tara Singh Bal, 7th Light Cavalry.
Major J. F. Maxwell, Newar Bhil Corps.
O.C. "A" Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse.

HOME AND DOMINION MAGAZINES

THE "Army Quarterly" for January has as its chief feature an excellent review by Lieut.-Colonel de Watteville on the course of the Italo--Abyssinian War to the beginning of December, 1935, when the Italians had occupied Makale. Complete details are given of the Italian mobilisation and of the forces sent overseas. Its perusal is almost indispensable for any one desiring to follow the course of events intelligently. Major-General Fuller discusses the question whether modern war is more horrible than of old and opines that physically it is not, but morally it is, so that moral and not material dangers, especially among an undisciplined civil population, are those chiefly to be guarded against in any future conflict. An essay by Colonel Baird Smith on command of the Mediterranean, which he believes to depend mainly on the control of Egypt and the Suez Canal, is another item of typical interest There are two more articles on the much discussed questions of officers' education and promotion, and an entertaining account of a court-martial of Wellington's days from Lieut.-Colonel Burne.

The "Fighting Forces" for December has a sober and clear discussion of the problems before the Naval Conference by Captain Tuke. His figures of ships might with advantage have been taken from the official publication "Fleets" instead of from the rather unreliable League of Nations Armaments Year Book. Lieut.-Colonel Burne in this issue discusses the battle of Ctesiphon, and a very interesting tale he makes of it. An amazing story of Neuve Chapelle is told by Captain Wynne, who makes it clear that the progress of our attack beyond the final objective, in which 48 battalions were engaged, was completely held up all day by one well-posted and boldly-handled German rifle battalion!—a humiliating but indubitable revelation. Promotion and its slowness again forms the subject of the article in the "Perplexities of the Army Officer" series.

The February number of "Fighting Forces" has a discussion of the woman's point of view as regards Army life, as exemplified in a recently published novel "Ask the Brave Soldier." Captain Tuke describes the course of the Naval Conference down to the withdrawal of Japan from its sessions. Lieut.-Colonel Burne sums up in one article the lessons to be drawn from the five episodes recently featured in the Military History articles in the periodical. There is a correspondence on the subject of O.T.C. training and methods. Captain Macgregor puts in a plea that young Army officers should take full advantage of the system whereby they may be seconded for duty to the Royal Air Force, and may gain thereby much useful and fascinating experience of the work of a new Service.

The "Royal Artillery Journal" has a number of good features—mainly historical, travel, or sporting in interest. The "Duncan" Highly Commended Essay on the weights of artillery shell by Captain Skentlebery, holds pride of place. Major Thrupp sums up in the recent discussion as to the true rôle of tanks in modern war, and Lieut.-Colonel Voysey pleads for the application to the Territorial Army of the Guernsey system of recruitment based on a compulsory quota of men levied in each parish, and for increased drills and camp training for all T.A. personnel as recruited for service.

The "Royal Engineers' Journal" contains a discussion by Captain Edwards on "R.E. Co-operation with the tank brigade," an account by Captain Heap of his experiences on the Northern Rhodesian-Belgian Congo Boundary Commission, and two brief sketches of the composition and military value of two Imperial Volunteer Forces—those in the Federated Malay States and in Johore. The book and magazine reviews are on their usual ample scale.

The "Journal of the United Service Institution of India" contains an admirable narrative by Major Mullaly of the battle of Adowa, and a lively story by Brig.--General Marsh of his experiences with the Murmansk force in North Russia in 1918. An anonymous paper puts forward some sensible suggestions on how to prevent young officers running into debt at the beginning

of their military careers, and the steps to be taken in case such prevention fails of its purpose.

"The Royal Army Service Corps Quarterly" for November consists in the main of technical articles, of which those on the recruitment of R.A.S.C. officers and the operation of mechanical transport in a desert country are best worth reading from the outsider's point of view.

The "Royal Air Force Quarterly" on the other hand contains an unusual wealth of general matter Major Pemberton's article on "India in the Making" gives a useful sketch of the constitutional development of the country down to the Act of last year, and there are a number of descriptive and travel articles on Scotland, Kurdistan, Palestine, and Cyprus.

The "Canadian Defence Quarterly" has two articles of highly topical interest at the present moment, one giving the history and duties of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the second summarising the arguments for and against a Ministry of Defence. The Prize Essay by Major Lisle on "Can Canada Defend Herself?" concludes that only a considerable increase and remodelling of her present inadequate defence forces could enable her to do so, and a plan for her new model organisation for this purpose is outlined. A paper on the Memel crisis, and an attractive sketch of the career of Marshal Ney are other interesting features. E. W. S.

The Editor acknowledges with thanks the receipt of the following:—

XI Hussars Journal. January, 1936.
The Eagle. Journal of the Royal Dragoons.
The Strathconian. Quarterly Journal of Strathcona's Horse, R.C.
Horse and Foot. Ceylon Mounted Rifles Magazine.
The Goat. Royal Canadian Dragoons Quarterly.
The Royal Tank Corps Journal. January to March, 1936.
The Fifteenth Lancer. A Quarterly News of 15th Lancers, I.A.

FOREIGN MAGAZINES

THE United States "Cavalry Journal" for November-December, 1935, contains an interesting article by Colonel Charils F. Martin on the subject of night marching by horsed cavalry when the latter is opposed by mechanized cavalry; it is, in fact, a report on an actual peace exercise of this nature. The narrative is rather too complex to reproduce in detail; neither can it be well condensed. The gist of the exercise lay in the task of a cavalry regiment (with artillery and engineer detachments) to march 20 miles by night and then to attack a mechanized regiment by dawn. The speed of march was as much as 5½ miles per hour on good roads, when unopposed; but it fell to 4½ miles on poor roads. The march disclosed the need for more training in night work; also the necessity for the presence of engineers with a demolition section, the latter being allotted permanently to cavalry; also the necessity of some means for crossing streams; lastly, the urgency of providing anti-tank guns for cavalry employed on such a mission. The exercise is held to have proved the effectual menace of horsed cavalry to mechanized cavalry in bivouac. The horsed cavalry managed to elude all the hostile reconnaissances.

The career of General Reuben Bernard is continued in a second instalment. This covers the Civil War in Virginia from November, 1863, to the end; during this period Bernard was credited with having participated in not less than 65 engagements. From lieutenant he rose to the rank of brevet-colonel, and as such performed subaltern's duties. In 1869 he was fighting the Conchise and Apache Indians, with his usual success.

Captain Wesley W. Yale discusses the necessity for introducing horse-vans for cavalry divisional and brigade head-

quarters. Taking the number of horses as eighteen for the division and twelve for the brigade, this would mean seven six-horse vehicles for a two-brigade division. The use of such vehicles and their place in the divisional organisation is discussed at length.

The number for January-February opens with a brief but important contribution by Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Surles, of the U.S. General Staff. The article gains in importance from being headed by a message from General Malin Craig, Chief of U.S. Staff, in which he definitely states that mechanization has not driven the horse from the army. The article compares the progress of mechanization in the United States and in Great Britain, and ends with a comparison of the horse supply situation in the United States and in Europe. The total horses of the U.S. number 18,000,000; the whole of Europe could only produce just half that number.

The story of General Bernard's career is next resumed. This instalment covers the war against the Modoc Indians of California in 1872-73. Various tasks followed until in 1878 Bernard was engaged in operations against the Bannock Indians in Oregon and Montana. Lieut.-Colonel C. C. Benson discusses in detail "Fast Marching with Horse Cavalry." He analyses all conditions conducive to fast marching with great care, and advocates the enforcement of the rates of marching laid down at the U.S. Cavalry School as a periodic exercise. These rates vary from a distance of 6 miles in ½ hour, i.e., at a rate of 12 m.p.h., up to a distance of 50 miles in 8 hours at a rate of 6¼ m.p.h.

Major A. R. Wilson writes about "A Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron for an Infantry Division." The U.S. infantry division is more or less in the melting-pot as regards its organisation. He would like to see the opportunity taken to allot to it a permanent reconnaissance squadron, so that it should not depend on Corps or Army cavalry for this service. He recommends a squadron composed of: Headquarters with 1 Communication troop, 1 Pioneer troop, 1 Supply and Transport troop, 1 Maintenance troop, 1 Armoured Car troop, 1 Mechanized Machine-gun troop, 1 Horsed troop.

In the French "Revue de Cavalerie" Captain Labouchère continues and concludes his story of the Battle of Amiens

(8-12 August, 1918) from the point of view of tanks and cavalry action. This instalment begins with a narration of the work done by the motor machine guns in the direction of Framerville and Proyart. The situation on the evening of the 8th is then summed up as having been a great success. On the 9th the 1st Cavalry Division failed to advance north of Vrely until joined by the 2nd Canadian (Infantry) Division. The 2nd Cavalry Division reached the western edge of Maucourt at nightfall. Although the advance was satisfactory, the tanks of the 3rd brigade were kept back too long and so failed to realise the best results. During the 10th the advance was continued. The two cavalry divisions, at first held in reserve, were ordered to advance. But as the attack reached the old battlefield of the Somme, the ground was so cut up by old trenches, shell-holes and barbed wire as to render movement most difficult for tanks and horses. So the Cavalry Corps was brought back in the valley of the River Luce.

On the 11th the enemy's resistance stiffened and the opportunity for cavalry was over. So, on the 12th, the whole Cavalry Corps was brought back into the valleys of the River Luce and the River Aure.

The lessons of the battle are pretty clear. On the first two days the ground was the level plateau of Santerre, which offered little cover but good surface. The speed of tanks, and cavalry, profiting by surprise, made excellent headway. But the combination of tanks and horse, says the author, quoting General Fuller, was not a success. In the approach march the cavalry outstripped the tanks [the old whippet model]; in battle the reverse was the case. Speed was all-important. Nevertheless, the battle ended well, since the enemy, although he managed to hold the old battlefield of the Somme, had been compelled to bring down 36 divisions to hold up the attack from all along his line.

For the future the following formula seems the satisfactory solution :—There is need for a large homogeneous automobile unit which will comprise an element possessing power, namely tanks; these will be supported by reconnoitring and contact elements, namely motor-borne machine guns for either purpose;

these units will be supported by troops, not numerous but equipped with automatic arms and with sufficient and powerful anti-tank weapons. These supports would be employed to occupy momentarily the conquered terrain, to force a water-course, and would constitute pivots of manœuvre. They would be transported in cross-country motor vehicles.

How would such forces be employed? Many cases may arise. It may be suggested that they should:—

1. First neutralise, throughout its depth, the tactical framework of the enemy, artillery, battle H.Q. and reserves;

2. Then to follow up the success with normal combatant troops provided that this process be contemplated as an advance in depth and not converted into raids extending up to an indefinite distance.

Next Major Breuillac describes the passage of the River Eure by the 3rd group of motor machine guns with the use of "Habert Sacks." A raft composed of two layers of 12 sacks each was constructed by employing building timber, in 3 to 4 hours. This would take track vehicles; a single layer of 12 sacks would carry wheeled vehicles. The article is admirably illustrated.

General Inostranev (of the Russian Army) describes some curious fighting that took place between the Russian 2nd Cavalry Division and the Austrian 5th Cavalry Division at the outbreak of war in August, 1914. The Russians had the mission of holding the line of the River Sbroutch (a tributary of the River Dneister which formed the frontier between Hungary and Russia. On the 16th and 17th the Austrians attempted to cross this river and encountered violent resistance. On several occasions mounted combats took place in which lance and sabre were freely used to good effect. Finally the Austrians tried to rush the village of Gorodok by a mounted charge. The attempt failed lamentably as the village was held by a battalion of rifles and two infantry companies. The whole story reads like that of an XVIIIth century battle.

Lieut.-Colonel Chavanne concludes his biography of that curious character, Chevalier de Brack.

This is an exceptionally interesting number.

In the January-February number Commandant Gazin writes of the work of the III Cavalry Corps of the German Army in Lorraine at the village of La Garde on 11th August, 1914. This combat is memorable for the charge of a whole brigade, conducted in true peace-time manner, but which still exercised a decisive influence. The incident is unique in the operations that took place between August and November. The German III Corps was ordered to carry out a strategic reconnaissance in the direction of Saint Mihiel and to the west of Moselle and Meurthe at the opening of hostilities. Until the 11th the cavalry had really failed to achieve any useful result. Anxious, on hearing of the enemy's progress and his occupation of La Garde, the French General commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division considered it necessary to oust the Germans from La Garde: and this was done by two battalions of infantry and a few guns. The Germans thereupon determined to take the place by a typical converging attack: they proposed to allocate for the task no less than 10 battalions, 10 batteries and 20 squadrons. The course of the action is full of interest, but the main feature is the action of the Uhlan Brigade of the Bavarian cavalry division. Of the infantry, the 2nd Jägers and 138th Infantry Regiment attacked La Garde from the north-east, south-east and south. A stubborn fight ensued and at about 10.50 a.m. the 97th Infantry Regiment, attacking from the north-west, was making very slow headway. General von Stetten, commanding the Uhlan Brigade, thereupon decided to intervene and carry the village by a charge. This was done by the 1st and 2nd Uhlans who actually penetrated into the village. The French, already severely shaken by the infantry attack, crumpled up. Out of 700 horsemen the Germans lost 14 officers, 278 men and 290 horses. The conclusion drawn by the writer is (a) that in the first encounter at the beginning of a war there will exist frequent occasion for tactical surprise which will not occur later; (b) that the Bavarians acted in accordance with the best cavalry traditions.

H. de Versonnex, a Frenchman serving as a captain in the Polish cavalry, describes his experiences during the Polish thrust into the Ukraine in May, 1919. The story takes the

form of extracts from the writer's diary and these are intensely readable and interesting. He considers that there was much to learn in this campaign. He discovered that there was no need to reconnoitre and search the ground : there was but one thing to do, namely, to advance. The story of the capture of a station where the retreating Ukrainians had set fire to trains and buildings is vividly told. Versonnex's regiment (cavalry) left Malice on 11th May. After twelve days' march eastwards, on 23rd May, at Sanerowka, near the River Bug, the regiment received the order to go back to build bridges over the River Bug to allow the Polish infantry to cross. This meant that the great Powers had forbidden the Poles to advance further into the Ukraine. Versonnex was thunderstruck, for, as he relates, the task of invasion in face of the Ukrainian resistance was easy. A thoroughly good article.

The German "Militär-Wochenblatt" contains many good articles on general topics, including some detailed criticisms of the Italo-Abyssinian war, but nothing of peculiar interest to cavalry. The "Berliner Monatshefte" is beginning an important series of articles on the mobilization of various armies in 1914. The first instalment deals with the process of mobilization in Serbia and Montenegro. It is therefore, not of great value to British cavalry officers, but the style and contents promises well for the future instalments.

The "Schweizer Kavallerist" has published several photographs of modern tanks and armoured cars. From the accompanying remarks it appears that the Swiss cavalry is to be supplied with a number of armoured vehicles for reconnaissance. But the exact type to be adopted is not yet fixed : it has, however, been decided that manufacture of a special type adapted to Swiss conditions shall be undertaken very soon and by Swiss firms.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"The Horse: Its Action and Anatomy." By an Artist, Lowes D. Luard. (Reviewed by Lt.-Col. Sidney G. Goldschmidt). Faber & Faber. 15s.

The opening sentence of this book—"Should an artist learn anatomy," can be answered unhesitatingly in the affirmative. I am enough of a Philistine to maintain that he should also learn perspective even though both these points are neglected by many artists of the modern school. Anatomy and perspective are the background to the artist's genius, just as a knowledge of facts should be the background to oratory and experience of life to poetry.

The author's knowledge of horseflesh combined with his artistic skill gives this book a merit peculiarly its own. Where necessary he is strictly diagrammatic in his illustrations, but by a happy application of colour-wash he has made his meaning doubly clear to the student, both amateur and professional. Where the movements of limbs and the articulations of joints are depicted and described one realises why artists and sculptors often fail so signally to get any feeling of movement into their works of art; the raised fore-leg with no corresponding shoulder effort is an example in almost every statue and a mistake that will not be made by any artist who studies this book. This movement is beautifully illustrated facing p. 44, and the diagrams from X-ray photographs that follow are particularly illuminating and are undoubtedly a guide in diagnosing lameness.

I once heard it stated by a great authority that there are in art only two horses—Meissonier's and Détaile's. There is something to be said for this somewhat sweeping statement and it is an undoubted fact that few artists can draw more than one type

of horse; in fact, a suitable sub-title of this original book might well read "First Aid to Artists and Sculptors."

"Elementary Veterinary Science for Agricultural Students, Farmers, and Stock-keepers." By A. C. Duncan, F.R.C.V.S., B.Sc., Barrister-at-Law, Lecturer in Veterinary Science at the Royal Agricultural College, Cirencester. (Reviewed by Major-General Sir John Moore, K.C.M.G., C.B., F.R.C.V.S.). Bailliere Tindall & Cox. 10s. 6d

This very complete treatise—Fifth Edition—is the outcome of Thompson's "Veterinary Lectures," originally published in 1895, and brought up to date in the advancement of present-day veterinary knowledge and scientific handling of animal diseases. Major A. C. Duncan is to be congratulated on his very valuable work, for no man in the veterinary profession has a better knowledge of animal disease than he has, and in his appointment of Lecturer in Veterinary Science at our foremost Agricultural College in England, it may be taken for granted that what he affirms in relation to causation of diseases of livestock, their prevention and treatment, may be taken as substantially correct.

In an introductory chapter reference is made to inflammation, its causes, its terminations; medicines, their actions and uses, methods of administering medicines, methods of control. Chapter II relates to bones, and special diseases of bone, i.e., splint, ringbone, sidebone, spavin and navicular disease. Chapter III deals with muscles, tendons, and injuries and diseases incidental thereto, i.e., wounds of all kinds, sprain of tendons, breakdown, sesamoiditis, windgall, bog spavin, thorough-pin, capped hock, curb, open joint, luxation of the patella. Chapter IV relates to the horse's foot, shoeing, and injuries to, and diseases of the foot of the horse; injuries to and diseases of the feet of the cow, sheep, dog, and pig. Chapter V —Digestive organs (horse), the mouth and stomach; injuries to and diseases of the digestive organs with special reference to colic, rupture of stomach, worms, crib-biting, wind-sucking, calculi. Included in this chapter, mention is made of diseases

of the dog and pig, swine fever and swine erysipelas being specially referred to in the latter animal. Chapter VI—Digestive organs (cow). In this chapter, after a description of the four stomachs of ruminants, derangements and diseases of the alimentary canal and accessory organs are alluded to, viz., tympanites, impaction of the rumen, vomition, lead poisoning, enteritis, diarrhœa, liver fluke (sheep), Johne's disease, intestinal tuberculosis, jaundice, anthrax (spleen), white scour, navel ill, hair and wool balls, joint-felon, and their appropriate treatment and prevention is given. In Chapter VII reference is made to the dentition of horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, and dogs, and diseases incidental thereto, and in connection with dentition, feeding stuffs are briefly remarked on. Chapter VIII relates to circulatory and lymphatic systems and their disorders and diseases. Chapter IX describes the respiratory organs, and diseases commonly affecting the horse, pig, dog, cattle and sheep, with special reference to nasal gleet, glanders and farcy, strangles, roaring, broken-wind, and influenza in horses; distemper in dogs; and contagious pleuro-pneumonia and tuberculosis in cattle, hoose in calves; and parasitic bronchitis and pneumonia in sheep. Chapter X, after describing the cerebro-spinal system, the sympathetic or ganglionic system, and the brain, makes special reference to the derangements and diseases of the nervous system, in particular hydrocephalus in the calf; sturdy and louping-ill in the sheep; milk fever in cows; shivering, stringhalt and tetanus in horses, and rabies in the dog. Chapter XI relates to the skin and skin diseases, viz., inflammatory (horse-pox, cow-pox, sheep-pox); non-inflammatory (angle-berries, horn-overgrowths, abscesses); and parasitic diseases (mange, warbles, ringworm, maggots, lice), and their appropriate treatment. Chapter XII gives a description of the urinary and generative systems, male and female organs of generation, and diseases in connection therewith. Special allusion is made to gestation, abortion, etc. In Chapter XIII, poultry diseases are fully dealt with, viz., tuberculosis in poultry, bacillary white diarrhœa, fowl-pox, fowl-cholera, blackhead in turkeys, coccidiosis, fowl paralysis, parasites, lice, fleas, and mites. Chapter XIV gives a synopsis of diseases, their

recognition and "First-aid" treatment. Chapter XV relates to simple formulas referred to in the various paragraphs.

The book is obtainable from Messrs. Bailliere Tindall & Cox, 7 and 8, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, W.C.2, and the price is 10s. 6d.

"Riding and Schooling of Horses." By Lieut.-Colonel Harry D. Chamberlin. (Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., London.) 10s. 6d.

Here is yet another treatise on the art of riding, but one which outshines the many which have been published since the war. It is written by an American, and it is a well-known fact that the author's country invariably aims at perfection in whatever form of sport it takes up. Colonel Chamberlin has visited all the cavalry schools of Europe and made a careful study of their respective methods. He has put the result of his investigations into practice and has become one of the most successful competitors in the show rings of all countries. His book is a clear and concise explanation of how any average man can become a first-class rider. The illustrations are so excellent that they very nearly tell the story without the text.

T. T. P.

"Horse Facts." By Major A. J. R. Lamb, D.S.O., late Queen's Bays. (Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., London.) 8s. 6d.

A condensed edition of Hayes and Fitz Wygram, combined, from which works as the author states in his preface, most of the "horse facts" have been gleaned. The book might almost be termed a horse dictionary, as it contains all that is known about a horse in an extremely small space. A very useful book of reference.

T. T. P.

"The Four Horsemen Ride." By "Trooper." (Davies.) 6s.

This book, which is heralded by a foreword by General Sir Hubert Gough, gives in brief compass the war-time experiences of a young cavalryman who served in France and Italy in a dismounted unit from the autumn of 1916 to the end of the war. It is a typical war-time story, told simply and without any

attempt at fine writing or vivid description—neither worse nor much better than several other works that have recently appeared. Perhaps because of its very simplicity and matter-of-factness, it represents more faithfully the point of view of the average soldier of these days than a more pretentious volume would have been able to do. There are a few well chosen illustrations.

"With Pershing in Mexico." By Colonel H. A. Toulmin. (Military Service Publishing Co., U.S.A.)

"Chasing Villa." By Colonel F. Tompkins. (Military Service Publishing Co., U.S.A.)

Both of these books deal with the same subject—the little campaign waged by the American cavalry under command of General Pershing in 1916 against the irregular forces of the Mexican Chief, Villa. Read in conjunction, they give a good idea of a very difficult and thankless operation, conducted to a satisfactory conclusion despite great obstacles of climate and terrain and in face of the dubious and obstructive attitude of the regular forces of the Mexican Government. Colonel Tomkins gives by far the fullest and most satisfactory account, that of Colonel Toulmin being too brief, scrappy, and scantily mapped to follow with ease. Both writers express the utmost admiration for the skill of the American commander and the fine spirit of the troops, though the subordinate leading left on occasion much to be desired. This little-known frontier campaign is a good example of the work that sometimes falls to the lot of the small regular army of the United States, and contains teaching of some value to ourselves, who are often faced with similar problems.

"Charles I and Cromwell." By G. M. Young. (Davies.) 7s. 6d.

This is a fascinatingly written and penetrating study of the course of events between Charles' surrender to the Scots in 1646 and his execution in 1649, and of how Cromwell and Ireton, as representatives of the all-powerful Army, came to be convinced of the necessity of the King's death. The story is told clearly and sympathetically, and the author's knowledge of his sources

and period is profound. His work can be most heartily recommended.

"The Foundations of Soldiering." By Major M. K. Wardle. (Gale & Polden.) 3s. 6d.

This practical little work is an attempt to suggest a framework and plan for infantry training within the battalion. Brief as it is, it is very comprehensive; all forms of training, from the platoon upwards, are dealt with, and the suggestions made are in every case sensible and realistic. Particularly valuable are the appendices of syllabuses and forms covering in detail many matters only briefly referred to in the text. The enthusiastic spirit of the author has communicated itself to his style, so that, though the work is one whose primary utility is to the regimental infantry officer, it can be read with pleasure and profit by anyone interested in military matters. It is to be hoped that it will find a place in many a unit library, and that many company and commanding officers will give it the detailed study it merits.

"Aces and Kings." By L. W. Sutherland. (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, and 37, Great Portland Street, W.C.1.) 6s.

Here is another of those excellent little Australian books of war recollections—this time by an airman who took part in the Palestine campaign as an officer in the 67th (Australian) Squadron, R.F.C. (No. 1 Australian Squadron). While the lighter side of the war in the air receives its meed of attention, the chief interest will be found in the vivid sketches the author gives of Lawrence of Arabia, his account of the destruction from the air of the fleeing remnants of the Turkish armies after the battle of Megiddo, and in his reflections on the spirit of the Australian Air Force at war. Mr. Sutherland's style is free, easy and vivid, and his book well merits its place on the bookshelf besides its many predecessors from this enterprising firm of Sydney publishers.

"Fencing Tactics." (The Sportsman's Library, No. 12.) By P. E. Nobbs. (Allen.) 5s.

This is a full and detailed account of the art and tactics of fencing, whether with foil, sword, or sabre, well illustrated by diagrams, and some useful appendices. Mr. Corble, a British amateur ex--champion, contributes an interesting chapter on the evolution and history of the art of fencing.

The following have also been received:

King George the Well Beloved. By Ernest H. Short. (Philip Allen & Co.). 8s. 6d.

Woodcock and Snipe. By J. W. Seigne and E. C. Keith. (Philip Allen & Co.). 5s.

Napoleon & Waterloo. By A. F. Becke. (Kegan, Paul Trench & Co.). 10s. 6d.

Elementary Study of Appreciations, Orders and Messages. By Major W. K. M. Leader, M.C. (Sifton Praed & Co.). 7s. 6d.

Sword and Stirrup. By Major H. de Montmorency. (Bell & Sons.). 16s.

Old Soldier, Sahib. By Private Richards, D.C.M., M.M. (Faber & Faber, Ltd.). 7s. 6d.

SPORTING NEWS--CANADA

Canada was again represented in the Army Team Competitions at the National Horse Show, New York, 6th to 12th November. Six Countries competed : U.S.A., Canada, Irish Free State, Chile, France and Holland.

The same countries competed at the Royal Winter Fair at Toronto, 20th to 28th November.

The Canadian Team at New York was Lieut.-Colonel R. S. Timmis, D.S.O., Capt. S. C. Bate, Capt. C. C. Mann and Lieut. H. A. Phillips.

In Toronto the same team, except Lieut. Marshall Cleland (Governor-General's Body Guard), replaced Lieut. Phillips. The other officers belong to the Royal Canadian Dragoons.

As usual, the Canadian Team only got together four weeks before the National Horse Show started, whilst most of the other teams spend all the year schooling and show jumping. The team won 23 ribbons in all, including four firsts and six seconds. In the International Team Cup at New York, the Nations finished as follows : Ireland, U.S.A., Chile, Canada, France, Holland.

In Toronto, in the Cup, the results were : Ireland, Holland, Canada, France, U.S.A., and Chile.

The Judges in the International Classes at New York were : Major-General Kromer, Chief of Cavalry, Brigadier-General Guy Henry, Commandant Cavalry School, Fort Riley, and Major-General Sir James MacBrien, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commissioner R.C.M.P. (formerly R.C.D., and Chief of the General Staff, Canada).

INDIA

RESULTS OF THE LAHORE HUNT HORSE SHOW, HELD ON 28TH AND 29TH DECEMBER, 1935, AT LAHORE CANTONMENTS.

CLASS I.—ENGLISH AND COLONIAL HORSES.

1st	Mr. C. W. P. Richardson's Eng. b. g.	Selangor
2nd	Mr. D. McD. Reinhold's Eng. ch. g.	Golden Entry
3rd	Major D. Vanrenen's	Hayclare

CLASS II.—ENGLISH AND COLONIAL PONIES (UNDER 15 HANDS).

1st	Capt. Gul Sher Khan Noon's Aust. br. m.	Neelum
2nd	Lieut.-Col. D. Pott's Aust. b. m.	Mint Sauce
3rd	Major C. H. Landale's	Link Boy

CLASS III.—INDIAN HORSES (15 HANDS AND OVER).

1st	Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. bl. h.	Black Bullet
2nd	Major L. C. Palk's Ind. ch. g.	Beau Brocade
3rd	Capt. J. H. Needham's Ind. br. g.	Nigel

CLASS IV.—ARABS AND INDIAN PONIES.

1st	H.H. The Raja of Faridkot's Ind. br. m.	Sunshine Susie
2nd	Capt. T. T. Todd's Ind. ch. g.	Oakwood
3rd	Mrs. T. T. Todd's Ind. b. g.	Debonair

CLASS V.—STABLE OF THREE.

1st	Major C. H. Landale's	Matchbox Ohio Sweet Verse
2nd	Mr. W. Iftikhar Khan's	Nominations
3rd	Lieut.-Col. D. Pott's	Nominations

CLASS VI. (B)—INDIAN COLTS, 24 TO 36 MONTHS OF AGE.

1st	Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. ch. c.	Torchman
2nd	Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. ch. c.	Philosopher
3rd	Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. b.c.	Bridge Winner

CLASS VI. (C)—INDIAN FILLIES, 24 TO 48 MONTHS OF AGE.

1st	Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. ch. f.	My Dear
2nd	Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. ch. f.	Pirousette
3rd	Mr. W. J. Madden's Ind. br. f.	Sunningdale

CLASS VI. (D)—INDIAN HORSES.

1st	Mohd Afzal's	Amrit Sidhu
2nd	Ismail Khan's	Dagechi
3rd	Kapoor Singh's	Amar Sidhu
4th	Jundoo Khan's	Amar Kot

CLASS VII. (A)—HACKS—HORSES (OPEN).

1st	Capt. H. D. Caldcott's Aust. ch. g.	Sun Storm
2nd	Mr. J. M. Ewart's Aust. br. g.	Duke
3rd	Major L. C. Palk's Ind. ch. g.	Beau Brocade

CLASS VII. (B)—HACKS—PONIES (OPEN).

1st	Major F. R. R Bucher's Aust. ch. g.	Madrasi
2nd	Major J. C. Garlick's Aust. gr. g.	Energy
3rd	Mr. N. A. K. Raza's Aust. ch. g.	Golden Morn

CLASS VIII. (A)—HACKS—INDIAN HORSES.

1st	Mr. M. Iftikhar's Ind. ch. g.	Razdar
2nd	Major C. H. Landale's Ind. b. g.	Match Box
3rd	Major F. R. R. Bucher's Ind. br. m.	Cynthia

CLASS VIII. (B)—HACKS—INDIAN PONIES.

1st	Major D Vanrenen's Ind. b. g.	Moose
2nd	Capt. T. T Todd's Ind. ch. g.	Oakwood
3rd	H.H. The Raja of Faridkot's Ind. br. m.	Sunshine Susie

CLASS IX. (A)—LADIES' HACKS—SIDE SADDLE (OPEN).

1st	Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. bl. m.	Norway
2nd	Capt. J. P. Wolfe's Ind. b. g.	Nightshirt
3rd	Major J. C. Cunningham's Ind. br. m.	Milliner

CLASS IX. (B)—HACKS—PAIRS (OPEN).

1st	Capt. H. D. Calcott's Aust. ch. g. Ind. ch. g.	Sunstrom / Spraggon
2nd	Colonel H. Macdonald's	Nominations
3rd	Major L. C. Palk's Ind. ch. g. Aust. gr. m.	Beau Brocade / Grizette

CLASS X (A)—OFFICERS' CHARGERS (MOUNTED BRANCHES).

1st	Major L. C. Palk's Ind. ch. g.	Beau Brocade
2nd	Capt. H. D. Caldcott's Ind. ch. g.	Spraggon
3rd	Capt. J. H. Needham's Ind. br. g.	Nigel

CLASS X (B)—OFFICERS' CHARGERS (DISMOUNTED BRANCHES).

1st	Lieut.-Col. B. H. Wallis' Ind. ch. g.	Peter
2nd	Major A. B. Miller's Aust. ch. m.	Rathor
3rd	Major J. C. Cunningham's Ind. br. m.	Milliner

CLASS X (C)—INDIAN OFFICERS' CHARGERS.

1st	13th D.C.O. Lancers' (278) Ind. b. g.	No. 264
2nd	13th D.C.O. Lancers' (277) Aust. b. g.	No. 2
3rd	3rd Cavalry's (426) Aust. br. g.	Charles

CLASS XI. (A)—POLO PONIES—HEAVY WEIGHT.

1st	Major J. L. M. Barrett's Ind. b. m.	Rouge
2nd	Major C. H. Landale's Ind. b. g.	Match Box
3rd	Major F. R. R. Bucher's Ind. b. m.	Maurette

CLASS XI (B)—POLO PONIES—LIGHT WEIGHT.

1st	Major R. J. Corner's Aust. br. m.	Souffle
2nd	Faridkot Bodyguard's Aust. br. m.	Ellingamite
3rd	Mr. S. D. Verma's Aust. br. g.	Shyama

CLASS XII.—POLO PONIES LIKELY TO MAKE.

1st	Major R. J. Corner's Ind. ch. g.	Suntime
2nd	Lieut.-Col. S. V. Kennedy's Aust. br. m.	Missfire
3rd	Mr. Daulat Singh's Ind. b. m.	Mary

CLASS XIII (A)—HUNTERS—HEAVY WEIGHT.

1st	Sir John Ewart's Aust. b. g.	Duke
2nd	Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. ch. g.	Grand Duke
3rd	Mrs. S. E. H. E. White's Ind. b. m.	The Witch

CLASS XIII. (B)—HUNTERS—LIGHT WEIGHT.

1st	Capt. H. D. Caldecott's Aust. ch. g.	Sunstorm
2nd	Capt. H. D. Caldecott's Ind. ch. g.	Spraggon
3rd	Major G. G. Collyns' Eng. b. g.	Tom Fair

CLASS XIV. (A)—JUMPING—OPEN.

1st	14th/20th Hussars	Nomination
2nd	14th/20th Hussars	Nomination
3rd	13th D.C.O. Lancers	Nomination

CLASS XIV. (B)—JUMPING—B.O.Rs.

1st	14th/20th Hussars	Nomination
2nd	1st Ind. Div. Signal's Ind. ch. m.	Freda
3rd	14th/20th Hussars	Nomination

CLASS XIV. (C)—JUMPING—I.O.Rs.

1st	13th D.C.O. Lancers	Nomination
2nd	Hodson's Horse	Nomination
3rd	Hodson's Horse	Nomination

CLASS XV.—TEAM JUMPING.

1st	13th/18th Hussars	Team
2nd	14th/20th Hussars	Team
3rd	13th D.C.O. Lancers	Team

CLASS XVI. (A)—BEST GUN TEAM.

1st	57th Field Battery	Team
2nd	57th Field Battery	Team
3rd	3rd Field Battery	Team

CLASS XVI. (B)—BEST PAIR LIGHT DRAUGHT HORSES.

1st	57th Field Battery	Nos. 128 & 148
2nd	57th Field Battery	Nos. 5 & 40
3rd	57th Field Battery	Nos. 72 & 100

CLASS XVII. (A)—BEST TROOP—BRITISH.

1st	13th/18th Hussar's Ind. b. g.	Henry
2nd	14th/20th Hussars	Nomination
3rd	57th Field Battery's Ind. b. g.	No. 93

CLASS XVII. (B)—BEST TROOP HORSE—INDIAN.

1st	13th D.C.O. Lancers' Aust. b. g.	No. 412
2nd	3rd Cavalry's Aust. b. m.	Lam
3rd	3rd Cavalry's Ind. ch. g.	Gem

CLASS XVII (C)—BEST TROOP HORSE—TROOPS OF INDIAN STATE.

1st	Faridkot Bodyguard's Ir. br. g.	Pilbrock
2nd	Faridkot Bodyguard's Aust. br. g.	Don Juan
3rd	Faridkot Bodyguard's Aust. b. g.	Wonder Bar

CLASS XVII (D)—BEST TROOP HORSE—PUNJAB POLICE.

1st	M. C. Banta Singh's Aust. b. g.	Hector
2nd	M. C. Gurcharan Singh's Ind. ch. g.	Ginger
3rd	M. C. Mohd Shabir's Ind. dn. g.	Adam

CLASS XVIII.—HANDY HUNTER COMPETITION.

1st	Mr. J. A. Campbell's	Nomination
2nd	Mr. P. A. V. England	Dick
3rd	3rd Cavalry's Aust. br. g.	Gambler
	LADY'S PRIZE.	
	Colonel H. Macdonald's Aust. br. g.	Freedom

CLASS XIX.—CHILDREN'S PONIES.

1st	Miss June Ellver's Eng. b. m.	Merrylegs
	BEST TURNED OUT RIDER.	
	H.H. The Raja of Chamba.	

CLASS XX.—TONGA PONIES.

1st	Akhtar's	3 CI.
2nd	Natha's	34 CI.

CLASS XXI. (A)—PACK MULES.

1st	L.A.T.T. Coy. (Mule)	Team
2nd	2nd Bn. The Royal Scots	Team
3rd	L.A.T.T. Coy. (Mule)	Team

CLASS XXI. (B)—PAIR DRAUGHT MULES.

1st	L.A.T.T. Coy. (Mule)	First Pair
2nd	L.A.T.T. Coy. (Mule)	Fourth Pair
3rd	L.A.T.T. Coy. (Mule)	Second Pair

CLASS XXII. (A)—BEST HORSE IN SHOW.

Mr. C. W. P. Richardson's Eng. b. g. — Selangor

CLASS XXII. (B)—BEST INDIAN HORSE IN THE SHOW.

Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. bl. h. — Black Bullet

CLASS XXIII. (A)—BEST PONY IN THE SHOW.

Capt. Malik Gul Sher Khan Noon's Aust. br. m. — Neelum

CLASS XXIII (B)—BEST IMPORTED PONY IN THE SHOW.

Capt. Malik Gul Sher Khan Noon's Aust. br. m. — Neelum

CLASS XXIII. (C)—BEST INDIAN PONY IN THE SHOW.

H.H. The Raja of Faridkot's Ind. br. m. — Sunshine Susie

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FIELD MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT ALLENBY,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.C.L., LL.D.

Colonel, The Life Guards and 16/5 Lancers

Photo by Topical Press.



FIELD MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT [illegible] LYNDY,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D[illegible] LL.D.

Colonel, The [illegible] Guards and 1st 5th Lancers

[illegible]

THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

JULY, 1936

FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT ALLENBY

Of the great Cavalry Leaders of recent times, Lord Allenby was probably better known personally to the majority of our readers than any other. Of his early military career in the Inniskilling Dragoons, we knew little as his regiment was buried in South Africa for a great number of years until relieved by the 11th Hussars in 1890. The majority of us received our first introduction when he took over command of the Cavalry Division on Salisbury Plain in 1910. Here it was at once obvious to all that we had a cavalry leader with big ideas. In those days a cavalry division was a much bigger thing than we had ever seen before, and the manner in which Allenby handled this large force of mounted troops was an eye opener to us all. Using the undulations of the ground, he moved the whole division unobserved from one end of the plain to the other.

At the commencement of the Great War, he was at the head of the Cavalry Division of five brigades. To us this seemed a formidable force, but in reality it was a mere fleabite in comparison with the great masses of cavalry at the disposal of the Germans. Nevertheless we held our own, and throughout the retreat those five brigades enabled the British Expeditionary Force to carry out the retirement in such good order that they were able, on the command being given, to advance and punish the enemy at the battle of the Marne.

As a division, the work of the cavalry during the retreat was perhaps disappointing, and the orders which reached brigades

were few and far between. At times the Divisional Staff had almost ceased to function and the big ideas of the leader did not appear to materialise. In fact, there were many of us who thought that Allenby was small minded. At times he would appear to think more about the position of the chin-strap of a private's cap than the strategy and tactics of this great cavalry movement. Now that the full story can be pieced together it will be seen that what appeared to be inaction on the part of the cavalry was the fault of the rôle they were ordered to perform and the wide extent they were expected to cover. The leader's genius was there, and from the moment the order was given to advance, and the cavalry given its proper rôle, there was no lack of leadership. The Cavalry Corps was formed at the Battle of the Aisne and the great feats performed on the Messines Whitschaete Ridge and in the first battle of Ypres are matters of history.

Lord Allenby's steady promotion show the confidence which Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig had in him. During the war he commanded troops of all parts of the Empire and the eulogies which have been expressed by Australians and Canadians speak for themselves.

The climax of Allenby's military career was of course the final phase in Palestine. Here a name was made that will ever be remembered. Apart from this record of achievements, there was a personal magnetism for the troops themselves. From the moment he took over command in the East he pushed his headquarters right forward, and was always in the midst of his troops, who felt that at last they had a man who would lead them to victory. No one knew better than Allenby what cavalry could do, if given the chance, and the Palestine operations will go down to history as the greatest achievement of the arm.

By his death the CAVALRY JOURNAL have suffered a great loss. Appointed Chairman of the Committee in 1926, he attended every meeting for the last ten years.

Those of us who were present at the Cavalry War Memorial Service a few weeks before his death little thought that this was the last time we should see his familiar figure.

THE YEOMANRY AT GAZA III

(*October 27th—November 6th*, 1917)

By Major Oskar Teichman, D.S.O., M.C., T.D.,
Late M.O., Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars.

During July, with the arrival of two Mounted Yeomanry Brigades from Salonika, the Cavalry was reorganised as three Divisions (each of three Brigades) with an extra Yeomanry Brigade and the Imperial Camel Corps attached.* This arrangement allowed one Division in the front line based on Gamli and Shellal, one in support at Fukhari and Abasan El Kebir, and one resting on the sea-shore at Marakeb.

The mounted troops derived great benefit from this scheme. The health of the men and the condition of the horses rapidly improved; they both now had their legitimate periods of rest, which had been impossible when only two Cavalry Divisions had been available.

Reconnaissances continued to be carried out from time to time by the Division on duty, mainly for the benefit of Corps Commanders and the staffs of the newly arrived Infantry Divisions; and also in order to accustom the enemy to large bodies of cavalry on his Beersheba front.

During a reconnaissance the Division resting on the sea-shore closed up to Abasan El Kebir and Fukhari, while the Division in support moved up to the Gamli-Shellal line.

These reconnaissances, which always resulted in some scrapping with the enemy's Caucasian Cavalry and Infantry outposts, generally lasted thirty-six hours, and during that time the

* In all eleven Brigades, each with its R.H.A. Battery, Desert Mounted Corps (August 12th, 1917) consisted of approximately 28,000 mounted men.

Yeomen had to manage with one water-bottle and one refill from the regimental water cart, while the horses had to do without water. On these occasions the senior visiting General Officer (C.-in-C., Corps Commander or Divisional Commander) and his staff were known to the Yeomen as the "Royal Party." The Division on duty often had an anxious time when a "Royalty" ventured too near the enemy's outposts; as is shown by the following helio* conversation, intercepted by "B" Battery, H.A.C., signallers between D.H.Q. and the G.O.C. 5th (Gloucester, Worcester and Warwick Yeomanries) Mounted Brigade:

Division: "Where has the Royal Party got to?"

Brigade: "The Royal Party accompanied by a Semi-Royal Party (a Divisional General and his staff) is flirting with the enemy about two miles in front of my outposts."

Division: "Get them back at once!"

Brigade: "I can't. His Majesty is enjoying himself, and won't come back. Besides he has motor cars, and I have only horses."

Division: 'All right. If you let a perfectly good Corps Commander get bent or broken by the enemy you'll be shot at dawn!"

During the next two months, while the usual routine of outpost duty and reconnaissance continued, Yeomanry Regiments were brought up to strength by the arrival of drafts and remounts, as the time approached for the great offensive.

It may be of interest to review the Yeomanry Regiments which the C.-in-C. now had under his command.

Out of 55 first line Regiments in the 1914 *Army List*, no fewer than 36 were represented at the Third Battle of Gaza and in the succeeding operations up till April of the following year.

Of these one half were dismounted and formed the famous 74th (or "Broken Spur") Division. Most of these Yeoman had fought at Gallipoli in 1915, and later had taken part in the Senussi Campaign and in the operations in the Western Oases. It was a sad fate which compelled these fine Yeomanry Regiments to be deprived of their horses, and fight on foot in a

* *The H.A.C. in The Great War.*

country which was so suitable for Cavalry; but as Infantry, with their fine physique, initiative and dash, they were looked upon as constituting a *Corps d'Elite*. Up till the First Battle of Gaza these Yeomen had fought as independent Brigades, but since then the 74th Division had come into being as part of the XXth Corps.

The 18 Mounted Yeomanry Regiments* were included in Desert Mounted Corps. This consisted of three Cavalry Divisions: the A. and N.Z. Mounted Division which contained only Dominion troops, the Australian (late Imperial) Mounted Division which included one Yeomanry Brigade (5th Mounted), and the Yeomanry Mounted Division which consisted of three Yeomanry Brigades (6th, 8th and 22nd Mounted). One additional Yeomanry Brigade (7th Mounted) was attached to the Corps; while one Yeomanry Regiment and one composite Yeomanry Regiment were allotted as Cavalry to the XXth and XXIst Corps.

Since November, 1915 (when the original 2nd Mounted Division left Gallipoli) these Mounted Yeomanry Regiments had been employed in open warfare—in the Senussi Campaign, in the Western Desert, in Macedonia, in Sinai and in Palestine. Theirs had always been a war of movement, as opposed to the trench warfare which their brother Yeoman were waging in France, and consequently their efficiency as Cavalry had increased enormously.

Long distance patrols and skirmishes with the enemy by squadrons, troops, and even sections, had developed an initiative amongst all ranks which is not easily developed when acting in larger formations.

During the Sinai Campaign of 1916 it had been no uncommon occurrence for an N.C.O. to have to cross some dozen miles or more of featureless desert, between two Yeomanry posts completely hidden in the sand dunes; where loss of direction might have had dire results, with wells few and far between and enemy patrols active. Cavalry raids in the desert had inured all ranks

* For Battle order of *all* Yeomanry Formations present at the Third Battle of Gaza, see end.

to the hardship of water shortage, and had impressed on them the importance of strict water discipline.*

The genuine Yeoman is usually a good horse-master; but even the Yeoman from the country town developed a considerable degree of horsemastership† when, owing to ignorance or carelessness, he found himself compelled to foot it over the desert under a blazing sun; for remounts were only available at considerable intervals.

The 7th Mounted Brigade had had useful experience in action with German Uhlans and Dragoons on the Macedonian front—while one Regiment of the 6th Mounted Brigade, the Dorset Yeomanry, at Agagiya (in the Senussi Campaign), had already had the opportunity of demonstrating the value of the *arme blanche*; an opportunity which was to recur and to be fully exploited by two Brigades during the coming operations.§

Finally, in addition to the almost daily "affairs" of Cavalry outpost duty, the Yeomanry, during the past summer, had often covered as much as 80 miles during a reconnaissance, which included contact with the enemy's Cavalry; and these expeditions had constituted the best possible way of getting the horses fit and the Yeomen prepared for the coming advance.

Briefly Sir Edmund Allenby's plan for the Third Battle of Gaza was to consist of the following three phases:—

(1) The capture of Beersheba by the XXth Corps, which included the 18 dismounted Yeomanry Regiments of the 74th Division, in order to drive in the Turkish left flank; while the A and N.Z. Mounted Division and the Australian Mounted Division (with 5th Mounted Brigade) assisted by the 7th Mounted Brigade made an enveloping movement on the outer flank.

(2) An attack on the Gaza coastal defences by XXIst Corps and the Royal Navy in order to distract the enemy from the main attack (No. 3).

* Of which the following is an example:—In July, 1916, the 5th Mounted Brigade received orders that while on the march no one was to touch his water bottle between dawn and sunset, and that even then he was not to empty his bottle until he knew for certain that more water was to be issued. Only those who have crossed an Eastern desert in midsummer can realize what this means.

† The "Official Historian" writes à propos the 5th Mounted Brigade:—"horsemastership learned in the hard school of Sinai had reached a level so high that sore backs were seldom seen."

§ These Cavalry charges will be described in a subsequent article.

(3) The capture of Hareira and Sheria by XXth Corps; and the subsequent advance of Desert Mounted Corps (after picking up the Yeomanry Mounted Division* which had been filling the gap between XXth and XXIst Corps) northwards on the enemy's left flank.

The enemy held a practically continuous trench line, 32 miles in length, from the sea to Beersheba. The upper third of this line from Gaza to the Atawineh Redoubt the Yeomen knew only too well from the Battles of Gaza I and II. Since then, during six months' outpost and reconnaissance duty, they had seen the enemy's strong positions at Hareira, the important system of trenches at Kauwukah, and thence the continuous line of fortifications through Irgeig to Beersheba. The fortifications of the town itself consisted of two lines. The outer line of trenches ran along a range of hills up to 960 feet in a semi-circle, roughly from north-west to north-east about two miles from the town; while the inner line of defences ran completely round the town, but on the east side had not been wired.

As it was important that the enemy should expect the main attack on Gaza itself and not on his left flank, various ruses were employed to deceive him. Of these the now well known "lost haversack" trick† exceeded beyond all expectation, and it had a very important effect upon the enemy's plans. He was now firmly convinced that our main and first objective would be Gaza itself; also he did not believe it possible for our Cavalry to march 35 miles in one night and to come down on him from his left rear. The enemy appears to have forgotten the lessons of Magdhaba and Rafa, and the distances covered by our mounted troops at Gaza I: for at Rafa the Yeomanry and Anzacs marched 30 miles to the battlefield, fought a ten hours

* This Division was to be under orders of the XXth Corps until the morning of the attack on Beersheba, then it was to come under G.H.Q. until picked up by Desert Mounted Corps.

† Early in October an officer from G.H.Q. rode out to hill 630, was fired at by the Turks, dropped his haversack, swayed in the saddle as if wounded and galloped back to our lines. The haversack contained £20 in notes with a letter to his wife, a copy of a letter from G.H.Q. to D.M.C. saying that a staff officer was going on patrol to 630, *and* a letter from a staff officer saying that the main attack would be on Gaza, and criticising the C.-in-C. for not making Beersheba the first objective.

Many different accounts of this ruse have been published, but the true story may be read on pages 30 and 31, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine—Part II, Vol. I.

action culminating in victory, and were back again at El Arish within 50 hours of the starting time.

By October 15th the enemy was getting more active on the outpost line, and evidently resented the way our branch railway (Rafa-Weli Sheikh Nuran), which had now crossed the Wadi at Shellal, was progressing across the plain towards Karm. On that day the Worcester Yeomanry, which happened to be duty Regiment of the 5th Mounted Brigade, had considerable difficulty in dislodging the Turks from 550 and 630; and in the afternoon it was necessary to call on "B" Battery, H.A.C., the Machine Gun Squadron and four armoured cars. The cars, moving swiftly over downlike terrain, returned undamaged after doing a valuable reconnaissance. The Worcesters had a few casualties, chiefly amonst the horses.*

On October 18th at dawn an important reconnaissance in force by the Australian Mounted Division took place. The 5th Mounted Brigade advanced the observation line beyond Ifleis and Geheir, in order that the Staff might obtain a nearer view of the enemy's defences a few miles north of Beersheba. The Yeomen encountered considerable difficulty in dislodging the enemy, and "B" H.A.C., had to be called on again in order to drive him out of Ifleis "Chapel."

Meanwhile the 7th Mounted Brigade (Sherwood Rangers and South Notts Yeomanries) moved from Fukhari to Esani; the South Notts then rode to Hill 970 where they were engaged all day with the enemy. A composite Squadron from this Brigade, with two Warwick officers, made a useful reconnaissance beyond Ras Ghannam, south-east of Beersheba, in order to find the way for the night march which was to precede the attack on that place. The Squadron encountered a company of Turkish Camel Corps, but was not seriously involved. When the 7th Mounted Brigade returned to Fukhari this reconnoitring Squadron had covered 70 miles.

At dawn on October 23rd the Australian Mounted Division was holding the outpost line, when the 5th Mounted Brigade (Worcesters, Warwicks and Gloucesters) moved out to take up a

* This and subsequent actions leading up to October 31st, may be followed on the map of Gaza III (Appended) disregarding positions of Units located for that battle.

CROSSING WADI GHUZZE, SHELLAL



WADI GHUZZE LOOKING EAST TOWARDS MENDUR

line from Ifleis ((on the Wadi Imleih) to El Buggar. The main object of this observation line was to deny the enemy positions from which he could direct observed artillery fire on our light railway construction parties between Shellal and Karm.

It soon became apparent that the Turks were waiting for us. It was barely light when "A" Squadron (Captain A. Wykeham-Musgrave), Gloucester Yeomanry, topping the Buggar Ridge, fell in with a Squadron of Caucasian Cavalry. After a short fight the enemy were driven down to the bottom and the ridge was made good.

One troop of "A" Squadron then moved forward with the intention of occupying Hill 720, but before it had gone a mile it was charged by a Squadron of Turkish Lancers, who killed one horse and captured its rider. "D" Squadron (Captain Algar Howard) with two machine guns then galloped out in support and drove the enemy back to Hill 720.

Meanwhile "B" Squadron (Captain Frank Mitchell) had driven the enemy off Hill 630 and maintained its position after losing five Yeomen from shell fire.

"The Berkley Troop, under 2nd Lieutenant H. P. Ellis, was heavily pressed by a Squadron of enemy Cavalry from the north-east, aided by the enemy force near Hill 720. Lieutenant Ellis by courageous and intelligent use of rifle and hotchkiss gun fire with his little force held up the enemy until the Warwick Yeomanry came up in support. For gallantry in this action Lieutenant Ellis (who was wounded) received the M.C."

Late in the morning, with the aid of "B" Battery, H.A.C., and "C" Squadron (Lieutenant C. Joynson), Warwick Yeomanry, Captain Howard tackled Hill 720 once more with his Squadron and drove the enemy off it.

The outpost line had been re-established.

In the afternoon the Warwicks relieved the Gloucesters and the Worcesters moved up in support. Just before sunset the Worcesters at Hill 630 observed enemy infantry advancing, whereupon our battery was called on again and, galloping into action, it drove the Turks across the Wadi Hanafish.

It had been quite an interesting day and there had been more "incident" than usual on an ordinary days' outpost duty. The

enemy was evidently beginning to show more enterprise in his reconnaissance work. Up till now the Turkish Cavalry had always been rather elusive, and this was the first occasion on which it had shown itself really aggressive.

As it was hoped that the forthcoming operations would be finished before the winter rains set in, the Yeomen dispensed with blankets and great-coats in order to lessen the weight carried by their horses. This, however, was very considerable, for the Yeomen were mostly big men. Each Yeoman carried two days' rations (and emergency ration) in his saddle wallets, one day's forage and two days' emergency rations of grain (38 lbs.); this, in addition to his arms, two full bandoliers (one round the horse's neck) and other impedimenta, meant that each horse was carrying about 20 stone. Some Yeomen carried a small soda-water bottle filled with water in the nosebag, ready to damp the feed, as this helped the horses when they had to go long without watering. Three limbered G.S. wagons per Yeomanry Regiment carried an additional day's ration per horse. All entrenching tools were carried on pack-horses.

Before the combined attack on Beersheba by XXth Corps and the Cavalry could take place, it was necessary to concentrate the A. and N.Z. Mounted Division at Asluj, the Australian Mounted Division (with 5th Mounted Brigade) at Khalassa, and the 7th Mounted Brigade at Esani.

As the Australian Mounted Division was due to march out on October 27th, its long outpost line, from a point south of Mendur along the Wadis Sheria, Imleih and Hanafish to El Buggar, was taken over by the 8th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry Mounted Division) which was temporarily under the 54th Division, on the night of October 26th.

The London Yeomen were accompanied by the Hants. Battery, R.H.A., and they were told that the southern sector of the line from El Buggar to Ifleis was to be held at all costs. The northern half of the line was only to be occupied by patrols as a Brigade of the 54th Division was behind it.

According to the "Official History of the War" the Third Battle of Gaza commenced on October 27th, for that day heralded the land bombardment of the town. At the same time a Yeo-

manry Regiment was fighting a very gallant action against overwhelming odds, on the outpost line some twenty miles away to the south-east.

Dawn found the 8th Mounted Brigade and the 21st Machine Gun Squadron disposed between Ifleis and El Buggar* (including Hills 720 and 630) as follows:—

Middlesex (1st County of London) Yeomanry on the right, 3rd County of London Yeomanry on the left, and the City of London Yeomanry in reserve between Karm and Khasif.

At 4.30 a.m. Captain A. McDougall and his troop of the Middlesex Yeomanry, who were dug in on Hill 630, were fired on by a Turkish Cavalry patrol, and half an hour later they were attacked by masses of Infantry, estimated by the Royal Flying Corps at about 2,000 men. Although the Middlesex Troop was driven off the top of the hill, it withdrew to a cruciform trench just under the summit, which had been occupied by the Gloucester and Worcester Yeomanries during the outpost fighting on October 23rd. Here the Middlesex put up a magnificent defence although nearly surrounded.

A Squadron of the same Regiment from support dashed out under heavy fire in order to work round from the south, but were held up by a Battalion of Turkish Infantry.

Meanwhile the G.O.C. 8th Mounted Brigade (Brigadier-General C. S. Rome) had despatched a Squadron of the City of London Yeomanry, under Major L. P. Stedall, to relieve the hard-pressed Middlesex. The Squadron galloped up under heavy fire and dismounted behind a ridge about 200 yards south of Hill 630. Although the Squadron was unable to move owing to concentrated machine gun fire, which accounted for many men and horses, it was able by its own fire to prevent the Middlesex from being completely surrounded. This little garrison although repeatedly attacked with the bayonet held out all day with the greatest gallantry, until late in the afternoon when a Brigade of the 53rd Division arrived and drove the enemy back.

While the little garrison on Hill 630 was holding out valiantly, a Squadron (actually only about two troops strong) of the Middlesex Yeomanry under Major A. M. Lafone, which

* About 6 miles, the Northern sector about 8 miles being only lightly held by the same Brigade.

occupied Hill 720 four miles away at the southern end of the Buggar Ridge, was attacked by the enemy in strength at 4 a.m. Several Squadrons of Turkish Cavalry swept round south of the Yeomanry post and forced the guns of the Hants. Battery R.H.A., which were east of Khasif to retire. Hill 720 was then subjected to a heavy volume of shell and machine-gun fire which inflicted many casualties on its defenders.

During the morning the dwindling garrison beat off several combined mounted and dismounted attacks. In one mounted charge a survivor estimated that about seventy saddles were emptied and an infantry attack was brought to halt within 20 yards of the defenders, 15 dead Turks being counted. Relieving troops from the City of London Yeomanry, although they prevented the enemy from making further progress, were unable to reach the Middlesex Squadron owing to strength of the Turkish Cavalry, which was estimated at 1,200 sabres. The last message from Major Lafone contained the words: "I shall hold on to the last." At about 11 a.m. several Squadrons of Turkish Cavalry were seen to gallop right over the Yeomanry position. There were only three survivors. They related that when the garrison was reduced to five, it withdrew to a trench just behind the original line, and that Major Lafone sprang out into the open to meet the last charge and was ridden down.

"The London Gazette" (18th December, 1917) contains the following posthumous award of the Victoria Cross:—

"Alexander Malins Lafone, Major, late 1st County of London (Middlesex) Yeomanry. For most conspicuous bravery, leadership and self-sacrifice, when holding a position for over seven hours against vastly superior forces. All this time the enemy were shelling his position heavily, making it very difficult to see. In one attack when the enemy cavalry charged his flank, he drove them back with heavy losses. In another charge they left fifteen casualties within twenty yards of his trench, one man who reached his trench being bayoneted by Major Lafone himself. When all his men with the exception of three, had been hit and the trench which he was holding was so full of wounded that it was difficult to move and fire, he ordered those who could walk to move to a trench slightly in the rear, and

from his own position maintained a most heroic resistance. When finally surrounded and charged by the enemy, he stepped into the open and continued the fight until he was mortally wounded and fell unconscious. His cheerfulness and courage was a splendid inspiration to his men, and by his leadership and devotion he was enabled to maintain his position, which he had been ordered to hold at all costs."

During the fighting on this day the 8th Mounted Brigade lost 10 officers and 69 other ranks, mostly belonging to the Middlesex Yeomanry posts on Hills 630 and 720.

After the fall of Hill 720 the City of London Yeomanry held the line between it and 630, and prevented the enemy's attempts to break through the gap between them; until the arrival of the 3rd A.L.H. Regiment, the Notts Battery R.H.A., and a Brigade of the 53rd Division. At dusk the enemy was forced to retire, and our troops re-occupied the whole of the line including Hill 720.

The very gallant resistance of the Middlesex Yeomen against an *Infantry Regiment*,* the *3rd Cavalry Division* and 12 *guns* had prevented the enemy from making a successful reconnaissance in force and digging himself in all along the Buggar Ridge. Had he done so he could have stopped our railway construction and he would have been very difficult to dislodge.

On the evening of the same day, October 27th, the 5th Mounted Brigade (Australian Mounted Division) marched out from Gamli, picketing the road north of Esani, to Ghalyun *via* Maalaga.

On the next day the 8th Mounted Brigade rejoined the Yeomanry Mounted Division at Shellal, whence the Division was to fill the gap between XXth and XXIst Corps, and wait until Beersheba had fallen before rejoining the Cavalry Corps in its northern advance against the enemy's left flank. The Worcesters, Warwicks and Gloucesters (of the 5th Mounted Brigade) relieved the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade on the sector Khalassa-Ghalyun-Maalaga-Abushar, and they found the enemy in considerable force opposite Ibn Said. Turkish

* A Turkish Infantry Regiment officially contained 4 Battalions of 1,000 men each.

Cavalry patrols were encountered but only a few shots were exchanged.

Meanwhile the Sherwood Rangers and the South Notts Yeomanries (of the 7th Mounted Brigade) had also marched out (from Fukhari) and had taken over the sector of El Buggar through Khabeira and across the Wadi Saba.

On October 29th the 5th Mounted Brigade rode to Khalassa at dawn, leaving a Squadron on Hill 970 to watch the enemy at Ibn Said. At night the Brigade held the heights north-east of Khalassa.

October 30th : There was a good deal of aerial activity during the day, and as soon as darkness came on the 5th Mounted Brigade accompanied its Division (Australian Mounted) and commenced to march to Asluj, preceded by the A. and N.Z. Mounted Division. En route we passed the ruins of an ancient Christian Khalassa and the Turkish wells which our R.E. had just opened up again.

After a monotonous ride over very rough and stony ground, we entered the great defile which leads into the Wadi Asluj.

Asluj was reached at midnight : this place was situated on level hard ground in a very wide part of the Wadi, flanked on either side by precipitous cliffs. It consisted of a number of houses with barracks, Officers' Mess, store house, bakeries, cavalry stables, water works and stone watering troughs a quarter of a mile in length. There was also a picturesque Mosque which, with the other snow-white buildings, looked very striking in the brilliant moonlight. Asluj in peace-time had evidently maintained a small garrison, since increased during the attack on the Sinai Peninsula. One large building was taken over for the Australian Mounted Division Receiving Station, and another housed a detachment of the Sherif of Mecca's soldiers who had apparently brought their women and children with them.

The waterworks, although entirely destroyed by the Turks, were through the indomitable perseverance of our engineers put in order sufficiently to water two Cavalry Divisions.

October 31st : At 1 a.m. we heard our Infantry attacking Beersheba north of Khalassa and an hour later the 5th Mounted

Brigade continued on its long trek, passing the railway station and the remains of the viaduct which our mounted troops had destroyed in June. This was the railway which used to run from Beersheba to Auja (built for the attacks on the Suez Canal in 1915 and 1916), whence another road led on over the Maghara Hills.

With the A. and N.Z. Division leading the long columns began to ascend the mountains which lie to the south-east of Beersheba. For miles ahead could be seen Regiment after Regiment, Squadron after Squadron of Yeomen and Australians pressing on and up towards the dawn. As the sun came up we crossed a moor-like country east of Itwail El Semin and Ras Ghannam.

At length the heights of Iswaiwin (1450), which overlooked the Beersheba plain, were reached. The 5th Mounted Brigade had marched 35 miles from Khalassa, including an hour's halt for watering at Asluj. This Brigade was to be in Corps Reserve, and took no active part in the operations, only suffering casualties to men and horses from enemy aeroplanes.

The battle had now commenced: the XXth Corps (including the 74th Dismounted Yeomanry Division) attacked Beersheba from the west, while the A. and N.Z. Mounted Division and Australian Mounted Division (less 5th Mounted Brigade) attacked from the east, with the 7th Mounted Brigade communicating from the south. Cavalry collecting stations had been established at Semin and Iswaiwin, with Receiving Stations at Asluj and Rashid Bek.

From the heights of Iswaiwin the Yeomen of the 5th Mounted Brigade obtained a wonderful panoramic view of the battle-field. A few miles away lay the picturesque little town of Beersheba, the most striking feature of which was its large mosque surrounded by cypress trees. We could see the Wadi Saba spanned by a fine viaduct and the continuation of the railway to the north-west.

It seemed strange that we could now obtain such a fine view of the town, which for the last six months we had been trying to obtain a glimpse of from the west during our mounted reconnaissances.

Field-glasses were now directed on the plain below and showed up the N.Z. M.R. Brigade advancing on Tel El Saba, and various A.L.H. Brigades, each followed by its British R.H.A. Battery, closing in on the enemy's positions outside the town from the south-east, east and north-east. Away to the west could be seen the explosions caused by our guns from Karm and the Buggar Ridge. The XXth Corps was now in action, and the 74th (Dismounted Yeomanry) Division was attacking with the 53rd and Smith's Group* on its left and the 60th on its right.

The dismounted Yeomen had been ordered to attack the defences between the Beersheba-Khalassa track and the Wadi Saba.

While the 5th Mounted Brigade had been marching to Asluj on the previous night (October 30th) the 74th Division, which had been concentrated at Khasif, was following the Fara-Beersheba road towards Towal El Harbari; the 229th Brigade leading, while the 230th and 231st Brigades each in mass marched north and south of the road. The march discipline was excellent, and "each of the rear Brigades presented a wonderful sight, a solid square of troops moving in the bright moonlight with a ripple of dust in front like the bow-wave of a ship, rising in a great cloud through which the moon shone redly in the rear."

About midnight the Division turned south-east and crossed the Wadi Saba about six miles west of Beersheba. The 230th Brigade crossed that part of the Wadi furthest east (i.e. nearest to Beersheba) by a narrow defile and then turned half left to take up the line to be held during the night. This outpost line was held by the Sussex Yeomanry, and before dawn Lieutenant H. E. Blunt of that unit carried out a daring reconnaissance with a scout patrol, under fire from snipers and advance posts, over ground to be crossed by the Brigade. For this highly valuable reconnaissance he received the M.C.

The Yeomen found ample cover in some confluents of the big Wadi, and waited for dawn and the hour of attack. Twenty miles away to the north-west rumbled the bombardment of Gaza

* Under command of the G.O.C. Imperial Camel Corps Brigade (Brig.-General C. L. Smith, V.C., M.C.), consisted of that Brigade and the 158th Brigade of 53rd Division (less two Battalions).

by the guns of the XXIst Corps and the Royal Navy, but the enemy in the trenches before the 74th Division was silent.

At 5.55 a.m. (October 31st) the XXth Corps Artillery opened. At 7 the firing was stopped in order to let the dust clear away and enable F.O.Os. to see their targets. An hour later it was resumed and shortly afterwards the 181st Brigade (60th Division) on the Yeomen's right, advanced and captured the enemy's works on Hill 1070.

Meanwhile with the 229th Brigade (Brig.-General R. Hoare) in Divisional Reserve, the 230th Brigade (Brig.-General A. J. McNeil) on the left and the 231st Brigade (Brig.-General O. E. Heathcote, D.S.O.) on the right advanced to the attack. The Regiments of the latter two Brigades were disposed as follows, from left to right:—

230th Brigade.—Norfolk Yeomanry combined East and West Kent Yeomanries, advancing through Sussex Yeomanry outpost line with Suffolk Yeomanry in support.

231st Brigade.—Combined Montgomeryshire and Welsh Horse Yeomanries, Denbighshire Yeomanry, with combined Pembroke and Glamorgan Yeomanries in support and combined Shropshire and Cheshire Yeomanries in reserve.

The two attacking Brigades came under heavy and accurate shrapnel fire directly they emerged from the wadis in which they had been hidden. The ground was very broken and it was difficult to maintain direction, but the numerous little wadis, running in all directions, afforded considerable protection to the Yeomen of tha 230th Brigade. The 231st suffered heavy losses, as the Welsh Yeomanry Regiments topped ridge after ridge, from machine-gun fire. "Casualties increased, the advance became slower, and each sky-line more fatal as the distance from enemy machine gunners decreased."

When the 231st Brigade was 500 and the 230th about 900 yards from the Turkish front line, Field Batteries moved forward to positions from which the wire could be cut, and machine gun companies worked well forward and opened fire on the main trenches.

The wire was about 100 yards in front of these trenches, which were cut in limestone rock on the far side of a wadi.

After about an hour's bombardment of the wire and the trenches, a general assault was ordered at 12.15 p.m. The bombardment was increased in intensity, the machine gunners directed a stream of bullets overhead, and the Yeomanry of seven counties advanced with great *élan* to the assault.

"Four companies in the first line, each on a front of two platoons, the companies in two waves, each of two lines—50 yards between lines and 100 yards between waves"—such were the general dispositions of each unit.

The G.O.C. 74th Division had ordered his artillery to lengthen range a little, in order to form a fog of dust behind which the Yeomen were able to cut the wire—for it was found intact.

The Denbighshire Yeomanry and the combined Montgomeryshire and Welsh Horse Yeomanries of the 231st Brigade met with the stoutest resistance on the right. Here some bitter fighting took place. In one post which held out to the last, Corporal John Collins of the Welsh Horse bayoneted 15 Turks, and afterwards advanced with a Lewis gun section beyond the objective and covered the consolidation of the position. He also carried many wounded men back to cover.

"The London Gazette" (December 18th, 1917) contains the following award of the Victoria Cross:—

". . . . . John Collins, Corporal, Welsh Horse. For most conspicuous bravery, resource and leadership, when, after deployment prior to an attack, his battalion was forced to lie out in the open under heavy shell and machine-gun fire, which caused many casualties. This gallant N.C.O. repeatedly went out under heavy fire and brought wounded back to cover, thus saving many lives. In subsequent operations throughout the day Corporal Collins was conspicuous in rallying and leading his command. He led the final assault with the utmost skill, in spite of heavy fire at close range and uncut wire. He bayoneted 15 of the enemy, and with a Lewis gun section pressed on beyond the objective and covered the re-organisation and consolidation most effectively, although isolated and under fire from snipers and guns. He showed throughout a magnificent example of initiative and fearlessness."

SQUADRON LEADER REPORTING TO O.C. WORCESTER YEOMANRY ON OUTPOST LINE



ENEMY ABOUT TO ATTACK YEOMANRY FROM WADI IMLEIH

(*Turkish Photograph*)

By 1 p.m. all the 74th Division's objectives were in its hands. The Pembroke and Glamorgan Yeomanries, who had been in support, then passed through the captured trenches and took up a defensive line 2,000 yards beyond, while the Yeomen who had taken part in the assault consolidated the positions they had won.

During the action described above and the fighting by the Divisions on either side of the 74th Division, the Denbighshire Yeomanry, Montgomeryshire Yeomanry and Welsh Horse suffered two-thirds of the casualties of the XXth Corps and took three-quarters of the prisoners.

In the afternoon it was uncertain whether the enemy's works north of the Wadi Saba were held. Reports came in that they had been vacated, but patrols of Smith's Group were shot at when they approached the line, and a little later the 230th Brigade came under long-range fire from the north.

G.O.C. 74th Division then obtained permission from G.O.C. XXth Corps to attack these works from the south while the Infantry of Smith's Group made a frontal attack.

Although the attack was timed for 6 p.m., it was postponed till 7, owing to the non-arrival of Smith's two Infantry Battalions, but even then the latter could not get into position in time. Finally, in order not to alter the artillery programme already arranged, it was decided to attack with the 230th Brigade alone, the Suffolk and Sussex Yeomanries being detailed for the assault.

At 6.45 p.m. the Suffolk and Sussex received orders to attack and clear up the enemy trench system from the Wadi Saba to the Fara-Beersheba Road, moving up from the south. The barrage was to fall at 7.30.

It was difficult to assemble officers for orders and get the two units to the jumping-off place in time. The Sussex duly arrived, but the Suffolk was not in position when the barrage opened.

Major Sayer, O.C. Sussex, however, realising the importance of advancing at once decided to attack. Personally he led the assault (which was originally intended to be carried out by four Battalions!) and by 9.30 p.m. the Sussex had taken the whole

system of works by themselves. The enemy did not put up a stiff resistance, but there was some bayonet fighting and snipers were troublesome until the Yeomen had swept over the entire position and had established an outpost line on the Fara-Beersheba Road.

By this time Beersheba had fallen and the dismounted Yeomen of 18 counties bivouacked on their battlefield. Their casualties had been 38 officers and 800 O.Rs.

We must now follow the fortunes of the 7th Mounted Brigade (Brig.-General J. T. Wigan, D.S.O.).

The Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry and the South Notts Yeomanry of this Brigade handed over their outpost line, El Buggar to the Wadi Saba, to the 53rd Division on October 30th and concentrated at Esani.

The Brigade received orders to march out at 8 p.m. and, proceeding *via* Khalassa and Itweil Es Semin, to establish by 6.30 a.m. on October 31st a line of posts astride the Asluj road from point 1210 to Goz El Naam. Its mission was to watch the enemy in his defences at Ras Ghannam and to pursue him if he retired; to keep in signal communication with the Australian Mounted Division at Kashim Zanna, and with the XXth Corps Cavalry, 2nd County of London (Westminster Dragoons) Yeomanry on its left; and to be ready to co-operate either with Desert Mounted Corps (less Yeomanry Mounted Division) on the right or XXth Corps on the left.

At 8 p.m. the 7th Mounted Brigade left Esani and rode in brilliant moonlight to Khalassa, and then turning north-east crossed the railway and the Asluj-Beersheba road, and reached Itweil Es Semin at dawn. A Squadron of the South Notts then occupied Goz El Naam and a line was taken up between that hill and Hill 1210, without opposition. After helio communication had been established with XXth Corps Cavalry and the 4th A.L.H. Brigade, the Sherwood Rangers pushed patrols forward about a mile towards Ras Ghannam and found the trenches strongly held.

At 4 p.m. patrols reported that the enemy was evacuating his trenches, and a general attack was ordered. In open order the Yeomen of Nottinghamshire galloped forward over very rocky ground, but after about a mile they were forced to dismount and

lead their horses. Scrambling to the summit of Ras Ghannam the Sherwood Rangers found that the trenches were still occupied. However, the Yeomen soon drove the enemy out of their positions, and by 5 p.m. the Turks were flying towards Beersheba, which they reached in time to be nearly all captured by the 4th A.L.H. Brigade, which had just completed its famous charge. The 7th Mounted Brigade then trotted down the Asluj road and reached Beersheba by 7 p.m., where the horses were watered for the first time for 30 hours.

We have left the 5th Mounted Brigade (which was in Corps Reserve) on the heights of Iswaiwin, its Yeomen watching the battle below them with the keenest interest.

The "Official History" states that when it was decided to enter the town from the east, G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps hesitated for a moment whether to employ the 5th Mounted Brigade (Corps Reserve) as the Australians were not armed with the sword; but as the 4th A.L.H. Brigade was closer in he decided that it should attack. With this mounted charge, the Australians using their bayonets as swords, the enemy received its *coup de grâce* and Beersheba fell before sunset.

At dusk the 5th Mounted Brigade, on the way to its bivouac just outside the town, watered in the Wadi Saba and was bombed by two low flying aeroplanes which were escaping to the north. The Warwickshire Yeomanry had a man killed and several O.Rs. and officers wounded; their C.O. (Lieut.-Colonel Gray-Cheape, D.S.O.) had a narrow escape as his horse was killed.

The *first phase* of Gaza III had been completed with the capture of Beersheba, but a story (current afterwards amongst the Yeomanry) about its Commander remains to be told:—

> General Ismet Bey, at 11 a.m. was sitting in his Battle H.Q. on a hill west of the town watching the attack of our 74th and 60th Divisions. He was not unduly worried, having several Regiments of Infantry and the 3rd Cavalry Division east and north-east of the town, formations which had not yet been called upon.
>
> Five minutes later, happening to look round, he saw the plain behind him covered with our Cavalry.

A Staff Officer was despatched with orders to find out whether this was merely one of our usual reconnaissances, coming from an unusual direction, or something more serious. Although the Staff Officer was captured by one of our patrols, the unfortunate Ismet received the answer himself afterwards when he perceived two Cavalry Divisions attacking him in rear!

After a cold night, spent just outside the town, the 5th Mounted Brigade moved down to the Wadi Saba in order to avoid the enemy's guns from the north. On the opposite side of the Wadi we found Turkish Cavalry stables which had been made by carving stalls out of the banks. Some of these were even fitted with mangers, and contained dumps of tibben, which were much appreciated by our horses who had been subsisting on their emergency ration of hard barley. In a building near by stacks of German lances were discovered, possibly left behind by a regiment of the Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division. Although a little water was found in the Wadi there was some shortage, owing to the fact that Abraham's original seven wells (Bir Saba), after having been blown in by the departing Turks, had not yet been repaired. Our transport now began to arrive from the south, as the Khalassa road was open. The mounted troops also received supplies from railhead, as the Fara-Beersheba road over the Buggar Ridge was now practicable. When night fell some enemy aeroplanes returned and dropped over a hundred bombs, causing a large number of casualties in our Field Ambulances. As far as one could see none of our anti-aircraft guns had yet arrived at Beersheba.

On the morning of November 2nd a reconnaissance by officers of the 5th Mounted Brigade took place beyond Barghut.

At the same time the 7th Mounted Brigade* with the 8th A.L.H. Regiment attached marched up the Hebron road, with orders to seize the wells at Ain Kohle and Khuweilfeh†. The latter is the highest point of a series of rocky ridges (1,500 feet) about 9 miles north-east of Beersheba, and it is separated by a valley from the opposing massif of Ras El Nagb (2,023 feet) lying to the north-east again.

* Loaned to the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division.

† This was part of the A. & N.Z. Division's advance to cover the right of XXth Corps.

CAPTURED ON THE OUTPOST LINE

WADI SABA, MORNING AFTER CAPTURE OF BEERSHEBA, SHOWING RAILWAY BRIDGE

Leaving the Hebron road at Kh. El Jubbein, the Yeomen and Australians proceeded along a track, almost due north, past Abu Jerwan to a point where it forked right and left. The Sherwood Rangers were ordered to work up the left track and seize the high ground at Kh. Abu Kuff (1250) which commanded the wells at Ain Kohle; the South Notts Yeomanry was ordered to occupy the heights of Ras El Nagb (2023) on the right; while the 8th A.L.H. Regiment was to advance in the centre between the Yeomen and capture Tel Khuweilfeh.

The Essex R.H.A. Battery was orderd to support all three units from the fork in the road; it being estimated that the Yeomanry Regiments would be four miles apart. It was an ambitious scheme for three Cavalry Regiments to carry out (it subsequently took an Infantry Division, a Battalion of the Imperial Camel Corps and a mounted Brigade four days bitter fighting to achieve success!) considering the dominating objectives and the strength of the enemy; for he was moving very large forces eastward to protect his left flank and the (to him) vital Hebron road which opened up the way to Jerusalem. It was from these enemy forces that the party of Australians and Yeomen was light-heartedly ordered to seize the wells! The Turks knew well enough that for the attackers there was no other water available nearer than Beersheba, ten miles distance.

At 1 p.m. the South Notts Yeomanry advanced up the right hand fork, and leaving Kh. Rumamin on the left reached the entrance to the Wadi Sultan (half the distance to Ras El Nagb) by 1.40 Up till now the Yeomen had encountered little resistance. The last three miles was an arduous climb, which entailed leaving the horses in the Wadi for the last two. The enemy's opposition stiffened as the Yeoman ascended over rough ground, and snipers were very troublesome. By 3 o'clock the South Notts succeeded in driving the Turks back, capturing 11 prisoners and two field guns, and seized Ras El Nagb. This was a fine performance, considering the nature of the ground and the commanding position of Ras El Nagb.

When night came on it was considered unsafe to leave the South Notts Yeomen in their isolated position. It was impossible to bring back the captured guns, as the only road lay from

Khuweilfeh to Dhaheryeh (both held by the enemy in force), so after removing their breach-locks they were tipped into a ravine. The Regiment was withdrawn in the darkness to the fork, with orders to re-occupy Ras El Nagb at dawn.

Meanwhile the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry had advanced at 1 p.m. along the left fork, but were held up after about three miles on the Wadi Kohle by several squadrons of Turkish Cavalry.

"B" Squadron managed to work round north of Ain Kohle, while "C" Squadron attacked from the south. A large body of Infantry now appeared on "C"'s left flank, which made the Squadron's position very precarious. "A"' Squadron was sent up at the gallop to relieve the situation, and after a spirited action, in which a Company of the Imperial Camel Corps (on the extreme left) took part, the ground on the left of the road was cleared of the enemy. Amongst the casualties was Lieutenant Abdy, who with a few men had very gallantly cleared some Turkish snipers out of the rocks on the side of the hill.

Having driven the enemy from Ain Kohle, the Sherwoods proceeded to attack that very dominating position Hill 1250 which was held by the enemy with a number of machine guns.

While "A" and "C" Squadrons worked forward over a "false top," which was separated by a stretch of flat ground from the real hill, the Essex Battery, R.H.A., shelled the objective. On the far side of the flat ground some cliffs were discovered which might offer some cover for the horses: and as it was thought that the flat ground could be crossed mounted with fewer casualties than on foot, it was decided to gallop it and leave the horses under the cliffs. Two Troops of "A" Squadron (Lieutenants Bircham and York) and two of "C" (Lieutenant Moss) galloped forward to the cliffs, but sustained heavy casualties from machine gun and rifle fire, and from horses falling on the rocks. The Yeomen reached the cliffs and dismounted, but found that they were pinned to the ground owing to the volume of fire poured down on to them from the enemy above; and there they held their position all day, until darkness made it possible for them to rejoin their Regiment. Meanwhile the rest of the Sherwoods with the help of a section of the 20th Machine Gun

(Yeomanry) Squadron, were in action on the flanks and rear of their advanced troops. Late in the afternoon the position became serious, as the enemy in increasing numbers nearly got round the Regiment's left flank. Every man of the Sherwood Rangers was now in action and the G.O.C. 7th Mounted Brigade (Brig.-General J. T. Wigan, D.S.O.) only had one platoon of Imperial Camel Corps in reserve. In the evening the situation was somewhat eased by the arrival of the 5th A.L.H. Regiment, but the Australians were unable to make progress against vastly superior forces. At night (as recorded above) great difficulty was experienced in withdrawing the advanced Yeomen, and a night outpost line was taken up before Ain Kohle.

According to the "Official History" the O.C. Sherwood Rangers (Lieut.-Colonel H. Thorpe, D.S.O.) believes that had the advance been made a couple of hours earlier the whole watershed (i.e., 1250, Kh. Abu Kuff, Tel Khuweilfeh, etc.) might have been won. But, "There had been an exciting race between the British moving northward and the Turks moving eastward, the Turks just winning."

Had the Sherwood Rangers been ordered to advance a few hours earlier, and had they been able to maintain themselves before being wiped out until reinforcements arrived, the subsequent course of events might have been very different.

While the 7th Mounted Brigade Yeomen were fighting their respective actions at Ras El Nagb and Ain Kohle, the 8th A.L.H. Regiment, which had accompanied them, advanced in the centre against Tel Khuweilfeh. Here the enemy on his most dominating position was in great strength, and a single Regiment was unable to make any impression. At night the Australians took up an outpost line about a mile south-east of their objective.

On November 3rd the South Notts Yeomanry moved up the Wadi Sultan again, and at dawn re-occupied Ras El Nagb without difficulty. At 10 a.m. the 2nd A.L.H. Regiment arrived to relieve the Yeomen, but as the enemy in front of their position appeared to be massing for an attack, the relief did not take place till mid-day, after the Australians (who had been reinforced by the 3rd A.L.H.) had beaten off an attack by two

Infantry Companies. At the same time the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry was relieved by the Imperial Camel Corps, the Yeomen suffering 16 casualties during their withdrawal. Both Yeomanry Regiments then marched back to Beersheba, where the horses watered the first time for 36 hours.

As the 1st A.L.H. Brigade's horses had been without water for 48 hours, it was decided to replace that unit by the 5th Mounted (Worcester, Warwick and Gloucester Yeomanries) Brigade,* which had left Beersheba in the morning. "This relief was a difficult affair," says the "Official History," a statement which the writer thoroughly endorses.

On the night of November 2nd the 5th Mounted Brigade had received orders to be ready to leave Beersheba at short notice under orders of the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division. Some of the fire-eaters had been chafing at the Brigade's inactivity during the attack on Beersheba, but in the next 48 hours, as it turned out, they got all the excitement they needed!

At 8 a.m. the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanries marched out, suffering a few casualties from enemy aircraft almost at once, and crossing the Hebron road near Tel El Saba reached Abu Jerwan at 10.30. Here the Gloucester Yeomanry joined the Brigade. The road was crowded with ammunition columns and Infantry of the 53rd (Welsh) Division. To the north heavy firing could be heard, and a little later shells could be seen exploding on the high ground in front. After trotting for about three miles we reached Kh. Rumamin, where four Field Batteries in line were hard at work, and close by two Infantry Battalions in reserve. The 53rd Division was now attacking the same positions (Kh. Abu Khuff and Tel Khuweilfeh), which had been assigned to the Sherwood Rangers and the 8th A.L.H. Regiment on the previous day.

Orders had been received to relieve the 1st A.L.H. Brigade at Ras El Nagb, and to prevent the enemy from occupying that height and thus menacing the right flank of the 53rd Division's attack. In order to reach our objective it was necessary to advance about two miles up the valley (from Rumamin) along

* The only Yeomanry Brigade in the Australian Mounted Division (at the time the Division was in reserve), it had been loaned by Corps to A. & N.Z. Mounted Division.

the front of the enemy's position and within 800 yards of it, and then turn half right up the Wadi Sultan or the Wadi Sirah, both of which led up to Ras El Nagb.

At 1 p.m., the Worcesters leading, the Brigade set off in column of half-squadrons extended across the enemy's front, at the trot, which became a gallop almost at once under a hail of machine gun and rifle bullets. During this gallop the writer looked to his left and could plainly see snipers lying out in the long grass only a few hundred yards away. The bullets were mostly low and churned up the ground under our horses' feet. Here and there a man or a horse was hit and came down. It then became necessary to stop in the middle of the gallop, take cover behind some rocks, pick up the wounded (on a horse), and follow the hunt again.

Fortunately none of the casualties were serious. We were very lucky only to have few of these, probably because the pace put the Turkish marksmen off their aim. Eventually, the entrance to the two wadis was reached, the Worcester Yeomanry (leading Regiment) and the Gloucester Yeomanry making for the Wadi Sultan, while the Warwickshire Yeomanry and B.H.Q. turned into the Wadi Sirah. These two wadis, both of which debouched into the plain opposite the Turkish main position, were separated by a precipitous ridge and met towards the summit of Ras El Nagb. It was now possible to attend to our few casualties, as although the enemy began to shell both wadis the slopes were too steep for his shells to take much effect, and by keeping the horses under the slope they also were immune from danger.

The Worcesters now climbed a thousand feet or more, on foot, to where the Australians were awaiting relief. Actually the latter could not leave the valley with their horses until dark. "A" Squadron (Captain M. C. Albright) and "D" Squadron (Captain Lord Hampton) took over the line which crossed the summit of Ras El Nagb, with "C" Squadron (Lieutenant J. W. Edwards) in support. Very little could be seen of the Turks concealed amongst the rocks, but whenever they showed themselves the Yeomen opened with hotchkiss and rifle fire. From the top of Ras El Nagb the writer obtained a wonderful view

of the enemy about Khuwelfeh, to the south-west, his trenches (sprinkled with our shells), his supports behind, and his transport in the valley below were plainly visible.

Late in the afternoon the shelling of our led horses in the Wadi became more effective, and also accounted for some of the horse holders; but the casualties of Yeomen on Ras El Nagb were not serious.

At sunset the Warwicks took up a line on the left of Worcesters (not in touch with the 53rd Division and far in advance of it), while the Gloucesters occupied the section on the right towards El Jabry. Thence the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade continued the line across the Hebron road to Kh. Salanta.

During the night about thirty wounded were carried, with great effort, over the high ridge from the Wadi Sultan to the Wadi Sirah, whence they were evacuated under cover of darkness to Rumamin.

On November 4th at dawn strong patrols found the enemy still in the same positions.

During the morning the enemy's fire increased, and died down at mid-day, but it was obvious that he meant to have Ras El Nagb. Relief had been promised in the early morning, but the sun rose higher and no relief came. The horses had not been watered for thirty hours, and the men were not much better off, especially those who had had their water bottles pierced by bullets. At 1 p.m. an enemy Cavalry Regiment was seen advancing from the north-west under cover of its own guns; the whole of the 5th Mounted Brigade was ordered up at once, and by its fire stopped the advance. After this incident an uncanny silence prevailed for some time, but it was evident that the enemy was massing under cover, as clouds of dust caused by fresh Infantry were observed from the direction of Dhaheriyeh. At 4 p.m. the storm broke when the Gloucester Yeomanry had just been relieved by the Worcesters and had moved back to their horses.

From his R.A.P. by an old Turkish ammunition wagon the writer saw the enemy's bayonets lit up by the setting sun, as they emerged from amongst the rocks with a rush shouting "Allah, Allah." It was an exciting moment. In some places

the enemy got within 80 yards of the Yeomen before they were mowed down by steady shooting. The Gloucesters had just reached their horses when they were urgently summoned to help their neighbouring county and to reinforce the left flank. As it was a question of minutes they mounted and returned at the gallop across ground over which when dismounted they had had difficulty in picking their way. They arrived just in time to pour a heavy volume of fire on a second attack, which resulted in a long line of enemy dead 100 yards away. From the cover of large boulders the enemy subjected the Yeomen to intense rifle fire, four officers and several O.R.'s becoming casualties.

At 5 p.m., owing to heavy pressure on the Worcester's right (Captain Albright "A" Squadron), Captain Valentine galloped up with "B" Squadron Warwick Yeomanry. In spite of this help the enemy still pressed on, and finally "C" (Captain Stafford) and "D" (Captain Gooch) Squadrons of the Warwicks had to be thrown into the fight—and only in the nick of time. Every man in the 5th Mounted Brigade was now in the firing line. The Turks could now advance no further, "against cool, steady shooting," and after dusk they withdrew.

This attack (according to the "Official History") was carried out by the order of Falkenhayn himself, and the attackers were estimated at over 3,000.

At 8 p.m. the first Regiment of the N.Z.M.R. Brigade (our relief) arrived, and Lieut.-Col. H. J. Williams, D.S.O. (O.C. Worcester Yeomanry), the senior officer on the spot, handed over the Brigade line to a cheerful and gallant N.Z. Colonel, who received it with perfect equanimity. Colonel Williams pointed out the seriousness of the situation, and added that the 5th Mounted Brigade was only obeying orders to retire owing to the very urgent need of water for men and horses. (During the night the New Zealanders were attacked; they suffered nearly 100 casualties and lost 119 horses).

After burying their dead the Yeomen had great difficulty in carrying the wounded over rough ground to the ambulance carts awaiting in the dark, at the entrance to the Wadi Sirah nearly three miles away. Wearily the Brigade marched through the night and arrived at Beersheba watering troughs (where

several of the horses died from exhaustion) at 3 a.m. on November 5th, 44 hours since the last drink! It had suffered 57 casualties and had lost 67 horses.*

While the fighting, described above, was proceeding, *Phase* 2 (of the Third Battle of Gaza), the attack on Gaza by the XXIst Corps (52nd, 54th and 75th Divisions), was being continued. This, it will be remembered, had been arranged in order to distract the enemy from the main attack, *Phase* 3, which included the capture of Hareira and Sheria by the XXth Corps (53rd, 60th, 10th and the 74th dismounted Yeomanry Divisions) and the subsequent advance of the whole of Desert Mounted Corps.

During the bitter fighting which took place on November 3rd, 4th and 5th, in which two Mounted Yeomanry Brigades played such an important part, the enemy had chosen to employ the whole of his available reserves in an immediate counter-attack. And it was this exhausting of the Turkish reserves so far away as Khuweilfeh and Ras El Nagb which ultimately paved the way for the 74th Division's successful attack on Sheria. In this way the Mounted Yeomen were of service to their dismounted comrades.

The 74th Division had left Beersheba on the day after its fall, and on November 3rd was occupying a position between the 10th Division about Abu Irgeig on the left, and the 53rd Division on the right; the 229th Brigade (74th) occupying the high ground north of Kh. Muweileh.

On November 4th the Yeomanry Mounted Division left Shellal, whence it had been filling the gap between XXIst and XXth Corps, with the latter's own Cavalry Regiment (Westminster Dragoons) at Karm. The gap was then filled by the Australian Mounted Division (less 5th Mounted Brigade, which was actively engaged at Ras El Nagb) and the 7th Mounted Brigade, both of which had moved across from Beersheba.

The Yeomanry Mounted Division marched behind the line of the XXth Corps until it reached a position between the dis-

* In a note in the *Official History* on "The Turkish Movements, November 1st to 6th," appears the following statement:—

Early on the morning of the 4th Falkenhayn ordered the recapture of Ras El Nagb. This attack carried out by the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the 77th Regiment, 19th Division, was as we know repulsed owing to the staunchness of the 5th Mounted Brigade." (A Regiment had 4 battalions.)

mounted Yeomen and the left of the 53rd Division, in order to be able to fill the gap between these two Divisions when they advanced.

Meanwhile the 60th Division moved in between the 74th and 10th so as to be in position for a frontal attack on the Kauwukah defences; while the 74th took the whole of the fortified area in flank and reverse.

The dismounted Yeomen had as objective the line of works east of the railway, after which they were to cover the right of the 60th Division, seize the high ground north of Tel El Sheria and protect the water supply.

By 3.30 a.m. on November 6th* the 74th Division was deployed within 5,000 yards of the enemy's long line of works east of the railway.

The 229th Brigade (on the left) was to direct the attack, with the 230th écheloned on its right rear and the 231st on its right rear again.

There was no preliminary bombardment. At 4 a.m. the Sussex Yeomanry (230th) advanced and captured an outlying work (46) within an hour. Another work (hitherto unlocated) just beyond was taken by two platoons of the same Regiment after very fierce bayonet fighting against superior numbers, while the rest of the Sussex swept forward.

On the 231st Brigade's front another outlying work (47) was captured by the Pembroke and Glamorgan Yeomanries, after a stiff fight, which considerably delayed the Brigade's advance, by 7 a.m.

By 6 a.m. the 230th Brigade—with the Suffolk Yeomanry on the right, the Sussex Yeomanry on the left, and the East Kent, West Kent and Norfolk Yeomanries in support—had captured 38, 39 and 45. The Suffolks suffered very heavily, all the officers of one Company being casualties.

Meanwhile the 229th Brigade, which had passed through the outpost line at 5 a.m.—Fife and Forfar Yeomanry on the right, West Somerset on the left, Ayrshire and Lanarkshire Yeomanries in support, with the two Devon Yeomanries in reserve—had advanced to the attack. This Brigade did not

* From here onwards the inset sketch-map may be consulted.

have to deal with any outlying works, the nearest trenches being about 4,000 yards away, but it met with heavy artillery, machine gun and rifle fire almost at once, both from the front and right flank. This enfilade fire caused heavy casualties until it was subdued by the attacks of the Suffolk and Sussex Yeomen on the right.

While the Suffolks and Sussex were thus fiercely engaged, the 229th Brigade captured 29, 35, 36, 37 and swept on to 26, 28, the Cactus Hedge Redoubt. Here the 229th encountered heavy artillery fire and was again raked by machine gun fire on its right flank, but by 7.30 a.m. the redoubt had fallen; the West Somerset Yeomanry capturing a Turkish Battery of 6 guns after shooting down its personnel.

During this phase of the battle the units of the 229th and 230th Brigades became somewhat mixed, some of the Sussex following the Fife and Forfar, while parties of the Devons found themselves with the Sussex. The 230th Brigade (less some platoons of the Sussex) was now some way behind the 229th, while the 231st Brigade was still further back owing to a later start and the delay caused by the outlying work (47) to the advance of the Pembroke and Glamorgan Yeomanries.

About mid-day Captain Powell Edwards, of the Sussex Yeomanry, on the right and rear of the 229th Brigade, observed over the crest of a ridge, the smoke of guns enfilading the advance of the 229th. He immediately sent his Lewis-gun Section with an escort to a position whence the enemy Battery could be enfiladed. Sergeant H. E. Johnstone came into action with his Lewis-gun at 150 yards and himself emptied one drum into the gunners. The Turks, who were still firing at the 229th Brigade, were taken by surprise. With the Battery, 3 officers and 25 O.R.s surrendered.

The advance of the 229th was greatly assisted by this exploit.

A little later the enemy launched a determined counter-attack on the Sussex, and drove the party covering the guns back into the Wadi Union, behind the high ground commanding the Battery, and this position was occupied by the Turks.

Lieutenant Hopkins then rallied his Company (which had been driven back) and, with a platoon of Sussex and one of

Devons, retook the high ground at the point of the bayonet. The enemy could now be seen hooking in teams of oxen to remove the guns, when Lieutenant W. Howard led his platoon in a bayonet charge, pistolled the drivers and recaptured the guns. The enemy then made yet one more attempt to retrieve his guns, and another counter-attack in great strength was seen to be moving to the assault.

At this moment the F.O.O. of the 268th Brigade R.F.A. arrived in time to direct his guns on the advancing Turks. The counter-attack did not materialize.

While this episode of the battle was being enacted, the Suffolk Yeomanry was also heavily counter-attacked, its right flank lying in the air. Eventually the 231st Brigade arrived, the Cheshire and Shropshire Yeomanries reinforcing the Suffolks.

Meanwhile the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry on the right, and the West Somerset Yeomanry on the left, were leading the 229th Brigade at great speed, in spite of severe artillery fire from the north of Sheria.

About mid-day there was a short pause, during which units of the Brigade which had become intermixed were reorganised. The Brigade then moved westward again along the line of Turkish trenches.

At 3 p.m. it delivered its final attack on the railway and captured its objective. Simultaneously the 60th Division took the Kauwakah system, and an enemy Battery, while trying to escape, was captured by the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry.

At night the 231st Brigade on the right, and the 230th on the left, held a line astride the Wadi Sheria, facing north-east. The 229th Brigade, which had sustained two-thirds of the Division's casualties (47 officers and 1,007 O.Rs.), was taken into reserve.

The ground over which the 74th Division advanced is gently undulating downland, scattered with stones. Although there are steep-sided wadis on both sides of the series of positions occupied by the enemy, these were of no use to the attacking Yeomen who, for six miles continuously under fire, found no

cover of any sort between them and each successive deep and well-sited Turkish trench system.

At Beersheba the 74th *qua* Division had received its baptism of fire, and had proved itself a first-class fighting unit. At Sheria the dismounted Yeomen won further laurels and incidentally made the first impression in the enemy's line, which subsequently became the gap through which their more fortunate mounted comrades (5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 22nd Mounted Brigades) galloped two days later

The best appreciation of the part played by the dismounted Yeomen on November 6th, is that by the Official Historian, in his description of the capture of Sheria by the XXth Corps :—

"The whole success of the attack depended on the resolution of the 74th Division in the early stages, and the Yeomen did not fall short of the expectations formed of them. Their advance began in darkness, over unknown ground, with indifferent maps, so that they had no artillery support in the first stages of their attack. In these circumstances the skill with which the machine-gun companies and Lewis-gun sections supported the Infantry, was a big factor in the success, but the biggest was the Infantry's own determination to close swiftly with the enemy."

BATTLE ORDER OF YEOMANRY FORMATIONS AT THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA, 1917

Yeomanry Mounted Division (Major-General G. de S. Barrow, C.B.).

6th Mounted Brigade. (G.O.C., Brig.-General C. A. C. Godwin).
- 1/1 R. Bucks Hussars.
- 1/1 Q.O. Dorset Yeomanry.
- 1/1 Berkshire Yeomanry.

8th Mounted Brigade. (G.O.C., Brig.-General C. S. Rome).
- 1/1 County of London (Middlesex Hussars).
- 1/1 City of London (Rough Riders).
- 1/3 County of London (Sharpshooters).

22nd Mounted Brigade. (G.O.C., Brig.-General F. A. B. Fryer).
- 1/1 Lincolnshire Yeomanry.
- 1/1 Q.O. Staffordshire Yeomanry.
- 1/1 East Riding Yeomanry.

Australian Mounted Division. (Major-General H. W. Hodgson, C.B., C.V.O.).



he maps issued 1916–17. These were made from an 1878 survey and Yeoman would not have recognised the scenes of their activities.

5th Mounted Brigade. (G.O.C., Brig.-General P. D. Fitzgerald, D.S.O.).
1/1 Warwickshire Yeomanry.
1/1 R. Gloucestershire Hussars.
1/1 Q.O. Worcestershire Hussars.

and

3rd and 4th A. L. H. Brigades.

Attached to Desert Mounted Force.

7th Mounted Brigade.* (G.O.C., Brig.-General J. T. Wigan, D.S.O.).
1/1 Sherwood Rangers.
1/1 South Notts Hussars.

XXth Corps Cavalry.
1/2 County of London (Westminster Dragoons).

XXIst Corps Cavalry.
Composite Regt. { 1 Sq. 1/1 R. Glasgow Yeomanry.
1 Sq. 1/1 Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry.
1 Sq. 1/1 Hertfordshire Yeomanry. }

74th (Dismounted Yeomanry) Division. (Major-General E. S. Girdwood).

229th Brigade. (G.O.C., Brig.-General R. Hoare).
{ 1/1 R. 1st Devon Yeomanry.
1/1 R. North Devon Hussars. }
1/1 West Somerset Yeomanry.
1/1 Fife and Forfar Yeomanry.
{ 1/1 Ayrshire Yeomanry.
1/1 Lanarkshire Yeomanry. }

230th Brigade. (G.O.C., Brig.-General A. J. McNeill).
{ 1/1 R. East Kent Yeomanry.
1/1 Q. O. West Kent Yeomanry. }
1/1 Sussex Yeomanry.
1/1 Loyal Suffolk Hussars.
1/1 R. Norfolk Yeomanry.

231st Brigade. (G.O.C., Brig.-General C. E. Heathcote, D.S.O.).
{ 1/1 Shropshire Yeomanry.
1/1 Cheshire Yeomanry. }
1/1 Denbighshire Hussars.
{ 1/1 Montgomeryshire Yeomanry.
1/1 Welsh Horse Yeomanry. }
{ 1/1 Pembrokeshire Yeomanry.
1/1 Glamorgan Yeomanry. }

* The Derbyshire Yeomanry of this Brigade (formerly 3rd (Notts & Derby) Mounted Brigade) had remained in Macedonia.

Note.—There being 4 Battalions in each Brigade, the Regiments shown in brackets denote one Battalion).

The writer has based the above account on his book "The Diary of a Yeomanry M.O." (1921), but he wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to "The Official History" (Egypt & Palestine II. 1), and to the Histories of the Worcestershire, Warwickshire, Gloucestershire, Sherwood Rangers, West Somerset and Sussex Yeomanries; also to the Histories of the H.A.C. and the 74th Division in the Great War. In 1929 the writer revisited the terrain of Gaza III, together with two other officers of the Worcestershire Yeomanry.

THE JAPANESE CONQUEST OF JEHOL, 1933

By Major E. W. Sheppard, O.B.E., M.C., Royal Tank Corps

INTRODUCTION.

The Japanese campaign in Jehol in the late winter of 1933 has attracted surprisingly little attention in this country, and few accounts of it have, so far as I am aware, hitherto appeared in military journals over here. It is true that the resistance put up by the Chinese was so slight, that it resembled rather a set-piece show against a skeleton enemy than an operation of war in the true sense of the term. Nevertheless the methods by which a great province, measuring 350 miles by 300, was overrun in less than a month must surely be worthy of study and afford useful lessons. A brief description of the campaign may therefore be of interest and value.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

By the end of 1932 the new state of Manchukuo, a puppet creation of Japan, had been set up, and the Japanese had concluded their operations in Northern Manchuria province, thus bringing it under the dominion of the new state. At the same time General Muto, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria, revealed in diplomatically veiled words a purpose of annexing to it the province of Jehol, by agreement with the Chinese government if possible, but if not, by force of arms—the arms of Manchukuo, in theory, but, as every one understood very well, those of Japan in actual fact. In Peiping there were no illusions under this head, and the concentration of such Chinese troops as were available under the command of Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang, the Governor-General of Manchuria, and General Tang-Yu-Lin, Governor of Jehol, was hurried forward.

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

Jehol province, an area of about 80,000 square miles, with a population of five millions, lies to the north of the Great Wall of China, and is bounded on the east and north by Manchuria, and to north and west by Inner Mongolia. Its interior is seamed by a succession of mountainous spurs, running generally down from north-west to south-east between the valleys of the



various tributaries of the Liao river, the main course of which is parallel with, and some 50 miles distant from, the western frontier of the province. Some of these mountain spurs rise to 6,000 and 7,000 feet, and being negotiable only at the various passes, are favourable for defence against any attack from north-east or east, while the streams in the valleys between afford further obstacles to movement and attack, bridges being few.

Communications too are scarce, the only roads of importance being those shown on the map, while there are no railways at all, except the branch from the main Mukden-Peiping railway leading to Nanling and Peipiao. On the other hand the invaders had available railways skirting the whole eastern border of Jehol from Tungliao in the north by Chinchow and Suichung to Shanhaikuan at the eastern end of the Great Wall, with spurs leading forward to the frontier from Chinchou to Peipiao and to Sunglingmen, and numerous lines running rearward to the interior of Manchuria. Thus the Japanese facilities for concentration and troop movement by rail were considerable. If necessary, too, reinforcements for the southern part of the theatre could also be sent by sea to Chinchou or Shanhaikhuan, once the latter port fell into their hands, as it did shortly before the outbreak of general hostilities in Jehol.

JAPANESE FORCES.

By the end of 1932 the Japanese C.-in-C., General Muto, whose G.H.Q. was at Hsinking, had under his command four and a-half divisions (nine brigades of infantry, and two brigades of cavalry). Not all of these, however, were employed in Jehol; only the 6th and 8th Divisions, one brigade of the 7th, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade took part in the actual conquest of the province. Practically the whole of the force was motorised, there being allotted to it several tank and armoured car units and mechanised artillery brigades, together with one bombing and one reconnaissance air squadron and a contingent of railway and technical troops. All units were at war strength.

By the end of the concentration period these forces were disposed along a front of about 250 miles from Tungliao in the north to Suichung in the south, as follows:—

1st Cavalry Brigade on the extreme right at Tungliao.

6th Division forming the right wing, with one Brigade (11th) at Tungliao and one (36th) at Suitung and Fuhsin.

8th Division in the centre, in the area Ichou-Chinchou.

7th Division (one Brigade only) forming the left wing at Suichung and north-west of it to the frontier.

The strength of this force may be put at 30,000 men. Certain units of the Manchukuo army were also allotted to take part in the forthcoming operations, but owing to their unreliability as fighting troops, none were actually used at the front.

CHINESE FORCES.

Marshal Chang Hsiao Liang had his disposal for the defence of Jehol a force imposing enough on paper, including four regular army brigades, the provincial troops, 30,000 strong, and various volunteer formations, totalling in all some 100,000 men. But the bulk of these masses were formidable in numbers only; an observer describes the army as "one with no staff work, with the generals staying hundreds of miles behind, with no transport, except of the most primitive sort, which took several weeks to supply the front, no liaison between the different commands, no anti-aircraft guns, entrenching materials, or artillery, and soldiers trained only in drill-ground rudiments."

The Chinese main bodies were held back in the central part of the province, where three defensive lines were being fortified, the first being some 70 to 100 miles west from the frontier, some 75 miles long from flank to flank, along the crest of the mountain ridge between Lingyuan-Chihfeng. To its right rear was a second between Fanchia pass on the Great Wall and Pingchuan, while a third crossed the eastern approaches to Jehol City. Strong forward detachments on the frontier west of Chinchou and about Kailu in the north-east corner of the province were in position to make head against the Japanese offensive in its first stages.

JAPANESE PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS.

Before the opening of the main attack, however, the Japanese C.-in-C. considered it necessary to secure his left flank against any possible interference by the Chinese forces south of the Great Wall by taking possession of Shanhaikuan. On January 2nd, 1933, the town was attacked, after a heavy bombing from the air, by a mixed detachment of the 8th Division, supported by two destroyers, which shelled it from the sea; 20 guns, 7 bombing planes, armoured trains and a company of light tanks were also detailed to take part in the operations.

The attack came as a complete surprise, the Chinese commander of the place being absent from his post; but the defenders, who enjoyed a considerable numerical superiority over the assailants, put up a stubborn resistance and it took the Japanese two days of fierce fighting to expel them. Casualties on both sides were heavy, and the civilian population also suffered. Eventually the defenders withdrew to the south of the Great Wall; the Japanese followed them up, and on January 10th captured the important Chumen pass, thus effectually closing the southern gateway by which the Chinese might have broken into their concentration area along the western shore of the Liaotung Gulf.

Further to the north, their preparations for the campaign moved forward steadily during the next six weeks, and were covered by a series of air bombing raids and reconnaissance flights. A series of frontier skirmishes also took place, Chinese volunteer bands pushing forward to interfere with the assembly of the invading army at various points, but without any noteworthy success. Five successive attempts were made by the Chinese force in Hopei, south of the Wall, to expel the Japanese from the Chumen Pass, but all were repulsed with loss.

By the middle of February the Japanese army of invasion was in readiness at its selected points of concentration, and all the mechanised arms and transport on which it was intended to rely to ensure a rapid and uninterrupted advance had been collected and brought forward. On February 10th General Muto accordingly despatched to the Chinese Government at Nanking an ultimatum, demanding the disarmament or the withdrawal beyond the Great Wall of all Chinese troops from Jehol, as their presence there was incompatible with the sovereignty of Manchukuo and the restoration of peace and order in Jehol. The Chinese Government rejected the terms, but before their refusal could reach Japanese G.H.Q., and even before the date (February 23rd) fixed for the expiry of the ultimatum, the invasion of Jehol was under way.

THE INVASION OF JEHOL PROVINCE.

The first stage of the offensive was undertaken on the right or northern wing, the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 36th Brigade

of the 6th Division moving in two columns from Tungliao *viâ* Kailu (1st Cavalry Brigade) on Hsiawa, and from Suitung (36th Brigade) on Hsiawa. Here the two columns reunited and advanced on Chihfeng, where the left flank of the Chinese defensive line was situated. The 11th Brigade of the 6th Division, which had originally been concentrated at Tungliao to support the advance of the cavalry, had apparently been despatched by rail to the 8th Division before the offensive started, and operated in conjunction with the central force.

Despite heavy snowstorms, sand drifts, and soft river bottoms, which considerably added to the difficulties of movement by mechanised columns, the advance in the north was carried through with almost bewildering rapidity. The Cavalry Brigade started on the 23rd, fought its way into Kailu next day, and by the 27th had reached Hsiawa, where the 36th Brigade joined up with it from Suitung. On March 1st the Japanese seized Chihfeng; the Chinese detailed to defend the town put up so feeble a resistance that treachery was freely alleged as the cause of it. There had in fact been treachery a few days earlier at Kailu, where one of the Chinese generals had gone over with all his command, and was detailed by his new allies to sweep the area northward of Chihfeng around Tienshan and Linhsi, so as to secure their right flank in that direction. Certainly the rate of advance of the invaders (200 miles in seven days) can be accounted for only on the assumption that there was no opposition worthy of the name, though even so it was, under the adverse circumstances of weather and terrain, a fine performance on their part.

The central column, consisting of the 8th Division and the 11th Brigade of the 6th Division, had a harder task in its advance on Chihfeng from the east. The first day of the offensive (February 23rd) saw a fierce fight for Chaoyang; air bombing preceded an attack with tanks and motorised infantry, but it was not till February 25th that the Chinese were finally driven from the town, to which Japanese G.H.Q. shortly afterwards moved forward from Chinchow. From this date onwards the 11th Brigade became the spearhead of the advance of the central column, which was resumed on the 27th. By March 2nd the

Brigade had reached Chihfeng and effected its junction with the right column there; no resistance had been encountered in the course of this ninety mile march, which was completed in three days.

The left column, the 14th Brigade of the 7th Division, had been allotted the route from Suichung by Pashihtsumen on Lingyuan. It set out from the first-named place only on February 25th, and had hard fighting at a series of mountain passes in the Shanling range, which were cleared only with the aid of intensive air bombing attacks. It was not till February 28th that the Brigade could debouch from the mountains at Peichangyingtsu; the next day saw it in Lingyuan. The Chinese resistance had collapsed in this quarter also, partly no doubt owing to the approach from the east, by the road from Chaoyang, of the 16th Japanese Brigade, which thus threatened to take the defence between two fires. Despite the heavy fighting, which had slowed it up in the earlier stages of its advance, the Left Column had averaged 16 miles a day.

With the fall of Chihfeng and Lingyuan, the whole of the defensive position on which the Chinese had relied to cover the approaches to Jehol City passed with almost ludicrous ease into Japanese hands.

THE CAPTURE OF JEHOL CITY.

The continuation of the offensive west from Lingyuan was entrusted to the 16th Brigade, while the 14th Brigade turned southwards, heading for Hsifeng pass through the Great Wall. Both brigades moved in motor lorries, preceded by armoured cars, and the Chinese retreated stragglingly before them with no attempt at resistance. Some of the defenders passed over to the Japanese side; the leaders fled or disappeared; the whole defence had ignominiously collapsed at the first pressure.

At 11.30 a.m. on March 4th an advanced patrol of the 16th Brigade entered Jehol City in a howling blizzard and set up the Rising Sun flag over the walls. On the same day the 14th Brigade secured the Hsifeng Pass equally without opposition. The Japanese however forbore for the moment to occupy the Kupei Pass on the Jehol-Peiping roads, possibly in order to

leave a bolt-hole for the masses of fugitive troops, who were only too anxious to leave the province, and whom the invaders were glad to see depart. After some fighting with the few scattered rearguard detachments which still retained some cohesion and military spirit, the pass was finally occupied on March 10th.

Meanwhile the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 36th Brigade further north had also pushed forward from Chihfeng south-westward to clear the area north of Jehol. At Weichang on March 5th they had the stiffest fight of the campaign with a Chinese column which, outflanked by the loss of Jehol City, was trying to make its escape to the west and south. It was routed and fled westwards into Chahar.

With this the occupation of Jehol may be said to have been effectively accomplished. The operations were not at an end by any means; fighting on the line of the Great Wall and to the south of it went on for nearly three months longer, with varying fortunes, until the Japanese finally dictated an armistice on May 31, on the outskirts of Peiping, under the terms of which Jehol finally passed from Chinese hands. But these events form no part of our story.

The Japanese casualties in the campaign had not been heavy —little more than 3,000 killed and wounded in the whole period from January to June, 1933, including those incurred during the Shanhaikuan episode and in the fighting around the Great Wall after the clearing of Jehol. A certain number of cases of sickness—mostly frostbite—must be added to the above figures, which however still remain small considering all that had been achieved, and go to prove that speed and manœuvre as much as fighting power were the real causes of Japanese success.

COMMENTS.

It will be clear from the narrative that the Chinese defence of the province was, and in the prevailing circumstances was bound to be, a poor one. Their troops were formidable in numbers only. They were deficient of every sort of military material, particularly of anti-aircraft guns, which had not been supplied despite the frequent demands of the local commanders; their spirit was poor, and treachery was not unknown; while jealousy and selfishness were rife among the various leaders—to

say nothing of apathy and incompetence. All these defects naturally much facilitated the task of the invaders, who, if the Chinese resistance had been better organised and of higher quality, might have been made to pay far more dearly for their prize.

But these considerations must not blind us to the extraordinary nature of the Japanese achievement in overrunnning, in less than three weeks, so vast a tract of country, defended by an enemy more than three times their own strength, established in part in prepared positions, and with a formidable series of natural obstacles to help them. Much of value may undoubtedly be learned from a study of their methods.

The weather to some extent favoured the invaders, inasmuch as the various river lines running athwart their path were frozen so hard by the bitter winter frosts that they no longer afforded obstacles to passage and could be crossed on the ice almost anywhere. On the other hand, the deep snow drifts on the roads, and particularly on the mountain passes, were at times serious hindrances to movement, and certainly added to the privations suffered by the troops, who endured them with the patient cheerfulness characteristic of their race.

The usual methods adopted during the invasion were for aircraft to prepare each stage of the advance by a series of intensive bombing raids against all hostile concentrations observed and all defensive positions blocking the route to be followed. Then came squadrons of armoured cars and light tanks, followed by mechanised artillery and lorry-borne infantry, the advance of which was heralded and covered up to the last possible moment by bombing and machine-gun fire from the air. Attacks were rapidly mounted and carried through, and the retreat of the beaten defenders turned into panic flight by relentless ground and air pursuit. No respite being allowed the Chinese, exploitation could be carried through to great depths and at a surprising pace. Little manœuvre was necessary or possible, movement being practically confined in the snowclad country to roads or cart tracks: but the rapid sweep of the advance, once the feeble defence had been swept aside at any one point, caused the thinly held wide Chinese fronts to collapse over wide areas, and their

garrisons, fearful of being cut off, to retreat in hurry and disorder.

It was the moral effect of this speed and the apparently irresistible momentum of the whole movement that enabled these small motorised columns, each of a few hundred men only, to carry through so prolonged and extensive an offensive to a triumphant conclusion, and to overrun in a few days, at a rate of twenty to thirty miles a day, a province as large as England and Wales put together. When all allowances have been made for the superiority of the Japanese over their adversaries in all military qualities, and for the inadequacy of the Chinese defence, it must still be admitted that, as a feat of organisation and tactics, the conquest of Jehol was a performance of a very, very high order.

CAVALRY CONVERSIONS OLD AND NEW

By Major T. J. Edwards, M.B.E., F.R.Hist.S.

Essential national institutions like the Defence Services maintain their ability to execute the rôle allotted to them by keeping abreast of the times in all departments of their organisation. But as the defensive machines are very large and costly it is obvious that any new ideas which will modify the whole or part of them must be subjected to very comprehensive tests before being adopted. In the case of the army, and the cavalry in particular, many such modifications have been made since the Standing Army was established in 1661 and it is proposed to show the reason for these changes, involving the conversion of regiments from one rôle to another, and their influence upon the regimental titles of the regiments concerned.

The first Establishment for the army took effect from the 26th January, 1661, and provided for :—

Three Troops of Horse Guards (now The Life Guards).
A regiment of Horse of 8 Troops (now The Royal Horse Guards).
A regiment of Foot Guards (now 1st Bn. Grenadier Guards).
The Duke of Albemarle's Regiment of Foot (now the Coldstream Guards).

There were some troops in Scotland also, viz. :—

One Troop of Horse Guards (now represented in The Life Guards).
A Company of Guards which soon developed into a regiment of Foot Guards (now the Scots Guards).

And on the Continent there were :—

A regiment of Foot Guards (now 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards).
A Scots Regiment (now The Royal Scots).
An English Regiment (now The Buffs).

THE HORSE.

The arms represented in the above Troops and regiments are Horse and Foot. In those days the term "Horse" was restricted to heavy cavalry and although our present Household Cavalry still belongs to that class, the word "Horse" survives solely in the title of the Royal Horse Guards.* Up to 1788 The Life Guards consisted of independent Troops of Horse Guards, but in that year the two existing Troops were regimented to form the 1st and 2nd Life Guards and the word "Horse" disappeared from their title.

Britain acquired Tangier through the marriage of Charles II to Catherine of Braganza; both Bombay and Tangier formed part of the Princess's dowry. For the original garrison of Tangier a troop of Horse was raised in 1661 under the Colonelcy of the Earl of Peterborough. In 1680 six further troops of Horse were raised to augment the garrison, but only three actually went to Tangier, the other three being disbanded.

Other regiments of Horse and numerous non-regimented troops of Horse were raised between 1662 and 1679, but all were disbanded. In 1685, however, James II raised further regiments and troops of Horse to meet the rebellion headed by the Duke of Monmouth, most of which had a brief existence and only the following remain:—

2nd Horse† (later 1st King's Dragoon Guards).
3rd Horse (later The Queen's Bays).
4th Horse (later 3rd Dragoon Guards).‡
5th (originally 6th) Horse (later 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards).§
6th (originally 7th) Horse (later 5th Dragoon Guards).‖
7th (originally 9th) Horse (later Carabiniers).‡

* In the Indian Army, however, the following regiments still perpetuate the title:— Skinner's Horse (1st Duke of York's Own Cavalry).
2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse).
Hodson's Horse (4th Duke of Cambridge's Own Lancers).
Probyn's Horse (5th King Edward's Own Lancers).
6th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers (Watson's Horse).
The Royal Deccan Horse (9th Horse).
The Scinde Horse (14th Prince of Wales's Own Cavalry).
The Poona Horse (17th Queen Victoria's Own Cavalry).
The Central India Horse (21st King George's Own Horse).
These titles preserve something of the regiments' original nomenclature.

† The Royal Horse Guards ranked as the 1st Horse at that time.

‡ These two regiments were amalgamated in 1922 to form the 3rd Carabiniers.

§ Now amalgamated with the 7th Dragoon Guards.

‖ Now amalgamated with The Inniskillings (6th Dragoons).

Several Horse regiments were raised by James II in 1688, but they soon disappeared. William III, however, established a Regiment of Horse on the 31st December, 1688, under the Colonelcy of Lord Cavendish, which is still in existence as the 7th Dragoon Guards (4th/7th Dragoon Guards). Other regiments of Horse were raised subsequent to this, but none survived more than a few years.

HORSE GRENADIER GUARDS.

In 1678 a new arm was added to the Service, viz. Grenadiers, a company of which was added to each Foot Regiment and a Troop to each of the Troops of Horse Guards.* These mounted grenadiers were designated Horse Grenadier Guards. The hand grenade was a new weapon and the tallest and finest men in the regiment were made grenadiers because they could be expected to throw it furthest. They wore caps instead of broad-brimmed hats to facilitate the slinging of their firelocks over the shoulders. Horse Grenadier Guards were practically mounted grenadiers. They were disbanded in 1788 and merged into the newly regimented 1st and 2nd Life Guards. (See under "The Horse" above.)

DRAGOONS.

As might be expected Horse regiments did not always possess the requisite celerity for securing tactical positions, bridge-heads, etc., in advance of the main army, and it was to rectify this situation that a kind of mounted infantry, armed with "a faire Dragon," came into being. It is from this weapon that they take their name of Dragoons.† "These Dragoons in their marches are allowed to be eleven in a rank or file, because when they serve, it is many times on foote, for the maintenance or surprizing of strait wayes, bridges, or foords, so that when ten men alight to serve, the eleventh man holdeth their horses: so that to everye troope of an hundred, there is an hundred and ten men allowed."‡ The 17th Century Dragoons were lightly armed and equipped and were mounted infantry pure and simple,

* The idea came from France, *vide* Grose, Military Antiquities, i, 160.
† Grose, i, 110.
‡ Ibid, i, iii.

riding for the sake of swifter mobility only and provided with inferior horses. They were armed with the musket and drilled like their brethren on foot (Fortescue, i, 216). They were organised in companies and not troops.

Although there were dragoons in the New Model Army it was not until 1672* that Charles II had such a regiment and that was disbanded two years later. Three more regiments of Dragoons were raised in 1678 only to fade away after a very brief life.† But a kinder fate was meted out to the companies of Dragoons raised in Scotland about this time. Three Companies were raised in 1678 for police work against the Covenanters: in 1681 three more companies were raised and, with the three already in existence, were regimented to form our oldest dragoon regiment—The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons). The senior dragoon regiment is the 1st The Royal Dragoons which takes its precedence from the fact that it sprung from the troop of Horse raised by the Earl of Peterborough in 1661 for Tangier, previously mentioned. To this troop three others were added in 1680 ,and when Tangier was abandoned these four troops of Horse were converted to dragoons, and, together with two other newly-raised troops of dragoons, were regimented in 1683, under the Colonelcy of John Churchill, later the great Duke of Marlborough. It was always a rule that Horse took precedence of Dragoons, a point which will also be noted later in connection with Dragoon Guards.

Thus this new arm came into being by the joint method of raising a Dragoon regiment and also converting Horse to Dragoons and amalgamating them with newly-raised Dragoons.‡

The Dragoon idea rapidly gained favour as will be seen from the dates of raising of the following regiments, all of which were raised as Dragoons and were designated as such until converted to other arms:—

* The Barbadoes Regiment of Dragoons raised 30th March, 1672, disbanded 1674. Prince Rupert was Colonel of the regiment.

† The King's Own Dragoons, Prince Rupert's Dragoons and Sir John Talbot's Dragoons.

‡ This curious composition is reflected in a Royal Warrant of 30th October, 1684, in regard to the precedence of Dragoons: they had precedence both as Horse and Foot; as Horse in the field and as Foot in garrison.

3rd Hussars ...	1685*	9th Lancers ...	1715†
4th Hussars ...	1685*	10th Hussars ...	1715†
5th Lancers ...	1689	11th Hussars ...	1715†
6th Dragoons (Inniskillings)	1689	12th Lancers ...	1715†
		13th Hussars ...	1715†
7th Hussars ...	1690	14th Hussars ...	1715†
8th Hussars ...	1693		

In 1746 the three senior Regiments of Horse were converted or reduced to the status of Dragoons, but as some compensation for this reduction they were granted the title of Guards,‡ hence Dragoon Guards—Dragoons, formerly Horse. The new titles of these regiments were :—

1st or King's Regiment of Dragoon Guards.
2nd or Queen's Regiment of Dragoon Guards.
3rd Regiment of Dragoon Guards.

The four remaining Horse regiments were accordingly re-numbered :—

4th Horse became 1st Horse (popularly The Blue Horse).§
5th Horse became 2nd Horse (popularly The Green Horse).§
6th Horse became 3rd Horse.
7th Horse became 4th Horse (popularly The Black Horse).§

But in 1788 these also were similarly converted with, respectively, the following titles :—‖

4th Dragoon Guards.
5th Dragoon Guards.
6th Dragoon Guards or The Carabiniers.
7th Dragoon Guards.

No account of regiments being converted to Dragoons can be regarded as complete without mention of "Pearce's Dragoons." During the War of the Spanish Succession in Spain the Earl of Peterborough was in command of the British troops during 1707. One of his Foot regiments was Barrymore's, now The

* Raised by James II for Monmouth's Rebellion.
† Raised by George I for the 1715 Rebellion in Scotland.
‡ By Royal Warrant dated 9th January, 1747.
§ From the colour of their facings.
‖ By General Order dated 14th February, 1788.

Somerset Light Infantry. His lordship found himself in urgent need of Dragoons and having no means of enlisting men immediately converted Barrymore's, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Pearce, to Dragoons—hence Pearce's Dragoons.*

CARABINIERS.

Carabiniers were a type of light horsemen intermediate between Horse and Dragoons. In 1691-2 William III converted the 7th Horse (later 6th Dragoon Guards) to Carabiniers, but a few years later it was re-equipped as Horse. It retained its light horse title of "Carabiniers" which has now descended upon the amalgamated regiment of the 3rd Carabiniers.† During the first half of the 18th Century continental armies made great progress with Carabiniers and Light Horsemen, but the British Army did not have another such regiment until the outbreak of the 1745 Rebellion, led by the Young Pretender. At this time the Duke of Montagu raised a Regiment of Carabiniers and the Duke of Kingston a Regiment of Light Horse. The latter regiment distinguished itself during its service in Scotland, particularly at the Battle of Culloden (16th April, 1746). When the rebellion was suppressed the regiment, in common with others, was ordered to be disbanded, but so high was it in the esteem of the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cumberland, that H.R.H. obtained permission to embody as many men as would re-enlist as his own regiment of Light Dragoons. This regiment of Light Dragoons was embodied in 1746 and served with great credit in the Netherlands. It was, however, disbanded in 1749.

LIGHT DRAGOONS.

The success of Cumberland's Light Dragoons led to a troop of Light Dragoons being added to several regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons in 1755. In 1758 nine of these troops were regimented under the command of Colonel George Augustus Eliott* and were employed in expeditions to the

* See "An Account of the Earl of Peterborough's Conduct in Spain."

† Army Order 238/1928. The Carabiniers was again converted to Light Cavalry in 1851 from which circumstance it obtained its light blue cavalry uniform which it wore until amalgamated with the 3rd Dragoon Guards.

* Later Lord Heathfield, the defender of Gibraltar. He also raised the 15th Light Dragoons.

French coast in which they demonstrated their usefulness. In 1759 five regiments of Light Dragoons were raised as follows :—

15th Light Dragoons, later 15th Hussars (15th/19th Hussars).

16th Light Dragoons, later 16th Lancers (16th/5th Lancers).

17th Light Dragoons. Disbanded 1763.

18th Light Dragoons. Renumbered 17th in 1763, later 17th Lancers. (17th/21st Lancers.)

19th Light Dragoons. Re-numbered 18th in 1763. Disbanded 1821.

So much were Light Dragoons considered a new arm that in the 1767, 1768 and 1769 Army Lists these regiments were numbered apart from the Dragoons as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Light Dragoons, but in 1770 they were re-numbered to follow the sequence of the Dragoons.* Some Dragoon regiments were also converted to Light Dragoons as follows :—

†3rd Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1818
4th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1818
7th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1783
8th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1775
9th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1783
10th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1783
11th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1783
12th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1773
13th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1783
14th Dragoons to Light Dragoons	...	1776

The 19th Hussars were raised as the 1st Bengal Light Cavalry and the 20th as the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry in 1858 and converted to Light Dragoons in 1861.

HUSSARS.

The next new arm to be introduced into the Cavalry was Hussars. The original Hussars were Hungarian Light horsemen noted for cruelty and ferocity. Their fame as light cavalry, however, spread to Western European countries and were intro-

* By 1794 there were numerous regiments of Light Dragoons all of which were disbanded after a few years existence with the exception of the original 15th, 16th and 18th as indicated above.

† All lists are given in order of regimental seniority to facilitate reference.

duced into the French army in 1692, but they did not appear in the British service until 1806. All of our Hussar regiments were conversions from Light Dragoons, such conversions taking place as follows :—

3rd Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1861
4th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1861
7th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1807
8th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1822
10th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1807
11th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1840
13th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1861
14th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1861
15th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1807
19th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1862
20th Light Dragoons to Hussars	...	1862

The 18th were raised as Hussars in 1858.

The 21st were raised as the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry in 1859 and converted to Hussars in 1861.

LANCERS.

As a result of the fine performances of the French lancers at Waterloo some of our regiments were converted to that arm immediately afterwards and for some years later, as follows :—

5th Dragoons to Lancers	... ...	1858*
9th Light Dragoons to Lancers	...	1816†
12th Light Dragoons to Lancers	...	1816
16th Light Dragoons to Lancers	...	1816
17th Light Dragoons to Lancers	...	1822
21st Hussars to Lancers	... ...	1897

MECHANIZATION.

In all the foregoing instances a change of rôle was accompanied by a corresponding change of title indicative of the rôle, but this practice was not followed in the next conversions, i.e.

* On cancellation of the order disbanding the regiment in 1799, General Order 698, dated 9th January, 1858. On its first appearance in the 1858 Army List it is described as the "5th (or Royal Irish) Regiment of (Light) Dragoons (Lancers)." It is a curious fact that, although this regiment was disbanded for insubordination in 1799, its place was kept vacant and the remaining junior regiments did not move up a place and assume new numbers as was the custom then.

† Although this regiment was converted to Lancers in 1816 its title was not altered until 1830—*vide* "London Gazette," 23rd July, 1830.

when the 11th Hussars and 12th Lancers were converted to Cavalry Armoured Car Regiments; in fact it was expressly stated in Army Order 62/1928 that on this change in organisation taking place these regiments would retain their former titles, precedence, etc., as regiments of Cavalry of the Line. These conversions, and those recently announced, may be said to have converted the regiments out of the traditional Cavalry arm into that of a mechanized arm.

At present, according to the latest available information, ten regiments of cavalry (including the 11th Hussars and 12th Lancers) have been selected for conversion to the Mechanized Arm. The expression "Mechanized Arm" means either :—

A.—Cavalry Armoured Car Regiments.
B.—Cavalry Light Tank Regiments.
C.—Cavalry Motor Regiments.

The ten regiments selected for conversion and the categories to which they will belong, are as follows :—

A.—11th Hussars.
12th Lancers.
B.—The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards).
7th Queen's Own Hussars.
9th Queen's Royal Lancers.
C.—1st King's Dragoon Guards.
3rd The King's Own Hussars.
4th Queen's Own Hussars.
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars.
10th Royal Hussars.

To the uninitiated it will be difficult to appreciate, from regimental titles, which regiments take the field on horses and which on wheels and tractors.

YEOMANRY CONVERSIONS.

After the Great War the Territorial Army portion of the Cavalry was re-organised. As a result of this re-organisation only fourteen regiments remained as Yeomanry proper whilst the remainder (nearly 40 regiments) were converted to units of other arms, the details of which are shown in the Monthly Army List. The great majority are now units of the Royal Artillery,

whilst others will be found in the Royal Corps of Signals, The Royal Welch Fusiliers and eight are Armoured Car Companies of the Royal Tank Corps.

In the matter of titles these converted Yeomanry regiments have not followed strictly either the old or the new practice in regard to Cavalry regiments, for they have retained their old Yeomanry titles to which their new titles have been added, thus :—

97th (Kent Yeomanry) Army Field Brigade, R.A.
406th (Pembroke Yeomanry) Battery.
2nd Cavalry (Middlesex Yeomanry) Divisional Signals, Royal Corps of Signals.
20th (Fife & Forfar Yeomanry) Armoured Car Company, Royal Tank Corps.

THE MILITARY TRAIN.

When the Crimean War broke out in 1854 we had no organised transport and as a consequence the Land Transport Corps was hastily organised in 1855, but the following year it was re-organised as the Military Train, an ancestor of the present Royal Army Service Corps. During the Indian Mutiny, the Military Train was converted to Cavalry in which capacity it did good service and was granted the battle honour "Lucknow." It also served in the same capacity in the China War and gained the further honours "Pekin" and "Taku Forts." In 1870 the officers of the Military Train went into the Control Department while the "other ranks" went into the first Army Service Corps.

MOUNTED INFANTRY.

In the list of conversions to the mounted arm mention must be made of those numerous improvised corps of Mounted Infantry which did such excellent work during the last South African War. The nature of the country and the style of fighting adopted by the Boers called for a large proportion of mounted troops, and to supply this need infantry regiments sent detachments to various centres and these were regimented. The Mounted Infantry regiments in South Africa were kept in being long after the war terminated.

TABLE SHOWING THE CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESENT CAVALRY REGIMENTS.

REGIMENT	Date of raising and organization on raising	Date of Conversion to				
		Dragoons	Light Dragoons	Hussars	Lancers	Mechanization. See footnotes, A, B & C
The Life Guards ..	1660 Horse	*Horse Grenadier Guards*, existed intermittently in The Life Guards from 1678 to 1788				
Royal Horse Guards ..	1661 Horse	—	—	—	—	—
1st King's Dragoon Guards.	1685 2nd Horse	1746	—	—	—	C
The Queen's Bays .. (2nd Dragoon Guards)	1685 3rd Horse	1746	—	—	—	B
3rd Carabiniers .. (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards)	Formed by the amalgamation of 3rd Dragoon Guards (Prince of Wales's) and The Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards) in 1922.					
(a) 3rd Dragoon Guards	1685 4th Horse	1746	—	—	—	—
(b) The Carabiniers ..	1685 9th Horse	1788	—	—	—	—
4th/7th Dragoons ..	Formed by the amalgamation of the 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards and 7th Dragoon Guards (Princess Royal's) in 1922.					
(a) 4th Dragoon Guards	1685 6th Horse	1788	—	—	—	—
(b) 7th Dragoon Guards	1688 10th Horse	1788	—	—	—	—
5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards	Formed by the amalgamation of the 5th Dragoon Guards (Princess Charlotte of Wales's) and The Inniskillings (6th Dragoons) in 1922.					
(a) 5th Dragoon Guards	1685 7th Horse	1788	—	—	—	—
(b) The Inniskillings	1689 Dragoons	—	—	—	—	—
1st The Royal Dragoons	A troop of horse was raised in 1661 to which 3 more troops were added in 1680. In 1683 these 4 troops were converted to Dragoons and, with 2 other newly-raised troops of Dragoons, were regimented to form the present regiment.					
The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)	1678—3 Companies of Dragoons raised: 1681 3 further Companies raised: 1681 these 6 companies regimented to form the present regiment					
3rd The King's Own Hussars	1685 Dragoons	—	1818	1861	—	C
4th Queen's Own Hussars	1685 Dragoons	—	1818	1861	—	C
7th Queen's Own Hussars	1690 Dragoons	—	1783	1807	—	B

A—Cavalry Armoured Car Regiment.
B—Selected for Cavalry Light Tank Regiment.
C—Selected for Cavalry Motor Regiment.

TABLE SHOWING THE CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESENT CAVALRY REGIMENTS.

REGIMENT	Date of raising and organization on raising	Date of Conversion to				
		Dragoons	Light Dragoons	Hussars	Lancers	Mechanization. See footnotes, A, B & C
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars	1693 Dragoons	—	1775	1822	—	C
9th Queen's Royal Lancers	1715 Dragoons	—	1783	—	1816	B
10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	1715 Dragoons	—	1783	1807	—	C
11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)	1715 Dragoons	—	1783	1840	—	A 1928
12th Royal Lancers .. (Prince of Wales's)	1715 Dragoons	—	1773	—	1816	A 1928
13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own)	Formed by the amalgamation of the 13th Hussars and 18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own) in 1922.					
(a) 13th Hussars ..	1715 Dragoons	—	1783	1861	—	—
(b) 18th Hussars ..	1858 Hussars	—	—	—	—	—
14th/20th Hussars ..	Formed by the amalgamation of the 14th King's Hussars and the 20th Hussars in 1922					
(a) 14th Hussars ..	1715 Dragoons	—	1776	1861	—	—
(b) 20th Hussars ..	1858 Raised as 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry	—	1861	1862	—	—
15th/19th The King's Royal Hussars	Formed by the amalgamation of the 15th King's Hussars and the 19th Royal Hussars (Queen Alexandra's Own) in 1922					
(a) 15th Hussars ..	1759 Light Dragoons	—	—	1807	—	—
(b) 19th Hussars ..	1858 Raised as 1st Bengal Light Cavalry	—	1861	1862	—	—
16th/5th Lancers ..	Formed by the amalgamation of the 16th The Queen's Lancers and the 5th Royal Irish Lancers in 1922.					
(a) 16th Lancers ..	1759 Light Dragoons	—	—	—	1816	—
(b) 5th Lancers ..	1689 Dragoons	Disbanded in 1799: disbandment cancelled in 1858			Reconstituted as Lancers 1858	
17th/21st Lancers ..	Formed by the amalgamation of the 17th Lancers (Duke of Cambridge's Own) and the 21st Lancers (Empress of India's) in 1922					
(a) 17th Lancers ..	1759 Light Dragoons	—	—	—	1822	—
(b) 21st Lancers ..	1858 Raised as 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry	—	—	1861	1897	—

A—Cavalry Armoured Car Regiment.
B—Selected for Cavalry Light Tank Regiment.
C—Selected for Cavalry Motor Regiment.

NAPOLEON'S EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY UNDER THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE

By THISTLE.

FREDERIC the Great had shown Europe what highly trained and disciplined masses of horsemen could accomplish in battle, but it was left for Napoleon to demonstrate the full possibilities of the mounted arm. His cavalry was used to the fullest extent in those operations which lead up to, and follow actions, as well as for shock tactics in battle. Frederic's cavalry had failed somewhat in light cavalry duties. While the cavalry of Napoleon was far from perfect at such work, its leaders at any rate understood these duties. This is clearly shown by books such as de Brack's "Advance Posts of Light Cavalry."

Napoleon followed the principles which had led to success in the wars of the ancient world. His development of these ideas became the basis of a new Art of War.

Those who have studied his campaigns have attempted to reduce his methods to a system or science, but the results have been disappointing. The truth is that Napoleon's secrets of success can neither be learnt nor taught, these were personal to him, in so far that his genius applied the means at hand to the end in view at the moment. Clear ideas about previous happenings are helpful, but as war is but a dreadful drama and circumstances never repeat themselves, rules of conduct cannot be laid down.

Napoleon's regimental experience previous to becoming a General, had been confined to the artillery. Exactly when he began to appreciate the full possibilities open to a powerful cavalry, we do not know; but during this second Italian campaign the value of cavalry in battle, when properly led, was dramatically demonstrated. At Marengo the charge of Kellerman's

weak Brigade went far to turn defeat into victory. Napoleon, although he did not publicly acknowledge his debt to Kellerman, realised it. Years afterwards in Spain when Kellerman was brought before the Emperor for misappropriating money, Napoleon said, "General Kellerman, whenever your name is brought before me, I can remember nothing but Marengo." He had good cause to say this, because never again in his wars did a weak brigade of four hundred sabres achieve a result of so much importance to his fortunes. Kellerman's Brigade had been engaged all day and had already lost more than fifty per cent. of casualties before the charge was made.

No commander has ever issued clearer or better orders to cavalry than Napoleon. He told them where to go, exactly what to find out, and when and where to return. He never sent the cavalry on vague or indefinite missions; on the contrary, when not urgently required, it was kept in reserve till an occasion for its use presented itself. He sent the cavalry where he required it, without limiting it to those areas which are usually considered suitable for cavalry action. This should be carefully digested by those who consider that the effective action of mounted troops is restricted to particular types of country.

From the beginning of the Austerlitz Campaign until the end at Waterloo, we find the Emperor relying more and more on his cavalry. Prior to a battle it screened his movements and gave him information. The manner in which the French horsemen were used to cover the movements of their army in 1805 and 1806, prior to the Ulm and Jena, furnishes a model for the method of the employment of cavalry in a protective rôle.

He used his cavalry in masses, holding that "the most abundant means if scattered can produce no result"; when he considered it necessary, he supported his cavalry with other arms.

In the Austerlitz and Jena Campaigns, when his cavalry was still young and inexperienced, he was very prudent in its employment. Later on as it gained war experience he became bolder in his use of it. But immediately after the Russian Campaign, when the cavalry was again largely composed of new levies, we find that it was once more very prudently used.

The cautious use of the cavalry in the Jena Campaign, was due to its protective rôle, and to the fact that it was closely supported by infantry. There is no doubt that the great reputatation of the Prussian cavalry made the Emperor very cautious. He did not wish to expose his cavalry to defeat at the opening of the campaign. While the French cavalry succeeded in keeping the Prussians in a state of mental fog, this holding back of the cavalry for protective duties resulted in the Emperor being somewhat uncertain about the movements of the Prussian army even up to the end of the Battle of Jena.

Napoleon's armies living on the country, separated to feed and concentrated to fight. The success of his plans (which always aimed at surprising his enemy) depended on his being able to keep his own dispositions concealed both from the enemy's knowledge and view. This meant that his cavalry had to drive away any reconnaissance of the enemy's horsemen.

His manoeuvres were not those which could be executed after the enemy had come in view on a battlefield. His army, (advancing by various roads, in separate columns, mutually supporting each other), required tactical security prior to and during deployment. Given such security for some twenty-four hours, he could concentrate on any given Corps, and be ready to give battle.

Napoleon covered the front of his armies with a cloud of protective cavalry. This, generally speaking, kept the enemy in a state of absolute uncertainty about his movements. Usually, owing to the high standard of the intelligence reports of his cavalry reconnaissance, he was able to co-ordinate the movements of the various army corps so as to give battle with an initial advantage. This is well illustrated by the surprise of Mack at Ulm, and the fog of war which surrounded the Prussians prior to Jena. While any real fighting prior to deployment, such as Lanne's action at Saalfeld, fell to the advance troops, the protection of the army was the task of the cavalry

In the cavalry protective work, the Light Cavalry were employed in the more advanced reconnaissance; the Medium, and even the Heavy Cavalry formed supporting bodies where

necessary. This arrangement had the advantage of employing the superior mobility of light cavalry where it was mainly required, and of utilising the superior fighting qualities of the medium and heavy cavalry (thus were kept comparatively fresh and untired) for the occasion when support by shock action was required. Napoleon says in his maxims: "Cavalry of the Line should be posted in the van, the rear and the wings, to support the Light Cavalry."

In the advance for the 1815 Campaign Napoleon made little use of his cavalry for reconnaissance. It is possible he realised its limitations and had other ways of obtaining information about the enemy. In fact, there was practically no cavalry activity on either side until actual fighting commenced.

But Napoleon's cavalry did not confine itself to the rôles of protection and exploration. It was the arm on which he relied to strike crushing blows to bring about decisive victory. During an action the cavalry co-operated with the other arms. Napoleon well understood its use on the battlefield. He neither overrated or underrated the arm. In his maxims he says: "Cavalry charges are good at the commencement, the middle and at the end of the battle"; also he says, "that the wish to keep cavalry to the end of the fight betrays no idea of the effective power of charges, combined of cavalry and infantry, for attack or defence." His 'reserve cavalry' was not kept in reserve.

The battle of Austerlitz was preceded by some severe cavalry fighting. The French were here thoroughly successful in defeating the Austrian and Russian horsemen.

At Jena the Prussian cavalry did not live up to their reputation. If the available Prussian cavalry had been used in masses at Jena, according to the teaching of Frederic the Great, the result of the battle might have been different, but the Prussian cavalry was split up amongst infantry formations. The leaders of Frederic's time were either dead or had sunk into senile decay. The shadow of the cavalry remained, the true spirit had perished.

The French cavalry took a brilliant part in the battle and materially contributed to the victory. Murat, with the reserve cavalry, did not arrive on the field till late in the action, just

in time to complete the victory and carry out the pursuit. There was no great mass attack, but the cavalry of the army corps engaged, was used for shock action throughout the battle.

From 1807 onward, the Emperor began to make an increasing use of cavalry masses in the battle. His victories, especially later ones, were largely gained by the employment of cavalry shock action in combination with other arms. But it was not his normal practice to order cavalry charges until the enemy had been to some extent demoralised by the action of other arms. He observed no pedantic rules, but normally did not use the cavalry until the enemy had been obliged to use up his reserves.

The system of massed cavalry attacks was for the first time fully developed in 1807. At Eylau, Murat led eighteen thousand sabres to a charge which saved Augereau's Corps, broke the Russian line and restored the battle. At Friedland the cavalry reserve was engaged in such hard fighting that it was unable to carry out effectually the subsequent pursuit. This failure may partly be attributed to the fact of Murat being absent on detachment.

At Wagram the cavalry was used in combination with artillery. A charge of forty squadrons was used here to cover the formation of one of those great massed batteries which Napoleon so often employed as a means of tactical victory. One hundred and two guns were concentrated, and the infantry attack of Macdonald's corps was made under the support of this battery. The artillery (firing case shot) simply blew a hole in a portion of the enemy's line, but it was the cavalry action that had enabled the battery to be established. At Borodino, in 1812, the French cavalry actually captured a redoubt. In the Waterloo Campaign the French cavalry shock action, in combination with other arms, failed from a variety of causes.

The British infantry possessed a morale, discipline and training above the average. Wellington's tactics of forming his main infantry line on the reverse slopes of hills, protected it from artillery fire. Consequently it was not demoralised at the time of the cavalry attacks. The linear system, although it failed the Prussians at Jena, did enable infantry holding a position, to meet cavalry with a greater volume of fire than was

possible from the column formations of the Continental infantry, against whom the previous French victories had been gained.

The French cavalry at Waterloo lacked both efficiency and numbers. It had not recovered from the losses of men and horses in Russia. This lack of trained horses and men caused the attacks at Waterloo to be made with an even greater lack of order and cohesion than had been customary previously. Apart from all this the contours of the ground were unfavourable for cavalry attacks, and the mud of the battlefield made the 'going' heavy, and destroyed the weight of the attacks.

The absence of Berthier, Napoleon's Chief of Staff, completely disorganised the French staff work in the Waterloo Campaign, and the further absence of that cavalry genius, Murat, left the cavalry without skilled direction.

The attacks at both Waterloo and Quatre-Bras lacked co-ordination, weight and the artillery and infantry support essential to success.

One brigade of Kellerman's corps broke two British squares at Quatre-Bras, but finally took to flight when Kellerman's horse was killed. Three of his available brigades were not engaged. He, the corps commander, was busy leading one brigade instead of co-ordinating the efforts of his corps. There were many good reasons for the failure of the French cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign.

After a victory, Napoleon's cavalry was pushed forward in pursuit to ensure the destruction of the retreating enemy army. The results of Murat's pursuit after Jena, are unequalled in history. The pursuit after Ulm and Austerlitz are other examples. The pursuit at Austerlitz was checked by the submission of the Austrian Emperor. Later, pursuits deteriorated. After Friedland, the Russian Army escaped with much less loss than it should have. The pursuit after Eckmuhl was vigorously conducted by the cavalry in the beginning. Nansouty and St. Sulpice overthrew the Austrian cavalry and pursued it hotly, until checked by the Austrian infantry. The pursuit was not, however, carried on because of the fatigue of the troops, and therefore the Austrian Army escaped destruction.

After Napoleon's great cavalry was destroyed in Russia, information became poor and scanty, victories were hard to achieve, and the results from victories became negligible. The cavalry could no longer cover Napoleon's armies and bring in information about the enemy. It was no longer able to act effectively. There were fatal failures to pursue at Lutzen, Bautzen, and Hanau; here tactical successes were not turned into decisive victories. There was either no cavalry to pursue or those available were inefficient at the work. Napoleon exclaimed after Lutzen and Bautzen, "What! no guns, no prisoners—after this slaughter!" If the cavalry which perished in Russia had been available during this campaign, these battles would probably have re-established Napoleon's hold on Europe again.

After the retreat of the Prussians at Ligny, in 1815, there was no effective pursuit. This neglect had serious consequences, the Prussian army retreated uncrushed, and was able to intervene at Waterloo a few days after with fatal results to Napoleon. The effect of what the presence of Murat with French cavalry would have been worth in the Waterloo Campaign, is hard to over-estimate.

It can be said safely, that from the time that Napoleon's original cavalry was destroyed in Russia and half-trained regiments used to replace it, his ascendancy over Europe slipped from his grasp.

LAKE AND VICTORY

By Colonel E. B. Maunsell, late 14th P.W.O., Scinde Horse, I.A.

Part V.

The general situation while the Grand Army was re-assembling at Agra, in late September, 1804, was roughly as follows:—

Holkar's infantry and guns were about half-way to Muttra, strongly posted, as usual, behind a marsh. If they could be induced to fight it was confidently anticipated that the war would be almost over. His horse were here, there, and everywhere.

The Bombay Force, upon whose movements Lake placed great stress, as it would press Holkar from the south, was near Ujein, some three hundred miles to the south. Its commander, Murray, an officer "notorious for his irresolution," was meeting with obstruction from the officials of our so-called ally, Scindhia, and Murray complained, querulously and repeatedly, of his difficulties in regard to supply, transport and shortage of cavalry. That Lake and Sir Arthur Wellesley both underrated them is more than probable, but both officers were of opinion that it was high time a more resolute commander superseded him. Lake's perfectly logical point of view was that as Holkar had succeeded in moving 150 guns, Murray should be able to move twenty. Orders were accordingly given that Major General Jones, of the Bombay Army, one of the very few officers admittedly a half-caste, should take over. This officer was thought very highly of by Wellesley and proved worthy of his confidence.

The whole country intervening between Lake and Murray being over-run with Holkar's horse and banditti, inter-com-

munication was difficult. It was not until half-way through October, when Lake was near Delhi, that Murray, after "reiterated and repeated orders from the Commander-in-Chief," commenced to move, and then only in a halting manner. By Christmas he had only covered about one hundred miles, when he was relieved by Jones, who found the force in such bad order that it was not until six weeks had elapsed that he joined the Grand Army before Bhurtpore. The Bengal officers, who had hoped to patronise the "unta gurgurs" (camel belches), as the Bombay troops were called, then found, to their astonishment, that it was then in extremely good order and better disciplined than their own army, though short of transport.* The 65th and 86th Foot had had great numbers of men sick during the rainy season, and their troubles had been accentuated by the loss of the camp equipment owing to a heavy flood, but by the time they reached Bhurtpore it would appear that they were reasonably fit. At all events there is no record to the contrary. Taken on the whole, there seems every reason to suppose that both Lake and Wellesley were correct in their judgment on Murray, and the curious sequel is this, that Wellesley, as Lord Wellington, had this same officer foisted on him in Catalonia, in 1813, where Murray again proved a failure. He evidently had friends at the Horse Guards, where nepotism and favouritism were rampant.

While the movements of the Bombay Force gave much concern, the situation at Delhi was not too bright. Though the Imperial City was not immediately threatened, its garrison amounted to only two and a half regular sepoy battalions, a corps from Perron's service under Harriot, taken over during the siege of Agra, and about one thousand very irregular scallywags. Things might be serious if Holkar made a strong effort

* Of the old Bengal Army of the days of Lord Lake, there remain at the present day the Governor-General's Bodyguard, the Sappers and Miners which had just been raised and who were to do yeoman work at Deeg and Bhurtpore, and four battalions of infantry. The infantry alone can be said to represent the old racial classes enlisted—Rajputs and Jats. Only two regiments of cavalry and the Sappers and Miners remain of the Madras Army. Of the Bombay Army, on the other hand, the troop of cavalry raised in 1804 swelled to the present 13th Lancers and nearly the whole of the infantry battalions are still in existence. It is probable that the large Mahratta element always enlisted, and promotion by merit in lieu of seniority accounts for the survival. The superior discipline and tone of the Bombay troops was noted by many officers during both the Afghan and Sikh wars.

against it. There were seven miles of tumbledown walls.*

The bastions were so small and so weak that the very act of firing guns from them brought down long stretches. In a huge city like Delhi there was bound to be a large turbulent element, and any mishap might be serious. In addition, the Palace guards of the Moghul were known to be intriguing with Holkar and but little reliance could be placed on most of the irregular corps. Fortunately, the old Moghul had taken a great liking to Ochterlony, who treated him with a deference and consideration which was in absolute contrast to that meted out by the low class French adventurers who had preceded him. The prestige of the British stood high in the Moghul Court.

With Burn, an exceedingly able soldier, in command of the troops, and with Ochterlony, administering the City and tending the Moghul, things were in good hands. Both officers, masterful men, were, moreover, on admirable terms.

While the Grand Army was assembling, and, indeed, until it was to reach Muttra, Burn, an officer whose great war experience had shown him the imperative importance of always showing a bold front to Orientals, had his troops outside the City, on the Muttra road, near the Purana Killa, determined if a general action by the Grand Army took place within a reasonable distance, to march to the cannon and strike Holkar in the rear. It was not until Holkar's infantry and guns arrived before Delhi that he was to withdraw within the walls, Lake deeming that the possession of the Moghul was of more importance than that of the City.

In the Deccan, famine prevented all major operations, though in Khandesh and the western Ghauts, small columns were busy reducing the innumerable Mahratta hill forts.

Sir Arthur Wellesley was at Calcutta, with the Governor General. On September 23rd, incidentally a Sunday, he had been present at a huge banquet in honour of Assaye. The affair was attended by all the leading lights of Calcutta, including our old friend, Mr. William Hickey. We learn that the toast, "Her Majesty and the Royal Princesses," drunk with

* The works we stormed in 1857 were built by British engineer officers, Lord Napier of Magdala, being one.

cheers three times three, was followed by the appropriate air, "Merrily Danced the Quaker's Wife," played by the Governor General's own band.

The toast, "The Honourable East India Company," was then honoured by "Money in both pockets," and the cheers that attended this were so long and so prolonged that the banquet dissolved into disorder.

Despite these festivities, Arthur Wellesley wrote, with admirable clarity, a memorandum on Monson's disaster. It may best be summed up in the supreme importance of security of supply, security of points of passage, and avoidance of allowing a force like the Mahratta, to deploy its immensely formidable artillery.

The country between Agra and Muttra, in 1804, differed materially from what it is now. The great Moghul Road, by which the old Emperors used to take the route for Delhi and Kashmir, although it was unmetalled, was, according to old accounts, bordered by trees for 150 miles of its length. The chaos of the eighteenth century had resulted in all being cut down and destroyed, and it is only at intervals we see even the old "kos pillars" marking the miles. The dead flat Gangetic Plain, in 1804, was, to all intents and purposes, a wilderness, with only a few scrubby babul trees, and movement on a wide front in every direction was easy. The vast irrigation system has transformed the country, crops and trees being where there was once only desert. The villages were all walled, some being almost forts, and the whole zone was ravaged by banditti, mostly mounted, and termed indifferently, Gujars, Mewattis or Rohillas. Muttra itself was a fertile oasis, but otherwise crops seem to have been but few and far between, for no man knew that he would reap where he had sown.

The problem confronting Lake was more concerned with supply than with the enemy, for by now the Doab was in an upheaval and convoys had to be heavily guarded, the supplies being drawn, in the main from the east bank of the Ganges, that is to say, from Oudh and Rohilkand.

A successful battle, and Lake's supply difficulties would end, for every doubtful raja would at once oblige. On the other hand,

the wily Holkar might shirk, and supplies must be certain in order to follow him up. Unless the Doab were quietened the convoys would be in continual danger. Lake, accordingly, detached a Captain Worsley, with two battalions and Skinner's corps to pacify the Doab between Agra and Muttra, while the Grand Army, with about ten days supply in hand, moved on Muttra by the west bank of the Jumna, hoping for a general action. Worsley, though only a captain, was thus commanding a force a modern Lieut-Colonel would be glad to have. The promotion rules in the Company's service of the period, however, were of such a nature that men could be promoted long after they had left India for good, with extraordinary anomalies. "Rank" promotion was, in consequence, extremely slow, though largely compensated for by lucrative and responsible "appointment" promotion. Cast iron seniority was the rule, "no damned merit" being recognised. Worsley, although only a captain, had twenty-three years' service. He was an exceedingly able officer, having already distinguished himself under Lake in the Mud War of 1803, and in Mysore under Cornwallis. The sundry turbulent leaders of society soon met their match in Worsley, one or two having their necks lengthened and their bodies left to decorate the landscape, while others had a good taste of the cat-o'-nine tails. The powerful raja of Hattress, it was considered, had better be left alone for the time being, though it was evident that even this chief was suffering from nerves, and, as we shall see, conducted himself in the opera bouffe manner peculiar to many such gentry.

The war now to be entered upon was to differ materially from that against Scindhia and Berar. With Scindhia it had been the case of big general actions, and Assaye and Laswari had caused the famous red-coated Brigades of de Boigne and Perron to dissolve, and with them, the power of Scindhia. These stout-hearted soldiers had, in large part, been taken into the British service in complete units, and were serving under their old adventurer officers. The First Brigade, for instance, which had played such havoc with Arthur Wellesley at Assaye, and which, alone, had retired in good order from the battlefield, still had a number of its old battalions under their genial

Hanoverian, Pohlman, who had commanded until the eve of that fatal day. Pohlman, as befitted a loyal subject of King George, still retained his Germanic taste in regard to ladies, for his enormous seraglio had many representatives famed rather for the full substance of their size than for their shape. His elephant, on which he rode in state, followed by an escort of troopers, gorgeously attired, served him, on the plains of Hindustan, much as the heavy landaus of the portly gentry of his native Hanover. This officer was now in the vicinity of Agra, and four months later was to play a very decisive part in the rout of Holkar's infantry. The battalions of Brownrigg, who had fought so stoutly at Agra, were now near Delhi, though the brave Irishman had fallen in the service of his country, and the command had devolved upon his friend, Harriot.

Actually serving with the Grand Army, moreover, were a great number of Perron's golandaz, or native gunners, and, before Bhurtpore, over one third of our artillery was to be served by these men.

Holkar's regular soldiery had never been the equal of Perron's, and the infantry were, in the main, of very poor material. His gunners, like all native gunners, were formidable. The strength of this chief lay in his hordes of horse, in his great personal courage and influence, and in his very fertile brain. He was an adversary with whom it would be dangerous to take unnecessary risks.

He had no European or half-caste adventurers in his service. He detested the French, and, with great consideration for men who had served him in stress and danger for some years, had had such of his British, or British half-caste officers who could not get away, murdered. "One-eyed Holkar," indeed, was a perfect little gentleman.

In the war against Scindhia there had been no serious menace to the baggage. There had been many cases, it is true, where small bands of robbers had pounced upon isolated camels or bullock carts, but, beyond this, nothing. Now things were different. Huge swarms of predatory horse roved the country, some of them from as far south as the Carnatic, and these were

far too formidable to be coped with by meagrely armed camp followers.

In Lake's Standing Orders (*vide* Journal of Army Historical Research, Spring Number, 1934), enormous stress is laid upon this baggage being well concentrated, not hampering the free movement of the troops, and on being loaded up ready to move in ample time.

Another paragraph in these orders gives us the detail for "safeguards"; in other words, piquets for the protection of property, such as valuable crops or buildings. "Forcing a safeguard" was punishable by death, and army orders gave special emphasis to the necessity instantly to shoot all plunderers. There was to be no preliminary Court Martial. Curiously enough, also, stress was particularly laid on preventing white soldiery from this plundering, and the same point occurs in the Wellington Despatches.

The mode laid down for flank protection is also of interest, for the menace was rather from the flank than from the head or tail of the column. Each troop or company—they were the days of two troops to a squadron and ten companies to a battalion—was to detail four "flankers" who were not to proceed more than two hundred yards from the main column. Each regiment or battalion was to detail one British officer to command the whole of the flankers of his unit. Thus, twenty-four troopers of the cavalry, and forty infantrymen, drawn from six troops or ten companies were jumbled together under an officer who probably only knew half of them, in lieu of the modern practice of detailing a complete unit. The cavalry troopers were detailed from the seventeen men per troop who carried carbines, for the rest had pistols only. The Brown Bess of the infantry had a fairly accurate range of about seventy yards, but the cavalry carbine would be lucky if it hit at forty, so it is not surprising to learn that it became necessary to unlimber the guns repeatedly when the pressure on the flankers became anything approaching the serious. On occasion, however, the modern piqueting system was resorted to.

Finally, a very important series of selections had to be made, namely, those of the Prize Agents. This was effected by the

votes of the officers, there being separate agents for the King's troops, the Company's cavalry and the Company's infantry—and our friend, John Pester, a subaltern of four years' service, was selected for the last named.

The Grand Army was to march on October 1st, with the Park, in other words, guns not attached to regiments and battalions, sometimes termed "guns of the line," ammunition column and ordnance stores, on the inner flank, and the baggage and bazaars further inside still. Their right would be protected by the Jumna.

The column of fighting troops, that is to say eight regiments of cavalry and eleven battalions of infantry, would be roughly two miles long in the then formations.* The baggage included probably a couple of hundred elephants, some the private property of the more well-to-do officers, but the majority for the carrying of the huge tents required for the white soldiery, and their charpoys. There would also be about four thousand camels and forty or fifty thousand bullocks, some in carts, but mostly pack, the majority the property of the Brinjaras. In addition would be a miscellaneous menagerie of goats, dogs, poultry and other live stock. The "bordels de campagne" of the French Foreign Legion were well represented by many dancing girls, who also followed the armies of the day.

The number of human beings accompanying Lake's 10,000 fighting men was probably nearer 60,000 than 50,000, of whom half were women and children.

The Grand Army was to march at 5 a.m. in the morning of October 1st. Long before the 4 a.m. appointed for the beating of the "General" the camp was afoot, for the native of India, then, as now, had to rise hours before any European would deem it necessary. Commencing with the appetising hawking and spitting, without which the fifty thousand odd Hindus could not possibly start the day, the noise gradually increased to pandemonium. The roaring of camels, the yelling of each and every one of the followers, male and female, addressing, at a range of two yards, their next door neighbours, and amid a blaze of numberless fires. Just before 4 a.m. could be heard the taps of

* Cavalry in "Divisions" about eight abreast; Infantry in "Quarter Companies" about six to eight abreast.

the drummer on duty in the Park, taken up, battalion by battalion, outwards, then, this time, inwards, the Drummers' Call, indicating that the whole of the drummers were standing-to to beat off the "General."

A long roll now commenced from the Park, taken up by the whole army, while far on the right the cavalry trumpets sounded the "Boot and Saddle." The din partially subsided, and now could be heard the bellowings of the Baggage Master and his assistants, bad Hindustani, and all blasphemous, intermingled with the swish of whips as some follower was "persuaded" to bestir himself.

At 5 a.m. a second long roll of drums indicated the Assembly, and the Brigades closed to their right preparatory to march—and very many men were never to see their homes again.

Within the next four months the casualties in the British Infantry were to run as high as sixty per cent., and those of Sepoy Corps to forty per cent., a percentage not equalled until the Great War.

Like all first day's marches, there was a good bit of confusion, and the Grand Army only covered nine miles in five hours. The infantry and cavalry had collided in the darkness, and, as the feeling between the 76th and one of the dragoon regiments was not too good, there had been bitter words. When, however, their comrades of Laswari, the 29th, came up, the 76th altered their tone, and much ribald chaff was exchanged, the "Dismounted Dragoons" following that battle being a subject of much witticism. In Spain, such affairs were common, and frequently led to serious brawls, for the horse soldier looked down on the mud-crunching infantry as dirt, while the latter regarded the cavalry, with the exception of three or four British regiments, and most of the German, as almost useless appendages for serious work. No enemy was encountered. The following day the enemy horse appeared in swarms. The cavalry deployed, hoping for an engagement. "It was a very grand sight," says Pester. Nothing materialised, and the enemy edged off as the infantry came up. The third day the army reached Muttra, swarms of horse harrying the march. The "flankers" were hotly engaged the whole day and a certain

number of casualties occurred. At one stage things became so serious that the whole line was halted and the guns unlimbered. At this juncture an unfortunate dragoon of the 8th, on a white horse, was seen to be bolted with. Drawing his sword, he was fortunate enough to direct his beast along the front of the army, though passing through sundry parties of the enemy en route. The animal was fortunately stopped, badly cut about, and the man rode back unhurt. A few weeks later the poor fellow was killed, the horse having again bolted.

Much baggage was lost this day, for the enemy had broken through the Rearguard. Pester lost his horse-tent, an article now unknown. Later on this officer had his horse inside his own tent. It was a very valuable Arab, one of the famous consignment brought from Basra by Sir John Malcolm and presented to the Marquis Wellesley, and cost, at Basra, Rs. 3,000.

Lake, "fuming to be at them," had been greatly disgusted at finding Holkar's guns had all made off, and, on the 5th, it became known that they were marching on Delhi under Harnaut, Holkar's "chela," or bondsman.

Orders were at once sent that the prime object was to be the security of the person of the Moghul rather than the possession of the city itself. Meanwhile, the supply factor intervened, and Lake, very wisely, determined to take no chances. Lord Cornwallis's blunder of moving on Seringapatam in 1791, and then finding he must retreat or starve was not to be repeated. Unknown to Lake, incidentally, there were, at that very moment, guns with Holkar which had been abandoned on that occasion.

The enemy horse swarmed, and, by some extraordinarily bad management, cut off a convoy of two hundred camels which was en route from Agra. The line of piquets was constantly engaged and the grazing of baggage animals in front of the camp was attended with great risk.

On one occasion even, the enemy succeeded in carrying off four elephants and a dozen camels from within one hundred and fifty yards of the piquets. The affair had, on the other hand, its lighter side, for two of the elephants were the property of an exceedingly fiery and unpopular colonel, whose roarings, like

those of good King David, were heard through the night watches.

We now get an interesting light on the system of discipline obtaining in sepoy corps. Pester found two men of his company short of their ammunition, and brought them before the Commanding Officer, who mildly reproved them. Pester, greatly disgusted, ordered his subahdar ("black captain" in his explanatory note) to parade the company at sunset and rattan the men. The subahdar was carrying out the punishment when the British Battalion Sergeant Major intervened and went off to inform the Commanding Officer. Meanwhile, the subahdar reported to Pester, who directed him to carry on with the punishment, and then placed the Sergeant Major under arrest. The Commanding Officer wished Pester to excuse the latter, but Pester, a subaltern of four years' service only, refused, whereat the Commanding Officer "expressed himself offended," and, what is still more curious, would only speak to Pester on duty for some time after. Still more curious, the Sergeant Major was brought to a Court Martial and sentenced to six months' suspension of rank and pay.

We learn, in this connection, that British officers did not themselves cane the men, the chief reason being caste prejudice on the part of the sepoys, who, being, for the most part high caste Hindus or Brahmins, would deem themselves defiled by a European with no caste at all.

The incident described, it is well to remember, took place at a period when the power of Commanding Officers in sepoy corps was immense. It was the persistent weakening of this power which led to the falling-off of discipline which eventually resulted in the Mutiny.

Although the powers of the Commanding Officers over the rank and file were enormous, there is reason to suppose that it was weaker over the British officers than it is now. Career was by hard and fast seniority, and bad reports seem to have had but little or no effect, for the Board of Directors were astonishingly weak in allowing useless men to remain in positions for which they were quite unfitted. Heavy drinking was universal, and the Commanding Officers often set the worst example.

Courts Martial, with innumerable petty charges, were the rule and not the exception, and officers were, in consequence, not by any means too afraid of being brought before a court whose sentence would only affect their careers under extreme circumstances.

The supply factor at Muttra was serious, and such was the difficulty in purchasing provisions that the irregular horse, who had to fend for themselves, commenced to desert right and left. As they were identical in race and appearance with many of the enemy, this was an easy matter, and, as we study the doings of Skinner, we shall see that his corps were on exceedingly affable terms with the hostile horse, and serious fighting was not expected on either side. The irregular corps of the day, indeed, were often a form of blackmail, recruited to keep possible enemies quiet. The pay of such corps varied according to the theatre of the war and, even in time of peace, when units were permanently embodied, regiments would not all receive the same pay. Hearsay's corps, with the Grand Army, was, however, unique, for the men, in theory, were his own peculiar henchmen. Hearsay, had, the previous October, marched into Lake's camp before Agra holding the status of an independent chief, and this half-caste of twenty-one drew a pension of Rs. 800 per mensem to compensate him for loss of position. He had been, in strict point of fact, not much more than a glorified bandit.

Four days after the army reached Muttra, a large convoy arrived with Worsley. This officer had cleared a zone through which Brinjara convoys, provided they kept to it, could pass with comparatively little molestation. The Brinjaras, it must be remembered, were a caste which had held the carrying trade and supply of armies since the days of the Emperor Baber, and probably before. They were quite capable of taking care of themselves when it was a matter of dealing with the normal banditti, for the Brinjara is a truculent fellow, and his lady likewise.

Unfortunately an important Brinjara chief elected to pass too close to Hattrass, and the minions of Diaram proved too much for him. The Brinjara code was honest enough, namely,

that they had contracted to get their convoys through, and this must be done if humanly possible. News was sent in to Muttra of the mishap. Skinner was accordingly despatched to work the oracle. After a hard ride he caught the convoy up as it was nearing Hattrass, and a comic opera fight took place with Diaram's representatives, casualties on either side being negligible, though much noise and matchlock firing took place. Diaram, after the opera bouffe manner of native rajas, now realised he had made a mistake and hastened to make amends, placing, as usual, the blame on his subordinates for the whole occurrence. He sent his Vakil to Lake, together with some scallywag horse, stating that the convoy had only been brought into Hattrass in order that it should be secure against another raja, whose castle it would have otherwise passed en route to the Grand Army.

Lake had already had experience of Diaram in September, 1803, just after the combat outside Aligarh. The unfortunate Perron, fleeing from this encounter "with his hat off"—in native phraseology, "rattled"—had stopped at Hattrass to rest and Diaram, one of his subject rajas, had treated him with the respect he had always paid to the stronger party. Within half an hour of Perron quitting, messages were sent welcoming Lake, and the British General, in his report, amusingly commented on his "remarkable and singular friendliness."

The arrival of Skinner at Muttra with convoy intact pleased Lake greatly, and the worthy half-caste was rewarded by the Commander-in-Chief taking off his own sword and belt and placing it round Skinner. Skinner, furthermore, tells us he was invited to dinner at Headquarters. At this period it is evident that his manners and habits were more native than European, for by a curious coincidence Pester dined there the same evening. We get the following entry in his journal: "Din'd (*sic*) this evening at Headquarters, where, as usual, a very great deal of wine was drunk and many songs were sung. The melody of Captain "T" was marred by the reiterated eructations of Captain "S," late of the Mahratta Service." As Skinner grew older his table manners improved, for he often dined with great men like Combermere and Malcolm.

As the value of Skinner's corps was shown in such a marked manner, he was ordered to go off and recruit it to 1,700 sabres. The pay was also raised by ten rupees a horse, though it is probable that most other corps deemed reliable also had their pay raised to the same standard. There was not the slightest difficulty in obtaining recruits, for Skinner had merely to visit the enemy, and the Hindustani Mussulman element would flock in.

The hordes of hostile horse, just as they had been in the Mysore wars, were almost impossible to bring to battle unless they were trapped, as Dhhondia Waugh, the freebooter, had been by Wellesley, with an obstacle behind them. In the country round Muttra at that period there were none of the irrigation canals now existing and, as we have pointed out before, the whole country has altered. It was, however, hoped that a blow might be struck by a "beat up" of their camps at dawn, for each and every chief had his own ideas as to where he should pass the night. The difficulty was to fix upon which camp to strike, for there would, in all probability, be some minor bivouac en route which would give the alarm. The most important was located at Areeng, seven miles west of Muttra. With some sixty thousand hangers-on accompanying the army and the whole of Muttra watching any movement, to ensure secrecy was a matter of the greatest difficulty. There was indiscreet talk among the officers, and news of something on the tapis evidently spread, for the troops, having marched a couple of miles in pitch dark, stumbled upon a piquet—in all probability it was the bivouac of a minor chief—and by the time Areeng was reached the enemy was making off. It was an intensely hot day and the British Infantry suffered greatly.

During this operation, Hearsay's corps had been mistaken for the enemy—we have seen similar errors in recent years on the Frontier—for the men were identical. He was, in consequence, directed to carry blue flags with a St. George's Cross.

Three days later, on October 10th, a second attempt was made at a "beat up." The cavalry made a wide sweep, hoping to drive the enemy into the infantry by another line. Thorn, of the 29th Dragoons, took part. Despite the troops being

turned out in astonishing secrecy and the staff work being admirable, Holkar was thoroughly on the alert and had piquets out which sent up blue lights to give the alarm. Acting on the principle "Think bloodily and gallop like Hell," the whole of the cavalry deployed into two lines, in columns of half regiments, and rode straight for the camp. The birds were already in flight, and kept just ahead of the hunt. "When we halted, they did so also and stood gazing at us. When we turned our backs to return home, they dashed after us, attacking our flanks and rear, firing long shots with their matchlocks, while those that were armed with spears and tulwars flourished them in the air, making, at the same time, a noise like jackals, by way of bravado."

We think we have seen the like within the last twenty years. There has, indeed, been extraordinarily little change in this form of war. Orientals, in general, are not given to night movements, and this characteristic had been noted for some years with regard to the scallywag horse of India. In cold weather the dislike of night work is very marked.

The irregularity of discipline, and, not infrequently, superstitious dread of darkness causes such irregulars to prefer to huddle in camp. The roving mounted banditti which comprised Holkar's horse, were well known to confine their activities to daylight. Furthermore, natives of Hindustan and India to the south of it are exceedingly vulnerable in the early hours of the morning, even when reasonably disciplined.

Although the two "beats up" had only a few miserable prisoners, an elephant or two and some camels to show for them, they were on the right lines. Within the next four months there were to be three striking successes, the last one, a brilliantly executed night march round Bhurtpore, scattering Holkar's camp to the four winds and winning the war—which was lost a year later by the worthless acting Governor-General, Sir George Barlow, one of the worst men who ever disgraced India.

For the time being, Lake wisely decided on striking something more tangible in the shape of Holkar's artillery, and only the supply question held him up.

On October 10th, news had arrived that Harnaut, with Holkar's infantry and guns, had arrived before Delhi on the 8th. The following day it was reported that a bombardment had commenced which was bringing down the works in all directions.

Sufficient provisions now having accumulated, Lake decided to march on the 12th, and, shortly after starting, news came in of a brilliant sortie by the garrison, which was still holding the line of ramparts in lieu of retiring within the Palace.

Before leaving Muttra, Lake directed Worsley to establish a bridgehead there, quieten the immediate neighbourhood and form an Advanced Base. This able officer remained at Muttra for the whole of the operations of the ensuing five months.

The army reached Pulwall on October 16th, and here news was received of the raising of the siege of Delhi. Pulwall happens to be close to the defile leading to the Mewatti Country, in which direction Harnaut was marching. Lake had evidently come to the conclusion that it was useless to attempt to follow, owing to the supply factor, and was in by no means the best of tempers.

We learn "it was a service of much danger to approach him," and the Commissary of Grain had a particularly bad time for not being able to produce supplies like manna from heaven.

It so happened that certain of the junior staff officers, and a precocious prig of the Civil Service, one Charles Metcalfe, who, to do him justice, was an extremely able young man, commenced airing their views and expressing the desirability for the Grand Army to follow up Harnaut. Rounding on this amateur strategist, Lake requested him to confine his attentions to the pen, and leave the sword to those whose duty it was to wield it. The snub rankled, and, two months later, to "make good," Metcalfe asked for, and obtained permission to accompany the storming party at Deeg.

Delhi was reached on October 18th, the army camping in a huge square, the two longer fronts being held by the infantry and cavalry lines respectively, the latter including Don's Reserve Brigade of infantry. The shorter faces were held by the piquets coming on, or going off duty. This perimeter camp was merely a reversion to the usual practice of the Mysore Wars.

For the last three days' march Holkar's horse had, in some astounding manner, faded away, and the movements of this chief, for some days, were enshrouded in mystery, being reported in several different places at the same time. He had, indeed, reverted to the Mahratta war of his forebears, "who made their homes on the backs of horses."

The full details of the defence of Delhi were now learned. Though the actual fighting had not been serious, it was a feat of arms worthy of greater notice than it has been accorded.

The garrisons of the posts had been under arms for over a week, constantly on the alert, for their fate, if caught by the enemy, would have been horrible. The rotten state of the bastions had made it necessary to work continually to keep them in even reasonable condition to withstand assault. At the very opening of the siege two of the irregular corps had gone over to the enemy, and there was treason within the City, though Ochterlony's able policing had kept this under. Fortunately, the corps from Perron's service, under its half-caste officers, had proved brilliant and full of fight.

An assault had been attempted on the 14th, after a bombardment along the whole of the south and south-west fronts. It had, however, developed against the west front, on the Lahore Gate.

The defence, very ably conducted, had kept its supports and reserves mobile, and had avoided the error of premature deployment. The posts held firm, and on the arrival of reinforcements, the attackers had been repulsed with heavy loss. In all the long history of Delhi, this was the first occasion on which the city had not opened its gates on the first approach of an assailant.*

It had been Lake's intention to press on after Harnaut after depositing his heavy stores and obtaining more supplies, but the last factor again baffled him, and in an ignominous manner, as we shall see. The rebuff, contrary to expectation, proved a blessing in disguise and the stage was now set for one of the greatest pursuits of history.

* Among the defenders of Delhi was a young officer with whom fate, fifty-three years later, was to deal hardly. He was Hugh Wheeler, who was commanding at Cawnpore at the outbreak of the Mutiny. This officer had greatly distinguished himself in Afghanistan and in the Sikh Wars, a good soldier and a great and gallant gentleman.

BIG GAME FROM ANOTHER VIEW-POINT

By Lord Baden Powell.

I expect that Major Payne Galway's description of buffalo shooting in Tanganyika as described in a recent number of the Cavalry Journal must have made a lot of mouths water, and some anxious searching of atlases to ascertain the real whereabouts of Tanganyika, and inquiries as to what does it cost to get there.

Having just paid a flying visit (in both senses of the word) to that part of the world I can only say that were I eligible, I should aim to get a commission in the King's African Rifles. As it is, having entered my sixtieth year in His Majesty's Service, I was out for the milder form of big game hunting, namely with the movie camera instead of with the sporting rifle. I had done some shooting in Kenya 30 years ago on my flat feet, and I realise how comparatively luxurious and easy it is nowadays with roads and motor cars and a good air service. Weeks of travel are reduced to days, and preservation of game has made it more plentiful, with the added attraction of good trout fishing.

Personally I am not ashamed—though I ought to be—to confess that I did my hunting this time in the most luxurious style *à la* millionaire from———. I stayed in what to me is the most delightful hotel in the world (and incidentally the only one I know of where you find hooks supplied for your razor strop), viz., "The Outspan," at Nyeri, run by an ex-officer of the R.F.C. When Major Payne Galway speaks of the outlook on the beautiful country at Masoko I could also hold up for comparison the lovely view from the deep verandah over the gorgeous flower garden at "The Outspan," across the vast valley leading up to the snowy peak of Mount Kenya.

For the fisherman there is an 8-pounder in that pool at the bottom of the garden, but don't let your wife wander meanwhile up the hill-side into the wood, as happened the other day when the lady got the shock of her life in meeting a family of elephants coming down. The next stream you come to—and there are many of them—you are confronted with the notice: "Trout fishers beware of Rhino." Rhino! Lovely fellows! The laughing stock of all the rest of the jungle folk. Short-sighted, small-brained, antediluvian back number! You never know what he'll do next. Nor does he know, himself. He'll get your wind, put in his top gear, and rush up to you, and suddenly stop: "Oh, it's you," he says. And then, you never know, it may be: "Dammit! Get out of my way." (And you do so if you are wise and quick enough.) Or he may say: "Sorry you've been tr-r-roubled," and trot off at a tangent; stops; thinks: "No, that's not what I meant," then turns and hustles off for all he's worth in quite another direction. Then look at the fellow—as if the jungle were not good enough for him, there he comes, strolling across the golf links at Nyeri, in spite of everybody shouting "Fore." What a lad!



"Also Ran"—in the Competition for Ugliness.

But he is not the only freak. Look at that old Hippo—rolling in aldermanic fat, but secretly a little ashamed of it, and conscious of his bloated physiognomy. He fades out quickly into the water at the approach of a stranger, and only keeps a watching eye above the surface. He thinks he is unobserved,

forgetting that besides his eye his two ears and his two expansive nostrils also advertise his whereabouts, and his ugliness! Poor chap! He just hates being photographed, and I don't wonder.



ANOTHER COMPETITOR; BUT CAMERA-SHY—AND NO WONDER.

But after all old Hippo needn't be so self-conscious; there is a still uglier brute than him in the bush—the Warthog. My word! He's no beauty, but for his part he rather glories in it,

THE WART HOG:
WINNER OF THE CHAMPIONSHIP FOR UGLINESS.

and tells you so as he curls his great tushes and, squinting at you out of the corner of his eye, scuttles off with tail straight up on end, in derision.

All prehistoric peeps are not necessarily ugly, and the Giraffe, for all his absurd ungainliness is a dear and beautiful beast, with his richly mottled coat, his tiny head and his great soft eyes. I don't know who could have the heart to shoot him.

SLOW MOTION GLIDER.

But it is worth while to rush him, just to see him go. Well, you can't call it a gallop, he simply straddles his ungainly long limbs and slowly BOUNCES along. He seems to sail through the air as if in a slow-motion movie picture. Almost equally joyous to watch



HARTEBEESTE—STIFFNECKED BOUNDER.

is a hartebeeste doing what he is pleased to call a gallop, for he can't help imitating in his small way the action of his big friend, the giraffe. He keeps a very stiff neck, his head screwed on tight

at a fixed angle, which, with his rather pricked up horns gives him a very ridiculous, conceited appearance, and his ridiculosity is mightily increased when he starts off to race you. He has rather more control over his legs than the giraffe, but he has adopted very much the same bouncing action which makes you laugh at him in spite of yourself. The giraffe has another imitator in the Gerunuk. This is just an ordinary buck, but has carried his hero-worship for the giraffe so far that he has already stretched his neck to an inordinate length and in a few generations will no doubt have changed his plain coat for a more gaudy and patchy one.

Major Payne Galway has shown how the Buffalo is the most dangerous animal of the bush, with his toughness, his courage, his cunning and his quickness. He is a really characterful beast. And so, too, is the Baboon, who is uncannily human in thought as well as in action.

Then there is that stately old monarch of the bush, the Elephant—a link with the mastodon of long ago. But the elephant by no means considers himself a back number, he goes on increasing in numbers to such an extent that some 12 to 1,500 have to be shot every year to keep them within their reserves. A ghastly idea, but there it is. I have been among them, but I would as soon blow up the Tower of London as shoot one of these dignified old aristocrats of the jungle. It is too big a lump of death to deal out at one go. Indeed, as one grows older one doesn't want to deal out death to any of the jungle folk, especially since it is all made so easy.

You motor to the Serengetti Plains, and if you don't see lions, you just sound your horn, and they pop up at once, eager for the bit of Zebra which most visitors throw out to them. Everywhere one sees fat-rumped zebra in their gaudy dress, Kudu and Waterbuck vying with one another in posturing as "The Monarch of the Glen," the dozens of different kinds of Gazelle—all having their fascinating ways.

So hunting with the camera, besides supplying all the excitement the stalker can want, gives him a new view-point on the animals as he sees them, and particularly from the humorous side in the case of those of the bigger fry.



THE TREE TOP.

At Nyeri, indeed, you can get a very new view-point, since, as an annexe to "The Outspan" there is an observation post established in a tree, a comfortable little bungalow 30 feet above the ground. It overlooks a salt-lick and water-hole which seems to be the Mecca of all the jungle animals of the Aberdare Range, from Elephant to Porcupine. A girl watcher, here, assayed with a billiard cue to chalk her mark on an elephant's back, but finding her reach was not quite long enough (a fishing rod would have done it) she did what was altogether rude and unladylike—she spat on the Lord of the Jungle!

DEER STALKING ON SHEEP GROUND

By Richard Clapham.

How often have I pored over the lists of "Properties for Sale or to Let" in the columns of the "Field," and imagined how delightful it must be to be able to buy or rent on long lease a first-class deer forest in Scotland. Such luxuries are not for the poor man, however, so unless he is lucky enough to win the Irish Sweep, he must look in some other direction for his sport.

In my own case, I happen to live in a county that contains the only English deer forest. This forest of Martindale lies entirely in Westmorland, and has been the home of the wild red deer since time immemorial. In addition to the stags in the forest proper, which has been leased for many years by Lord Lonsdale, red deer are scattered in considerable numbers outside it, and far to the south the woods hold a good stock of red deer and roe. All the country is sheep ground including Martindale, and the presence of these woolly inhabitants of the fells, often tends to make stalking more difficult.

On a forest proper the amateur is in the hands of a professional stalker, who knows every hole and corner, and every wind and air current on his particular beat. Stalking on sheep ground is a different proposition, for there the amateur can afford to be independent and be his own stalker. In this case the stock of deer is limited, and the amateur only has himself to think about, whereas in a regular forest divided into beats, he is probably one of a number of invited guests, and therefore cannot expect to be allowed to go out alone on ground with which he is unfamiliar, and where he would be ill-fitted to cope with existing conditions.

Having always been my own stalker, with no experience of stalking behind a professional, I think I should take badly to

that method after being independent for so long. A great deal of the fun of stalking lies in planning and carrying out the stalk, and if the latter has been difficult, a successful shot at the end of it puts a good finish to a meritorious performance. As soon as you get to know your ground thoroughly, you begin to save time in carrying out your plans, for experience quickly teaches you the best way to go about the business. Having found your stag, the sooner you can get in to him, the better. Every false move on your part has to be reconsidered and made good, and the loss of a few minutes may result in what should have been an easy chance becoming a difficult one, and perhaps no chance at all. There is a good deal of art in choosing the easiest route before beginning a stalk, as well as in remembering certain landmarks along that route. The foregoing applies particularly to open hill ground, for in and about the woods there is generally far more cover, which makes the approach easier.

A thorough knowledge of the ground often means the difference between success and defeat. Lack of such knowledge on one occasion lost me a big woodland stag, and the memory of it rankles yet. The friend on whose ground I happened to be, gave me directions how to find a deer pass above a hillside plantation, he himself volunteering to walk through the covert on the chance of moving any deer that might be in it. Accordingly, I went round and out to the open moorland above the wood, and found what I took to be the right spot affording a good view of the ground. I sat down in the heather and waited for a long time; then a stick cracked somewhere on the edge of the wood, and a few seconds later out walked a big stag, coming straight towards me. He had to cross some rough ground amongst scattered trees and scrub, so I waited in hopes he would offer a good chance when he reached the open. Instead he turned to his right and disappeared from view behind a clump of spruce and yew trees. Expecting any minute to see him again to my left, I faced in that direction, but he failed to show up. Realizing something was wrong, I moved quietly forward just in time to catch a glimpse of him high up to my left near the crest of the hill. He offered a brief and almost im-

Stag caught by hind leg in a wire fence. **Gralloching a Stag.** **Bringing him home on a sledge.**

Photo—Richard Clapham, Troutbeck, Windermere.

possible chance, which I took, and of course missed. On looking over the ground, I found out how he had fooled me. From the edge of the wood a narrow gully ran up towards the ridge and, entering this, he had followed it to the top. Not having been on the ground before, I knew nothing of this ravine, and could not see it from where I was sitting. Had I known the pass as well as I do now, instead of a miss, I might have had a very different tale to tell.

Red deer are provided with good noses, but their eyesight is nothing remarkable. Needless to say, on this account it is necessary to pay strict attention to the wind, and not give away your position by scent. Usually it possible to get in up-wind, or on a side-wind, and sometimes it can be done down-wind if deer happen to be lying on a steep face and the wind is strong enough to blow your scent clean over them. This last method of approach is, however, very uncertain. It always pays when feasible, to stalk deer from above, as they usually keep their attention on the ground below them, and seldom look uphill unless suspicious of danger. Wind acts very queerly on the hills, particularly when it is blowing strongly. All sorts of air currents are formed, and the breeze may be deflected or checked and returned upon itself if it strikes a steep face. In boisterous weather with a strong wind, deer are very uneasy, and if disturbed often go a long way before they settle down again. During fine, warm weather, especially when the flies are bad, they retire to the high tops where they escape their winged tormentors. Deer vary in disposition according to their environment. Woodland stags will lie in coverts near roads, and are accustomed to sights and sounds that would at once stampede Scotch deer. Stags inhabiting open hill-ground are much easier to find than woods deer, but they are more difficult to approach.

When stalking on sheep ground one does not come across large herds of deer, for the stags are usually scattered about singly or in small lots. It is seldom, therefore, necessary to move or get round undesirable beasts which block the approach to one's objective. In this respect working on sheep ground is easier than on cleared ground. On the other hand, sheep are often a terrible nuisance, and give the show away at once unless

you manœuvre very carefully. Deer always keep an eye on the movements of other creatures, and they are quick to take alarm if they see a hare, fox or grouse has been disturbed.

Once you have found your stag, the next thing is to map out a suitable line of approach. If you can work up-wind and there is sufficient cover, the stalk may present no great difficulty. On the other hand, you may have to come down on him from above, the descent being over exposed ground. Rolling stones are the great danger when working down-hill. As already mentioned, sheep may get in your way, and once your stag becomes suspicious, the approach is anything but easy. You slide down on your back, keeping a wary eye on your quarry. Suddenly the stag turns his head, and you freeze into immobility, hardly daring to breathe. The grey clothes you are wearing harmonise well with the rocky background, and you feel fairly safe; still you wish the staring match would come to an end, because you have been caught in an awkward position, and an attack of cramp is not a nice thing to endure without moving. When you feel you really cannot stand it any longer, to your great relief, the beast looks away. You cover a few more yards, then round swings that antlered head and again you become part and parcel of the hillside. This time you endure a shorter scrutiny, and at length manage to reach the shelter of a water-course in which you have room to stand upright. It is as near as you can get, but the stag is lying down and offers anything but an easy chance. If you whistle or kick a stone loose, he may spring up and go straight off, showing nothing but the back of his head and his tail; therefore you decide to wait his pleasure. Although now you have room to stretch your legs, the time passes so slowly that you begin to think the brute has taken root. At long last, however, he rises, stretches himself, then turns and exposes his broadside. You take a steady aim behind his shoulder, squeeze the trigger, and at the crack of the smokeless he springs forward, gallops off for some distance, then falls with a crash. "Habet!" or in other words, he has got it good and plenty. His head carries ten points, with a strong, rough horn, and the bullet hole behind his near shoulder testifies to a clean heart shot.

Waiting for a stag to rise is often a trying business. I have lain for an hour and twenty minutes in a cold, drizzling rain until a beast condescended to leave his bed amongst thick bracken and offer a chance. When a stag is lying down and you want to save time, you must either chance a shot as he lies or rouse him. You can do the latter by whistling or kicking a loose stone, or by backing off a bit, and then getting slowly to your feet with your rifle at the ready. In the latter case he may stare at you for an instant before rising, or he may spring up and then make a momentary halt. Should he, however, bolt straight out of his bed, do not be in a hurry to shoot at the back of his head if he goes away end on, for after running some distance he is nearly sure to stop and turn broadside to look back. If he offers a crossing shot as he goes away, remember to hold well forward, and you will get him if he is within a hundred yards.

Mention of shooting at a stag lying down reminds me of a switch horn I once accounted for. He was lying on a ledge on a very steep face, and I got in within ten or twelve yards of him. He was head on to me, and I could see the upper half of each horn. Very slowly I rose to my feet, and as I came within his line of vision, I fully expected him to bolt. Instead he stretched up his head and neck and stared me in the face, and I got him right between the eyes. His head sank down, and that was the only move he made. Had he got up and been killed he would have rolled some hundreds of feet down the crag face. As it was it required ropes to extricate him from the ledge where he lay.

If a stag is disturbed on sheep ground, and finds he is not followed, he may not go far. I was out one day on a stretch of fairly level ground, cut up by heather-covered knolls and low ridges, with here and there swampy patches abounding with willows and rushes. Thinking it was time for a smoke and a look over the country with the glass, I sat down on the side of one of the knolls. I had just struck a match when a stag sprang out of the long heather some sixty yards away. He galloped off, then turned for an instant to look back, but before I could seize the rifle he disappeared over a ridge. I could see

practically all the surrounding ground, and as he never showed up again, I felt pretty sure he had stopped. After allowing him some time in which to settle down I crept round the ridge where I last saw him. Foot by foot I advanced, keeping a sharp look-out ahead, and ere long I found his tracks crossing a boggy patch. Beyond and to my left lay a clump of willows, and I had the feeling that the stag must be behind them, although I could see neither horn not hide. Very cautiously I moved on, when crash, and away he went, giving me a beautiful crossing shot at about forty yards. I got him, and he went down, but scrambled up again and galloped off, to fall dead within a short distance. He had been watching me from behind the willows, and I might easily have passed him, but, like many a hunted creature often does, he lost his nerve, and gave the show away by moving too soon. In this instance I had carelessly relaxed my vigilance when I sat down to light a pipe, and thus missed seeing his horns above the heather. The overlooking of an object in the foreground is quite easily done, especially when using a glass, for one instinctively searches the middle and far distances.

A clean miss is a clean miss, and although it rankles you have the satisfaction of knowing that your stag is none the worse. On the other hand, if you get a bullet into a beast and he goes on, he may lead you a long chase before you finally stop him. A wounded stag is ever on the alert, and if you press him too hard he is likely to travel a long way. Perhaps your bullet breaks a leg, and then if you have not got a dog with you, you may never see that particular stag again. With a broken fore-leg a stag will rather travel uphill than down, whereas if a hind leg be broken he will avoid the hill. Thus, if you get a chance to re-stalk a beast in the first instance, try to keep above him; but in the second, keep below. A stag shot through the lungs generally travels uphill, because the internal bleeding suffocates him. In open ground you can generally keep your glass on a beast and watch him till he stops, but in woods he is soon lost to view. A good dog is a great help in recovering a wounded stag lost in big woodlands. Most wounded stags are hit low and too far back and although they may be very sick, they are

not always easy to secure, for the first hint of danger sends them off, to keep on going till they die, or to hide in some out-of-the-way spot. If your bullet grazes the point of the shoulder, back of the head or base of a horn, the stag may drop as if struck by lightning; but being only stunned, he will recover unless you get to him quickly and administer the *coup de grace*. I once hit a stag in this manner and he dropped, but soon began to show signs of life again. It was a long shot, and I could get no nearer as I was amongst deep snow, so rather than wound him I refrained from shooting a second time. About a week later, and on the same ground, a friend of mine killed this stag, the mark of my bullet where I had scruffed him being plainly visible. It is well to remember that a wounded stag can be exceedingly dangerous, and it pays to put another bullet into his neck to finish him, rather than use the knife. If you chance the latter, he may give you a very nasty or even fatal blow with his foot or antler.

With regard to rifles for deer stalking, small bore, high velocity weapons are now, of course, in general use. A stag is a beast of medium size, and not difficult to kill, thus a rifle of great power is unnecessary. Time was when the .450-400 Express was used for stalking, whereas to-day weapons of small bore like the .303, .256, .280 Ross; Holland's .240, and Vickers' .242, of which the last three develop a velocity of 3,000 ft. per second, are in general favour.

Personally speaking I have used the .303 successfully on deer, but most of my stalking has been done with a more or less out-of-date weapon, *i.e.*, the Winchester Model 1892, .44-40 Carbine, weighing 5¾ lb. One cannot take long shots with this light and handy rifle, but the soft point, blunt-nosed bullet kills extremely well. The modern high velocity rifle practically eliminates the necessity for judging distance up to at least 250 yards, but this does not mean that one should make a practice of taking shots at this range. The real art and pleasure of stalking lies in making a close approach to one's stag, and a clean kill.

Telescopic sights are used by some people for deer stalking. If such a sight is used, it should be set on top of the rifle, and

not on the side, as was the case with the sights supplied to us in France for sniping purposes. A sight so set is apt to make a man cant his rifle and perhaps use his left eye, and what is worse still, it is impossible to use the sight when shooting through a narrow loophole. A telescopic sight is, of course, a great aid to accurate shooting in the half-light of early morning or late evening, and will still give clear definition when it is too dark to use open sights. Even by moonlight or starlight quite good shooting can be done if the sight is fitted with a large object glass. Much as I appreciated a telescopic sight when a Hun's face offered a momentary target, I prefer open sights for deer stalking.

Stags in the north of England cast their horns in April. They seldom drop both antlers at the same spot. I have seen a disturbed stag drop one antler as he moved off, and get rid of the other as he crossed a water-course. The woodland stags often carry fine horns, rough and thick in the beam, but smaller in spread than the heads of stags living on the open fells.

Like other wild creatures, deer occasionally suffer from accidents, wire fences being the chief cause of casualties. The most curious accident I have come across happened to a stag when jumping a low wire sheep fence. At intervals between the fence posts, upright wires were run through the horizontal ones. Evidently the top portion of one of these perpendicular wires had become loosened, for when I discovered the stag he was caught by the off hind foot, the wire being twisted round between the fetlock joint and the hoof. Having no wire cutters with me, I had to make the descent of the fell, and down below in the dale I found a friend to give me a hand; so we returned to the captive, and with the help of an old file and a pair of pliers, managed to cut the wire and let the stag go. In his struggles to escape the poor beast had injured his stifle, and never properly recovered. When the stalking season came round he was shot.

At rutting time a stag is apt to be a fearsome spectacle, particularly if he has been rolling in a soiling pit. As he emerges with the wet peat batter dripping from his coat, he looks as black as the ace of spades. His body, too, is thin and

tucked up, while his mane stands out like a great ruff, and his eyes are red-rimmed and bloodshot.

Mention of the rutting season brings to mind a rather uncommon incident on the Lakeland fells. It was in October, and the Ullswater hounds ran a fox to ground high up on the face of Buck Crag, in Bannerdale. The day was cold and windy, and the cry of the marking hounds was now and then interrupted by raucous sounds from across the dale. These sounds were made by stags roaring defiance at their rivals. In front of us lay the Nab, the sanctuary of Martindale Forest. The Ullswater is the only pack of foxhounds whose country includes a recognised deer forest.

At other times than the stalking season, deer are interesting creatures to watch. It is pleasant in summer to lie out on the fell-side and view the stags through the telescope, or a powerful pair of field glasses. Their horns are in various stages of growth at that season, and covered with velvet. The growing antlers are tender, and if two stags chance to disagree, they will stand on their hind legs and spar with their forefeet rather than risk a head-on collision. Their summer coats are reddish and they show up almost as brightly as a fox, when the sun strikes them. Sunlight plays queer tricks with colour. One moment a gleam lights up a stag whose coat looks foxy-coloured; but when he moves slightly and the glint dies, he appears to be a beast of quite another shade. When you sit down to spy it is, perhaps, quite dull, and you search diligently with the glass, slowly working your field of view up and down, or from right to left. Suddenly there is a rift in the mist and through the clouds above comes a slant of sunshine. Your field is transformed from a drab prospect to a brightly illuminated landscape, and you can pick up objects which were invisible before. Perhaps after a long look through the telescope, your eye catches what appears to be a slight movement. In order to make sure, you do not gaze straight at the object, but a little to one side. By so doing movement is much more easily picked up.

"IN BANGALORE SOME EIGHTY-EIGHT YEARS AGO"

By Lieut.-Colonel B. G. Baker, D.S.O., F.R.G.S., F.R.Hist.S.

"Horse Guards,
"*May 29th*, 1845.

"Madam,

"I will thank you to let me know whether you would be desirous that your son should be appointed to the Cavalry, either at home or in India, in preference to the Infantry. You are probably aware that the Cavalry service is more expensive, and that an officer entering it requires more for his equipment and ordinary yearly expenses than an Infantry officer. The Duke of Wellington begs you will consider this inquiry strictly confidential.

"I have the honour to be, Madam,
"your most obedient
"Fitzroy Somerset."

THIS letter it was that set young H. J. Wale, cornet in the XVth, "The King's" Hussars, sailing for India. The Secretary of State for War was right about the expensive equipment. The uniform alone ran the cost well into a hundred pounds; and there was such a variety of it, a jacket and pelisse heavy with lace of such substance as to be worth its weight in gold, at least so said the tailor to the Rev. H. J. Wale when ordering his son's uniform. There was an immense red shako with plume of cock's feathers and gold cords, top-hamper heavy enough to break a man's neck in a high wind. There was more gold on pouch, belt, sabretache and scarlet shabrack. There were many changes you could ring with your outfit, full dress, half-dress, mess dress, dress for stables, foot parade and drawing room, for Court functions red overalls.

The latter seem to have been a survival from the days when red breeches were one of an officer's distinguishing marks. There was much else packed in teakwood bullock trunks, airtight tin cases, hermetically sealed gun cases, the outfit of a jolly cornet prepared for an unbroken spell of Indian service that would mean half a life-time these days. Indeed it frequently amounted to that, as some regiments stayed out so long that their existence seemed to have been forgotten by the War Office. The XVth Hussars had already spent some seven years in India. They had sailed round the Cape in two divisions, reuniting at Bombay, and then marching by that well-known route along which the Southern Maharatta Railway later drew its narrow gauge trail, until they reached Bangalore where they took over the horses of the 13th Light Dragoons. The new cornet travelled by a much shorter route then just made accessible, a pleasanter one too, and offering more variety. What with seeing *in situ* at Alexandria, Cleopatra's needle, that he met again on the Embankment in later years, what with finding the names of Jones, Smith, Brown and others of equal distinction, engraved on Pompey's pillar, and then plunging into a twenty-four hour trek across the desert in a little omnibus drawn by four unbroken Arab horses, there was much to prevent the tedium that so insistently holds foreign travel in its grip in these our days of smooth efficiency. Let us hope for the sake of the race,

that among those who travel in luxury liners, there are still some who could draw enjoyment from lifting a ricketty omnibus out of a bed of loose sand while four squealing young Arab stallions are kicking rings round them. Another curious sight offered to young Wale, after all only 18 and just home from school, was that of a flowerpot occupying a cool, darkened room all by itself, a pot containing grass, just ordinary grass grown from English seed—but the only grass to be seen in Aden, or for many miles around it. This speck of green grass was the object of all one lonely subaltern's care and solicitude.

The stout-built paddle steamer "Haddington" took over the passengers at Suez and carried them safely to Madras, despite the storms that chose Palk's Strait as their playground. Passengers picked up the scent of Ceylon's spicy breezes before the island began to flicker on the horizon; this was very right and proper and was expected of every man acquainted with Hymns A. & M. Madras offered many diversions even as it does to-day, from the landing by surf-boats to the moment you start "up-country." This experience again has been shorn of much glamour since the days of mid 19th century. Wale, travelling by palanquin that like the sailor's ship will stick to you as long as you stick to it, gained some knowledge of the ground on which the youthful Clive had won his spurs and laid the broad foundations of an Indian Empire under the British Raj. Legends of Clive's romantic successes, his surprising capture of Arcot and ingenious method of defending it, his dealings with the Rajah of Tanjore, had in the course of a century passed into legend. As he traversed the country where the representative of an English trading concern had frustrated all efforts of the champions of the King of France, Dupleix, and Bussy, in his claims on India, young Wale seems to have given little thought to anything beyond keeping inside his palanquin. In this he was only partially successful, in fact he had to put up with all the tricks that are still played on griffins. At one stage he travelled by a dawk that an enterprising old Irish soldier had started together with his daughter Betsy O'Brien. Casters from the army described as "valuable and respectable horses," were roped into Mr. O'Brien's dawk service and generally

managed to land the traveller somewhere or other, if it was only into a paddyfield as happened to Cornet Wale. How long this dawk was does not appear, but even if it took a month or so it must have been well worth it. Apart from O'Brien's "respectable" cattle and their pretty ways, there were quaint characters moving in and out of the picture, characters with whom Dickens might have dealt adequately had he not harboured a curious dislike for officials in general and soldiers in particular. Perhaps Thackeray would have treated them with more understanding. He was rather inclined to caricature "Nabobs" as he called those who had their business in India, but this would have been superfluous in the case of some of those with whom Wale became acquainted. There was one who met him on his arrival at Bangalore, handed him out of his palanquin, discovered in his kit a book of comic songs, forthwith sat down on the steps and sang one straight off, and then finished off the contents of the new arrival's brandy flask. That type of acquaintance generally knows every horse in the station and is ever ready to do a deal.

Where Trinity Church now stands, is the crossing of roads that lead from Bombay, skirting the Western Ghats, to Madras, south to Seringapatam and Mysore, north to Bellary and the mighty river system of Tungabhadra and Kistna. There was a constant stream of travellers on those roads and endless, unlimited hospitality to be met wherever there was a settlement of Britons. You simply put your toothbrush in your buttonhole to show that you would be destitute of all necessaries but that one article, until your kit came in a week or so, and by that token you were welcomed with open arms. The hospitality of those days was proverbial, it had not yet been abused, and in this respect the XVth Hussars enjoyed a peculiarly high reputation. Officers of John Company's service finding themselves in pleasant surroundings, extended their stay to such lengths that they became identified with the XVth and talked of them in terms of "my regiment." They were wonderful people, those *qui hais* of old, capacious vessels for liquor of any kind, great as shikarees, greater still as romancers, and greatest of all in their devotion to the natives over whom they were put in charge. They took it

hard when a new broom came out with quaint notions such as anti-duelling, anti-swearing and other childishness. Duelling was probably rare, at any rate the General Commanding at Bangalore did not like the practice, but swearing was another matter, in this direction he could unbend a bit. On one such occasion Wale acting as extra A.D.C. and mindful of the prohibition, bowdlerized an order given by the G.O.C. If there was one sight the General loathed to see it was that of a bullock battery, he could not stand bullocks "messing about the place." There had been a very fine sham fight, very sham of course, but a glorious spectacle, when into the grand finale there hove in sight the bullock battery slowly swaying over the brow of a hill. Wale was sent galloping with an order transposed from the original into "Will you please take your show out-of-the-way." "But where is out-of-the-way?" If Wale had transmitted the order in the General's own words no doubt could have arisen in the battery Commander's mind as to the destination suggested.

The XVth, as already shown, were a popular regiment, and not only on account of their hospitality but by reason of their intrinsic merit. The men were mostly drawn from the yeoman class, 701 of them, average age about 30 and weight in marching order some 17 stone, which was a good deal for a light horse to carry. There was proud tradition in the regiment that still called itself Elliott's Light Horse and was seriously engaged in training for any future occasion on which it might add to its roll of battle honours. By that time all memory of a poet in the ranks of the regiment had been effaced. Some regiments can still tell of one or other phenomenally bad soldier, but none other of one who combined this peculiarity with the gift of poesie. A poet is not *ipso facto* a bad soldier, the Great War has proved the contrary in several glorious instances, but there is no disputing the fact that S. T. Coleridge as a soldier was quite incredibly inefficient. He was totally incapable as a horseman and quite unable to keep himself clean. One day at an inspection the captain asked "whose is that rusty scabbard?" Coleridge wanted to know: "Is it very rusty, Sir?" "Yes, very." "Then it must be mine." A disarming answer like that may have turned away wrath, of its direct effect there is no record.

It seems that Coleridge was already popular as a ready writer of letters for his comrades, who would do his "rifting" while he entertained them even as did Micky Free in Charles O'Malley's troop of dragoons. The nature of the entertainment was different but the ethical conditions were very much the same, and Hussar Silas Tomkyn Comberbatch might have become a regimental mascot had he not purchased his discharge, resumed his rightful name of Coleridge and with it his pen which he did not allow to grow rusty; but then it may have been a goosequill.

The ranks of the XVth Hussars in India were not a safe place for an incapable rider like the poet Coleridge. Nolan of Balaclava fame, was enthusiastic about the horses, "Arab, Persian, Turcoman, horses from the banks of the Araxes, all unrivalled as warhorses." There is no doubt about it, they were warhorses, mostly stallions; Wale gives the number as 81 entires in his troop alone. The turning out of the regiment before dawn had not the somewhat eerie effect that those remember who have soldiered in India, there was no still-life about it. Even Bobby the drum horse could play up "bobbery" on occasion. He would not allow the drums to be placed on his back until he had been led out on to the barrack square. On one occasion the drums were put on to him in the horse lines. Bobby lay down and rolled until he had flattened them out completely; this meant much expense to the regiment. However, Bobby, like all the other stallions, had to "go through it." A capable vet. performed with great success, and Bobby's loud, deep neigh changed suddenly to a colt's treble whinney; he grew fatter but throve exceedingly. The trouble about horses was that they were becoming more expensive, and the Government studs in India were not up to supplying the demand. At about this time horses were introduced from the Cape and Australia, and mares brought into the ranks. By the time Wale left India in 1851 there was only one entire horse left in his troop. Another exotic of the *genus equus caballus* was introduced from Burma about this time, for we read that the enterprising gentleman who was dirsee, sowkar, and who followed kindred trades as well, went about his more or less lawful occasions mounted on a fat Pegu pony. As far as the XVth Hussars were concerned, the fate of the stallion as war-

horse was sealed when one of them chased the Regimental Sergeant-Major. There is a limit to all things, that stallion o'erleapt it. He was running about loose and causing a deal of trouble to the parade when the Colonel called out: "Sergeant-Major, cut that horse down." The Sergeant-Major bore down upon the horse in all the dignity of his office when the horse suddenly turned and put the S.-M.'s mount to flight. This was more than any Colonel could stand. The C.O. drew his sword and in his turn started to chase the loose horse that no sooner found itself pursued than it turned again and offered battle. This time it was the Colonel's turn to be chased. But that came as an anti-climax; Colonel's are often chased by yet superior officers, indeed some generals consider them their lawful game, whereas a Regimental Sergeant-Major is never chased by anyone, it simply is not done. To avoid any recurrence of such outrage, the gelding order was issued and executed as already described. This is a story with a moral concealed somewhere within it, but it should not be taken up by any mechanization fanatic as an additional reason for more and yet more tanks, however thankful we may be that the tank is free from the sportive proclivities of the entire horse.

Old maps and plans of the Cusba of Bangalore place the barracks of European Cavalry on the northern side of the parade ground that stretches from the cross roads at Holy Trinity Church along the Madras road with the riding-schools on the bank of Ulsoor tank. The site to which British Cavalry eventually removed was the Artillery practice ground, and beyond it was a chain of tanks one of which watered the Lal Bagh and filled the moat of the old fort that had still some military value for this important strategic point. All about in the surrounding country are places with those soothing names you find wherever Tamil and Telagu are dominant, names known to all shikarees, Billacully, Goodhully, Putnageery, and many "pols," Ramanpol, Gollarpol, also a very small village with a very long name Gungagoundhullypolia, which when dissected by an etymologist will be found full of deep and mystic meaning. Young Wale does not seem to have been a great shikaree, but he naturally became well acquainted with the Nundidroog country

which then, even as it is to-day, was a favourite manœuvre area. Talking of manœuvres there was one in which the XVth were interested as a purely regimental affair. There was among the officers, one, a charming young fellow to whom Wale refers as A.B. He was a character of the kind that Thackeray would have liked to introduce to his reading public. A.B. was of those whose life is like unto the bucket in the well, constantly going up or down. Such as he generally found their way to India that was still regarded as a refuge for the destitute. The Colonies were treated in like manner by several generations and not only by the British but by those of other nationalities as well. Germany's colonies became a recognised retreat for army officers in financial difficulties; some of these were curious characters before they became yet more so on their return to the Vaterland if they survival the conflict between a tropical climate and its concomitant thirst. Many a French Colonial soldier is appreciated the better the longer he defers his return home. As to A.B. there was nothing strikingly wrong about him, he was an ornament to the Mess, could play and sing a good song, what he could not do, however, was to live within his income, if any. He had on joining driven up in a smart curricle, he kept a pair of good horses, lived hard and happy till in his third year of service the smash came. Wale who became his confidant asked A.B. why he had never borrowed from him, and A.B. answered frankly that he never suspected Wale of having money to lend. In any case it was now too late, so the Mess decided to get A.B. away quietly. This made great demands on the pooled talents of the Mess, it meant a stupendous output of strategy, tactics and diplomacy, not to say duplicity. A.B. having gone to earth in the Nilgiri Hills, was packed in straw secretly and by night, into a bullock bandy and sent south, while his belongings were despatched north with all possible ostentation. Boogee, Ramaswammy, Moodelieh, Alliaska and others of a host of creditors raising their eyes hopefully to the hills, did not become aware of the deception until A.B. had been safely deposited at Madras and taken out to his ship on a Sunday morning on which day a writ could not be served. A.B. vanished for a while, then was seen sweeping a crossing at one time, at another hunting in Ireland well mounted

and looking the pink of perfection. It is a pity that A.B.'s memoirs if any, have not been left for curious folk to see and therefrom draw morals or amusement. A book by A.B. might have been just as interesting as that written by H. J. Wale. More exciting perhaps, because the gallant cornet, after having packed off A.B. seems to have thought that a "spot of leave" would do him no harm; he applied for it on the plea of wanting to marry. He got his leave readily enough, sailed home and really did marry as soon as suitable opportunity offered. Then when about to retire and settle down for life he was recalled to take a draft of Scots Greys from Ireland to the Crimea. His war experiences were disappointing as he spent most of his time in hospital, and the state of his health made necessary a complete change of life; this he achieved by taking Holy Orders. There is nothing very new or startling about this, neither is there any reason why a good soldier should not make a good priest. There is also precedent, though I doubt whether the Rev. H. J. Wale, M.A. was influenced by the fact that a well-known "condottiere" once came from the wars of mediæval Italy to take over the bishopric of Norwich. Hugh de Spenser may have been a good bishop, you hear little of him in that relation, but everyone in Norfolk knows how he and a lance or two of horsemen chased Litester and his rebels across Mousehold Heath, charged their entrenchments at North Walsham, and simply trampled the incipient rebellion under foot.

There was no such activity awaiting the incumbent of Folksworth in the happy, undulating country-side west of Norman Cross in Huntingdon. Here the Rev. H. J. Wale, late of the XVth "the King's" Hussars, settled down in his rectory and here wrote an account of his doings in "Sword and Surplice," dedicating it to his "two commanding officers," General G. W. Key, Colonel XVth "the King's" Hussars, and the Rt. Rev. the Lord Bishop of Winchester.

*THE RIFLE THIEF**

By Colonel D. C. Crombie, C.B.E., *late* 11th P.A.V.O. Cavalry F.F.

The officers were assembled in the anteroom after dinner. The conversation was general and seemed to embrace all subjects from a discussion of the merits of the films showing at the various cinemas and the prospects of the next race meeting at Twezeldown to the war in Abyssinia, the mechanisation of the cavalry and the use of tanks and armoured cars against guerilla fighters, especially on the North West Frontier of India.

Somebody murmured something about "the wily Pathan," whereupon one of the mess guests, an officer of the Indian Army on leave, took up the running.

"It is all very well," he said, "to allude to the North West Frontier tribesman as 'the *wily* Pathan!' But you must not exaggerate his wiliness. As a matter of fact in many ways he is not a bit wily, but rather stupid. He is a poor linguist, for instance, and is apt to make heavy weather in his attempts to master Urdu. Nor was he—I am talking of pre-war days—what you would call brilliant at mugging up his drill book. As a horsemaster in the cavalry he might be described as 'unsympathetic'—though that, you'll say, is more a matter of heart than of brain. And the remarkable thing is that he was not, as you might expect him to be, a naturally first-class shot on the range—not so very much better than your down-country Jat or any other common-or-garden Indian soldier who probably never heard the crack of a rifle before he joined the Army.

"I admit, of course, that as a guerilla fighter on his own barren hillside he is superb—could, no doubt, knock spots off these unfortunate Abyssinians. And he is second to none as a

* Founded on fact.

kidnapper or rifle thief. There he has full scope for his genius and is at his brightest and best. But even as a rifle thief he is not always consistently wily. He is no superman. Like everybody else he sometimes makes mistakes, slips up badly and must pay the penalty—generally pretty heavy on the Frontier.

"Here's a case in point.

"It occurred some time before the War at a small frontier post called Sirdar Khel. The garrison included a cavalry detachment of my regiment as well as some infantry. Our detachment consisted of thirteen men under old Sher Khan, Risaldar. He was a Punjabi Mohammedan—a Gakhar, to be precise, though I don't suppose that will convey much to you. He was the senior officer present and so commanded the post. The infantry detachment consisted of twenty-eight men under a Sikh Jemadar whose name I have forgotten. Each detachment was made up of about equal numbers of Sikhs (Hindus) and Punjabi Mohammedans.

"Besides the Sikhs and P.M.'s, each detachment included a brace of Pathans. These men belonged, of course, to their respective units and were used as interpreters with the local inhabitants. Ours, I remember, were a Mohmand and a Bungash. One of the infantry Pathans was an Afridi, Shah Gul by name; I don't know anything about the other. So that makes a total of two Indian officers and forty-one other ranks, quite a tidy little garrison.

"Surrounded by the most inhospitable country, all pebble slopes and deep ravines, the post lay almost in the centre of a small, flat, stony valley, say a mile long by three-quarters of a mile wide. On the eastern side ran the road to the nearest military station, 25 miles away. This was the *raison d'être* of the post as the valley gave access across the road to unadministered territory. On the southern edge of the valley there was a dry shallow nala bed which deepened gradually as it approached the road.

"The post itself was an irregular pentagon in shape. Its walls, of stone rough-hewn and roughly mortared, were more or less perpendicular for, say, the first 15 feet of their height and then steeply sloping for the remaining 12 feet. There was only one entrance, a heavily barred and bolted wooden gateway enfiladed by a machacoulis gallery from above. Inside the gate-

way and some way to the left was the small guardroom where the rifles and ammunition of the garrison were kept, the former chained to their racks when not actually in the hands of the men. There was also a small store room and lock-up. The interior of the post was a courtyard occupied by the horses of our detachment and flanked on three sides by the men's quarters. A steep wooden ladder led from the floor of the courtyard to the narrow footway which ran completely round the inside of the parapet on the top of the walls.

"That's enough description of the post—oh! no, I mustn't forget the cookhouse. This was built against the wall of the courtyard close to the foot of the ladder. It was made of corrugated iron and was partitioned down the middle to separate the sheep from the goats, as it were, one half being for the Mohammedans and the other for the Hindus. As a matter of fact the men did their cooking in the verandahs of their quarters, but their store of flour and firewood was kept there. Each half cookhouse also contained earthenware receptacles for the men's drinking water.

"Well, to come to the point. The incident occurred on a certain night of the cold weather. It so happened that I arrived at the post next morning on inspection duty, so I got all the details while they were still red hot. The night was bitterly cold, pitch dark, with a strong breeze blowing down the valley. All was quiet in the post. Old Risaldar Sher Khan may or may not have been his rounds. We need not enquire into that. Anyhow he was asleep in his room. The horses munched at their standings in the courtyard or lay on the extremely scanty bedding provided. The two sentries, one detailed from each detachment, stood near the guardroom. The order was that one sentry should always be moving round the post. As, however, it was close on midnight when their relief was due, both had gradually gravitated close to the guardroom door. At intervals one or other would glance inside at the guardroom clock—of the bee and alarm variety—which ticked all the more loudly because it was placed on an empty ammuntion box on the cement floor. This clock had long since ceased to function as an alarm, but it kept good enough time for the purposes of the post. Its dial

was illuminated dimly by the feeble light of a *chirag*—open-wick earthenware lamp—which burned with a smoky flame and showed signs of imminent extinction. On the floor, completely shrouded in their quilts, lay the prone figures of the guard. These included the only bugler in the post and one of the four Pathan interpreters on duty. That night it happened to be the Afridi, Shah Gul, of the infantry.

"Precisely at midnight by the non-functioning alarm clock one of the sentries came into the guardroom and, after much shaking and exhorting, succeeded in rousing the guard commander, Naick Pahlwan of the infantry. The two together then proceeded to wake up the relieving sentries.

"One of these was Sowar Jai Singh of my regiment. He was remarkable in one respect. The last thing I want to do is to suggest that, as a community, Indian soldiers are not conscientious. But I do say that it is exceptional to find among them one who is *over*-conscientious. Well, Jai Singh was the exception. He was over-conscientious to a fault, almost finnicking in fact.

"The relief of sentries at a frontier post is an informal business—the repetition of a few orders enjoining the safeguarding of Government property, the handing over of the two bored-out Martinis to the relieving sentries, the checking of the ammunition and the rifles in their racks and the thing is done. The counting of the rifles was the main responsibility of the guard commander at each relief of sentries. To assist in the scrutiny Jai Singh took the chirag from its bracket, held it close to the rifle rack and, as he afterwards told me, counted the rifles himself to ensure that there was no mistake. All correct; each rifle not only resting in its socket but also fastened to the rack by means of a steel chain which passed through all the trigger guards and was padlocked at both ends. After the scrutiny the guard commander lay down again on the floor, wrapping himself in his quilt.

"Jai Singh's fellow sentry, Ikbal Khan, was already at his post by the main gateway. As he replaced the chirag on the bracket Jai Singh noticed the expiring condition of its flame and glanced inside—no oil. So Jai Singh took up the oil pannikin from the floor and, good conscientious soul, filled the lamp to the

brim and stirred the wick with his finger just to ginger things up a bit. Then, satisfied that all was as it should be, he joined Ikbal at the gate.

"Presently Jai Singh announced his intention to walk round the post 'in accordance with the order.' Good cavalry soldier that he was, his first thought was for the horses. Now Ikbal, an infantryman, never bothered about them on *his* rounds. It seemed obvious to him that although, no doubt, horses had to be fed and watered and one shod their feet with iron occasionally, they could otherwise fend for themselves, especially at night when the trees grow and nothing else very much happens. But Jai Singh walked up and down the horse lines, examining each individual as best he could in the darkness. He kicked up the bedding of the Risaldar's horse and tightened up the heel rope of another. Then he took an armful of fodder from the verandah and put it down in front of his own horse. At least this is what he meant to do. But he was disgusted to find that it was not *his* horse but the farrier's pony that he had favoured in this way. Jai Singh described this trivial incident to me next morning to show how poisonously dark the night was.

"Then he moved on to the ladder that led up out of the courtyard to the ramparts above. At the foot of it, as I told you, was the galvanized iron cook house. As he passed it Jai Singh felt a quite unaccountable impulse to stop and look inside. This he did, but of course could see nothing. Then he passed on up the ladder.

"I suppose he must have spent about a quarter of an hour up on the wall making a complete tour of the footway, halting at intervals, listening, and peering through the loopholes down into the darkness below. Once he thought he heard the clink of a stone but it was too dark to make out anything and the stiff breeze confused one's hearing. Nothing else happened. So he climbed down the ladder again and, after another tour of the horses, rejoined Ikbal and reported 'all well!' The two stood together for a time and then separated, Ikbal going towards the guardroom. When they next passed each other on their beat Ikbal announced *his* intention to proceed round the post and went off.

"When Jai Singh came, in due course, to the guardroom door he stopped as if frozen stiff. The half-open doorway was a blank and the room itself was in complete darkness. Jai Singh gaped in astonishment. He could hear the clock ticking but there was no vestige of light although he had replenished the chirag not half an hour before. Something wrong! Without further hesitation he felt his way in and after a little searching found the box of sulphur matches which always lay beside the clock. He struck a light and relit the chirag. In doing so he noticed that it was still full of oil. So there was nothing to account for the extinction of the flame, not even a mild draught of air. On the contrary the atmosphere was thick enough to cut with a knife. Jai Singh's suspicions were by this time fully aroused. He took down the chirag and went straight to the rack of cavalry rifles. He counted twelve—all present and correct. You see, of the thirteen other ranks that formed the cavalry detachment one was the farrier and he carried a revolver instead of a rifle. Hence the number twelve.

"Jai Singh at once stepped across to the infantry rifles. A swift glance at once revealed that one was missing! It was represented by its trigger guard which had been unscrewed from the stock and dangled from the connecting chain as if in derision at the futility of taking such precautions.

"Jai Singh replaced the chirag on its bracket deliberately, reflectively. He cast his eye over the floor crowded with the recumbent forms under their quilts. Now a quilt can cover a multitude of sins in the guise of a sleeping human being. On the other hand a quilt which does not cover a human being can very easily be arranged to look exactly as if it does. That is an old trick. Jai Singh strode over to the spot where, to the best of his recollection, Shah Gul, the Afridi Pathan, had been sleeping. His train of thought is not difficult to follow. One naturally connects a Pathan with the idea of a missing rifle. But the hearty kick which he disposed on the selected quilt elicited from underneath it a muffled protest—in good broad Punjabi! This, I may remark, is not the dialect of Pathans. Undeterred, Jai Singh bestowed an equally vigorous kick on the

next quilt. Sure enough *this* one emitted no response, but collapsed on the floor, obviously empty and untenanted.

"Now what was to be done? Jai Singh's obvious duty was to alarm the guard. He did not do so. He did not even rouse the guard commander. He felt that this was a supreme matter which lay between him and the Universe. It was clearly up to him to report the news of his discovery only to the Highest in the Land as represented, at the moment, by the person of his own Indian Officer. So he slipped out of the guardroom straight to Sher Khan's quarters.

"It may be that Sher Khan was a very light sleeper or it is just possible that the news had already communicated itself telepathically to his brain. I can't say. But the fact remains that the first murmur of 'Risaldar jee' in Jai Singh's anxious whisper Sher Khan started up broad awake from his bed.

"Jai Singh was rather vague in his account of what happened after that. Of course the news of the theft of the rifle spread through the post like wildfire. In some mysterious way the courtyard became alive with the moving shrouded figures of the men. Perhaps Ikbal, the other sentry, finding Jai Singh absent on his return from the parapet, was responsible. Perhaps *he* also, by the aid of the rejuvenated chirag, had spotted the theft. Anyhow, Sher Khan seems to have held a whispered council of war, with himself in the chair and the Sikh jemadar as chief committeeman; and you may be sure that Jai Singh was chief spokesman. Some of the men hung about in Sher Khan's room or crowded together round the doorway.

"The question before the court was primarily to decide what action, if any, could be taken forthwith. A rapid search had already revealed the fact Shah Gul was the only absentee. If he had gone for good with the rifle—well, that meant that he was not coming back; and *that* was *that*. Nothing could be done till daylight and precious little then, and all their faces would be blackened for evermore. On the other hand there was the barest possibility that, after disposing of the rifle, the thief *might* return. By so doing he would cover his tracks, always assuming that his absence was not discovered in the meanwhile. This possibility was favoured by the fact that the theft occurred

so soon after the relief of the sentries. Barring accidents the thief could count on nearly two hours' grace before the next relief and the next counting of the rifles.

"All that seemed possible was to provide for this second contingency. It was not certain how the thief would return, but he must be seized red-handed if he *did* return. Sher Khan issued his orders accordingly. Some men were sent up the ladder to take up positions behind the ramparts; others were distributed about the courtyard and in the men's quarters. Characteristically the cavalry men had armed themselves with their naked sabres, all, that is to say, except Jai Singh.

"This gentleman still retained his sentry's bored-out Martini rifle and as chief protagonist in this adventure constituted himself Sher Khan's escort. He told me that, as he followed the risaldar out of his quarters, they saw that idiot Gurmakhtar Singh—a recently joined recruit—feverishly saddling up his horse. Old Sher Khan told him to off-saddle and not be a fool, while Jai Singh added: "Oh! Son of an Owl!" As a term of abuse this sounds rather anæmic in English, but in good, broad Punjabi it is not wholly unsatisfying. So the crestfallen Gurmakhtar Singh humped his saddle on tip-toe back to his room, while Sher Khan, followed by the faithful Jai Singh, climbed up to the ramparts. Here they crouched down under cover not far from the head of the ladder.

"I reckon that it must have been getting on for some forty minutes after midnight by this time. The wind seemed to be dropping but it was still intensely cold. The night was as dark as ever so that Jai Singh could barely make out the nearest of the other crouching figures in their sheepskin coats. The silence was complete except for the snoring of one of the horses in the courtyard below.

"Jai Singh said that hours seemed to pass before, for the second time that night, he heard the clink of a stone. But this time it was quite distinct and unmistakable. He touched the arm of the risaldar. Old Sher Khan nodded without looking round. Then complete silence as before. Jai Singh was so cold that he had to bite his lips to control his chattering teeth. For some seconds he had been vaguely conscious of a faint

murmur in his ears, when suddenly and with a thrill he realised that he was listening to the laboured, though suppressed, breathing of something living. It was quite close to him, somewhere on the slope of the parapet, but whether to right or left he could not tell. He dared not move for fear of betraying his own presence. But even while he listened a dark shadow seemed to detach itself from the top of the wall, hesitate for a second at the head of the ladder and then disappear; all in the most perfect silence; the ladder did not even creak.

"Jai Singh followed at once, and close behind him came the Risaldar and some of the others. As Jai Singh felt for the ladder with his foot there came from below the faintest clang of metal. There is no mistaking the sound of a knock on galvanised iron—the quarry had gone to ground in the cookhouse! I suppose the thief's idea was to establish one last desperate alibi in case his absence should even now at this eleventh hour be detected. I should agree with you if you suggest that such an alibi would be scarcely convincing. Indian soldiers do not usually visit their cookhouse in the middle of a cold winter's night. But for that very reason the refugee could count on finding the cookhouse untenanted; so perhaps he merely intended to use it as a *point d'appui* till he could be sure that the way was clear back to the shelter of his quilt on the guardroom floor. Anyway, there he was in the cookhouse with most of the garrison expectantly outside, Jai Singh to the fore with his Martini at the ready. It was really quite a humourous situation.

"From all accounts Shah Gul, the thief, when he did at last step out from cover to find the muzzle of Jai Singh's rifle thrust into the pit of his tummy, acted his part quite creditably. His surprise was, of course, genuine enough, but the skill with which he assumed an air of outraged innocence was worthy of a better cause or, at least, of a more sympathetic audience. Naturally he disclaimed all knowledge of a missing rifle. When asked where he had been and what he had been doing he indicated the cookhouse with a superb gesture and replied that he had only come to get a drink of water. This statement was received by the crowd with ribald laughter. At this juncture Pahlwan, the

guard commander, arrived with a pair of handcuffs, an essential article of store in all frontier posts, and Shah Gul was braceleted. It soon became evident, however, that this public examination would serve no useful purpose. So Sher Khan adjourned the meeting to the privacy of his own quarters, Shah Gul was accordingly marched off there under escort and all the onlookers were ordered to disperse. Only a select few were permitted to remain with the prisoner in Sher Khan's room. It is perhaps needless to remark that Jai Singh was one of them.

"I have never succeeded in getting Sher Khan, Jai Singh, or anyone else to give me a proper account of what then transpired. All that I have been able to discover is that after a great deal of talk Shah Gul at last admitted that he had taken the rifle and—what was much more surprising—actually offered to point out the very spot where he had hidden it. Thereupon the whole procession filed out of the main gate under the envious eyes of the sentry Ikbal, and wended its way across the four or five hundred yards of stony plain to the nala which lay under the hills to the south. Here the rifle was found under a heap of stones awaiting, no doubt, the arrival of Shah Gul's confederate. The non-arrival of the latter seems to indicate that there was bad staff work somewhere.

"So the rifle was recovered, the thief captured and honour satisfied. All the men returned to their quarters, the guard dossed down once more under their quilts, the dud clock continued to tick thunderously on its box and the chirag burned with as bright a flame as can be expected of a chirag which, as you ought to know by this time, is not saying very much. Jai Singh, considerably elated by his share in this happy *dénouement*, resumed his sentry-go with Ikbal. In fact the situation was much the same as it had been scarcely an hour before. The only difference was the prisoner in the lock-up.

"At daybreak it occurred to Risaldar Sher Khan that Shah Gul's performance in climbing up the wall in the middle of the night was very remarkable and that he would rather like to see it repeated in daylight. This repetition, besides being regarded in the light of a sporting event, would form the subject of an interesting addendum to the written report which he intended

to draw up and which, he hoped, would redound greatly to his credit. So one half the garrison ascended to the top of the wall to receive the unfortunate Shah Gul as he arrived, while the remainder escorted him to the foot of the wall to ensure that he did climb up and to catch him if he should fall. At the angle of the wall selected by the prisoner his wrists were freed and up he went, spread-eagling himself against the masonry and progressing by the use of his hands, elbows, knees and toes until he eventually reached the top.

"I arrived in my tonga soon after the close of this episode. The first thing I saw was Shah Gul sitting in the lock-up loaded with chains. Sher Khan offered to make him climb once more for my special delectation, but I declined with thanks. I inspected the place, however, where the feat had been performed and expressed my admiration for such skill and resource. This appeared to be highly gratifying to Jai Singh, who had clearly assumed, by this time, proprietary rights in the whole exploit. He saluted smartly and with a grin remarked that 'it was a kindness on my part' (thus to express my approval).

"But you see the error Shah Gul made. He had two alternatives. Both of them, in varying degrees, promised a fair measure of success. In the first place he could have gone clean away with the rifle. If, however, as seems to have been the case, he wished to go on serving with the idea of stealing another one, he ought to have left the rifle at the very foot of the wall for his confederate to receive it at his leisure. By doing so he would have reduced the period of his absence and the risk of detection to a minimum. But instead of going the whole hog in either direction he chose the middle course of conveying the rifle to a considerable distance. In doing so he was asking for trouble and got it. In rifle thieving as in everything else that is worth doing in this world, half measures are fatal. Shah Gul richly deserved the ten years or so of penal servitude that I have no doubt the subsequent court martial awarded him.

"What became of Jai Singh? Oh! he did well in the War, was promoted to Risaldar Major and got the King's Commission just before he retired. *Lieutenant* Jai Singh now, *if* you please. He lives in Tarn Taran in the Amritsar District of the Punjab.

I see him every year when he comes up for the regimental sports. But he has never yet told me exactly how Shah Gul was induced to confess that night in old Sher Khan's room."

"But haven't you got any idea of how it was done?" somebody asked.

"Oh! yes," said the officer from India, "I have my suspicions, of course, and pretty shrewd ones at that. But I am only quite certain about one thing; and that is that—Jai Singh will never tell!"



THAMIN

By Colonel F. A. Hamilton, late 3rd Cavalry, I.A.

Karim Khan, Shikari and Cantonment Overseer, was very keen that I should go with him on a shooting expedition to the forests south of Mandalay, in search of Thamin or Brow-antler deer. I welcomed the project and on a certain November evening we found ourselves steaming down the river on board one of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company's vessels, with my friend Captain Duncan, on the bridge.

As I sat on the upper deck in a long chair, sipping a gin cocktail, I watched what is by no means the least of the beauties of the Irrawaddy, the glorious sunset behind the Yomas, those wooded mountain ranges which form the backbone of Burma, saw its marvellous colours reflected in the placid waters and also the Pagodas and tiny villages half hidden amongst the jungle on the river bank. I watched the boats of many kinds, manned by crews of little river people; native boats, quaint in design that carried cargoes of rice a thousand miles or more, the quaintest and most picturesque of all being the "Laungzat," a vessel of considerable size with uptilted bows, beautifully modelled hull, and stern in the form of a tower elaborately carved in a style that only the Burmans can achieve, for they are great carvers in wood.

These vessels are propelled by oars, twelve to sixteen in number, worked by the crew with a slow rhythmic swing, while they sing some old-time river chantie. When the wind is favourable and they are running before it, they make use of six or seven square sails, which enable them to travel at great speed. The whole craft is vastly intriguing to look upon, and might

easily have come into being from some book of fairy tales. I watched the rafts made up of immense logs of teak cut from forests far away in the Chin Hills; literally floating villages, manned by crews of Shans from up-country, complete with their families and livestock, including cows, goats and chickens. Erected on the raft are huts and even pagodas made of bamboo, they are, in fact, entirely self-contained and prepared for a voyage of several weeks. Without any artificial means of propulsion they are launched upon the bosom of the waters to drift with the stream. With the help of a number of paddles the crew, if they are lucky, manage to keep the raft clear of shoals and sandbanks. It behoves other river-craft to keep out of their way or take the consequences. In this manner logs of teak are conveyed to the timber yards of Rangoon.

The scene was one of considerable beauty. The warm air produced an effect of quietude and peace. The mighty river swept on with great dignity. In the fading light I could see flocks of geese settling upon the islands and sandbanks. Wild fowl in vast numbers came flying on to the smooth surface to share with the cormorants the spoils of the river; kingfishers darted to and fro in search of an evening meal. Presently the setting sun sank behind the distant hills, and then for half an hour or more I saw the most marvellous changing of colour, now a pearlish tint, now rosy, now deep red, now violet, while "old gold" tipped the hill-tops until at last they were enveloped in a purple shroud. The stars came out and darkness descended upon the Land of Pagados.

The friendly voice of the Captain awoke me from my reverie, "Don't you like my gin cocktails? There is just time for another before I have to see her tied up at Palon for the night." What a charming Captain and what a good host!

We slept aboard the steamer, and after a quick breakfast by lamplight, I bade farewell to my friend and landed in the early dawn, complete with Karim Khan and camp kit. The air was cold and damp, and heavy dew was dripping from the reeds and kinegrass. We had twenty-five miles to go before we could reach the village in the Thamin country, which was to be our *pied-à-terre* during the week's shooting.

The Superintendant of Police had lent us ponies, hardy and surefooted little chaps, and also an elephant for our impedimenta.

How shall I describe to you the first day's ride? It is difficult to picture the luxuriant and bewildering beauty of a Burmese forest in early winter. It is big, magnificent and solemn, and it is very impressive. Palms and bamboos wave gracefully over a mass of beautiful undergrowth of flowering shrubs of many kinds. There are creepers such as Morning Glory, honeysuckle, and many other varieties. There are orchids, some of a great size, upon the boughs, some rare and some ordinary. Of the latter the most beautiful is one of a heavenly blue, "Vanda Cerulia," its long sprays of blossom are truly exquisite. During my travels in Burma I sent home over thirty different kinds of orchids, some of which were honoured with a place in the Botanical Gardens of Dublin.

Above the undergrowth giant trees rise high, teak, cotton and others, many of which attain over 200 feet in height. Long tendrils of creeper stretch from one tree to another forming trapeze and other gymnastic appliances for old-men monkeys, known as Lemurs, inquisitive, chattering people, who follow you and fear no man. And then the bird life: parrots, parakeets, doves, pigeons, jays, woodpeckers, finches, and wagtails. The woodpeckers share with the lizards and tree frogs the numerous insects in the tree trunks.

The forest is full of game, wild elephants, bears, panthers, tigers and deer, are all there. Wild boar show themselves aggressively, only to disappear as quickly with an angry woof-woof; for even they are shy of humans. Snakes haunt the rocks and undergrowth. Pythons in the trees, cobras and other venomous reptiles lie concealed in the fissures of the rocks. Riding through the forest one sees little of them for it behoves one to look well ahead and ride circumspectly to avoid the fallen trees, creepers and other obstacles. The sun rises very quickly in Burma, and by midday, even in the winter months, the forest's shade is more than welcome. In the sunbeams which penetrate it butterflies of great beauty hover and flit from flower to flower. It is difficult in so short a space to adequately

describe the charm of the Burmese forests. The streams, the waterfalls, the rushing torrents, the wealth of beauty and the marvellous effects of light and colour. To my mind there are few things in the world to equal the beauty of a tropical forest.

By noon we were glad of a rest, and after our lunch a few minutes siesta. The ponies grazed happily and the elephant devoured quite a hundredweight of tender bamboo shoots.

Towards sunset the afternoon march came to an end, the ponies were tethered beneath a forest hut, the elephant equipped with a large wooden bell, was turned loose to forage for himself.

The headman of the village, with true oriental politeness, conducted us to the forest hut, in which all was in readiness for our week's stay. Close to the hut was a monastery, or Hpoongi-kyoung. These monasteries are occupied by Buddhist priests, who call the villagers to prayer, teach the village children and look after the pilgrims who visit them. They have shaven heads and wear saffron-coloured articles of clothing not unlike a Roman toga. They lead simple lives, and emulating their great master, Guadama the Buddha, are the soul of kindness and self-sacrifice. They live entirely on the charity of the village. The roofs of their monasteries are ornamented with thousands of little bells which tinkle in the breeze. Gongs with a marvellous tone, sound the hour for prayer. These buildings are raised several feet above the ground so that the dwellers therein may be unmolested by snakes, floods and malaria. Bouganvillea and other creepers climb in great luxuriance over the roofs.

From the upper storey of the hut I could see the pretty and simple homes of the villagers nestling amongst the groves of bananas, mango trees and toddy palm; thatched with dried leaves and built of bamboo with teak uprights and cross pieces. Most fascinating of all, we could see the little Burmese people, the women with their bright silk lungyis and short white jackets; naked children, their tummies distended with rice, playing games in the sunlight, such as leap-frog, kite flying and football of a kind, played with a basket ball. We could see roaming in the village streets, geese, pigs, and mangey and emaciated country dogs, who keep up an incessant yapping for the benefit of the strangers in their midst. Towards evening the

cattle came home, driven by an urchin or two, seated astride the oldest of the cows; bullock carts with thick and solid wheels creaked and squeaked along the cart tracks, labourers were returning from the rice fields, where they had been spending the day (from sunrise to sunset is their day's work). The gongs of the Monastery called the people to prayer. Karim Khan was calling to me to the effect that my bath was ready and what was he to do with the whisky bottle? A tactful hint that he and the headman of the village wanted the evening tot of grog. To ensure good sport an adequate supply of whisky was essential. Karim Khan, though a good Mahommedan on his father's side, inherited the love of wine from his Burmese mother's side of the family tree. We decided to start very early next day and shoot until it became too hot. In this way we should have a chance of a good stag before the heat and flies compelled them to retire to the leafy glades in the heart of the forest.

As we moved off at the crowing of many cocks, there was a pleasant nip in the air, a dense mist hung upon the rice-fields, screening everything from view until the sun rose slowly, gaining power, penetrated the mist and revealed a very lovely landscape. We were standing on high ground from whence we could see the distant plains in the glory of the sunrise; the mighty river sweeping along through the rice-fields in great curves. The villages were awakening, herds of cattle were roaming towards their grazing grounds, sending up columns of red dust. The smoke of many fires with its aromatic odour rose perpendicularly into the air as the women cooked the morning meal, preparatory to the day's work; but let us to our shooting!

The Thamin or brow-antlered deer (Rucervus Panola Eldii) frequents the more swampy parts of the forests of Burma. He is in truth a species of swamp deer. His very long brow antlers make, with the upper portion of the horns, a graceful "C" shaped curve. The measurements of the horn and the weight of the deer average, according to the age of the stag, much the same as in the case of the Indian Sambhur and the Red Deer of our islands.

One way of shooting this fine stag is to sit in a bullock cart disguised as a load of hay or sugar cane, by which means the

"Sportsman" is enabled to get within easy range of the unsuspecting quarry, and resting his rifle on the side of the cart, draw a bead on the poor beast! This method we scorned as being too easy and unsportsmanlike. We rode our ponies to the shooting ground, which was only a few miles from the forest hut. A bullock cart followed behind us with a few light refreshments and to carry back anything that we shot. These bullock carts are quaint. The wheels are quite solid discs of wood, a crosscut sawn from a tree trunk and attached to the cart by a lynch-pin. The minimum of oil and grease is used so that the creaking and groaning of the wheels may be as loud as possible, the better to ward off the evil spirits which the Burmans imagine lie in wait for the unwary. Each cart has a pair of bullocks. The harness consists of a yoke and little else. The cart provides good lying-down accommodation for the weary traveller, and often for the driver, who has no hesitation in having a long and sound siesta when no sahib is with him. You must, however, get used to the jolting, lurching and bumping, which is unavoidable on so rough a track with a springless cart. The roads are so bad that in spite of the boulders, the dried up bed of a stream is often preferable as a means of communication.

After an hour's ride we arrived at some lowish "Sal" jungle. Karim Khan signed to me to dismount and handing the ponies to the driver of the bullock cart, took the lead, carrying my spare rifle. A narrow track took us to a large open park-like space, which we surveyed with our glasses from behind the cover of a rock. It was a matter of moments when we spotted six does about 400 yards away, but we could see no sign of a stag. After watching for some ten minutes we were about to move on when we heard a strange noise away on our right. Thudding and stamping, and every now and then a loud clash like the striking of two large billiard balls. Karim Khan, with a muttered invocation to the prophet, seized my arm and pointed down a natural lane between the "Sal" trees, at the end of which in a small open space on the short green grass, was a very thrilling sight. On this ideal duelling ground two magnificent stags were involved in a mortal combat. We stood and watched the fight which was taking place not more than 200

yards away. One of the combatants was apparently older than the other and a heavier animal. The six does were the prize for which they were fighting. They engaged, backed a few paces, reared up and clash, two splendid sets of horns met. They remained with heads together for a while, each trying to push the other back by sheer brute force, and again went through the same tactics. Again and again this ring craft was repeated, until it was obvious that the old stag was getting the worst of it.

"Shoot him, the old one, he has the best head, and old stags should be thinned out," said Karim Khan.

I followed his advice and put a bullet behind the older stag's shoulder, and down he went, never to move again. His opponent, no doubt thinking that it was all his doing, looked at him, stamped on the ground, sniffed the air, bellowed loudly and bounded away after the now quickly vanishing does. This stag's head was the finest I shot on that trip, very thick in the beam and only one and a half inches short of the record. The usual rite of "halaling" was gone through and he was lifted on to the bullock cart, which had soon appeared on the scene.

On returning to the village for the midday rest we noticed that large numbers of the men were squatting on the ground with large banana leaves in front of them. This was preparatory to the distribution of venison, of which the whole village has a share. The Headman divides it up most carefully, allotting portions to all families. The Burmans love fresh meat above all else. The evening was spent in pursuit of jungle fowl, a very beautiful little wild game-cock resembling an English game-bantam. They fly like pheasants, giving most sporting shots when driven and are excellent to eat. A few birds were all that were necessary for the larder, a hare, a few quail and a snipe or two made up the evening's bag. To shoot like this on a cold winter's afternoon is truly delightful.

As I sat in a long chair in camp with a "sundowner" and a pipe the headman and his satellites sat on the ground in a circle, drinking ginger beer and smoking large white cheroots. The fire-flies danced amongst the trees, crickets and tree frogs contributed their evening concert. A large camp fire was burning, the flames shooting upwards lighting up the immediate sur-

roundings and enhancing the mystery of the blackness beyond. Only those who have experienced it can realise the great pleasure of a "Bari-ag," a forest camp fire, the light of the blazing logs under a starry sky.

Soon the whole village had collected. The cheery little Burmese people chatting and laughing without any shyness or restraint. Karim Khan, acting as my interpreter, passed on many thrilling tales of adventures with wild beasts of the forest.

I had stag's kidneys and bacon for dinner and Pilsener beer as made by the Germans in pre-war days, and now no more! A last pipe and then the sleep of a tired "sportsman."

The next day's programme was very similar. We started at dawn and came up with a herd of Thamin at about 7 a.m. Careful scrutiny through our glasses revealed a very good stag, some younger ones, and at least a dozen does. They were in a very open space, and to stalk the old stag without disturbing the others called for great patience and no little skill. For at least an hour I stalked, making use of the trees and rocks and clumps of bamboo. To enable me to move as silently as possible over the dried leaves I was wearing rope soled Sambhur-hide boots. By dint of crawling almost *ventre à terre*, I had very nearly arrived within range when I unfortunately broke a twig with my knee. The hinds were off like lightning, followed by the younger stags, and well in the rear galloped their antlered lord. The whole herd swung left-handed into the forest and out of sight and range. I knew that my only chance was to head them off and I went as fast as I could through the trees. Fortune favoured me and I arrived at a less thickly treed space in the jungle forest as the leading doe came into sight. The range was well over 200 yards, and I could not see clearly. I let the does and their A.D.Cs. pass and awaited the old stag who, as is usual, had put the ladies well in the forefront of the battle. At last he appeared, moving at a lumbering gallop, with his horns thrown well back. I was so blown that I could not hold my rifle steady. I aimed well in front and missed, fired again and struck a tree, ran madly on and fired once more, but with no result. At last I had only one cartridge left in my magazine.

I ran on parallel to the stag and waited for a clearer shot. By a piece of luck he crossed an open space in the forest. I swung my Rigby Mauser well in front of his shoulder and over he went like a shot rabbit. I felt a violent blow on my shoulder and an excited voice behind me shouted, "Well done, old Cock!" It was Karim Khan, who, I should have told you, prided himself on his English, which he was wont to make use of only on special occasions. It was a heavy stag with a head measuring half an inch less than that of yesterday. It had been an exciting chase. That afternoon we again shot for the pot with fair success.

Walking home I said to Karim Khan: "One more good head and I shall shoot no more Thamin."

"Sahib, to-morrow we must kill the Father of all the Stags," he replied.

"Inshallah" (God willing), said I.

The next day we rode out to a more distant hunting ground famed for its big heads shot in the past by "Commissioner Sahibs" and "General-Sahib-Bahadurs." It was 10 a.m. before I felt the familiar grip on my arm.

"Down, Sahib, quick, get behind cover there," he whispered. His glasses were soon at work. A muttered exclamation in his own language and I could see that he was unusually excited. He seized my arm and pointing to a shape in a dark shadow under a clump of bamboos, some 300 yards away, said:

"Look, Sahib, can you not see that stag, he is surely the Father of all the Stags, and has a wonderful head. Can you not see him there in the shade by the bamboo clump?"

Yes, I could certainly see a stag standing close to what appeared to be a large boulder, but the bamboos prevented me from seeing his head. I took careful aim at his shoulder and crack, over he went! The "boulder" jumped up and galloped off into the jungle and out of sight before I could fire, but not before I had seen that he had indeed a magnificent head, and was almost black with age. I had shot a stag with hardly a point to boast of. How was I to know that the "Boulder" was the Father of all the Stags! The old Shikari threw himself on the ground and almost wept with disappointment and grief. I rode home!

It took several tots of "Visky" before Karim Khan would speak to me again.

The Burmans were, of course, delighted, meat was all they wanted, and one stag was as good as another.

The following day I got a good head, which did a little towards comforting the old Shikari. He mourned over the record head that I had missed through being too hasty for many moons. "Never, never had there been such a Thamin, the Father of them all!"

Returning to camp that evening we were riding quietly along the banks of a river, not wide, but fast and deep, when we saw emerging from the forest on the far bank a Thamin stag moving at a laboured gallop, horns back, tongue lolling out, eyes red and bulging with fear. Every now and again he would stop, give a terrified look back and on again. He fled along the bank as if all the demons were pursuing him.

"What can be hunting him?" said I to my companion.

"Wait, Sahib, you will soon see! Ah! There they come," he replied. "They" emerged from the jungle, running absolutely mute close on the line of the stag, noses to the ground, sterns down, a pack of ten to fifteen couples of large red dogs, all much the same in appearance and running close together like a good pack of fox hounds. "Dholes" they were, the red jungle dogs of Burma.

"The Shaitans, they will not stop till they have him, let us ride on Sahib and watch the chase."

And so we rode on a parallel line to the strange hunt which was taking place on the far bank. The red dogs hunting silently and relentlessly, were gaining every hundred yards. The stag was becoming very done and we feared the worst.

Now stags, many of whom I have seen hunted by hounds in the west country of England, sooner or later take to water and this one was no exception to the rule. Suddenly, as the Dholes were upon him, and jumping up at him, some already gripping him by the throat, he turned sharp, bounded on to some high rocks overhanging a deep pool and with one mighty leap plunged into the depths of the pool. As he came to the surface his pursuers did likewise. We thought it was time to intervene. Two

rifles cracked, and the two leading hounds finished their last hunt. Two more shared their fate before the remainder turned, swam to the shore and fled into the forest. The stag swam down the stream until he reached shallow water where he landed, blood and water dripping from his flanks, and turning once more to make sure that he was alone, he passed out of our sight. These Dholes will hunt even a tiger to death. They are the terror of the jungle beasts and the anathema of the forest officers, who put a reward on their heads. A hunt like that, inadequately described by the writer, is seldom witnessed by white men.

I am glad that we were there to rob them of their prey. They might well have been the hounds of Satan hunting their quarry over the hob of Hell!

The remainder of the week was spent driving hog-deer, a pigmy animal, very neat, very beautiful and very fast, not much bigger than a roe-deer, but with diminutive stag horns. To shoot them with a rifle, not with a gun, is real sport and ten to one on the hog-deer! I bagged two, but let off several. Then I caught Captain Duncan's steamer and went back to Mandalay. On the whole I had earned my gin cocktail.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor, THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.

SIR,—Now that it has been decided to retain a certain number of horsed Cavalry Regiments, both at home and in India, it seems that the question of their re-organisation should be carefully considered.

Motor and Tank Cavalry Regiments will undertake all operations in well-roaded country or on the broad plains of Central Asia, Irak, or Southern Afghanistan, where there will be few obstacles to mechanized movement.

Horsed Cavalry will be required for work in areas unsuitable for mechanized movement, such as certain portions of the Western Front, Palestine, or the North-West Frontier of India, or possibly in areas, which have been subjected to intense air action, resulting in the destruction of communications.

At present, with the idea of taking weight off the horse and increasing mobility, many items of equipment—essential to cavalry and formerly carried on the saddle—have been relegated to the various echelons of mechanical transport.

The practical effect of this is that horsed cavalry are, within certain narrow limits, tied down to the vicinity of roads or of country suitable for the passage of mechanical vehicles. But this is just the sort of country where Motor Cavalry will operate.

A clean break should be made with roads and wheels. Horsed Cavalry should be re-organised entirely on a pack basis so that they will be independent of ground and able to undertake tasks beyond the scope of Motor Cavalry.

Not only the transport, but also the auxiliary arms, the artillery, signals, and R.E. should be re-organised in a similar manner. Our armament firms should easily be able to design an

efficient light pack-howitzer or long-range mortar, suitable for the support of cavalry.

If Horsed Cavalry is re-organised on an all-pack basis there seems no reason why, in future, it should not play a very important part.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A. G. ARMSTRONG, Lieut.-Colonel,
Late 8th (K.G.O.) Cavalry.

May 5th, 1936.

NOTES

The Indian Cavalry Dinner

was held at the Trocadero Restaurant, on Thursday, 28th May, 1936. Guest of the Club was Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Bart., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., D.S.O. (Colonel, The Greys and 8th King George's Own Light Cavalry). In the chair was General Sir George de S. Barrow, G.C.B., K.C.M.G. (Colonel, The Scinde Horse). The following officers were present :—

Skinner's Horse (1st Duke of York's Own Cavalry). (*Late 1st D.Y.O. Lancers and Skinner's Horse.*)—Lieut.-Colonel V. A. Coaker, D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel C. F. Knaggs; Lieut.-Colonel H. Medlicott, D.S.O.; Major E. D. Metcalfe, M.V.O., M.C.; Major G. T. Van der Gucht; Captain N. T. Loring; Captain R. Wilson; Lieut. A. S. Armstrong.

2nd Royal Lancers (Gardner's Horse). (*Late 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse) and 4th Cavalry.*)—Brigadier-General M. E. Willoughby, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G.; Major K. Robertson; Major J. H. Wilkinson.

3rd Cavalry. (*Late 5th Cavalry and 8th Cavalry.*)—Captain D. S. L. Gregson; Lieut. K. P. Dhargalkar; Lieut. P. A. H. Heneker.

Hodson's Horse (4th Duke of Cambridge's Own Lancers). (*Late 9th Hodson's Horse and 10th Duke of Cambridge's Own Lancers.*)—Major-General E. de Burgh, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.; Colonel The Lord Middleton, M.C.; Colonel C. H. Rowcroft, D.S.O.; Major M. S. Bendle; Major R. H. R. Cumming; Major C. F. L. Stevens, M.C.; Major J. E. Walker; Captain J. R. Keogh Murphy; Captain R. A. Oswald.

Probyn's Horse (5th King Edward's Own Lancers). (*Late 11th K.E.O. Lancers and 12th Cavalry.*)—Major-General Sir Dennis Deane, K.C.I.E., C.B., D S.O.; Lieut.-

Colonel R. H. Anderson; Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Grace, M.C.; Lieut.-Colonel W. Hesketh, D.S.O.; Major R. G. Alexander, M.C.; Major J. W. Davidson, M.C.; Major R. H. Sheepshanks, D.S.O., M.V.O.; Major J. Hulme Taylor; Major D. Van Renen; Major T. N. Watson, M.V.O., M.C.; Captain H. E. P. Dyke Acland; Lieut. J. D. Butler; Lieut. A. R. Kemsley.

6TH DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S OWN LANCERS (WATSON'S HORSE). (*Late 13th D.C. Lancers (Watson's Horse) and 16th Cavalry.*)—Colonel G. B. Irvine, C.B.; Colonel A. M. Jameson; Colonel G. G. C. Wylly, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel H. W. D. Hill, D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Lang; Lieut.-Colonel C. Mackenzie, C.M.G., D.S.O.; Major J. R. Brown; Major G. F. White, M.C.; Captain K. O'Brien Harding, O.B.E.; Captain E. H. Whitford-Hawkey, M.C.; Captain A. D. F. Thomason; Lieut. F. R. C. Stewart.

7TH LIGHT CAVALRY. (*Late 28th Light Cavalry.*)—Lieut.-Colonel P. Shelley Claridge.

8TH KING GEORGE'S OWN LIGHT CAVALRY. (*Late 26th K.G.O. Lt. Cavalry and 30th Lancers (Gordon's Horse).*)—Brigadier-General C. R. Harbord, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Brigadier-General W. W. Warner, C.M.G.; Lieut-Colonel H. A. B. Johnson; Major B. H. O'Donnell; Major H. T. Walker; Captain P. M. W. Martin; Captain H. D. Tucker.

THE ROYAL DECCAN HORSE (9TH HORSE). (*Late 20th Royal Deccan Horse and 29th Lancers (Deccan Horse).*)—Brigadier-General C. E. Macquoid, C.I.E., D.S.O. (*Colonel of the Regiment*); Colonel F. Adams, D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel F. Oswald; Lieut.-Colonel E. Tennant; Lieut.-Colonel F. W. C. Turner; Major C. Gregson; Major A. N. Lovell; Captain J. D. Heaton Armstrong; Captain J. C. J. O'Connor.

THE GUIDES CAVALRY (10TH QUEEN VICTORIA'S OWN FRONTIER FORCE).—Brigadier D. K. McLeod, D.S.O.

PRINCE ALBERT VICTOR'S OWN CAVALRY (11TH FRONTIER FORCE). (*Late 21st P.A.V.O. Cavalry (F.F.) (Daly's Horse) and 23rd Cavalry (F.F.).*)—Colonel H. L. Ismay, C.B., D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel J. C. R. Gannon, M.V.O.; Major G. Carr-White; Captain G. T. Wheeler; Lieut. J. R. H. Orr.

SAM BROWNE'S CAVALRY (12TH FRONTIER FORCE). (*Late 22nd S.B. Cavalry (F.F.) and 25th Cavalry (F.F.).*)—Major I. F. G. Hall; Major N. E. Marriott; Captain G. H. S. Webber.

13TH DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S OWN LANCERS. (*Late 31st Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers and 32nd Lancers.*)—Colonel W. M. Macleod; Lieut.-Colonel Z. G. Burmester, O.B.E.; Major F. R. R. Bucher, M.C.; Captain H. D. Caldecott; Captain F. C. Field; Captain P. H. Sheil.

THE SCINDE HORSE (14TH PRINCE OF WALES'S OWN CAVALRY). (*Late 35th Scinde Horse and 36th Jacob's Horse.*)—General Sir George de S. Barrow, G.C.B., K.C.M.G. (*Colonel of the Regiment*); Major-General Sir Edward Fagan, K.C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Connop, D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Thompson, O.B.E.; Lieut.-Colonel K. de L. Young, M.C.; Major I. F. Hossack; Major E. Montagu Smith; Major F. W. S. Watkins; Lieut. H. M. Prentice.

THE POONA HORSE (17TH QUEEN VICTORIA'S OWN CAVALRY). (*Late 33rd Q.V.O. Lt. Cavalry and 34th P.A.V.O. Poona Horse.*)—Colonel G. Knowles, D.S.O. (*Colonel of the Regiment*); Lieut.-Colonel W. Kenworthy; Lieut.-Colonel C. S. Stack, C.M.G.; Captain D. F. Massy; Lieut. J. H. Wakefield.

18TH KING EDWARD'S OWN CAVALRY. (*Late 6th K.E.O. Cavalry and 7th Hariana Lancers.*)—Colonel J. K. Tod, C.M.G. (*Colonel of the Regiment*); Lieut.-Colonel S. W. Egerton; Lieut.-Colonel L. Lawrence-Smith; Major G. F. Gretton; Major M. H. Simonds; Lieut. L. M. Murphy.

19TH KING GEORGE'S OWN LANCERS. (*Late 18th K.G.O. Lancers and 19th Lancers (Fane's Horse).*)—Colonel The Right Hon. The Lord Wigram, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.S.I. (*Colonel of the Regiment*); General Sir Havelock Hudson, G.C.B., K.C.I.E.; Brigadier-General F. F. Lance; Colonel G. A. Money; Lieut.-Colonel S. E. L. Baddeley; Lieut.-Colonel V. A. S. Keighley, D.S.O., M.V.O.; Lieut-Colonel P. E. Ricketts, D.S.O., M.V.O.; Lieut.-Colonel W. A. Sykes, D.S.O.; Bt.-Lieut.-Colonel D. H. Currie, M.C., D.C.M.; Major C. H. Howell; Major J. G. Pocock; Captain M. H. Francis; Captain R. J. Tweedy; Lieut. G. E. V. Keighley; Lieut. J. W. F. Lance.

20TH LANCERS. (*Late* 14*th Murray's Jat Lancers and* 15*th Lancers* (*Cureton's Multanis*).)—General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O. (*Colonel of the Regiment*); Colonel H. M. Johnston; Colonel J. G. McConaghy, C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O.; Lieut.-Colonel D. G. Bromilow, D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel G. R. Maitland, D.S.O.; Lieut.-Colonel K. D. Barbour; Lieut.-Colonel H. St. Clair Smallwood; Captain P. G. M. Baldwin.

THE CENTRAL INDIA HORSE (21ST KING GEORGE'S OWN HORSE). (*Late* 38*th K.G.O.C.I. Horse and* 39*th K.G.O.C.I. Horse.*)—Major-General E. D. Giles, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Major A. A. Filose; Major R. George.

HIS MAJESTY'S INDIAN ORDERLY OFFICERS VISITED DURING THE EVENING: Risaldar-Major and Hony. Lt. Narian Singh, Sardar Bahadur, I.D.S.M. (6*th D.C.O. Lancers. Watson's Horse*); Subadar-Major and Hony. Lt. Bhagat Singh, Sardar Bahadur, I.D.S.M. (1*st Batt. Royal Fusiliers, City of London Regt.*); Subadar-Major and Hony. Lt. Hardit Singh, Bahadur (2*nd Royal Batt.* 11*th Sikh Regt., Ludniana Sikhs*); Subadar Ishar Singh, V.C. (4*th Batt.* 15*th Punjab Regt.*).

COLONEL S. LOW, D.S.O., *Honorary Secretary.*

HOME AND DOMINION MAGAZINES

The "Army Quarterly" contains a number of interesting articles without any one being particularly outstanding. Mr. Hoffman Nickerson discusses land, sea and air warfare, and concludes that the value of the air arm tends to be overrated. He points out some of the limitations of aircraft which are often forgotten; thinks it unlikely that the use of the air arm against purely civil targets will either be good policy or will bring decisive results; and considers that the value of naval and military forces will remain in future as great as ever in the past. Major Thrupp describes the opening operations of the B.E.F. in 1914 as they might have been had we then possessed tanks and armoured cars, and considers that our defensive power would have been considerably increased thereby. Lieut.-Colonel de Watteville continues his valuable narrative of the Italo-Abyssinian war, carrying the story down to the end of February when the latest Italian advance in the north was due to open. M. Leurquin discusses Belgium's military position, and points out how completely she will continue to depend on aid from France and this country if she is to maintain the integrity of her territory. Captain Denne advocates the introduction of a partly short service scheme for service in the Regular Army at home so as to provide for a subsequent period of service in the Territorial Army and its Reserve, and the substitution for the officer of a series of courses in place of promotion examinations, with a complete classification of officers as to capacity and prospects on completion of these courses.

The "Fighting Forces" for April includes a valuable paper on the prospects of British officers in the Indian Army—an abstract of the views of Sir Philip Chetwode, the late C.-in-C. India. He declares that the Indian Army is still a fine career,

and will remain so for a generation at least, despite the inevitable advance of Indianisation. Another article puts forward a plea for a revision of the present system of officers' training. A school for company commanders, and a reduction of the Staff College course to one year with a year's continuation for picked students only—these are the reforms proposed.

There are other papers, too numerous to analyse in detail, on such varied topics as history, vocational training, O.T.C., night flying, physical training, and sport. Deserving perhaps of special mention is the account by a "G" Cadet of his experiences while qualifying from the ranks for Sandhurst—an article in which modesty and honesty are attractively combined with enthusiasm.

The "Royal Artillery Journal" has a whole series of useful articles. Major-General Sir John Headlam, looking back over a previous period of rearmament, shows that the correct timing and conduct of the process are of utmost importance, for it is so costly that it can be repeated only at long intervals. Once decided on, however, it should be pushed on with the least possible delay. Experiment must always be a long and tedious process, but production must be hastened, even at the expense of cash, if the dangerous transition period is to be passed safely.

An article by Captain Murler on the attack on Zeebrugge in 1918—the Memoirs of Sir Roger Keyes do not appear to have been made use of by the author—gives a useful description of the action, but alas! without a plan to illustrate it. Major Reynolds gives an outline of the Memel problem, one of the danger spots of Eastern Europe. The admirable narrative of Napoleon's march through the Sinai peninsula, on the route followed by our E.E.F. in 1916-17, is concluded, and there is a full and interesting description of the Gold Coast and the various military operations that have taken place there and in Togoland in the last two hundred years.

The most interesting article in the "Royal Engineers' Journal" is that by Major Fowle, proposing that Army barracks should be done away with and officers and soldiers be lodged out-

side and come in to their work daily, as civilians do. He avers that the loss of freedom and individual private life in the Army is the main obstacle to recruiting to-day, and that only by some such revolutionary reform can we get the numbers and type of men we need. Armouries, institutes, dining rooms and small officers' and sergeants' messes would be retained, and for collective training units would go into camp. Depots would continue to exist, but units would not go abroad as such; men would do three years on foreign service immediately after leaving the depot, and then be posted home when they would be at liberty to marry. He reckons that the increase in cost would not be excessive, in view of the fact that new barracks will soon be largely needed everywhere, and those already existing require large scale modernisation. The whole thesis is well and persuasively worked out; not everyone will agree with it, but it has very attractive possibilities, and the experiment might be well worth trying in certain of the less well populated stations with selected units.

An interesting account of life with the Nigerian battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force, and a discussion of the part played by the R.E. in mechanisation, help to make up an attractive issue.

The "Journal of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps" contains an important article translated from the German on animals in chemical warfare. The effects on animals, the horse in particular, of the various toxic and vesicant gases used in war are given in great technical detail, together with the veterinary treatment recommended for animals as affected. Protection of animals against these gases is admitted to be a difficult problem. Something can be done by careful choice of lines and bivouacs, and by arrangements for rapid evacuation of any affected area. The screening and decontamination of foodstuffs is also dealt with. Individual protection by masks will, however, usually be necessary, and some progress in devising a suitable mask has been made by all armies. Such masks must be light, cheap, easily fitted and removed, designed so as not to interfere with the use of reins, and proof against all

gases likely to be encountered. Animals and men must be carefully trained in their use both by day and by night. Protection of the whole of an animal's body against vesicant gases does not appear to be a practical proposition, so that veterinary officers must expect a number of these gas cases and be prepared to treat them on a large scale.

The whole article is one which cavalry personnel will do well to study carefully.

The "Journal of the United Service Institution of India" contains a number of interesting articles. Lieut.-Colonel Baird Smith contributes a review of mechanisation; he stresses the difficulty of providing the vast mass of vehicles required and the necessary repair, replacement and supply organisation for a complete mechanisation of the British Army, and discusses the strategical and tactical problems involved, on which, he considers, not much useful light has been shown by recent peace exercises. He sees in the future a combination of A.F.Vs. with motorised troops as the basis of the army, and considers possible the disappearance of armour from the battlefield altogether.

Major Westmorland gives an account of the Anzac landing at Gallipoli and considers that a great opportunity of securing decisive success was lost by failure to exploit the first surprise, indifferent beach organisation, overcrowding, and failure of leadership, information, and control.

Major Hamill, in an article on the choice of a preparatory school, offers Service parents, for whom this question must often be an anxious one, some useful hints on the way to set about solving it.

There are other articles on topics of varied interest.

The "Royal Air Force Quarterly" is a most interesting and important number. It opens with an analysis of the epoch-making theories of the Italian General Douhet, which have caused such wide interest in Continental military circles. This doctrine is that armies and navies will in future be replaced by an independent Air Army of bombing and reconnaissance aircraft, to be used offensively and intensively from the first

moment of a war to attack the hostile material and moral resources, by first gaining the mastery of the air and then bombing the enemy into surrender.

The defects in this doctrine are then luminously expounded in the first part of a discussion of "Air Strategy" by the Russian General Golovine, in collaboration with a technical expert. These authors then proceed to discuss the world situation and to outline their views on the composition and distribution and use of our own Imperial Air Forces. The results are too long to summarise in brief, but they advocate, as regards distribution, a threefold division of our air arm into squadrons for auxiliary duties with the Army and Navy and for Dominion local defence, squadrons for local strategic duties such as the defence of the homeland, the Middle East, the Singapore area, and the North-West Frontier, and squadrons for general duties, such as the mobile defence of any threatened part of the Empire, for the achievement of local superiority in conjunction with our allies on the Rhine and in the Mediterranean, and for an air offensive on a large scale in any future great war. The paper also contains clear and brief descriptions of the present composition and condition of the world's air forces and an analysis of recent technical aerial progress in all its branches. It is a most valuable piece of work, which everyone interested in modern warfare and its possibilities should peruse and study.

The rest of the periodical, including the lighter items, is well up to the standard we have learnt to expect from the "Royal Air Force Quarterly."

The "Canadian Defence Quarterly" for April is an excellent number. An anonymous article on "The Attack at Dawn" describes fully the difficulties facing a General when initiating offensive plans, and is doubtful whether under modern conditions of war even the best equipped army can do more than play a defensive rôle. Major Reynolds, in an article which recent events have made somewhat out of date, sketches the various issues, for ourselves, the League of Nations, and the world, of the Italo-Abyssinian war. Major Oxley points out that the military supremacy of the white race is a recent phenomenon in

history, and one which in his opinion now seems to be tending to disappear with the loss of the white man's monopoly of industrial power. The Editor contributes a useful summary of Anglo-Egyptian relations from 1882 to date, and there is a suggestive lecture on some aspects of British Imperial strategy, which the writer considers will in future, as in the past, be mainly concerned with the Far East, Afghanistan, and the balance of power in Europe, with special regard for the security of the Low Countries.

The "Territorial Magazine," the first issue of which appears to-day, is excellently calculated to serve the purpose for which it is produced—that of serving the interests of officers and all others interested in the welfare of the Defence Forces, and the O.T.C.s and Cadet units throughout the country. It is obtainable at all bookstalls, price one shilling.

E.W.S.

The Editor acknowledges with thanks the receipt of the following:—

The Royal Scots Greys Association. Report, 1935.
3rd The King's Own Hussars. Magazine, 1936.
10th The Royal Hussars. Gazette, April, 1936.
16/5th Lancers, The Scarlet and Green. Journal, 1935.
The 15th Lancers. A Quarterly News. April, 1936.
The Royal Tank Corps Journal. March, April and May, 1936.
The Wasp. The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment Journal. March, 1936.
The Faugh a Ballagh. Royal Irish Fusiliers Gazette. January, 1936.
The Goat. Royal Canadian Dragoons. Quarterly, April, 1936.
The Strathconian. Lord Strathcona's Horse. Quarterly, April, 1936.
The Journal of the 2nd Royal Lancers. Gardner's Horse. May, 1936.

FOREIGN MAGAZINES

THE United States "Cavalry Journal" for March-April contains the concluding instalment of the narrative of the career of General Reuben Bernard. This part includes the Sheepeater Campaign of 1879 and the rounding up of the Chiricahua Indians in 1881. These were really very minor "wars," but are nevertheless remarkable for the astounding performances of both men and horses in pursuit of lesser Red Indian tribes who were little better than armed brigands. Bernard, as ever, comes out of these affairs extremely well; indeed, the reader at the end of these chapters is left with the impression that this American cavalryman was a fearless and exceptionally successful master of irregular warfare. It is to be regretted that Bernard was too young during the Civil War ever to have commanded even a brigade.

Captain W. W. Yale gives an account of a training experiment in which raw recruits were put through a six-weeks course of intensive training as a species of "mobilization test," the purpose being to prove how quickly recruits might be trained in an emergency to take their place in a cavalry regiment. The course was devised from a purely practical point of view: close order foot drill was reduced to a minimum, while every effort was made to devote the whole of the man's time to essentials. Captain Yale claims that the men, who were not specially selected for the course, responded very well to the treatment and would have passed muster at the end of forty-five days as efficient soldiers. But his conclusion is that training of this nature and at this speed can only be attempted by first-class cadres of officers and instructors, and by avoiding what he calls "disciplinary" drills. The course proved a harder test for the horse than for the man.

Colonel J. A. Baer next deals with "Battlefield Mobility." This, he urges, is very largely a matter of speedy reconnaissance leading to complete information being gained so as to enable the commander to act with the greatest rapidity. To ensure such rapidity he advocates, when nearing the scene of possible action, a distribution of the regiment into (*a*) a covering force behind which the commanding officer should ride; (*b*) a fire echelon comprising all the machine guns of the regiment; (*c*) a manœuvre echelon composed of the rifle platoons. This system was tried during the manœuvres of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1934-35 and was found to be both simple and effective. The covering force reconnoitres, and according to their reports the commander then orders the movements of the two echelons that follow him, the fire echelon leading. This latter echelon is virtually formed as an independent machine-gun squadron.

The next article is not of special cavalry interest but should appeal to every officer who studies the Great War. This is an appreciation of General Pershing's rôle and the value of his work in 1917-18. Without claiming for Pershing any high place among great commanders, the author repeats a British opinion to the effect that "there was perhaps no other man who could or would have built the structure of the American Army on the scale he planned."

Under the title, "The Great Delusion," Major J. H. Burns writes on a topic that must appeal to all officers reading for promotion examinations. He inveighs against the theory that military history, alone and as such, will teach a man to command and lead troops in war. "The military historian," says he, "needs to range through anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics, social and industrial history, and philosophy. . . . . The problem is to combine man, the unchanging, with the implements, machines, tools and instruments he ceaselessly spawns . . . . into an army that can solve the problems of the coming war." An arresting article with the greater part of which most readers will unhesitatingly agree.

The French "Revue de Cavalerie" for March-April starts with the reproduction of an anonymous memorandum written

in 1915 concerning the employment made of cavalry during the opening phase of the Great War. As this was actually written immediately after the first phase of the war, it carries some weight and is of high interest. The memorandum is divided into four headings: (*a*) The lost opportunities"; (*b*) "Services rendered"; (*c*) "Is the rôle of cavalry a thing of the past?"; (*d*) "What remains to be done." Under the first heading there is an examination of the work performed by cavalry during the opening stages of the war down to the stabilization of the Western Front. The conclusion is that trench warfare set in after the turning point of the Marne because there had been no pursuit after that battle; and for this result the cavalry is chiefly to blame.

The next paragraphs consider the services rendered by cavalry, these falling into the period covered by "the race to the sea." Cavalry was compelled to resort to fighting dismounted. But the German cavalry fulfilled its purpose by delaying the French mounted troops, and so both cavalries neutralised each other. The French cavalry had, in fact, lost ten days, so that instead of executing the outflanking movement, which would have been the ideal, it was limited to retarding action. This, however, proved adequate to gain the necessary time for the French and British infantry to bar the road to the Germans all the way to Dunkirk. So far this was a great achievement. In a secondary manner the Allied cavalry had also succeeded: this was in the respect for itself which it had inspired among the German mounted troops. But for that fact a bolder leading of the German Cavalry Corps could have brought the latter very near to occupying Paris in early September, 1914. And what a result that would have been!

The writer now sums up the failures and the successes of the Allied cavalry up to that moment of the war. He virtually concludes that, apart from the fear which the French instilled among the German horsemen and their achievements in holding up the German advance at Ypres and in the valley of the River Lys, it failed: and it failed because it did not know how to fight dismounted; whereas it is essential to fight dismounted by fire in order to open a way for mounted progress. To force a gap

in the enemy front may be a rapid process; to exploit that opening a more lengthy business. For this purpose rapidity of action is needed and cavalry must still supply this need.

The writer then analyses the objections to his thesis [written in 1915: let that not be forgotten]; these are: (*a*) There may have been opportunities for mounted action, but are they likely to recur? (*b*) The enemy's line has been pierced—that is true; but will it happen again? (*c*) After penetration, the attack may be destroyed. (*d*) The successful attack may be held up by back positions. He dismisses these as untenable.

He next puts forward his views for the correct training and employment of the mounted arm. This part of the memorandum must be largely familiar to those who have studied the Battle of Megiddo and the pursuit of the Turkish armies to Damascus in 1918; it virtually contains the instructions on which the mounted troops were employed on that occasion. There are sectors of the front—this refers to France and Flanders—where the ground is not propitious to action by cavalry: these should be avoided. The width of the opening necessary to the advance of the mounted corps is next considered: on *level* ground an opening four to five miles in width will be necessary. There must be surprise. These are the general conditions of such an operation. Then there are the more special conditions applicable to the cavalry only: progress must be methodical and it must act as opportunity offers; it cannot be tied to topographical objectives; it must seek surprise; it must look ahead beyond the immediate objective. Finally the memorandum concludes with a study of cavalry tactics of the future. These have really been so far embodied in modern training since the war as to require no further discussion at this point. But the entire memorandum will repay careful study.

The next article deals with the action of a dismounted cavalry regiment, the 4th Cuirassiers, at the Battle of Laffaux, where the regiment greatly distinguished itself by the capture of the village of that name.

Commandant de Montergon contributes a noteworthy article on Rudyard Kipling as a military writer. "Kipling is astonishing," thus begins the article, and the quotations and

analysis that follow show how far the writer understands and appreciates the military tales of the great author. It is the possession of the self-same qualities that he depicts in his characters that make Kipling's success as a military tale-teller: he has an incisive glance that teaches the essentials, a vivid imagination that can supplement this vision. He quotes Kipling throughout the article with telling effect: he relates Kipling's anecdotes with understanding and sympathy: altogether an exceptional feat for a French writer. The article concludes with a comparison of Kipling's soldier heroes with those of the best-known French writer of similar tales, Georges Courteline; but Courteline, the author seems to overlook, is far more limited in his repertoire of stories, even though there is a family likeness between the escapades and orgies of Courteline's hussars and Kipling's "Three Musketeers."

The German "Militär Wochenblatt" for May 4th contains a lengthy and very appreciative article on "Haig." This in itself is a review of Duff Cooper's new book. But the author, who has frequently written on the higher strategy of the war on both sides, is a convinced admirer of Haig and has taken the opportunity of contributing what is a criticism of British strategy during the entire war. "Haig," he begins, "is one of the most chivalrous personalities amongst the enemy higher commanders," and this sympathetic note is maintained to the end. In the matter of the controversy between Haig and Lloyd George the writer unquestionably reproduces what is the German view of the case, that is a strong partisan feeling for the soldier. He reproduces Lloyd George's statement made after visiting Haig's headquarters in January, 1916:—"Everything is more business-like than in French's time. A new spirit reigns. Haig is very active in doing his work, and his staff makes an excellent impression." A long disquisition of the Battle of the Somme concludes the article, which reveals a profound understanding not only of Haig himself but of the Allied High Command.

The Spanish "Revista de Estudios Militares" for February contains an excellent study of the well-known cavalry action at

El Maghar (November 13th, 1917) in which the 6th Cavalry Brigade played a leading part in the defeat of the Turkish XXII Corps. The writer, Commandant Montoje, who has based his study on the best British sources, has some shrewd comments to make on the work this cavalry brigade, which he acclaims as typical of the work of the British cavalry throughout the Palestine campaign; he gives reasons for their offensive spirit and their success with which all readers will be fully in agreement.

The Portuguese "Revista Militar," for April, begins a description of the British cavalry. The narrative is based on the official report of a deputation of Portuguese officers who visited England in 1934. After obtaining every facility from the Army Council to visit all British military stations they returned to Portugal greatly pleased with their visit. The article in question gives a very complete and accurate description of the present organisation and armament of the British cavalry. It is so far up to date that it relates the trial of mechanization made in the R.H.A., and also of the new machine guns to be issued to cavalry regiments.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"Haig." Volumes I and II. By Duff Cooper. (Faber & Faber.)

Haig was perhaps slow to accept, or even to experiment with, the unproven, but of his capacity to carry through great undertakings and of the solidity and soundness of his work the unprejudiced reader of his life and achievements must be convinced. Now that we have Mr. Duff Cooper's complete book we should, I think, study his career and assess his accomplishments as a whole and not concentrate on the incidents of the war round which controversy has run riot, nor on the final victories which have led some to exalt him into an unduly high place among the great commanders. Mr. Duff Cooper, though he naturally presents his subject in a favourable light, does not make extravagant claims and is, I think, a reliable guide. Wisely he does not attempt to refute in detail criticisms launched by Haig's detractors. He does, however, present fairly the difficulties of the problems of decision and execution which Haig encountered and the immensity of his task in the war.

In some ways perhaps his first volume is the more interesting as it gives us an insight into Haig's character, his training and the place he occupied among his contemporaries—he was in no sense a product of the war. It may be said that Haig was one of those born with a silver spoon in his mouth and he certainly had the advantages of wealth and influential connections, but for all that he was essentially a self-made soldier. What influenced him to become a soldier at all seems to be unknown and his decision was made curiously late. Once he had decided on his career there was no lack of enthusiasm and he threw himself into the study of his profession with all the determination and earnestness for which he remained distinguished for the rest of his life. At Sandhurst, as a regimental officer and in

temporary Staff positions, he at once stood out. Visits to the Continent to study languages and watch and report on foreign manœuvres were undertaken on his own initiative. His friendship with Sir Evelyn Wood, made in the ordinary course of duty, helped him to see service in the Sudan where he made his mark and attracted Kitchener's attention, and thus he was fairly launched. No doubt influential friends, polo, and private means had opened doors for him that others might have found difficulty in passing, but he had not relied on the gentle art of wangling.

His association with French in South Africa followed similarly from a normal appointment. The reputation he gained there had nothing meretricious about it, and with the close of the war there was competition for his services. It was not, however, till after a period of regimental command that Kitchener secured him for India. Then in 1906 Lord Esher saw to it that he was brought back to strengthen the reformed War Office, and he became Haldane's right hand in working out the Territorial scheme. India again as C.G.S., and then the Aldershot Command in 1912, in his 51st year, completed his pre-war preparation. Whatever his detractors may say that was not a record possible for a stupid man, nor is it likely that Haldane would have found much use for a man with a "Stone-age" mind.

Up to the war Haig's career is a record of success and encouragement. How would he stand failure, opposition and hostile criticism? Mr. Duff Cooper shows us that he was equal to the test—his poise was never upset and his determination never shaken. Whether a man with more genius could have obtained speedier and more sensational results and at less cost must remain a matter for speculation and opinion, but for the competence which enabled Haig to direct the vast machinery which grew up in the war or of the staying power over a long course in heaviest going we can have nothing but admiration.

Mr. Duff Cooper's record of Haig's service in the war loses, I think, some of its interest for soldiers from the fact that the Official History and other books have made us already familiar with most of the incidents; and matters of controversy have

already been thrashed out *ad nauseum*. Moreover, the story of the war is too big to be described in reference to any one man however high his position. Haig's responsibility for the tactical conduct of the various offensives was shared by his army and other subordinate commanders to an extent which Mr. Duff Cooper hardly explains. How far did Haig exercise control and how far did he delegate responsibility? We get no clear answer but it must be obvious that with his immense burden of administrative direction, of dealings with our Allies and with his political chief, delegation to a high degree was essential and in many matters he had to be guided by the opinion of his subordinates. To take, for example, the employment of tanks—was his somewhat hesitating reliance on the new weapon due, as has been asserted, to his conservatism and lack of imagination or was he influenced by his subordinates? Many of us know the pressure exerted on him to give the denuded infantry precedence over tanks after the fighting in 1917. It may be argued that the C.-in-C. should have acted on his own judgment, but that is asking a great deal when the C.-in-C. no longer is in a position to take direct charge of the battle. One could have wished that Mr. Duff Cooper could have thrown more light on Haig's tactical ideas, and one has to judge his tactical capacity from his record as a Corps and Army Commander. In the later stages of the war at any rate he is primarily concerned with Haig's strategical plans and controversial questions connected with them. What he is able to show, however, is that when a tactical solution was found, and when under Foch, he acquired greater liberty of action, Haig almost alone saw the opportunity and possessed the driving power and determination to seize it.

Mr. Duff Cooper has given us a very good book. It does not answer all questions and criticisms connected with Haig's command but it shows the conditions under which in a modern democratic regime a soldier has to carry out his task in war and prepare himself for it. How in a democratic country is genius to emerge. Nothing short of revolution can discover it and place it in a position where it will have full scope.

C. W. G.

"King George The Well Beloved." By E. H. Short. (Allan.) 8s. 6d.

The author calls this book "an intimate biography," and in it he follows the public career from birth to the lamented death which so recently snatched from a grateful and sorrowing country a monarch who, as no other monarch since Elizabeth, had endeared himself to the hearts of British women and men all the wide world over. Mr. Short writes of him with that sincere and loving pride that goes with full knowledge of its subject, and has penned a worthy memorial. He finds the keynote of King George's life and the secret of his people's love for him in the simple yet eloquent epitaph on Thomas Hardy's Giles Winterbourne, "You was a good man and did good things," and it was because of this goodness of soul that King George's "people were the better for his life and work, and that they came to love him well." They came to love him because they came to know him—moving simply and unpanoplied in their midst, present at all their popular functions, fond of sport, fond of home, rejoicing in children and simple things, kindly, smiling, good—a man, one of themselves, such an one as any one of them would have liked and been contented to be. Fortunate indeed will this country be if, take him for all in all, she is ruled by his like again.

"Old Soldier Sahib." By Frank Richards. (Faber & Faber.) 7s. 6d.

Mr. Richards, author of "Old Soldiers Never Die," an admirable picture of the Great War as seen through the eyes of a typical private soldier, now recounts his pre-war career in the ranks of the Royal Welch Fusiliers. This picture of his life is vivid, racy, and attractive—it might have come straight out of Kipling, who, however, Mr. Richards does not consider presented an entirely accurate portrait of the average British soldier, at any rate as he himself knew him. Some of the stories he tells leave little to the imagination; he was no puritan as regards wine, women, or gambling, and many of the scenes he depicts are unconventional and disreputable enough. But he appears as a good soldier, a good comrade, and an accurate and

amusing observer of the quaint, the exotic, and the unusual, wherever he found it.

Most of his foreign service was spent in India and Burma, and now that the army in which he served, and the men beside whom he soldiered, have passed away never to return, and the faces of these countries where he sojourned have also so radically changed, his book is not only an autobiography but a memorial. Both as such and for its own merits it can be most heartily commended.

"The Holy Hunger." By Renee Haynes. (Hutchinson.) 7s. 6d.

This novel, of which the period runs from 1900 to the present day, is the study of an adventurous minded woman who finds her desire for the spice and peril of life fulfilled, first in her marriage to a man killed in the Great War and then in the fortunes of her children, whom, though she loved them dearly, she left to face their own difficulties and dangers because she realised that in them a portion of her own brave spirit lived again. It is an admirable study, delicately and sympathetically penned; war and military matters make only a fleeting appearance in its pages, but any reader whose interests are not bounded by such subjects will enjoy its perusal.

"Sword and Stirrup.' By H. de Montmorency. (Bell.) 16s.

This lively book of reminiscences tells of a varied military and sporting career. The author joined the Royal Artillery in 1887, being then the youngest officer in the whole Army, but soon resigned to ride his own horses on the Turf. Of his races, which included the Grand National, he gives a full and vivid account, which is full of thrills and queer incidents. Soldiering, however, soon claimed him once more, and the outbreak of the Boer War found him fighting with Colonel Plumer's Rhodesian Field Force attempting to relieve Mafeking. Of Plumer as he then was he gives a somewhat different account from that in General Harington's recent life of the Field Marshal. He thought little of the showing put up by our Army or its leaders in South Africa, and was glad to leave again for civil life after it was over. After an interlude hunting for the Cocos Island treasures and gun running for the Irish Volunteers just prior to the Great War, he returned to the Army for the third time,

in 1914, first as an infantry officer, then in command of a field battery in the 16th Irish Division. With this he saw Arras and Passchendaele, of which he gives a vividly horrible account. Subsequently he was sent as liaison officer to French G.O.G., and saw the end of the war from that vantage point.

Major de Montmorency's humorous, outspoken, and sometimes rather bitter pages tell a fine story of varied and virile adventures, and are good to read.

"An Elementary Study of Appreciations, Orders and Messages." By Major W. K. M. Leader. (Sifton, Praed.) 5s.

This handy little volume is intended for the use of examination students and for those who feel the need of further elucidation of the general methods laid down in F.S.R. on the subject, as applied to small mixed forces. There are hints for examinees, and a series of five schemes with explanatory notes, dealing with appreciations, the approach march, attack, defence, and withdrawal. This is a useful little manual.

"Military Organisations and Administrations." By Brigadier W. G. Lindsell. (Gale & Polden.) 7s. 6d.

This, the sixteenth edition of a book which it is superfluous to recommend to all promotion and Staff College candidates, for whom it has long been a standard work of reference, has been completely revised so as to embody the details of the reorganisation recently decided on. The war establishments of the new units are given; the revised maintenance machinery of the expeditionary force is outlined; and the modifications of the supply system resulting from the mechanisation of now first line transport are also embodied. All this goes to make a valuable book more valuable and up to date than ever to all those concerned with its wide-reaching and complicated subject matter.

"Napoleon and Waterloo. By Major A. F. Becke. (Kegan Paul.) 10s. 6d.

Major Becke's admirable history of Waterloo, published in the early months of the Great War, established itself at once as by far the best in English among those students who in those hectic days were not preoccupied by current events. The original two volumes have now been reduced to one by cutting out most of the appended documents, and the fine coloured maps have

given place to black and white ones, which, however, are no less clear and comprehensive. Major Becke's text remains much as before, but he confers a qualified approval on the views put forward since his book was first published by M. Lenient, whose thesis was that the real cause of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo was an overweening self-confidence, which blinded him to facts and induced him to commit errors and negligences which he himself would have been the first to condemn in other and lesser men. Major Becke, however, finds a secondary cause in a strange, new-fangled disease known as acromegaly, which apparently causes strange fits of lassitude and lethargy between bouts of great exertion and mental strain. It seems to us personally that the fact that Napoleon, after suffering from the strain of twenty years of intense life and at full stretch, and of a weight of responsibility almost unparalleled in history, had to contend with forces twice as numerous as his own is a more than sufficient explanation of the result of the campaign. Certainly we should look no further for one in the case of any other general, and the fact that all historians seem to find this inadequate is in itself the most striking possible testimony to the Emperor's genius and marvellous reputation.

"Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871." By C. P. Stacey. (Longmans.) 10s. 6d.

This book describes the development of the Canadian problem of defence from the middle of the 19th Century, when the burden fell entirely on the home country, at the time passing through a difficult period of economic gestation and domestic distress, to the time when Cardwell, by withdrawing all the British troops from their garrisons in the Dominions, cast the onus once for all on the shoulders of those who most benefited by it. The history of the Canadian volunteer force is traced from its first beginnings in the Crimean War, soon after the Dominion was given responsible government, to the date when it came to full stature as the country's means of defence, and the crises accruing from the American Civil War and the serious troubles are also fully dealt with. This story of a little known aspect of the age-old question of Imperial Defence and Dominion self-government deserves study by all interested in these questions, which are so topical to-day. E. W. S.

"From Saddle and Fireside." By R. S. Summerhays. (Country Life, Ltd.) 10s. 6d. net.

This book begins well, ends well, and the middle piece is excellent. The author's intense enthusiasm for the horse is expressed throughout the pages. "Just an Ordinary Hunt"—the opening chapter, will catch the heart of the reader, even in this month of June, and force him to read on to the end of the book. Nor will he be disappointed.

Many are the pleasures given to us by the horse and the sorrows are *nil* except perhaps as regards the humanitarian side in war. All horse lovers, even though they obtain their pleasure from being mounted, must be pleased that the horse is gradually being ousted by machinery from the horrors of war.

Mr. Summerhays enthusiastically takes us through the various sports, pastimes, haulage and other business duties (including circuses) in which the horse has long taken part. Is he right, however, in saying that hunting is in the melting pot? A hundred years ago was it not said that railways would kill hunting, but it waxed even stronger. Neither motor cars, nor tarmac roads, nor wire have killed the pastime. Nor will the latest enemy, "electrification of railways," kill it, but it may narrow down the hunting country. However laudable are the author's efforts to revive the art of driving and of coaching, yet it must be realised that he pleads a "lost cause."

He is right in saying that polo needs encouragement for the youth of the country in the public schools and universities and, incidentally, of "big money" too, but it is the fickle English weather that is the main enemy of the game.

"From Saddle and Fireside," excellently illustrated by Maurice Tulloch's pencil sketches, which are full of life and vigour, is one of the best horse-books published in the last few years and will be popular with the horse-loving public of every age.

"Woodcock and Snipe." By J. W. Seigne and E. C. Keith. (Philip Allan & Co.) 5s.

This book is Volume 13 of "The Sportsman Library"—a series of practical treatises on important sports and pastimes.

The life history of these birds has been for long "a closed book" in spite of the fact that they are mentioned in literature of past centuries, but the authors, by close observation in a woodcock sanctuary and on a snipe bog, have been able to give a detailed account of the habits of the birds. Some original views on the organisation of shoots are clearly expounded.

This is a valuable book, of interest not only to bird lovers, but also to those sportsmen who can only manage to get a single day's shooting in the year, the enjoyment of which will be greatly enhanced by previous study of the habits of the snipe and woodcock. O.J.F.F.

"The Hoghunters' Annual." Volume IX. 1936.

Under the continued editorship of Captain Nugent Head and Major J. Scott Cockburn, this volume is keeping up the high record of previous production. The type of printing, the high quality of paper, and the perfect reproduction of the illustrations give a really first class magazine. Pigstickers of bygone days will be thrilled at the growth of the "greatest of sports," and although the increase of competitors has, to a certain extent, obliterated the old idea that pigsticking is purely a sport, it will be seen from the "logs" of the older clubs, that the "spirit" is still there and that riding and the killing of the pig still takes precedence of the prick which entitles a rider to claim "first blood."

It takes a bold man to ride a pig but the author of an article on shooting pig in Hungary can hardly be styled as 'timid." The fact that his article has been published by this journal is fully justified by the interesting account of the method of beating and the behaviour of the driven pig, and the Austrian pig is certainly a mighty boar.

The whole journal is so full of interesting articles that our space does not admit of their description in detail. The journal must be read to be appreciated.

Copies are obtainable from the Editor, 24, Park Street, Calcutta, or the Agent, Withington House, Andoversford, Gloucestershire. Price Rs. 5, or 7s. 6d.

T. T. P.

SPORTING NEWS

INTER-REGIMENTAL POLO TOURNAMENT, 1936.

The Inter-Regimental Tournament of 1936 was played at Meerut on the 28th February, 2nd, 4th and 7th March. The majority of the games were played under excellent weather conditions, but the final was played on a cloudy, muggy day, threatening rain which actually fell in a light drizzle in the fifth chukka. The grounds were in excellent condition, thanks to the care of the 17th/21st Lancers and a welcome fall of rain just before the tournament started. The going was pleasantly soft, but rather inclined to cut up in the later games, and the grass was almost as green as in England.

Eleven teams—four British and seven Indian Cavalry—entered. The draw resulted in a number of very level matches. Hardly any runaway victories occurred while three games went to an extra chukka with widened goals.

The actual games were as follows :—

1st Round.

13th/18th *Hussars* v. *8th K.G.O. Light Cavalry.*

Most people were expecting the 13th/18th to win on the strength of their last year's performance, when they were in the final. They have, however, since then lost Hirsch while the 8th are a team of four experienced and high handicapped players. The 8th won 9—5, largely owing to Gardiner who was playing at the top of his form.

Probyn's Horse v. *Skinner's Horse.*

This game had already been played once before in the Indian Cavalry Tournament. The result was the same, and very nearly the score, which was 8—6 to Probyn's. The game was exciting, goal being scored for goal for the greater part of the match.

19th K.G.O. Lancers v. *14th/20th Hussars.*

This was one of the best matches to watch in the whole tournament, the fifth chukka rising to heights which the writer has seldom seen surpassed. After a rather scrappy start, the game became open and fast, and finally went to an extra chukka before the 19th won 6—5. For the 14/20th, who are ten goals less than the 19th on handicap but are well mounted, Chaytor played a very fine game. Keighley, for the winners, played a good game too, but did not receive the support that a No. 1 has the right to expect from his side.

2nd Round.

10th Royal Hussars v. *15th Lancers.*

To the 15th remains the honour of having been the most successful team against the ultimate winners : actually they had much the better of the match

and lost it owing to goals from penalties. Out of the total of seven goals scored by both sides, no less than three were from penalties, two being against the 15th. Anderson played a good game for the losers but somewhat countered this by being responsible for the two fouls mentioned.

The score was 4—3 to the 10th.

Probyn's Horse v. *8th K.G.O. Light Cavalry.*

Although this was a very close game and went to an extra chukka before the 8th won 6—5, it was a strangely slow match, and, from a spectator's point of view, disappointing.

19th K.G.O. Lancers v. *Central India Horse.*

Owing to various mishaps, the C.I.H. did not play their originally intended team and had no less than three substitutes playing. Nevertheless, they held the 19th until half-time and for the first two were actually pressing. After half-time though, the unfitness of two of the substitutes began to make itself evident and the 19th were on top, especially in the fourth chukka.

The final score was 9—2 to the 19th who scored five of their goals in the fourth chukka.

George played a very hardworking game for the losers but was very inaccurate in front of goal.

P.A.V.O. Cavalry v. *17th/21st Lancers.*

In this game the holders, the P.A.V.O. who had come a thousand miles from Secunderabad to defend their title, lost after extra time 4—3. This was expected to be a close game but most people expected that the P.A.V.O. would win. The game was very exciting but there was a good deal of mis-hitting.

SEMI-FINALS.

19th K.G.O. Lancers v. *17th/21st Lancers.*

This was an extraordinary game. At the end of the 1st chukka, the score was 5—1 against the 19th : at the end of the 2nd, it was 5—5 ! From then on the 19th were always on top. The accuracy of the shooting, too, was remarkable. At one time, out of 13 shots over the back line, no less than 11 were goals. This was largely due to the lack of marking by both sides, especially by the 17/21st, which resulted in a game, spectacular enough for the spectators, but of no high standard of polo. The 17/21st mainly owe their defeat to leaving Colonel Dening entirely alone. He is always formidable but unmarked he is a hitter of remarkable length and accuracy. On this occasion he took full advantage of the poor marking of the 17/21st, and played a memorable game. Score 11—9.

10th Royal Hussars v. *8th K.G.O. Light Cavalry.*

This match had none of the spectacular nature of the first semi-final and was marred by considerable mis-hitting. Gardiner of the 8th was definitely off form and the 10th were on top from the start. Gairdner of the 10th suffered

a nasty accident in the 5th chukka which might have had a serious effect on the result of the final. His pony somersaulted over another pony which had slipped up, and lay on him, injuring his already game leg.

Malet had to substitute for him. The result was 8 goals to 2 in favour of the 10th Hussars.

FINAL.

10th Royal Hussars v. *19th K.G.O. Lancers.*

The game remained very even for the first half. In the latter half the 10th drew steadily ahead and won 7—3. The 19th forwards appeared out-ponied and Dawnay stopped many 19th attacks, Keighley being unable to get to him. The 10th were paying more attention to Dening than had the 17/21st: nevertheless, he was able to put in a lot of good work. Gairdner, whose knee had been cocained and who returned to hospital immediately after the game, played a very fine game for the 10th. It must be a singular satisfaction to him to have done so much to win the game for his side on the last occasion that they will play as horsed cavalry in India: perhaps, in fact, unless mechanization invades the Cavalry in India too, the last time they will ever play in this country.

TEAMS.

	10th Royal Hussars.	*19th K.G.O. Lancers.*
1.	Capt. M. N. E. MacMullen	Mr. G. E. V. Keighley
2.	Capt. C. B. C. Harvey	Mr. N. F. E. Chaplin
3.	Maj. C. H. Gairdner	Lt. Col. R. Dening
Bk.	Capt. D. Dawnay	Capt. G. H. Critchley

EQUITATION SCHOOL HORSE SHOW, 1936.
SAUGOR.

THE Equitation School Horse Show was held in Leicestershire on 17th and 19th March.

The entries this year were, on the whole, well up to average. The Ladies' Hacks, and a new Class for Infantry Officers' Chargers both produced a larger entry than had been anticipated.

Donors of Cups included His Excellency The Viceroy; His Excellency The Commander-in-Chief; His Excellency The Governor of the C.P.; His Exalted Highness The Nizam of Hyderabad; Their Highnesses The Maharaja Dhiraja of Patiala, Udaipur, Jodhpur, and Indore; His Highness The Nawab of Junagadh and the Major General, Cavalry.

To judge the classes, the Committee were fortunate enough to have the assistance of The Major General, Cavalry, India, Lieut.-Colonel T. H. Sebag-Montefiore, D.S.O., M.C., Major P. R. Tatham and Captain L. T. Firbank.

At the conclusion of the Show, the prizes were presented by Mrs. Geoffrey Brooke.

RESULTS OF CLASSES.

TROOP HORSES—INDIAN STUDENTS.

1st. Havildar Fateh Singh ("V" Field Battery, R.A.).
2nd. L/Dfr. Hardwari Singh (Skinner's Horse).

A moderate Class. First two difficult to separate.

TROOP HORSES—BRITISH N.C.O. STUDENTS.

1st. L/Sgt. N. Gray (17th/21st Lancers), Grey Tick.
2nd. Bomdr. F. A. Buckley ("E" Bty., R.H.A.), Tony.

An average class. (Winner a very good type of Troop Horse, and the second a well trained young horse).

STATE FORCE HORSES OR PONIES IN HAND.

1st. Lieut. A. R. Bijili (Mysore Lrs.), b. Aust. m. Zarina.
2nd. Ris. Abdul Aziz Khan (2nd Lrs., H.I.S. Troops), bl. Aust. g. Tarzan.

22 entries judged. A fair class, winner outstanding.

PIGSTICKERS.

1st. Mr. A. F. Harper (Royal Deccan Horse), ch. Aust. m. Grakle.
2nd. Mr. A. G. Munn (R.A.), ch. Ind. g. Harlequin.

10 entries—a useful lot.

JUMPING—INDIAN STUDENTS, FOR THE "GOLCONDA" CUP.

1st. L/Dfr. Budh Singh (P.A.V.O. Cavalry).
2nd. L/Dfr. Hardwari Singh (Skinner's Horse).

The standard of jumping was below average.

JUMPING—BRITISH N.C.O.'s.

1st. Sgt. J. Blake (14/20th Hussars), ch. Ind. g. Severn.
2nd. Sgt. E. E. Jones (14/20th Hussars), b. Ind. g. Lancer.

The standard of jumping was below average.

JUMPING—BRITISH AND STATE FORCE STUDENT OFFICERS FOR THE 2ND LANCERS CUP.

1st. Mr. R. L. V. Ffrench Blake (17/21st Lancers), b. Ind. g. Whiskers.
2nd. Mr. Mohammed Yousuf (7th Light Cavalry), b. Aust. g. Umeed.

An average class. Number of entries below average.

JUMPING—EQUITATION SCHOOL STAFF.

1st. S.S.M. A. Elsworth (14/20th Hussars), br. Ind. g. Arzolie.
2nd. Captain D. C. Voelcker (20th Lancers), b. Ind. g. Carlos.

An average class.

OPEN JUMPING—FOR THE VICEROY'S CUP.

1st. Mr. J. N. Barker (Royal Signals), dun. Aust. m. Kangaroo Baby.
2nd. Sgt. Green (Royal Signals), dun. Aust. g. Bill.

The first and second in this class put up a high class performance, each doing clear rounds over a difficult course. Remainder of the class were average.

OPEN HANDY HUNTER—FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S CUP.

1st. The Poona Horse, b. Aust. g. Hussar.
2nd. Sgt. J. Blake (14/20th Hussars), ch. Ind. g. Severn.
3rd. Dfr. Budh Singh (P.A.V.O. Cavalry), b. Ind. g. Replacement.

A very large class. The average standard of performance was well up to average and the prize winners rode with judgment and completed a difficult course with very few faults.

STAFF HANDY HUNTER.

1st. Captain D. C. Voelcker (20th Lancers), b. Ind. g. Carlos.
2nd. Captain D. C. Voelcker (20th Lancers), b. Ind. g. Glenlaird.

A good class—Captain Voelcker did well to get first and second over a difficult course against strong opposition.

GOVERNMENT POLO PONIES.

1st. The Poona Horse, b. Aust. m. Radiant.
2nd. Mr. R. A. C. Sorby (8th Light Cavalry), ch. Ind. m. Ginger.

A moderate class ; first two well schooled.

INFANTRY OFFICERS CHARGERS.

1st. Captain C. J. C. Molony, ch. Ind. g., Harry Hunks.
2nd. Lt.-Col. A. H. A. Empson, ch. Ind. g., Red Lad.

A fair class.

PONIES LIKELY TO MAKE.

1st. Mr. J. H. Gardner (The Central India Horse), br. Aust. g. Larry.
2nd. Mr. C. J. Godfrey (R.E.), b. Aust. g Kings Cross.

A good class. First and second difficult to separate.

LIGHT WEIGHT POLO PONIES.

1st. Mr. J. R. Cordy-Simpson (13/18th Hussars), ch. Aust. m. Tofia Rose.
2nd. Captain F. Walton (The Guides Cavalry), b. Aust. g. Ebony.

A good class. First and second outstanding.

HEAVY WEIGHT POLO PONIES.

1st. Mr. Mohammed Yousuf (7th Light Cavalry), b. Aust. g. Umeed.
2nd. Colonel M. D. Vigors, b. Aust. g. Kestrel.

The two winners are high class ponies. The second being a very promising young pony.

HORSES IN HAND.

1st. Captain F. Walton (The Guides Cavalry), bl. Aust. g. Black Auster.
2nd. Major C. Goulder (R.H.A.), b. Aust. g. Practical Joke.

A good class throughout.

OFFICERS CHARGERS. FOR A CUP PRESENTED BY THE MAJOR GENERAL, CAVALRY, INDIA.

1st. Mr. C. W. Hesketh (Probyn's Horse), b. Ind. g. April Fool.
2nd. Mr. Mohammed Yousuf (7th Light Cavalry), b. Aust. g. Umeed.

Not a good class.

BEST STABLE OF THREE.

1st. Colonel M. D. Vigors.
2nd. Captain F. Walton (The Guides Cavalry).

A good class.

LADIES' HACKS.

1st. Major C. Goulder (R.H.A.), Practical Joke.
2nd. Captain J. S. Kingston (R.A.V.C.), Night Raider.

An average class. Winner outstanding.

BEST PONY IN THE SHOW.

Mr. J. R. Cordy-Simpson (13/18th Hussars), ch. Aust. m. Tofia Rose.

BEST HORSE IN THE SHOW.

Captain F. Walton (The Guides Cavalry), bl. Aust. g. Black Auster.

NATIONAL HORSE BREEDING AND SHOW SOCIETY OF INDIA'S MEDAL FOR THE BEST INDIAN BRED HORSE IN THE SHOW.

Mr. C. W. Hesketh (Probyn's Horse), b. Ind. g. April Fool.

RESULTS—CAVALRY CUP—1935-36

The following are the results of this year's Competition :—

1st Round

4th Hussars	beat	15th/19th Hussars	2—1 (after extra time)
3rd Hussars	beat	Queen's Bays	3—1 (after extra time)
3rd Carabiniers	beat	9th Lancers	4—0
5th R. Innisk. D. Gds.	drew	Royal Horse Gds.	2—2
5th R. Innisk. D. Gds.	beat	Royal Horse Gds.	5—0 (Replay)

Byes

Life Guards, 4th/7th D. Gds., 16th/5th Lancers, Royal Scots Greys.

2nd Round

4th/7th D. Gds.	beat	16th/5th Lancers	3—0
3rd Carabiniers	beat	4th Hussars	6—0
Royal Scots Greys	beat	3rd Hussars	2—1
5th R. Innisk. D. Gds.	beat	Life Guards	2—1

Semi-Final

Royal Scots Greys	drew	4th/7th D. Guards	3—3
Royal Scots Greys	beat	4th/7th D. Guards	3—2 (Replay)
5th R. Innisk. D. Gds.	beat	3rd Carabiniers	3—1

Final

5th R. Innisk. D. Gds.	beat	Royal Scots Greys	1—0

The Final was played on Queen's Park Rangers Football Ground, Shepherd's Bush, on Saturday, 25th April, before a large number of serving and Old Comrades.

Field Marshal Sir Philip W. Chetwode kindly presented the Cup and Medals.



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CHANGING SENTRIES

The Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards) 1832

The frontispiece to the present number is reproduced from a contemporary oil painting in the collection of Mr. Godfrey Brennan and represents, as will be seen, a relief of sentries in the 6th Dragoon Guards.

The date is about 1830 to 1834, in which latter year a different helmet was adopted.

The regiment was formed in 1685 and received the title of Carabiniers in 1692 or 1693, being still included in the regiments of "Horse." It was converted into Dragoon Guards in 1788, and continued to be equipped as other regiments of that arm until 1871, when a dark blue Light Dragoon type of clothing was ordered for it as there was then an intention to send the Regiment on a tour of Indian service. Up till that date the Dragoon Guards and Dragoon regiments did not serve in India.

Now the Regiment has been amalgamated with the 3rd Dragoon Guards as the 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards), and the dress uniform has reverted to the scarlet faced with yellow, which was worn by the Carabiniers when they were the 3rd Horse during the greater part of the 18th century.

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THE

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OCTOBER, 1936

TWO CAVALRY EPISODES IN THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN, 1917-1918

By General Sir George de S. Barrow, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Part I.

I.—*The Operations of the Yeomanry Mounted Division in the Judæan Mountains—November 18th to 29th*, 1917.

COMPOSITION OF THE YEOMANRY MOUNTED DIVISION.
July 1917 to March, 1918.

6th Mounted Brigade .. .. .. (Brig.-Genl. C. Godwin, C.M.G., D.S.O.)	1st R. Bucks. Hussars. 1st Q.O. Dorset Yeomanry. 1st Berks. Yeomanry. 17th M.G. Squadron. 6th Mtd. Bde. Signal Troop.
8th Mounted Brigade .. .. .. (Brig.-Genl. C. Rome, C.M.G., D.S.O.)	1st County of London (Middx. Yeo.) 1st City of London Yeomanry. (Rough Riders). 3rd County of London Yeomanry (Sharp Shooters). 21st M.G. Squadron. 1st London Bde. Signal Troop.
22nd Mounted Brigade .. .. .. (Brig.-Genl. F. Fryer)	1st Q.A.R. R. Stafford Yeomanry. 1st Lincoln Yeomanry. 1st East Riding Yeomanry. 18th M.G. Squadron. 22nd Mtd. Bde. Signal Troop.
R.H. Artillery—XX Brigade	Hants. Battery. Berks. Battery. Leicester Battery. XX Bde. Ammunition Column.

6th Field Squadron R.E.	
Yeomanry Mtd. Divisional Signal Squadron.	
Cavalry Field Ambulances	2nd South Midland.
	1st London.
	1st North Midland.
Mobile Veterinary Section	3rd/1st North Midland.
	4th/1st North Midland.
	3rd/1st Highland.
Yeomanry Mounted Divisional Train.	
7th Mounted Brigade	Sherwood Rangers.
(Brig.-Genl. J. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O.)	South Notts. Hussars.

BEFORE proceeding to an account of the adventure of the Yeomanry Mounted Division in the hill country of Judæa, it is necessary to describe briefly the general situation of the opposing armies at this period, and the nature of the "massif" into which the Division was about to penetrate.

The Turks had been driven out of the Gaza-Beersheba line of defence, where they had held the British in check for many months. Beersheba had fallen on November 2nd, Gaza on November 5th, on which date the Sheria position, to which the Turks had retired after their withdrawal from Beersheba, was captured after heavy fighting. The Yeomanry Mounted Division, together with the other units of the Desert Mounted Corps had followed close on the heels of the Turkish rearguards* The Seventh Turkish Army had been driven back into the Judæan mountains; the Eighth Turkish Army had retired to the line of the Nahr-el-Auja (i.e., the Auja River, north of Jaffa) with the Desert Mounted Corps in close contact.

The XXIst Corps (British) had seized Junction Station, the Yeomanry Mounted Division had entered Ramleh and Lydda (Ludd).

On November 17th General Allenby issued orders, having as their ultimate objective the capture of Jerusalem. The 75th Division was to take the only metalled road, via Amwas and

* During this operation the Yeomanry Mounted Division had made two successful mounted attacks, at El Mughar and Abushushe on positions held by Turk Infantry, Artillery and Machine Guns, carrying them at the point of the sabre. Theoretically these attacks should have failed. But the theory of war is a very different thing to its practice because the human factor which plays a dominant part in war, is an uncertain and ever varying quantity. It is for this reason that the writings of so-called military experts who have little or no experience of war are often fallacious or misleading, however logical and convincing they may appear to the lay mind.

Qurieb-el-Inab; the 52nd Division was to move by the Lydda-Jerusalem road and Beit Liquya. The Yeomanry Mounted Division was directed on Ramallah, its task being to cut the *Turkish communication running north from Jerusalem. (Ramallah is situated eight miles north of Jerusalem on the Nablus road.) The XXth Corps remained in the neighbourhood of Gaza, recovering from the effects of the severe fighting and the privations of the days succeeding the capture of Beersheba.

The portion of Judæa through which the Yeomanry Mounted Division was about to march is stern and barren. It resembles, on a small scale, the Himalayas that oppose the north-west frontier of India. It is a waterless wilderness of tumultuous hills broken by steep ravines and stony valleys, and marked by the built-up terraces and decayed wine presses of a bygone system of agriculture. The countryside has altered completely since the days when it was possible to say of Judah, even in hyperbole, that "he washed his garments in wine and his clothes in the blood of grapes." The prophecy of Isaiah has been fulfilled and "every place in which there were a thousand vines at a thousand silverlings; for briars and for thorns shall it be. And all the hills that were digged with the mattock, thou shalt not come thither for briars and thorns, but it shall be for the sending forth of oxen and the treading of sheep." The surface is a waste of stones. Stones are everywhere ranging in size from pebbles to boulders a couple of feet high. There are no paths or tracks between villages as are usually to be found in mountainous regions that are inhabited. It is obvious therefore that the movements of troops and transport must be slow and tortuous. For this reason the invasions of Judæa have always followed certain pre-determined lines, and for the same reason resolute and active men, comparatively few in number, have been able to resist successfully the advance of invading armies greatly superior in numbers and quality of armaments. In these hills Judah had "couched as a lion and as an old lion," and none had dared to rouse him until the days came when Assyria swept over

* The Australian official account says that "Chauvel ordered Barrow to move on Bireh and cut the Turkish line of retreat . . ." This is wrong. The order was given me personally by General Allenby.

the tribes on the east and north and Galilee and Samaria succumbed to the arms of Rome.

November 18th, 1917, the Yeomanry Mounted Division commenced its march across "one of the roughest and bleakest areas of the Judæan Hills* passing by Abushushe or Gezer, the Mount Gisart of the Crusaders, which guards the entrance to the ancient road leading to Bethhoron. The Division had captured Abushushe three days previously.† Its strategic importance was obvious, apart altogether from its historical background, and on finding it occupied by the enemy during our march towards Ramleh, I reported to Corps headquarters my intention to capture it. The reply of the Corps was to the effect that I was to do nothing of the sort and I was ordered to make straight for Ramleh, which was the scheduled destination of the Division on that day. But the lessons of History cannot be lightly disregarded, and the significance of Abushushe is eloquently described by George Adam Smith in his Geographical History of the Holy Land. "On what camps and columns has it looked down through the centuries, since first you saw the strange Hebrews burst with the sunrise across the hills and chase your countrymen down Ajalon—that day when the victors felt the very sun conspiring with them to achieve the unexampled length of battle. Within sight of every Egyptian and every Assyrian invasion of the land, Gezer has also seen Alexander pass by, and the legions of Rome in unusual flight, other armies of the Cross struggle, waver, and give way, and Napoleon come and go. If all could rise who have fallen round its base—Mongols, Ethiopians, Hebrews, Assyrians, Arabs, Turcomans, Greeks, Romans, Celts, Saxons—what a rehearsal of The Judgment Day it would be." It was with these words in my mind that I decided to attack Abushushe and run the risk which a soldier incurs when he deliberately disobeys the orders of higher authority. The attack succeeded,‡ and success in war, more perhaps than in any other form of human activity, covers a multitude of sins.

* The Australian official account says that the Yeomanry Division *was ordered* to assist the 75th Division in the attack on Abushushe. This is incorrect.

† Official history.

‡ This attack was brilliantly executed by Brig.-General Godwin, now Lieut.-General Sir C. Godwin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., with the 6th and 22nd Mounted Brigades.

The ancient outpost Gezer gave us no challenge as we passed by on our way to our objective.

The footpath, for it is no more than that, which the Yeomanry Mounted Division was about to follow, is historic. It has witnessed the flight of the five Kings of the Canaanites and their followings before the merciless pursuit of the Israelites down the Vale of Ajalon; the Philistines retreating before the onslaught of Saul and Jonathan; David driving the Philistines from Gideon even unto Gezer; Judas Maccabæus with his small company, albeit ready to faint with fasting, greatly daring, putting to flight the "mighty host of the ungodly" which Seron, Prince of Tyre, was leading against Jerusalem; the Romans escaping behind the veil of night from the fury of their Jewish pursuers; the Crusaders, with hearts set on the possession of the Holy City, coming empty away. Once again that straight and stony path beheld the invaders' advance, but was not to witness as on every former occasion, the troubled reflux.

A pre-war cavalry division, with its first line transport and field ambulances, occupied over nine miles of road in column of route.* A few miles upwards from the mouth of the pass it was only possible to move in single file dismounted and leading the horses over the broken and boulder bestrewn road. It was therefore out of the question for the whole division to march in one column. Consequently it was decided that the 8th and 6th Brigades should march on consecutive days, via Beit-ur-el-Tahta and Beit-ur-el-Foka and that the 22nd Brigade should move up the valley that leads to Shilta and Ain Arik.

On November 17th, i.e. on the day preceding the march of the Division, two reconnaissances were made by the 8th and 22nd Brigades respectively. The 1/3rd County of London Regiment reached the country as far as Annabe and Berfilya and found it empty of enemy, roads and water. The Lincolns reconnoitred to within two miles of Nalin and were met by rifle and

* The difficulty of moving large bodies of troops is not realised by laymen, and it is this which so often leads amateur strategists astray. An infantry division, at the time of the Great War, took up 15 miles of roadway when in column of route. This means that if the head of the division marched off, on a good road, at 8 a.m., the rear of the column would only begin to move at 2 p.m. and would not reach its billets in winter, even after a comparatively short march, until after dark.

machine-gun fire, losing one officer killed and one trooper wounded.

November 18th.—The 8th Brigade marched at 9 a.m. The Advanced Guard, consisting of the 3rd County of London, ran into a party of Turks at 12 noon. The regiment attacked immediately and drove back the enemy, taking 20 prisoners. Suddenly a squadron of Australian Light Horse appeared out of the blue and started firing indiscriminately on friend and foe, assuming that the crowd of soldiers who unexpectedly came within their view were Turks. Cover was rapidly sought and no casualties occurred, but the prisoners took the opportunity to escape in the confusion. How the Australian squadron got where it did I never discovered. The squadron commander being complaisant, I annexed it temporarily and it proved a valuable addition to my force during the next few arduous days. Among its other useful services it sent me a leg of mutton —a very acceptable gift for my mess when rations were almost unobtainable. The Australians had a special flair for living on the country, an invaluable faculty in troops. They acquired mutton not only in the green pastures, but also in the bare highlands of Palestine, which led to one observer remarking that at last he understood why in the words of a familiar hymn the "shepherds watched their flocks by night!" This encounter with the enemy stayed further progress and the 3rd County regiment halted for the night two miles short of Tahta, covering the remainder of the brigade which bivouacked in depth along the road.

Preston in "The Desert Mounted Corps" alludes to the 8th Brigade march on this day as "a remarkable feat." The distance from Lydda to Beit Sira is 12 miles; the rate of march did not exceed one mile per hour, owing to the difficult nature of the road and the necessity for picquetting the heights. In these circumstances Preston's tribute was fully earned.

The head of the 22nd Brigade arrived at Shilta on the afternoon of November 18th. The road was found to be impracticable for wheels and the Leicester battery and field ambulance were sent back to Lydda. The battery was replaced by one section of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery.

The arduous march of the 8th and 22nd Brigades on this day was followed by a night of much discomfort. Tahta is 2,000 ft. above sea-level. Summer had changed to autumn as rapidly as a scene is shifted on the stage. The division was still clad in the khaki drill and inconsiderable underclothing which had sufficed in the desert during the hot season. Blankets, tents, greatcoats, horse rugs, had been left behind when mobile operations commenced on November 1st. All that a man had in addition to the clothing he wore was one waterproof sheet. The troops lay on the stony ground beside their horses holding the reins in their hands, and sleep visited them in snatches according as cold or fatigue gained momentary ascendancy. The horses remained saddled.

November 18th.—The advance continued. The 8th Brigade passing through Tahta descended into the Wadi Sant, the narrow bed of which is a mass of boulders. On each side steep rocky hills ascend to a height of several hundred feet. Horses could only be led in single file. At 2 p.m. the enemy was encountered, and although he was finally dislodged from the positions he had occupied in the hills, the Brigade Major reported personally to Divisional H.Q. that it was not possible for the Brigade to progress farther on that evening, and that it would bivouack in the Wadi Sant.

The 22nd Brigade continued its way towards Ain Arik, starting at 6 a.m. and marching all day. The length of its column was six miles. It met with little opposition, but progress was very slow, for the heights had to be picquetted* on both sides and the majority of the men had therefore to lead two horses. Moreover, every time a horse foundered from want of water coming on top of the fatigues of the preceding week, or a camel lay down in his tracks to die from the same cause, the advance was delayed until the carcass was removed from the narrow path. The Brigade bivouacked in the wadi Ain Arik.

The 6th Brigade together with the Berkshire Battery and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery (less one section) and

* It did not require any training in mountain warfare to realize that the heights must be picquetted. It was a shock to find that a height which had to be crowned, though only distant 1,500 feet to 1,800 feet direct range, took 2½ to 3 hours to climb.

Divisional Head Quarters arrived at Tahta at 2 p.m. Picking my way with difficulty up that forbidding path, David's prayer for the discomfiture of his enemies "may their way be dark and slippery and the angel of the Lord pursuing" passed through my mind in all its dramatic significance. Rain, the "early" or "former" rain of the Bible, which falls in November descended in torrents. Being already wet to the skin we did not get much benefit from our ground sheets and we passed a wretched night.* Worse was to come.

November 20th.—Divisional orders for this day:—"6th Mounted Brigade to advance at 6 a.m. on Beitunia and Bireh via Beit-Ur-el-Foka. 22nd Mounted Brigade to continue its advance on Bireh via Ain Arik. 20th Mounted Brigade R.H.A. (less Hants. Battery) to concentrate at Beit-Ur-el-Tahta under escort of one regiment 8th Mounted Brigade. Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery to be attached to 6th Mounted Brigade. D.H.Q. to follow 6th Mounted Brigade. 8th Mounted Brigade to withdraw to Beit-Ur-el-Tahta and follow D.H.Q. as divisional reserve." In accordance with these orders the 6th Mounted Brigade marched at 6 a.m. The night's rain had made movement even more difficult than on the previous day. Every yard of ground not covered by stones was turned into black viscous mud in which men and horses slipped at every step.

At 11.30, when 2 miles S.W. of Beitunia, the Dorsets came up against a number of Turks ensconced behind boulders and difficult to locate. The Berks arrived in support of the Dorsets but no appreciable advance was made before darkness supervened. During this advanced guard affair one officer was killed and three officers and 8 O.R. were wounded. Meanwhile, on account of the extreme difficulty of the road, all wheeled transport and guns (less Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery) were sent back to Ramleh under escort of one Squadron 1st County Regiment, the remainder of that regiment furnishing escort to the divisional ammunition column marching to Tahta.

We had employed a guide, a resident of Tahta, more for the purpose of enabling us to identify on the ground the places

* From the diary of a trooper in the Middlesex Yeomanry "the most wretched night of war." "Yarn of a Yeoman" by S. F. Hatton.

shown on the map, than to point out the road. Between Foka and Tahta I saw him lying in a shallow depression a few feet off the track. His expression was so peaceful that I thought he was asleep and went to wake him up, when I found he was indeed asleep for the last time. The cause soon became evident for a Turk machine gun suddenly opened fire and very nearly put me and my A.D.C. to sleep also.

The head of the 22nd Mounted Brigade reached Ain Arik at 2 p.m. after another trying march. The rear of the Brigade only arrived at Ain Arik at 11 p.m., i.e., 9 hours later than the head. Two squadrons of the Staffords occupied PF. 2085 N. of Beitunia without opposition, and one regiment was sent forward from Ain Arik towards Ramallah. It found Beitunia and the hill of Muntar in possession of a strong Turkish force.

The supply situation was beginning to cause anxiety. The great physical difficulties that we were to encounter had not been foreseen prior to our move into the hills. No reports of the country had been obtainable and the description given by local inhabitants proved worthless. When it was found that the supply column could proceed no farther than Annabe, arrangements had to be improvised to carry them by pack in sacks which were hastily made up of old ration bags and any available material that came to hand. The weary pack animals, supplied by units, had in many cases to do a double journey over that toilsome road. The Lincolns and East Ridings got no rations on this day. Some figs and a little tibben for the horses was obtained from the villages. Water, too, was scarce, and horses were suffering thirst. The horses of the 1st County of London were watered on this evening for the first time since leaving Ramleh.*

Heavy rain fell again on shelterless men and horses and hunger added to the cold and discomforts of the preceding night. Extreme fatigue, hunger, cold and wet or extreme heat and thirst are normal accompaniments to the drama of war, but in the course of several campaigns, in Palestine and other lands, I have never seen the endurance of troops tested so greatly as was that of the Yeomanry Mounted Division during its ten days

* i.e., from morn of 18th to eve of 20th November—56 hours (approx.).

in the mountains of Judæa. Never have I seen hardships borne more cheerfully and uncomplainingly.

November 21st.—It had become evident by nightfall on the 20th that the Turks were in considerable strength in front of Beitunia, and that it would require the utmost efforts of my small force of dismounted men, with the almost negligible artillery support of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery, to reach the Jerusalem-Nablus Road. On account of the casualties and of the sickness occasioned by the hard fighting and hardships of the previous 10 days and to the necessity for providing for the care of the horses and for the camps at Lydda and Ramleh and for escorts and guards, the fighting strength of the Division was reduced to 1,200 rifles supported by the camel battery of old-fashioned screw guns with Indian personnel. Some squadrons were reduced to 20 rifles and 4 Hotchkiss rifles in the firing line. I was doubtful whether it was wise to go on with the attack on the following morning. But when in doubt the boldest course nearly always proves the safest, and so it proved in this case. In spite of the rebuff which we received sure I am that this attack and the stubbornness with which it was continued to the last possible moment was to prove our deliverance. It gave the enemy an exaggerated idea of our strength. It made him pause in order to re-organise, bring up reinforcements of men and guns and prepare a counter attack. It was this pause that saved us. Had we remained quiescent opposite Beitunia, or had we simply retired to some rearward position, he would have followed in overlwhelming numbers before help could have reached us and the Upper and Lower Bethorons would have become once more the stage of an invader's discomfiture. Here was an undesigned illustration of the military adage which says that "the best defence consists in a vigorous attack."

The attack on Beitunia ridge (called Zeitoun ridge in O.A.) was resumed at 7 a.m. by the 6th Brigade supported by two regiments, the 1st City and 3rd County, of the 8th Brigade, the Middlesex forming the Divisional reserve at Tahta. The Berks advanced from the west against the front of the position while the Dorsets were directed towards the village of Beitunia from

the south. The Bucks were kept at first in brigade reserve. Progress was slow and the Bucks were soon put into the fight, between the Berks and Dorsets. By 12.30 the whole attack was brought to a standstill, the Dorsets being held at 1,800 yards from Beitunia by very superior rifle and machine-gun fire, the Bucks, who had reached the ridge at Pt. 2709, by the enemy securely ensconced behind a stone breastwork 100 yards behind the ridge breastwork, and the Berks by a redoubt held by infantry and well furnished with machine guns. The 1st City attempted to attack up the valley on the right of the Bucks, but did not carry this far being soon required, in conjunction with the 3rd County, to give direct support to the Bucks.

The horses of both brigades had been left in the Wadi el Ilmesh, which runs west and south of the Zeitoun ridge.

The 22nd Brigade with one section Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery advanced on Ramallah at 7 a.m. The East Ridings leading, followed by Staffordshires. The East Ridings came under heavy shell fire from four .77 field guns and mountain artillery, and at 1,000 yards east of El Muntar the attack in this direction was stayed by the Turks in very superior numbers. Meanwhile the Lincolns, who at 12.45 had been directed to assist in the attack on Beitunia from the north came under heavy flanking fire 800 yards from the village, which stopped further progress on this side. About noon considerable reinforcements could be plainly seen from Divisional advanced headquarters, coming through Beitunia to the support of the Turkish forces already engaged. It was becoming evident that the force opposed to us was greatly our superior in numbers and armament. Indeed, from information obtained from prisoners and other sources it appears that our little force of 1,200 rifles and 6 screw camel guns was attacking a position held by the Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division and 24th Division which latter was composed of fresh well-trained units, part of the Yilderim force lately arrived from Aleppo, with a number of .77 field artillery guns and mountain guns. We were outnumbered by at least 3 to 1 and in a hopeless inferiority as regards artillery.

The Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery made splendid efforts to support the dismounted attack, but their little popguns were

of doubtful effect, and they were greatly hampered by the long train of camels which stood up clearly against the skyline and brought down a heavy fire which kept them constantly on the move from position to position. One cannot imagine in the whole animal world any creature less suited to mountain warfare than the camel. The mobility of the battery under this handicap was remarkable.*

Communication, or rather its absence, between divisional headquarters and the 22nd Brigade caused me much anxiety. The heliograph could not be employed owing to the clouds; the topography prohibited the use of flags; the wireless broke down. The only means of maintaining contact was with officers' patrols. This was uncertain and very slow on account of the difficulty of movement, and this difficulty became greater as the day wore on and the Turks became possessed of the ground between the 6th and 22nd Brigades.

The Turks had some excellent observation posts (O.Ps.) and were able to shell our rear areas with accuracy. The Middlesex came under a particularly hot fire for some hours.

One of the most distressing sights on this day was that of shells falling amongst groups of horses standing linked behind whatever cover was available. It was impossible to move them to any better positions or to relieve them in any way. An eyewitness writes: "A hateful sight we had to endure was to watch these shells falling among our linked horses and taking terrible toll of these our mounts and friends. Into one group of some eight horses near me a shell fell direct; it must have killed a number outright, but the remainder, panic stricken, careered backwards and fell a mass of dead, dying and maddened life

* An eye-witness, quoted in the O.A. writes "The section (of H. & S. Batt.) attached to the 22nd Brigade by sheer determination got their little gun as far forward as El Muntar (a mile North of Beitunia and 1½ miles from Ramallah, from which, as recorded, the Turkish Batteries were firing over open sights). Their camels' feet were bleeding, and as they progressed by the narrow wadi beds it was not an uncommon sight to see them practically lifting their animals laden with ammunition over high boulders and rock which obstructed the path. They started dauntless and remained undaunted . . . Even when they were actually in action, each time they fired their gun a cloud of black smoke gave away their position and they were replied to by batteries which they could not reach with shells that came over them like a covey of partridges. Yet in spite of the fact that on account of range they could really do little damage, they continued to invite destruction all through the afternoon." What eyewitness saw is typical of the behaviour of the whole battery during the long hours of November 21st.

over a terrace. It was a difficult job to stop panic spreading throughout the horses during this afternoon.*

Throughout these operations our horses had been nothing but an encumbrance. Instead of lessening they had greatly added to the fatigue of the men, having to be led instead of ridden. It had not been possible, as has been seen, to feed or water them regularly and they were half-starved and suffering from thirst and cold, and there were many casualties from fatigue and shell fire. It may well be asked why we took them with us at all, or why, when we discovered the difficulties of the road, did we not send them back to Ramleh sooner? The answer is to be found in the mission that was given us, viz., to cut the Turkish line of communication on the Jerusalem-Nablus road. The scanty information regarding the nature of the country over which we were about to operate had not given us to suppose that it would be so entirely unsuited for mounted work as it proved to be. We could not anticipate; we should not have been justified in supposing for a moment that we would not succeed in reaching our objective, when our horses, as far as we could foresee, would be indispensable. In the circumstances we were right in taking our horses and keeping them with us until the last hope of reaching our objective had vanished.

At 3 p.m. the Turks began to counter attack. The Dorsets gave way slowly under superior weight of numbers and the Bucks were forced back on the Berks. A report was made to me about half an hour after the counter-attack had begun that the whole of the Dorsets had been "wiped out." Fortunately for my peace of mind I did not believe it.

At 4 p.m. I ordered the action to be broken off as far as it was possible to do so, and the 6th Brigade to retire at 5.30 covered by the 8th Brigade, to the positions it had occupied on the previous evening. This critical movement was accomplished without a hitch.

The disentanglement during battle and retirement from the front of an ascendant enemy is one of the most difficult operations of war, whether the forces engaged be large or small. All the more difficult is it when there is no support from artillery

* "The Yarn of a Yeoman" by S. R. Hatton.

or aircraft. It cannot succeed unless direction from above, training and leadership is good, the men stout-hearted and mutual confidence between all ranks well established. All these essential qualifications were present in the 6th Brigade Commander and in the Yeomanry regiments and M.G. Squadrons which constituted his command. Had there been the slightest signs of panic and undue haste or disorder of any kind the enemy would have been encouraged to press forward with greater vehemence than he did, and no one can say what would then have been the issue.

Shortly before the retirement commenced General Godwin* urged me personally to withdraw my headquarters farther to the rear. It was fortunate that I took his advice for I had not gone more than 50 yards when a shell fell right on the spot where I had been sitting most of the day. In the midst of the apparently indiscriminate death toll of war is it by blind chance or by the direction of a Supreme Power that every bullet finds its billet?

The 22nd Brigade also succeeded in breaking off the action without serious consequences. The situation on this side was somewhat easier than on the 6th Brigade front as the Turks had not made a counter-attack against the 22nd Brigade, nor did they pursue their advantage. The Brigade was ordered to retire to Tahta. It was around Foka and Tahta, the Upper and Lower Bethoron that had witnessed so many fierce fights in the days of Biblical history, that I proposed to make a stand should the enemy, as seemed more than likely, attempt to dislodge us. Tactically the Foka-Tahta position appeared to be the best available. It was obviously of the utmost importance to hold on to the ground we had already gained in these hills in view of the operations of our main forces which were about to develop against Jerusalem. Here therefore I determined to stand. Whether timely relief was forthcoming or not there was to be no further retirement. Describing the events of the day the official account says: "The difficulties of this abortive but doggedly-conducted operation can scarcely be exaggerated. The ground, rocky, boulder-strewn, often precipitous, slippery from

* Now Lieut.-General Sir Charles Godwin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

the rain, would have been hard enough to advance across had there been no enemy. . . . ."*

The "Cease Fire" did not end this day's trials. The removal of the wounded was a lengthy and heartrending task. Those of the 6th and 8th Brigades who were unable to walk (that is all but the slightly wounded) had to be carried down the steep and slippery side of the Zeitoun ridge to the valley Imelsh—a descent of 1,000 feet—placed in camel cacolets and taken 600 feet up to Foka. Those of the 22nd Brigade had to be brought all the way round by the Wadi es Sunt, close on 8 miles over an appalling country, to Tahta. The camels frequently tripped over the boulders in the darkness or slipped upon the wet ground and brought the wounded with a crash to earth, and the sufferings of the poor occupants of the cacolets are indescribable.† There were only a sufficient number of camels to take the worst cases; even men with broken legs had to be mounted on horses. After travelling in this manner through a great part of the night they had to continue their journey in the same means of transport next day down to the plains. The delay caused by the safe evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield was such that although the 6th Brigade received its orders to withdraw at 5 p.m. it was not until 2 a.m. on the 22nd that it was able to move off with its horses from the Wadi. The 22nd Brigade marched at midnight and only reached Tahta at 10.50 on the 22nd November. The day's casualties were 196 officers and other ranks and 108 horses.‡ The Middlesex lay out all night prepared to receive the enemy should he attempt to follow us during the hours of darkness.

November 22nd.—By noon the division was assembled about Foka and Tahta. The 8th Brigade held the heights east of Foka;

* O.A. Egypt and Palestine. Vol. II, Part 1, p. 200.

† "The wounded of this (The Yeomanry Mounted division, without tents or bivouacs, suffered terribly from the weather." (O.A. Vol. II, Part 1, p. 205).

‡ "Up the hill to Foka and then I heard groans and found a pretty kettle of fish . . . . the camels had blundered into the houses and got stuck. The first one I found had the cacolet jammed into the branches of an olive tree, the native driver curled up asleep between the camel's feet and the wounded unable to do anything but reiterate querulous curses; the next camel had knelt down between a couple of houses and nothing could get it up . . . Then more groans and striking a match I found a camel with its back broken lying in a ten-foot hole with the remains of a smashed cacolet underneath. Luckily both passengers had been flung clear and were too badly wounded to care much about the fall which hadn't killed either of them." ("Diary of D.A.D.M.S. on the Jerusalem Campaign" by Lt.-Colonel H. F. Humphreys, D.S.O.)

the 22nd Brigade was concentrated at Tahta; the 6th Brigade was in reserve at Foka. Divisional Headquarters at Foka.

Cold, wet, lack of sleep, hunger and thirst added to the fatigue of fighting, and marching across this harassing ground had brought men and animals nearly to the point of exhaustion. It was possible now to issue a full ration all round. During the preceding sixty hours the troops had received only one half-day's ration, and the horses nothing but a few handsful of tibben (bhoosa or chaff). Nevertheless the spirit of all ranks remained undiminished.

I thought it was not unlikely that the enemy might try to exploit his success of the previous day by attacking us on this morning. In spite of the fatigue of the troops therefore orders were issued to all units to be prepared for action at half-hour's notice, under cover of the outposts which were found by the Middlesex. One cannot say what reasons, such as shortage of ammunition, the Turks may have had for not making a more immediate effort to keep us on the run. Failing any preponderating reason it seems to me that the Turkish commander was lacking in the higher quality of leadership. We should have been hard put to it, weary as we were, had he not given us breathing time in which to rest and reorganise. Fortunately it soon became evident that the enemy did not intend to venture on any immediate advance and it was possible to cancel this order and to let the men obtain some sorely needed rest.

There was much reorganisation to be undertaken without delay, in anticipation of further fighting. All horses and mules* except those required for M.Gs., Hotchkiss and pack, were sent back to Ramleh under escort; ambulances were cleared; damaged equipment was restored as far as possible; arrangements made for replacement of ammunition. Finally the whole division was organised to fight as a dismounted unit according to a scheme which had been worked out when training previous to the advance. By this scheme each brigade furnished the equivalent of a weak battalion, a regiment provided a company, a squadron a platoon, a troop a section. Thus the division was

* Five hundred camels were obtained from the XXIst Corps in exchange for the G.S. wagons of the divisional train. The first supplies brought up by these camels arrived at Tahta on the evening of the 22nd.

transformed temporarily into the equivalent of three battalions, each consisting of three weak companies of four platoons. The total force, after escorts for the sick, horses and all that was returned to Ramleh barely reached a strength of 1,200 rifles. The M.G. Squadrons combined the personnel of Nos. 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 sub-sections each to make a dismounted sub-section on an infantry basis. The remaining guns and equipment were returned to Ludd as there were not sufficient personnel to man them. The difficulty of supply alone made it essential to dispense with every man and animal who could not be actively employed in the fighting line. During the day hostile aircraft bombed the Berks, wounding 1 officer, 8 other ranks and 31 horses and mules and damaging a quantity of equipment.

November 23rd.—This was a day of relative peace. The remaining sick and wounded, and unwanted animals were evacuated to Ludd, the emergency rations were replaced and the reorganisation of the division completed.

November 24th.—It now became necessary to link up with the 52nd Division of the XXIst Corps which was fighting its way through the hills, on our right. The 8th Brigade* was accordingly sent to Beit Duggu, having its left at Et Tire, 800 yards from the nearest post of the 6th Brigade. At the request of the XXIst Corps a demonstration was made towards Beitunye. It was carried out by the East Ridings Yeomanry and Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery under Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Guy Wilson. It was naturally not able to do much beyond performing an act of mercy in destroying some wounded horses of the 6th Brigade which it came across, and which had lain without food or water since November 20th.

I did not think we should be able to withstand a determined attack without having some artillery support in addition to that afforded by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Battery and I therefore called up the Leicester† and Berks Batteries. All avail-

* Strength 300 rifles, 8 machine guns and 24 Hotchkiss rifles.

† The O.C. Leicester Batt. (Maj. Noel) made a personal request to me to be allowed to make an effort to bring up his battery. The guns had to be man-handled the whole way up by the gunners. It was a fine example of determination and perseverance. "Clad in shorts and shirts only, the sweat dripping all over them from under their pith helmets, covered in dust, scratched, bleeding and bruised, their boots cut to ribbons on the sharp stones, these lads had somehow got their guns thus far." ("Yarn of Yeoman" by S. F. Hatton.)

able men of the 22nd Brigade were turned on to make the road between Tahta and Foka passable for guns. That portion between Berfylia and Tahta had already been considerably improved since the commencement of operations.

(*To be continued.*)

The Author desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to the Historical Committee of Imperial Defence, and to His Majesty's Stationery Office.

NOTICE.

To the Editor

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.

SIR,

I have been entrusted by Lady Allenby with the writing of the biography of the late Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.

I should be most grateful if those who have any letters or papers which might be useful for the biography and those who knew the late Field-Marshal well, especially those who knew him in the early years of his service, would communicate with me at the address given below.

Yours truly,
A. P. WAVELL,
(Major-General).

CHURCHILL HOUSE,
MARLBOROUGH LINES,
ALDERSHOT.



THE YEOMANRY AT HUJ.

8th November, 1917.

By Major Oskar Teichman, D.S.O., M.C., T.D.
Late M.O., Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars.

* "You have worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Cavalry."

The Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanries, who form the subject of this article, were both founded in the early nineties of the 18th century; and in 1914 they were still imbued with that happy characteristic of the feudal system which united the tenant farmer and the landlord in time of war. Many troops were still known by the name of the district or estate where they had been raised at the time of Pitt's first invasion scare, two years after Valmy: and a number of officers could trace a direct connection with the Regiment over a period of a hundred years. Esprit de corps was still strong in these Regiments in 1917, although by then reinforcements were no longer of the farmer type, but being of the county these young men were inordinately proud of joining that *Corps d'élite*, the County Yeomanry Regiment. Before the Great War these units (like all other Yeomanries) had long waiting lists, and on mobilization (when Regiments were brought up to war strength, doubled and finally trebled) many a would-be recruit was advised to join the New Armies—"Not quite the type for a Yeoman" observed the Squadron Leader or C.O., who could afford to be very particular in 1914!

In those gorgeous pre-war camps, gay with the pageantry of full dress uniform and replete with the luxury of other days, many a Yeoman brought his own groom and sometimes two horses, in the hope of selling one after the Regimental Horse-Show at the conclusion of training.

* The concluding words of a congratulatory message received by the Worcestershire and Warwickshire Yeomanries, from the C. in C., a few hours after the charge

Few Brigades of Yeomanry could have been more beautifully mounted than was the 1st South Midland (Worcester, Warwick and Gloucestershire Yeomanries, later to become the 5th Mounted Brigade) in the first month of the war " they were picked from the cream of three hunting counties with an eye only to the selection of the very best obtainable."

The Worcestershire Yeomanry alone contained no less than seven Masters or Ex-Masters of Hounds. In these three Regiments (like all other County Yeomanries) all the officers, (including M.O.'s) and many O.R.'s hunted, and " they possessed therefore that incalculable advantage than which, combined with study, there is during peace no better practice for acquiring the gift which Kellerman naturally possessed."*

On mobilization the Worcestershire Yeomanry was commanded by Lt.-Col. The Earl of Dudley, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. On returning to the Regiment in 1911 as Second-in-Command, after completing his time as Governor-General of Australia, he attached himself for long periods to Regular Cavalry units in Egypt and elsewhere in order to fit himself for command.

On taking over the Regiment in 1913 one of the first things Lord Dudley did was to secure at his own expense the services of 12 N.C.O.'s, picked for special purposes from the ranks of the Regular Cavalry. These N.C.O. Instructors reinforced the existing Permanent Staff of one R.S.M. and four S.S.M.'s, allowed by the War Office. This arrangement added greatly to the efficiency of the unit during the year preceding the War and was invaluable during the first months of training after mobilization.

Lord Dudley was always a great advocate of the *arme blanche*, and on the outbreak of war he armed the Worcestershire Yeomanry, at his own expense, with the modern cavalry sword in place of the old fashioned sabre with which Yeomanry Regiments were armed at that time. Within a few weeks all Yeomanry Regiments were issued by the War Office with the new weapon, but the Worcesters were always proud of their special

*The late F. M. Sir Evelyn Wood V.C., G.C.B., referring to British Cavalry Officers, when discussing K's charge with 800 sabres which won the battle of Marengo, in "The Achievements of Cavalry."

Turkish Cavalry at Junction of Wadis Sheria and Barrata (Tel el Sheria on right). From here the Yeomanry rode at Dawn, 8th November, 1917.

(From an enemy photograph found at Hui)

Wilkinson blades, which they used with such effect at Huj. When a man became a casualty it became the duty of the M.O. to see that his sword did not accompany him down the line, lest the "Dudley sword" should be replaced by one of the ordinary issue.

Lord Dudley was invalided from Gallipoli and was succeeded in command by Lt.-Col. the Hon. C. J. Coventry. He was taken prisoner in 1916 and until the arrival of Lt.-Col. H. J. Williams (K.D.G.'s) from France, Major the Hon. J. C. Lyttelton was in command. Colonel Williams had been commanding the Worcestershire Yeomanry for more than a year in November 1917.

The Warwickshire Yeomanry (second senior Yeomanry Regiment in the Army List) was commanded by Lt.-Col. F. Dugdale, C.V.O. on mobilization, who was succeeded by Lt.-Col. T. A. Wight-Boycott D.S.O. On his being promoted Brigadier General at Gallipoli in 1915, Major H. A. Gray-Cheape * of the Worcestershire Yeomanry was promoted Lt.-Colonel and given command of the Warwickshire Yeomanry, and he was commanding in November 1917.

Unfortunately the Gloucestershire Yeomanry were not available at the moment to take part in the charge. Had they been present it is probable that some 2,000 Infantry as well as 3 Batteries of guns would have been captured.

These three Regiments, which formed the 5th Mounted Brigade, had during 1916-17 been practising mounted attacks on an imaginary enemy entrenched in the open.

A Regiment charged in column of Squadrons in line with 200 yards between squadrons.

The first Squadron charged with drawn swords, jumped the trench, and then fell upon the enemy's supports.

The second Squadron charged without swords, jumped the trench, dismounted and attacked the enemy from the rear.

The third Squadron dismounted before reaching the trench and attacked the enemy from the front.

This method was not used at Huj, as will be seen below, for Batteries protected by mobile Infantry presented an entirely

*Brother of Capt. Leslie Cheape (K.D.G.s) adjutant of the Worcestershire Yeomanry, who was killed while commanding a squadron of that Regiment in April 1916

different proposition. It was the *arme blanche* and nothing but the *arme blanche*.

The charge at Huj, had it occurred in a minor war, would have gone down to history like the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava. In the Great War, when gallant deeds were being enacted on all fronts almost daily, it was merely an *episode*; but as the Official Historian * remarks: "for sheer bravery the episode remains unmatched."

After the capture of the Sheria and Kauwukah positions by the 74th (Dismounted Yeomanry) † 60th and 10th Divisions orders were issued for the advance of the Cavalry through the enemy's broken centre. The first objectives were to be Huj and Jemmame, whose water supply was of paramount importance to the mounted troops.

"The great moment had come, a moment such as cavalrymen on all fronts had been looking forward to for the past three years!"

It had been hoped that three complete Cavalry Divisions would have been available, but on November 7th only six Brigades could be mustered; for the Yeomanry Mounted Division‡ was still guarding the left of the 53rd Division in the hills North-West of Beersheba, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (A. and N.Z. Mounted Division) was engaged at Khuweilfeh.

The Mounted Brigades immediately available were therefore —the 1st and 2nd Australian Light Horse of the A. and N.Z. Mounted Division, the 3rd and 4th Australian Light Horse and the 5th Mounted (Worcester, Warwick and Gloucester Yeomanries) of the Australian Mounted Division; and the 7th Mounted (Sherwood Rangers and South Notts Yeomanries). Of these the men and horses in the 5th Mounted Brigade were by no means fresh, having only returned to Beersheba (where several horses had died of exhaustion) after 48 hours continuous fighting at Ras El Nagb, at dawn on November

*Military Operations Egypt and Palestine—Vol. II Part I Page 122.

† Vide The Yeomanry at Gaza III by the Writer (Cav. Jour., July, 1936).

‡ It will be recollected that the Mounted Yeomanry Regiments on this front consisted of 9 in the Yeomanry Mounted Division, 3 in the Australian Mounted Division, 2 in the 7th Mounted Brigade and 2 attached to the Infantry Corps.

5th; and "D" Squadron (Captain Gooch) Warwickshire Yeomanry had returned to Ras El Nagb with part of the Brigade Machine Gun Squadron in order to reinforce the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade. The Worcestershire Yeomanry were also one Squadron short as "D" (Major Lord Hampton) had been temporarily detached in order to operate with the 60th Division.

During the afternoon of November 7th the 5th Mounted Brigade, which had been suffering from shell fire by the enemy's retreating guns, reached the confluence of the Wadi Sheria and the Wadi Barrata.* At dusk this Brigade received orders to make a mounted attack on the retreating enemy with the special object of capturing his guns.

Cantering in lines of squadrons the Yeomen advanced into the night, and for the next two hours they wandered about with swords drawn, over broken and unknown ground in pitch darkness without bumping into the guns. The Gloucester Yeomanry lost direction and was fired on by our Infantry to the West. Finally, after losing its way several times, the Brigade was brought back with much difficulty to the Wadi Barrata, where it spent the night.

At 1 a.m. on November 8th the 1st and 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the 7th Mounted Brigade were ordered to advance on Bureir: the 3rd and 4th Australian Light Horse Brigades and the 5th Mounted Brigade were directed on Huj, with the 60th Division on the Yeoman's left flank.

Soon after dawn long columns of the enemy were observed moving northwards towards Jemmame; they were however, protected by the staunch 53rd (Turkish) Division which, after the fall of Gaza, had been ordered to move across the front through Huj with the object of preventing the British Cavalry from destroying them.

At 6 a.m. the Worcesterhire and Warwickhire Yeomanries rode out of the Wadi Barrata in pursuit of the enemy. The Gloucestershire Yeomanry, which was to be in Brigade reserve, remained behind to water—as also did the Battery ("B" Honourable Artillery Company), Machine Gun Squadron less two guns and the Hotchkiss rifle sections.

*Map I may be consulted from here onwards.

The Worcesters and the Warwicks, each only two squadrons strong (for the reasons mentioned above), who were in a few hours to take part in the most glorious episode of their respective histories, were not only without their comrades from Gloucesterhire, the Battery and the Machine Gun Squadron, but they were also without a Brigade Commander* for the time being.

As the Yeoman cantered Northwards over the undulating downland†—" the going was perfect, the day glorious and victory was in the air."

On the Worcesters' right rode the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade diverging towards Kh. ‡ El Kofkha, while on the Warwicks' left écheloned to the rear marched the 179th Brigade, advanced guard to the 60th Division. The retreating enemy made use of every ridge in order to fight small rearguard actions and delay the Yeomen's advance. In some places the Turks took up positions behind mud walls, in others they were lightly entrenched. This entailed a number of dismounted actions and much expenditure of ammunition each time before the enemy was dislodged.

At Juaithim (a collection of mud huts and mud walls) the Yeomen overcame the first serious resistance and, leaving a large number of wounded Turks and much abandoned material on the ground, galloped on to the ridge which includes Kh. Zuheilika, reminiscent of the 1st Battle of Gaza.§

At Zuheilika the enemy stood again, and it became evident that about 2000 of his Infantry were covering the retreat of his guns, which every now and then came into action against the Yeomen.

After clearing the Zuheilika position the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanries kept advancing by bounds, galloping from one ridge to another, each of which was held successively.

*Brig. General P. D. Fitzgerald D.S.O. had been relieved of his command of the 5th Mounted Brigade before dawn, and his successor Brig. General P. V. Kelly C.M.G., D.S.O., who arrived after the Regiments had started did not find them until after the charge. This officer (Lieut.-Col. 3rd Hussars) had recently commanded in the Darfur Campaign which he had brought to a successful conclusion.

†Which closely resembled Salisbury Plain except for the absence of occasional clumps of trees.

‡ KHIRBIT—A ruin or heap of stones.

§ Vide: The Yeomanry at Gaza I. (Cav. Jour., October, 1935).

About a mile East of Munteret El Baghl the Yeomen fought dismounted for nearly half an hour.

All through the morning desultory scrapping continued, and casualties were left grouped together, generally in charge of one lightly wounded man on the line of advance, to be picked up eventually by the 5th Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance.

Steadily the Turkish Infantry were driven backwards upon their artillery by the relentless pressure of the Yeomen. The latter had now advanced about 10 miles, and they knew from the explosions of the shells that they were rapidly gaining on the guns. The Writer sent back a galloper with an urgent message for the Field Ambulance, as he felt that this rapid advance would doubtless culminate in shock tactics. On the left he could see the 179th Brigade (60th Division) on slightly higher ground, advancing in extended order over the rolling down-like country. It was an inspiring sight to watch the steady progress of these Londoners who, in spite of the holes torn in their ranks, never wavered. They were being shelled by field guns which were covering the retreat of the Turkish 8th Army H.Q.

By mid-day the Yeomen and the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade captured the Kh. Kofkha position, which was held by a Turkish rearguard, and after that the pace improved. The ground was strewn with dead Turks and the material they had abandoned in their haste—ammunition, gun limbers, equipment, wagons etc. It was noticed how, during this retreat, the enemy had commenced by throwing away merely his old shell-cases, and gradually as time went on, and he was hard pressed, more and more equipment was abandoned. As the Yeomen had not had a drink for many hours, some abandoned Turkish water-barrels were a God-send, but there was no time to waste and those lucky enough to get a drink mounted hastily to follow the hunt.

And now, for the first time in Palestine, the Yeomen had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy really retreating. Now was the time to keep him on the run and turn retreat into rout.

About mid-day the Writer heard a loud explosion in front which was followed by tremendous clouds of smoke about two

miles away, due to the destruction of an enemy ammunition dump.

We will now leave the Yeomen—getting nearer and nearer to the guns, the Cavalry's advance over the dry turf raising clouds of dust which attracted the unwelcome attention of the gunners—and follow for a while the fortunes of "D" Squadron Worcester Yeomanry, who had been detailed on the previous day as an advanced cavalry screen to the 60th Division, acting under the immediate orders of Brigadier General F. M. Edwards, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding 179th Infantry Brigade.

Towards evening (November 7th) the Squadron reached the Wadi Sheria, but as the 179th Brigade was still in action on the Northern bank it was not possible to water until midnight.

At 5 a.m. on November 8th Major Lord Hampton led his Squadron out of the Wadi with orders to reconnoitre on each side of the track running from Tel El Sheria to Huj.

During the morning the Squadron must have been close to the advanced guard of the Worcestershire Yeomanry in the earlier stages of its advance, as both of them reached the proximity of Zuheilika about the same time. From here "D" Squadron bore left handed towards Muntaret El Baghl, and rode over open downland intersected by small wadis. Two miles to the North lay the mud huts and cactus hedges of Baghl at the foot of a ridge of low hills.

As the advanced troop approached the village, it soon became apparent that not only Baghl was held by the enemy in considerable strength with a Battery, but also that the main body of the Turkish rearguard had halted on the hills and was preparing to offer determined resistance to the advance of the 60th Division. Major Lord Hampton sent his second troop round the Western side of the village, while his third and fourth troops advanced by a small wadi to the Southern side. After capturing some forty prisoners, further advance was held up by heavy gun and machine-gun fire, and "D" Squadron halted to wait for the 179th Brigade and its Battery.

Through the village and up the hill beyond marched the Infantry, supported by its guns, the Turks hurriedly evacuating their positions. "D" Squadron was then ordered to push for-

A FEW HOURS AFTER THE CHARGE
On the Right is the Machine-gun Ridge.

AFTER THE CHARGE.
On the Left an Austrian Gunner who survived; on the Right a Horse at the muzzle of a Gun.

THE DAY AFTER
Looking South East across Valley to Ridge "A". The earliest casualties in centre distance in front of Horse Lines.



THE DAY AFTER
Looking West at Battery. Note Austrian left-hand Gun (in foreground) swung round to meet Charge, led by Major Wiggin (*vide* Map II).

ward on the left flank and try to work round the rear of the retreating enemy, leaving the 179th Brigade directed on Huj. It was at this time that the Infantry came under the heavy fire of enemy Howitzers and Field guns which has been noted by the Writer above, who was with the main body of the Worcestershire Yeomanry.

"D" Squadron trotted on for two miles until it reached a prominent hill West of Huj (where the Berks, Bucks and Dorset Yeomanries had been hotly engaged on the evening of the 1st Battle of Gaza). From this hill the big camp of Huj could be seen a couple of miles away, with its tents, pumping station and enormous dumps of war material near the railway station. The advanced troop galloped forward to a ridge overlooking the camp and observed a considerable number of the enemy running about, collecting boxes and piling them against the largest of the dumps, while others were streaming away over the opposite hillside. It was now obvious that the enemy was preparing to blow up his dumps.

As the Squadron moved quickly forward a terrific explosion occurred and a great column of smoke (noted above by the Writer) ascended above Huj. One dump had been destroyed, and it was only a question of minutes before the others would be exploded.

Disregarding the retreating enemy on the hillside Lord Hampton led his Squadron at the gallop straight for the camp, while the remaining Turks, who had been left to fire the dumps, mounted their horses and escaped. By his action an immense quantity of Howitzer and other gun ammunition was saved, and this was used against the enemy later on, in his captured guns.

We must now return to the Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanries, most of whom had halted and dismounted for a few minutes about three quarters of a mile North-East of Muntaret El Baghl at 1 p.m. while the situation was being discussed by the two C.O.'s, and while some recent casualties were being collected and attended to. We were sheltering under a low ridge, which sloped up from the bed of the Wadi

Fueilis, about 1200 yards from the nearest Turkish Batteries and their Infantry escort.

On our left the 179th Brigade appeared to be definitely held up by a heavy volume of fire from the guns in front, which now seemed to be paying much more attention to the Infantry than to the Yeomanry the dust of whose advance had now ceased —it seemed that immediate action would have to be taken by the Yeomanry if the whole advance of the 60th Division was not to be held up.

Lieut.-Colonel H. J. Williams, D.S.O. (K.D.G.'s), O.C. Worcestershire Yeomanry and senior officer on the spot remarked to the Writer that the time was now opportune to charge the guns from a flank; but that before giving the order he would ride over to the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade near Kh. Kofkha, and ask the Australians to cover the mounted attack with rifle and machine gun fire and thus give protection to our right flank.

When Lieut.-Colonel Williams rode off to the Australians, Lieut.-Colonel H. Gray-Cheape, D.S.O., O.C. Warwickshire Yeomanry became senior officer, with Major W. H. Wiggin, D.S.O. temporarily in command of the Worcestershire Yeomanry.

A few minutes after Lieut.-Colonel Williams's departure a Ford car was seen bumping over the downs from our left. It contained Major-General J. S. Shea, C.B., D.S.O., G.O.C. 60th Division. He had seen "a long straggling column of the enemy moving from West to East some three miles ahead, and a flank guard with artillery hastily taking up a position to the right front."

To Major-General Shea, himself a cavalry soldier, it appeared a unique opportunity for the Yeomanry to break through the flank guard and charge the enemy column.

At the moment Lieut.-Colonel Cheape was making a personal reconnaissance of the ground in front, and while so engaged his Adjutant (Captain Drake) rode up with an order from Major-General Shea, instructing the Yeomanry to make a turning attack on the artillery position in front, in order to clear the way for the advance of his Division.

After Lieut.-Colonel Cheape had despatched his second-in-command, Major A. C. Watson (7th Hussars), to the G.O.C. 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade on the right, informing him of his intention, he sent back word to the newly-appointed G.O.C. of the 5th Mounted Brigade that he was about to attempt mounted action.

Lieut.-Colonel Cheape then rode across to Major Wiggin, and between them they collected all the various detachments of the Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanries that they could lay hands on (for the two Regiments were on a wide front) amounting to one and a half weak Squadrons of each unit.

The following were their respective strengths:—

Warwickshire:	9 Officers	76 O.R.'s	Total 85
Worcestershire:	9 ,,	96 ,,	,, 105
	18	172	190*

This was not a formidable force to attack Batteries in action, supported by Infantry and Machine-guns, especially as no fire support could be expected from the 5th Mounted Brigade's R.H.A. Battery, Machine-gun Squadron or Hotchkiss rifles.

The ridge "A" † behind the Southern end of which the Yeomanry were sheltering, bent Eastwards and then Northwards, and it appeared to Lieut.-Colonel Cheape to provide a way of approach by which the Turkish flank might be turned About one thousand yards North of the Yeomen a Field Battery of 75's was established on the slope of ridge "B", supported higher up by four German machine-guns and a Battalion of Infantry. From this position a lower ridge "C" ran Eastwards for about four hundred yards and then rose to the same height as "B."

The highest part of "C" ridge was occupied by three companies of Infantry and a Mountain Battery; while about three

*The weak strength of these three Squadrons was due to recent casualties during Gaza III, casualties on the line of advance during the morning, and the fact that some detachments were so dispersed that they could not be called up in time.

The above strengths are taken from Major E. G. Pemberton's pamphlet and differ from those given in the "Official History" and in the Warwickshire and Worcestershire War Histories. The latter were written soon after the War and were probably copied by the Official Historian. Major Pemberton, himself a Warwickshire Yeomanry Squadron Leader has since gone into records carefully and has published the above figures.

†Map II should now be consulted.

hundred yards in rear of the latter a Battery of 5.9 inch Howitzers, protected by more Infantry, was in action.

The exact location of the guns and number were not known to the Yeomen but it was evident that at least two Batteries were firing at the 179th Infantry Brigade.

At 1.20 p.m. Lieut.-Colonel Cheape gave his Regiment the order to mount, and when Major Wiggin repeated the order to the Worcestershire Yeomanry he called out:—"Now then Boys for those . . . . guns!" A remark which was greeted with a rousing cheer by men who would follow him anywhere.

The order "Line of Troop Columns" was given and the Yeomen trotted off in the following order:—

Worcestershire. "A" Squadron (Major M. C. Albright) and two Troops of "C" Squadron (Lieut. J. W. Edwards).

Warwickshire. "B" Squadron (Captain R. Valintine) and two Troops of "C" Squadron (Captain J. S. Stafford).

After covering about a quarter of a mile the dust raised by the movement drew the attention of the enemy to the threat to their flank, and the Field guns on ridge "B" were swung round to meet it. For the next two hundred yards the Yeomen were under fire from these guns, but as the former were now galloping "all out" only one casualty occurred. In a few seconds, as it seemed, the Yeomen reached the cover of a knoll (D) which protected them effectively from the guns on ridge "B".

From this position behind the knoll, the Howitzer Battery covered by about two companies of Infantry, and on its left the Mountain guns and more Infantry could be seen. Almost at once the Yeomanry came under fire from the Infantry, many of whom were standing up to aim at six hundred yards range; the Mountain Battery also came into action. The Turkish Mountain gun (in the Writer's experience) was never a very dangerous instrument of war in the Palestine Campaign, and on this occasion it did little harm. Lieut.-Colonel Cheape made up his mind at once. It was obviously impossible to open the mounted attack on ridge "B", where the Battery of Field guns and the majority of the Infantry were in position, while the Turks on ridge "C" could enfilade the advance at a range of 500 yards with rifle and artillery fire.

He therefore ordered "A" Squadron Worcestershire Yeomanry to charge the Infantry and Mountain Battery on ridge " C ".

Major Albright immediately formed his Squadron into Column of Half-Squadrons extended, drew swords and charged up the slope and into the enemy. A considerable number of Turks were killed with the sword, while the rest, including the personnel of the Mountain Battery, broke to avoid the shock and fled down the reverse slope with the victorious Yeomen thundering at their heels. Most of these Turks could now have been galloped down and killed or taken prisoner: but at this moment Major Wiggin appeared and with Major Albright rallied the Squadron, for there was other work for it to do. The guns of the Howitzer Battery, which were being limbered up to retreat when the charge took place, and the abandoned Mountain Battery, were left for the time being to be collected by Lieut.-Colonel Cheape a few minutes later.

Meanwhile he, seeing ridge " C " successfully cleared of the enemy, ordered "B" Squadron Warwickshire Yeomanry to charge the Battery on ridge "B", accompanied by Lieut. Edwards and his two Troops of the Worcesters.

Captain Valintine drew swords, wheeled his Squadron to the left and, forming column of half-Squadrons, led it over the ridge to charge the guns 1400 yards in front of him: Lieut. Edwards being slightly échelloned to right of the Warwick Squadron.

No sooner had the leading Yeomen cleared the crest of the ridge, behind which they were, than they were met by a terrific outburst of shell fire, machine-gun fire and rifle bullets. The ground dipped and then rose again—about 400 yards down a steep slope, 600 yards level, and then 300 yards uphill, with the last 100 yards very steep indeed: so that about 1000 yards had to be covered under continuous fire before the charge could be driven home.

Men and horses fell quickly, but still the Yeomen raced forward, down the side of the ridge, into the valley and up the steep slope to where the guns stood, through a hail of projectiles and the din of battle. In vain did the Austrian Artillery swing their guns round to face the oncoming Yeomen, depress the

muzzles of their guns and set their fuses at zero; in vain did the riflemen (who mounted the limbers) and machine-gunners redouble their efforts—. Captain Valintine, Lieut. Edwards and many more fell in the charge, but with irresistible impetus the Yeomen surged into the guns shouting, and sabred the artillerymen who fought desperately to the last with revolver and sword-bayonet.

Lieut. W. B. Mercer, M.C., who was in the leading line of Captain Valintine's Squadron and the only officer not hit, has given the following account of his experience :—

" . . . . . A whole heap of men and horses went down 20 or 30 yards from the muzzles of the guns. The Squadron broke into a few scattered horsemen at the guns, and then seemed to melt away completely. For a time I, at any rate, had the impression that I was the only man left alive. I was amazed to find that we were the victors ".

There is no doubt that had the Turkish Infantry had the courage and tenacity of the Austrian Artillerymen, who literally fought like lions and who were nearly all killed, the Yeomen would have been annihilated but the Turks, who like the French Infantry at Villers-en-Cauches * could not face the *arme blanche*, broke and fled to their machine-guns at the last moment.

We must now leave the remnant of Captain Valintine's Squadron and Lieut. Edward's two Troops, and return for a moment to Major Albright's Squadron ("A" Worcester Yeomanry) which had charged and cleared the Infantry from ridge " C ". Major Wiggin had ridden close to this Squadron and, as stated above, had succeeded in stopping it before the Yeomen, whose blood was up, could pursue and capture the Howitzer Battery in rear of the position.

Major Wiggin had seen the sadly thinned ranks of the Warwicks and the Worcesters approaching the Austrian Field guns on ridge " B ". Instantly appreciating the situation and realizing that it was literally a matter of seconds, he galloped straight for the flank of the guns, two of which were again swung round

* 1794. When two Squadrons of the 15th Light Dragoons and two squadrons of Austrian Hussars (after the four Squadron-Leaders had sworn on crossed swords to "ride home") charged a Battery, captured 3 guns and dispersed 3,000 Infantry.

to meet this second onslaught, followed by Major Albright and his Squadron.

Fifty yards from the Battery Major Wiggin was wounded in the head by shell fired at point blank range, and in a dazed condition galloped on to the muzzles of the guns themselves. Here his horse was killed, and he fell *under* a gun, only to be wounded a second time by the sword-bayonet of an Austrian.

Fortunately a Worcester Yeoman, (a member of " C ", Major Wiggin's old Squadron), who had become unhorsed, saw his old Squadron-Leader's predicament and sabred the gunner just in time.

The Austrians had continued firing with fuses set at zero point blank at the Yeomen until the last moment, and one of their last shots passed right through a horse that was on the gun's muzzle.

Meanwhile Captain Valintine's Squadron, which had been the first to reach the guns, burst right through the Battery position after sabreing the gunners and dashed on, a mere handful, to attack the Machine-guns about which raged a furious struggle.

Inspired by Major Wiggin's gallant example, Major Albright's Squadron hacked its way through the Turkish left and wheeling to the right continued the charge up the main ridge behind the guns, where some twenty mounted men were confronting several hundred Turks and four machine-guns. Many fell before the crest was reached, but up and over it the Yeomen rode as the Turks, to whom the spectacle of a second Squadron charging in a cloud of dust with flashing swords gave the impression of a large reinforcement, broke and fled before the onslaught.

Then down the reverse slope into masses of Turkish Infantry rode the remnants of "A" Squadron using their long swords with terrible effect. " Only two of this gallant little band, Lieut. Parsons and Trooper J. Williams returned unhurt, walking back to the crest; none rode back. The remainder, among them their leader Major Albright, lay scattered about the broad valley down which the enemy had retired ".

A few minutes before the above events took place Lieut.-Colonel Cheape was moving forward with Captain Stafford and his two Troops of " C " Squadron Warwick Yeomanry in order to sup-

port Major Albright, when the Howitzer Battery behind ridge "C" was seen to be retreating Northwards. Lieut.-Colonel Cheape immediately led his two Troops at the gallop straight for the guns, two of which were captured, after shooting down the drivers and escorting Infantry, and also the guns of the Mountain Battery which had been abandoned when Major Albright charged the Infantry at the beginning of the action.

It may be of some interest to describe the Writer's experience while the events described were taking place.

When Captain Valintine led his Squadron over ridge "A", en route for the Field Battery, supported by Lieut. Edwards and his two Troops of Worcesters, the Writer followed a few hundred yards behind.* He was accompanied by his chief medical orderly (Sergt. G. F. Hemming, D.C.M.) and his second servant, the former only with a sword, while the latter also had his rifle. The Writer was glad to feel that he had his revolver with him on this occasion. It may sound incongruous to wear a brassard and carry arms but, as most readers of the *Cavalry Journal* are aware, a Medical Officer is allowed to protect his wounded, in accordance with Paragraph 1, Article 8, Geneva Convention 1906—a paragraph which is capable of a fairly wide interpretation in times of stress !

As we three cantered down the grassy slope behind the Yeomen, the noise was deafening; shrapnel and H.E. seemed to be bursting everywhere, but the machine-gun and rifle bullets were not for us, as they were directed more accurately on the mass of galloping horsemen in front.

Almost at once men and horses began to go down, but I had agreed with Hemming that once started we would not stop until the guns were reached, where our presence would be most needed. Across the level 500 yards of valley raced the Yeomen, never diverging from the direction set by their gallant leader Captain Valintine. Then the ascent to ridge "B"; the last part of this ascent was very steep and while the Writer and his two followers, slightly protected by the declivity, purposely walked

*The position of a Cavalry M.O., when his Regiment charges, is not laid down in the book, but it appeared evident to the Writer that unless he followed in the wake of the charge he would be left a mile or more behind at the moment when his services were most needed.

their horses up *very slowly* the Yeomen in front disappeared over the top.

Suddenly the terrific din of shrieking and exploding shells ceased, although the sound of rifle fire continued, and we knew that the end had come!

As we three topped the ridge, a few minutes later, Hemming's horse was shot under him and he had to continue on foot.

A wonderful and terrible sight met our view!

Captain Valintine's Squadron and Lieut. Edwards's two Troops, assisted by Major Albright's Squadron on the flank, had only just burst through the Battery position. In addition to the casualties which had already occurred in the valley, the ground in front of the guns was strewn with Yeomen and their horses, while under, on, and behind the guns the killed and wounded Yeomen, Austrian, and Turk lay intermixed.

About three hundred yards behind the guns on the crest of the ridge lay more casualties around the four captured machine-guns. Here the Writer found Captain the Hon. Elidyr Herbert * (Gloucester Yeomanry and Brigade M.G. Squadron), who had suddenly turned up and was firing the German machine-guns at the enemy now retreating slowly in crowds down the reverse slopes and occasionally discharging their rifles at us; the majority were, however, congregated on ridge "E", some 800 yards away, where they presented a good target. "Just like a crowd moving off after a race meeting," someone remarked!

Soon afterwards a subsection of our machine-guns, under Lieut. Halliday (Warwick Yeomanry), appeared and after shooting down the last of the Howitzer teams, whose drivers were trying to save the gun, turned its attention at long range on the Turkish Column which General Shea had observed before the charge.

A few hundred yards to the East could be seen the two Howitzers which Lieut.-Colonel Cheape had captured, and close by some of the oxen which had drawn them, peacefully grazing as if nothing had occurred. Scattered about the downs lay some hundred † killed and wounded horses, many in that pathetic

*He was killed four days later at Ballin, while very gallantly covering the retreat of the Gloucester Yeomanry after all his men had become casualties.

†Actually 110 were killed or had to be destroyed, out of 190 present at the action, of which probably 140 charged.

sphinx-like attitude which is so often seen on a battle-field.

Then our machine-guns and the retreating Turks ceased fire, as if by mutual agreement, and perfect silence reigned.

A few minutes later Lieut.-Colonel Williams (who had returned from his visit to the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade) found the remnant of his Regiment arranging the defence of the ridge; while Lieut.-Colonel Cheape with Major Watson, who had previously come up with men unhorsed earlier in the charge, was rallying the Warwicks.

Suddenly the Writer realized the situation—about 90 unwounded officers and men with 3 captured Batteries, 4 captured machine-guns and about 80 prisoners were alone, with some 2,000 Turks only about 600 yards away! Our friends of the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade. who had been busy capturing guns after shooting down their teams on the Wadi Jemmame, had not arived. Our third Regiment, the Gloucester Yeomanry, owing to a late start had not yet caught up the hunt; and the advanced Brigade of the 60th Division, though doubtless hurrying to our assistance, was not in sight.

Had the Turkish Infantry now made any sort of counter-attack to recover their guns, it must have gone hard with the few Yeomen left to maintain their position and their hard won captures.

But the Turks had had enough of it, they had had an experience of the *arme blanche* which they could never forget, and for all they knew another Regiment of Yeomanry might arrive at any moment.

We commenced to dress the wounded at once, some 60 Yeomen scattered in all directions. Wounded enemy came crawling in and one could not help contrasting their clean sword wounds with the jagged wounds sustained by our men from shell-fire and sword bayonet.

About 90 Austrians and Turks had been killed outright with the sword, some 25% of which through the head. While the Writer was dressing a very youthful subaltern, who had charged with the two Troops of "C" Squadron Worcester Yeomanry, the latter remarked naively that his sword had gone right through a Turk's head "like butter."



Men of the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade and the 179th Infantry Brigade examining Yeomanry's Guns on November 9th.

The Writer discovered part of a Turko-German Field Ambulance which had been unable to escape, in a hollow behind the machine-guns, and its equipment was invaluable to us as our dressings soon ran out.

The Turkish orderlies were put to work amongst their wounded, and the intelligent German medical N.C.O.'s proved very useful.

Nearly all the Austrian gunners had been killed where they stood, but the Writer had an interesting conversation with an *Artillerie Feldwebel* who had escaped with a sword thrust which rendered his right arm useless. This N.C.O. related that the sight of the Cavalry as they charged was terrific, that he was thunder-struck when they actually reached the guns without being all blown to bits, and that only Austrian gunners could have stood the shock as they did. He was most contemptuous of the Turkish Infantry who broke, and added that had they stood not a single *Kavallerist* (Trooper) would have survived.

After about three quarters of an hour much to the Writer's relief he saw some Infantry arrive, the advanced troops of the 179th Brigade, 60th Division; and a little later what was more important to him part of a Field Ambulance, for it had been quite impossible for two of us (all the Regimental stretcher-bearers had become casualties in the charge) to discover and collect all our wounded before dark.

The Gloucester Yeomanry had also arrived and our position was consolidated.

The Writer happened to be the first officer to be interrogated by Brigadier General Kelly when he rode up, and had the honour of telling him (as far as he knew at the moment) what had occurred.

Seldom in the Great War can a Cavalry Brigadier have taken up a new command on a more auspicious occasion, directly after two of his Regiments had charged and captured 11 guns and put 2000 Turks to flight! It will be remembered that Brigadier General P. V. Kelly had superseded Brigadier General P. Fitzgerald in command of the 5th Mounted Brigade at dawn, and had found that the Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanries had already moved off. He had been informed that the

Gloucestershire Yeomanry, "B" Battery H.A.C., the Machine-gun Squadron and the Hotchkiss-gun horses would be unable to advance unless allowed to complete watering, as they had been unable to water on the previous day.

To quote his own words:—

> "I eventually caught up the advanced elements of my Brigade, and the first intimation I had of any action was brought to me by two very excited wounded men, saying that they had been in a charge, losses were very heavy, they thought all the officers had been killed, and that unless the survivors were supported at once there would be no one left alive.

My action on this was:—

(*a*) Report to the Australian Division on my right.

(*b*) Report to the 60th Division on my left.

(*c*) Send forward an officers' patrol at a gallop to try and find out what was happening.

(*d*) Send my Battery and Regiment forward under Palmer (Lieut.-Colonel A. J. Palmer D.S.O., Gloucestershire Yeomanry).

(*e*) Go forward myself at a gallop and find out the situation.

I was not going to push in the remainder of my force without knowing what was happening.

After going forward a mile or two I found that all was over, the Turks had retreated and Cheape was rallying his Regiment."

During the evening the C. in C. sent his personal congratulations to the Warwicks and the Worcesters, adding the much valued words which stand at the head of this article. "But of all the tributes that were paid so generously and lavishly, none were more highly valued than those which came spontaneously from the rank and file of the splendid 60th (London) Division; the men who knew for whose lives the supreme effort was made."

And that effort had not been made without heavy losses.

All the Squadron leaders were killed while leading their Squadrons. Captain Valintine ("D" Warwicks), Major Albright ("A" Worcesters) and Lieut. Edwards ("C" Worcestres). In the Worcesters, out of 9 officers engaged, 2 were killed and 4 wounded; and out of 96 N.C.O.'s and men, 17

were killed and 35 wounded—that is total casualties 55%, and horses 62%.

In the Warwicks out of 9 officers 1 was killed and 2 wounded. Out of 76 N.C.O.'s and men, 16 were killed and 16 wounded, that is total casualties 41%, and horses 53%.

The heavier casualties in the Worcester Yeomanry contingent were probably due to the fact that nearly everyone charged, whereas the two Troops of "C" Squadron Warwick Yeomanry only had two men wounded while capturing the Howitzers without charging.

From the above figures it will be seen that the total casualties in both Regiments amounted to: all ranks 49% and horses 58%*.

In the famous charge of the Bucks and Dorset Yeomanries at Mughar, a few days later, the casualties were much lower—only 16% of all ranks and 33% of the horses. This however, was due to the fact that the charge in this engagement was supported by the Berks Battery R.H.A., 6 Machine-guns and a Field Artillery Brigade attached to the 52nd Division.

Had our R.H.A. Battery ("B" H.A.C.), Machine-gun Squadron and the Field Artillery Brigade of the 60th Division been available to support the charge, the losses would have been reduced and the number of prisoners greater, as the survivors might have been sufficient to pursue the Turkish Infantry.

The total captures by 190 of all ranks of the Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanries at Huj amounted to:—One Austrian ("75") Field Artillery Battery of 4 guns; One (5.9 inch) Howitzer Battery of 3 guns; One Mountain (pack) Battery of 4 guns; 4 German Machine-guns; and about 70 prisoners. In addition some 90 of the enemy were killed with the sword, and an unknown number were killed and wounded when their own machine-guns were turned on them.

The whole operation † was completed in a few minutes, and the 60th Division marched into Huj without further casualties.

*All the above figures are taken from Major Pemberton's revised "Tabular Form of Casualties," and differ from those given by the "Official Historian," but the final percentages are approximately the same..

† "This operation," wrote Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne, D.S.O., M.C. (20th Hussars) in the Cavalry Journal, October 1921, "by a small force is a wonderful example of the power of the mounted attack to gain a rapid decision; and in a pursuit of this nature "time" is the one thing which must be denied to the retreating enemy."

When the charge took place, General Baron Kress von Kressenstein and the staff of 8th Army H.Q. were still at Huj (only a mile and a half away), and they narrowly escaped capture by the advanced troops of the 60th Division about an hour later. In their hurried flight the staff had to leave everything behind them, including their wireless code book! As the Turks continued to use the same code, this book was invaluable to us when the enemy re-established his wireless service.

But the effect of this charge by a handful of Midland Yeomen extended far beyond Huj and the subsequent advance of the 60th Division—as will be seen by the following extract translated by the Writer from *Zwischen Kaukasus und Sinai* (by Kress von Kressenstein) Vol. I. *Dritte Schlacht von Gaza* page 51 :—

> "On November 9th a panic broke out at Et Tineh (some 20 miles from Huj), chief depôt and railway junction behind the front of the Eighth Army, among the assembled troops, transport units, lorry drivers and Flying Corps personnel, which shook the morale and weakened the fighting strength of the Eighth Army more than all the heavy fighting which had previously taken place. Several bombing attacks by strong enemy squadrons had caused explosions in the large ammunition dumps of Et Tineh, destroyed telephonic and telegraphic communications and had produced an acute state of nervousness; when suddenly the news spread that *enemy cavalry had pierced the Turkish security-line* and was about to gallop into Eighth Army H.Q. at Et Tineh!

Although this rumour was false, it caused such intense excitement that a considerable number of formations precipitously took to flight. A large number of officers and men could not be stopped until they had reached Jerusalem or Damascus! An indescribable state of confusion occurred especially amongst the transport and Army Service Corps who, owing to the way in which the various units had become intermixed during the battle, had completely lost their morale and their respect for those in authority. The result of the panic was particularly disastrous, because not only was all telegraphic and telephonic communica-

tion destroyed, but nearly every horse belonging to the H.Q. Staff was seized and this was therefore unable to function. Thanks to the self-sacrificing work of a number of German and Turkish officers it was possible on the next day to establish order.

On the afternoon of the same day (November 9th) the news was spread in Jerusalem that the British had pierced our line and had *captured the Eighth Army H.Q.** (at Huj). This news caused a critical state of excitement in Jerusalem."

One can imagine the tales which the terrified Turks, who had witnessed the charge, brought to Et Tineh within a few hours. Tales of the relentless English Cavalry and their terrible swords, whom nothing could stop, not even Batteries firing point blank and thousands of brave Turks! And no doubt the tales lost nothing by the telling as they were passed from mouth to mouth, until they helped to produce the panic which Kress describes.

This was the first time the sword had been used in the Palestine Campaign; but within a few days it was to prove its worth again at Mughar, and at Abu Shusheh. During Sir Archibald Murray's command, G.H.Q. had contemplated withdrawing swords from all Yeomanry Regiments in Palestine to lighten the burdens of their horses, on the ground that the *arme blanche* was little likely ever to be used.

Sir Edmund Allenby was, of course, a firm believer in the value of the modern cavalry weapon, and armed the 3rd and 4th Australian Light Horse Brigades with it in the following year.

There is no doubt that Fox-hunting helped to make the charge at Huj a success, for all the leaders were first-class men to Hounds. Rapidity of decision, an eye for a country and the desire to ride straight have their fruits in war as well as in the hunting field.

Major Albright, who led two charges before he fell was Master of the South Herefordshire. Captain Valintine, who charged right up to the Battery, where he fell mortally wounded, at the head of his Squadron, had been a well-known follower of the Warwickshire for over twenty years. Lieut.-Colonel

*Which doubtless would have occurred had the Yeomanry been reinforced by another mounted unit immediately after the charge.

Cheape,* whose eye for a country enabled him to get his men into position at the psychological moment, launch two charges and then gallop down the Howitzer Battery with only two Troops, was Master of the Berwickshire—and Major Wiggin, who rallied "A" Squadron (Worcesters) and led them up to the mouth of the guns where he fell wounded, had hunted all his life and subsequently became Master of the Worcestershire and the Croome.

These Officers had acquired, in the hunting field the gift which Kellerman naturally possessed.

Lieut.-Colonel Cheape and Major Wiggin received bars to their D.S.O.'s. The latter (who to the Writer's knowledge was recommended for the V.C.) was, on recovering from his wounds a few months later, promoted Lieut.-Colonel and given command of the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry; and several M.C.'s, D.C.M.'s and M.M.'s were won by junior officers and O.R.'s.

The best epitaph to those Yeomen who fell at Huj is contained in the words of our Official Historian (Captain Cyril Falls) :—

" This charge must ever remain a monument to extreme resolution and to that spirit of self-sacrifice which is the only beauty redeeming ugly war."

The Writer has based the above account on his own diary, but he wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the Official History of the Campaign Vol. II, Pt. I.; The War History of the Warwickshire Yeomanry, by Capain The Hon. H. A. Adderley; The War History of the Worcestershire Yeomanry, by Colonel the Viscount Cobham, T.D.; and to a pamphlet on the Charge by Major E. G. Pemberton, O.B.E., M.C., T.D., of the Warwickshire Yeomanry.

* Sad to relate this gallant officer was drowned, with his adjutant, Captain Drake, when the transport carrying his Regiment to France in 1918 was torpedoed.



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SUDAN PATROL

By Major A. J. R. Lamb, D.S.O.

Part I.

1.—*Prologue.*

In the wild and little known country that lies to the west of the upper reaches of the White Nile, there lives a savage and primitive tribe known as the Agar Dinkas. Although friendly in the past to the Anglo-Egyptian Government, their chief, Matiang, had been slowly asserting his independence and demonstrating his resentment against the white man's rule. Being a man of some force of character he had rapidly obtained a large following, moved away with them into an unknown and unexplored corner of the country, and set himself up as king. From here he openly defied the Government, refused to pay taxes, and approached the neighbouring tribes with a view to forming an anti-governmental alliance. These tribes had, for the moment, elected to "sit on the fence" and wait to join the strongest side. Should such an alliance have come into being, a large tract of the Bahr-el-Ghazal province would have become impassable alike for Europeans and friendly tribes. Matiang was therefore declared to be a rebel chief, and the Government decided that he and his followers should be subjugated and punished.

It is far from easy to inflict punishment on these tribes. Financial indemnities cannot be exacted, for money is quite a secondary consideration, and is in fact seldom used by them. The burning of their villages does not mean much to them since their worldly possessions are practically *nil* and the *tukls** in which they live are very easily replaced. As they very seldom

* Round huts built of grass and shaped like bell-tents.

fight in large bodies, the casualties they suffer in this kind of warfare are comparatively few; death has few horrors for them, and in all probability the killing of some does not have a very salutary effect on the remainder. Thus the ordinary methods of warfare were unlikely to achieve any great result.

There is one possession, and one only, that really matters to them and without which they literally cannot live, and that is their cattle. They trade with them; live on their flesh; drink their milk; make shields from their hides; and put them alive or dead to a hundred-and-one uses, even to the extent of making tooth-powder from the ashes of burnt cow-dung and adding cow's urine as a tonic to their children's milk.* I might enlarge on the uses to which they put the waste matters from their cattle, but it is hardly a pleasant subject to write about.

According to the number of cattle they own so rises or falls their status in the tribe. If a chief, who is generally the biggest cattle owner, were to lose all his cattle he would *ipso facto* lose his pre-eminence as well. The first objective of the punitive expedition was therefore the chief's herd of cattle; next in importance, the cattle of his richest followers, and failing these, any other cattle in the hostile country. The capture of Matiang himself was also an important consideration, but owing to the nature of the country, no great hopes were entertained of achieving this. A single naked man in a boundless, unexplored and trackless territory is not exactly an easy prey when one takes into consideration that he can live on next to nothing, knows the location of all the water, and is surrounded by spies who give early information of the movements of any troops in pursuit of him.

The problem that the leader of the punitive force had to solve was also complicated by the fact that his troops could not "live on the country." His communications would be extremely long, fever was very prevalent, and water very scarce. The enemy knew the country inside out but our commander had to rely on local information, which was usually incorrect or deliberately misleading. The only maps available were quite inaccurate and consisted chiefly of blank spaces! A large force

* This custom is also in vogue amongst certain Caucasian tribes. (See "Kapoot," by Carvett Wells.)

cannot operate with any chance of success under such conditions, and would only be a drag on its commander whose constant anxiety would be to find enough water for it. Then there is the problem of getting supplies to it through a trackless bush country. A small mobile force was therefore indicated and I was fortunate enough to command a mounted infantry company which formed part of it.

2.—*The Journey.*

Pandemonium reigned! Egyptian and Sudanese officers, translators, *effendis*, and swarms of black women from the "*harimat*" lines shouted and beat drums; the women added tenfold to the tumult, "lu-lu-ing" with excitement in those piercing notes which are a blend of a shriek and a Swiss "yodel." The amount of handshaking to be done was wearisome, but at long last the trumpeter sounded "Prepare to mount," the Sudanese cavalrymen tore themselves from the arms of their nearest and dearest and we boarded the train which was standing at a little wayside station a hundred miles north of Khartoum. So, at length, we were off, and peace reigned once again.

My command consisted of three troops of regular Sudanese Cavalry mounted on Sudanese countrybred horses and tiny Abyssinian mules.

We detrained at Khartoum and embarked the animals in double-decked barges, each holding sixty horses and mules in two rows, with their heads outwards and their tails touching in the middle. A mule was placed between each two horses as a safeguard against biting, for the most savage horse will stand as quiet as a lamb when he has got a mule each side of him. The mules were in their element. There are no greater snobs in the world; their one ambition in life is to be seen with a horse!

On a Sunday morning we commenced our thirteen-day voyage up the White Nile. The stern-wheel steamer "Fateh" surrounded by six great barges resembled a hen amongst her chicks. She was the identical boat that the late Lord Beatty commanded in the 1898 expedition, so she did not owe very much to her builders.

Morton, who picked up his command further upstream, and an armourer-staff-sergeant were the only Englishmen on board.

After collecting some Nuba recruits at Omdurman we proceeded on our way. For the first day or two we were steaming through dry desert country, with misty blue hills on the horizon seemingly detached from the ground in many places by the intensity of the mirage.

One of the greatest trials on a Nile voyage is the endless amount of time spent at wood stations. The loading more often than not occurs at night. The moment there is a job of work to be done in this country shouting and pandemonium commence. It sounds as if everyone were in a furious rage with everyone else. Add to this the ceaseless crashing of logs into the holds, the blowing-off of steam, the throbbing of pumps and dynamos, choruses sung by the loading parties, and further upstream the stamping and squealing of the animals when the mosquitoes began to get troublesome, and it will be realised that sleep on such occasions is quite out of the question.

Two or three times we disembarked the animals to stretch their legs (see Photo 1). Poor brutes ! They needed it, they were packed like sardines on the barges to keep them from falling down On these occasions Morton and I used to wander off into the bush in search of game " for the pot." Guinea-fowl, Franklyn partridges, bustard and various types of gazelle were quite common. It was very difficult to dissuade our men, who were all Mahomedans, from cutting the throats of game we had shot. Their religion forbids them to eat meat if this has not first been done, and of course it ruins a head if one wants to have it " set up."

Five days out from Khartoum we were in the land of big game and saw our first hippo tracks. That day we reached Renk and turned out a special guard of honour for the Duke of Connaught who was voyaging up the Nile for reasons of health. They were paraded on the roof of the " Fateh," but their combined weight cracked it and they were almost deposited into the cabins underneath. Morton and I rigged up the best clothes we could muster, joined the Duke's party in the native village. A war dance performed by several hundred Dinkas in full war paint, with spears, drums and bells, was in progress. Their

1—EMBARKING ANIMALS AFTER EXERCISE



2—" THE SUDD "

3—SHAMBE, SHOWING FLOODS SURROUNDING IT

4—MORTON (who was killed during these operations)
COMING THROUGH THE FLOODS NEAR SHAMBE



5—A "MARAH"

6—SHERWELL AT L'WELL

leader stood well over seven foot high and looked most impressive in a long vermilion robe of honour, which showed off his height to advantage amongst all the more or less nude Dinkas.

After tea with the Duke on his steamer "The Gedid," we went our respective ways.

The further one gets up the Nile the thicker the vegetation. What I at first took to be a lot of little islands covered by tall reeds turned out to be floating masses of papyrus grass that had broken away from the *sudd* region further upstream. The weather began to get appreciably hotter, and Morton and I slept in the mosquito house on the roof. It resembled a large meat safe, and kept out all but the smallest of the many kinds of "bugs." A week from Khartoum we were steaming through real forest country with a wide *toich* on either bank. Toich-es are treeless spaces which always occur on river banks in this part of the Sudan. After the high Nile has subsided, they are covered with luxuriant grass, and all sorts of game come into them to feed and drink.

The next place of interest was Fashoda (now called Kodok), where General Marchand was sent by the French about the time of the Battle of Omdurman in 1898, an act which nearly precipitated war between England and France. Lord Kitchener, accompanied by Colonel Watson, whom I afterwards worked with whilst serving in the Sudan, went up to parley with him and war was diplomatically averted. Marchand's mud fort is still to be seen there. Further on lies Malakal, the headquarters of the Upper Nile province, a native village built of thatched *tukls* nestling amongst *sisaban* trees. It contained the usual Government offices, a wireless station and a detachment of Sudanese troops, and looked a deadly place to be stationed in. The surrounding country is a flat, grassy plain.

We were now in the the country of the Shilluks, another friendly savage tribe. They are very tall and thin and do their hair in round discs at the sides of their heads. These discs are quite hard and are made by plastering the hair with cow-dung! Their fighting men are elaborately attired with necklaces of silver discs strung on elephant hair; feathers in their heads, anklets made of a sort of cotton wool, and a cloak slung over

their left shoulder. The general appearance is most warlike, and handfuls of little spears which they all carry, add to the martial effect. The Shilluks are an extremely lazy tribe and cattle-breeding is their only interest in life. So presumably their warriors are more for ornament than for use.

Taufikia, where the 10th Sudanese were stationed, was another most depressing-looking spot, and I pitied the British officers who were unlucky enough to be stationed there. It was completely surrounded by flood water when we reached it; nobody could get any exercise, and it swarmed with huge mosquitoes that attacked one in an aggressively voracious way.

Here we embarked two companies of the 10th Sudanese and a machine-gun section, thenceforward under Morton's command, and after the usual noise and confusion proceeded on our way. That day we passed the mouth of the Sobat River which comes in from Abyssinia where it is known as the Baro, and further on the mouth of the Zeraf. In the evening we reached Tonga to disembark a number of black women from Taufikia. They had the most astonishing and varied mass of luggage, including fifteen beds, hundreds of pots and pans, boxes and bundles, as well as a goodly assortment of goats and chickens. I was told they were only going there for a week-end, so what they take on a permanent move must baffle description!

Tonga boasts of a Catholic Mission Station. "Dumped" like this in the middle of nowhere one wondered what the use of it could be. It may certainly benefit the small village itself, but how can it influence a huge district of thousands of square miles with intervals of perhaps twenty or more miles between habitations and no roads to speak of. Still, I have always found that missionaries are charming people with very high ideals, and so good luck to them!

On waking up the morning after leaving Tonga we found ourselves in the real *sudd* region (see Photo 2), having passed the head of Lake No and turned off down the Bahr el Gebel before daylight. There was nothing to be seen except "papyrus" grass in every direction. The stream itself was quite narrow and wound about amongst this *sudd* which formed a wall perhaps twelve feet high on either side, and was so thick and solid that the eye could

never penetrate more than a foot or two into it. The extraordinary thing about the *sudd* is that it is all more or less floating and boats can force their way through it. To the west it extended for about 150 miles; a flat waste of water and "papyrus" grass. From the cabin deck one could not see over the top of the grass and therefore felt as if one were going along a kind of corridor. Never a square inch of land can be found in all this region. It had a strangely depressing effect upon the spirits. Occasionally we came past narrow openings like doorways in one of these walls, connecting the main channel to open lakes in many cases several miles long. As quickly as these doorways appeared to open they shut again and we were ploughing along our narrow groove. Fireflies invaded the boat after dark. The phosphorescent light shining from their tails was marvellously bright and gave the impression of tiny electric bulbs. The channel wound and twisted in all directions. Our unwieldy craft with its satellite barges spent most of its time bumping into the "papyrus" walls, backing and shunting, and being continually pushed the way it didn't want to go by the strong current swirling round the bends. What a strange line of communications for a warlike expedition!

At 10 p.m. on the thirteenth day of the voyage we steamed into a fair-sized lake and about half an hour later arrived at Shambe, the end of our voyage and the base for the ensuing operations; 853 miles from Khartoum of which 250 were *sudd*. We had yet a further hundred miles to cover on land before reaching our concentration point.

Some idea of the size of this huge country may be obtained when it is realised that a previous expedition sent from Khartoum to the southern frontier to co-operate with troops from Uganda, not only covered 150 more miles by river than we, but on landing, had to "trek" for nearly a month before coming to hostile territory. I also knew an officer bound for "leave" to England who had "trekked" for six weeks before even reaching Khartoum. Truly one realised that time was no object, and in these days of rush and bustle there is a lot to be said for the slow and primitive life one used to lead out there in normal times. It certainly broadened one's mind and often made one wonder if the

benefits of civilization were really all that they are supposed to be.

We were at Shambe two days getting everything ready for the march to Rumbek, the capital of the Bahr el Ghazal Province, and our concentration point for the operations. Shambe only consisted of a few *tukls* and corrugated-iron Government buildings. It stood on a slightly elevated piece of ground, which at that time was an island with water running far inland behind it (see Photo 3). Here my men deposited their red tarbooshes and donned the neat little khaki-covered straw hats which they had made for themselves during the voyage, to protect themselves against the rains. Prior to our arrival a large number of transport carts and donkeys with three months' forage and provisions had been sent here. They had just finished taking it all to Rumbek, so we used them to move our heavy baggage across the flooded area. The little light two-wheeled carts drawn by donkeys in tandem looked unique, slowly creeping in a long column through the floods, the donkeys up to their breasts in water.

By this time my animals were getting quite bald from the heat and the continual rubbing against each other in the barges! We treated them with a salt and water solution which seemed very effective.

The day after our arrival the "Fateh" steamed away on her return voyage to Khartoum. We had grown quite fond of her, and were quite sorry when she left us stranded on this dreary little bit of land. My black cook who had been ill on board with pneumonia had now developed pleurisy, but had to come along with us as there was nobody at Shambe to look after him.

When we commenced our march to Rumbek the usual first-day-out troubles afflicted us: the pack saddlery was not properly fitted and the mules were fresh and very averse to having their loads put on their backs. In some cases this necessitated their being lifted bodily off the ground whilst the operation was performed. The first two or three miles were through deep water up to a horse's shoulders (see Photo 4). The little Abyssinian mules were almost immersed, and many a load of baggage disappeared into the water. We then got into dense bush country,

but our troubles were only beginning. There was a lot more water and deep mud to negotiate; miles and miles of it. The transport carts tumbled over like ninepins in the bog. Practically all our stuff was soaked. My wretched cook rode on one of these carts and must have longed for death. Four hours of this brought us to comparatively dry land, and we camped in a square for the night.

During the march we saw a lot of baboons. They were most fascinating to watch. The adults sat round in circles exactly like old men in a club, whilst the young ones played round about them. There is a rather sinister side to the character of the male baboon. His human instincts are so pronounced that the native women fear to go far from their villages after dark. In a few notable cases they have ignored this precaution with shocking results.

We moved on again at 4.30 a.m. and covered a further thirteen miles through forest country along a deep sandy track to Gameiza where there was a well. We found it almost dry, so came to the conclusion it would be best to divide the column so as not to put such a strain on the water supply in front of us and give the wells a chance to fill up a bit between visits. Nearly drowned in floods the day before, we now wondered how to get enough water to keep us going. Our column was two miles long and consisted of my composite mounted infantry company (Arabs and blacks), two companies of the 10th Sudanese and a machine-gun section under Morton, 350 transport donkeys, a large number of transport mules, an Egyptian medical detachment and a host of savage "friendlies" acting as carriers. So I went ahead with my M.I. and most of the transport animals and left Morton to follow on with the remainder, my cook being amongst them. It is only on these occasions that one realises to the full how important one's cook is to one's well-being. The average temporary native cook can just manage to keep one alive at a wage of £3 per month. Heaven help you if you are reduced to anything worse!

We came across many fresh elephant tracks and got close to two "tiang," a species of antelope the size of a large mule. They are ugly brutes, very low in the hindquarters, with long horns

sweeping over their backs. Being poor food they are not much sought after. Once we passed a giraffe* grazing off the top of a tree. He was quite unmoved and continued his meal as if unaware of our passing. We did twenty-six miles on the second day out from Shambe, always at a slow walk to keep pace with the donkeys; tiring work till one was used to it. We arrived at Ardeiba in the dark and left before daylight, so saw nothing of it. When marching in the dark the donkeys were driven along by men carrying grass torches. They frequently dropped them and so started large fires, but there was no one to mind or suffer from them, so we "let them rip." Next day we came to the Lau River Post and Mission Station. I had a cup of early morning tea with the American missionary and his wife. Their two small children lived there with them. They led a strange life surrounded by naked Dinkas. Some years previously they were attacked by some of these people, but the missionary beat them off single-handed by firing at them from his roof with an elephant gun till help arrived. Stout fellow! He told me he was now trying to teach these Dinkas to read their own language and had published parts of the New Testament in phonological Dinka language. Their cattle meant so much to them in life, that he had described St. Mark as being an exceptionally large bull, to them, a higher conception of Divinity than any ordinary mortal!

The village contains a mud fort and a small detachment of Sudanese infantry. All the native *tukls* here and in the country ahead were built on stakes about five feet off the ground to keep them from getting flooded out during the annual rains, when Dinkas go about in dug-out canoes and have little ladders to climb up into their homes.

We forded the Lau River before daybreak. It was a weird sight to see three hundred donkeys, each carrying an eighty-pound load, being herded through the water in the flickering torch light. Each driver was responsible for five donkeys and he had his work "cut out" to prevent them from stopping; one instant's pause and down they went and had a glorious roll with disastrous effect to their loads.

* Giraffe are strictly preserved in the Sudan, and the license to shoot one costs £20.

Attiaba was the next halt, twelve miles further on. The well had been fouled by bees and the water was consequently undrinkable, but there was a small scummy pond which was the lesser evil. All these halting places had grass-built rest houses for travellers; no furniture and no caretaker, a thorn zariba to keep out wild animals being all that was deemed necessary. A further twelve miles brought us to Atwot Post where there was yet another small garrison. By slow stages we passed through other Dinka villages called Sheikh Akot, Atta Marial (where we forded the Khor Gol), Naam River Post, and Billing, eventually reaching Rumbek, having covered the hundred odd miles from Shambe in six days. On leaving the Naam River we were caught in a terrific and awe-inspiring thunderstorm coming down the "toich" from the north. The lightning was unusually vivid, the clouds jet black and the rain torrential. We were soaked to the skin as we were only wearing shirts and shorts. Having passed overhead it veered round and followed us all the way to Billing. So literally did it remain with us that the ground in front, till then bone dry, only began to get wet as we reached it, and in a few minutes was under two or three inches of water. We arrived at Billing in a sorry state!

Some parts of the route were attractively sprinkled with fine tall trees, others boasted of smaller trees with bright green leaves. Amongst these one felt one was passing through a huge orchard, the trees somewhat resembling apple trees. Where they obtained sufficient moisture to be in leaf at that time of year was a real mystery! Strange to say, the bush often reminded me of our own native countryside. One place we passed through had a distinct resemblance to an English country village with a big village green and high trees all round. One half expected to see the church tower sticking up amongst them. Was it just a sort of delusion or was there any real resemblance? I would like to be able to go back and look again! The whole country was completely flat but at times one felt one was going up or down gentle inclines. We used to argue whether this were so or not and never arrived at any decision; perhaps it was only another illusion caused by being shut in all round by bushes, trees, and tall grass.

During the final stages of the march we were in close proximity to hostile villages, so had to take extra precautions. Actually, ever since leaving Shambe, we had moved with advanced, flank, and rearguards whilst on the march. My old black soldiers were mostly Dervishes captured during the reconquest of the Sudan and enlisted for life. As we rode along they sometimes broke into most tuneful melodies: old songs composed in the days when they followed the Mahdi and the Khalifa. The words of nearly all of them referred to the many years of hostility to the hated "turks," as they styled all men whiter than themselves. One found oneself joining in these choruses and singing about the hated white man in true Dervish fashion. Dear old nuggets! They were as loyal as could be, and what mattered the words so long as their hearts were right?

Seeing new country and new people is always enjoyable and especially so when one is quite independent and can make one's own arrangements, starting and stopping as one feels inclined. I really enjoyed the march which, incidentally, gave us all a chance to get used to our jobs and to put the animals into hard working condition after the long voyage. But we little realised what desperately hard work they were going to be called upon to do during the ensuing three months.

At Rumbek we found all the rest of the troops that were going to participate, ready and waiting for us. Till the arrival of Morton and his column I lived in the British inspector's house, which was really a glorified thatched barn. Although rough, it was quite comfortable inside, reminding me of pictures of some Canadian shanty in the backwoods. Rumbek had a permanent Sudanese garrison in a mud fort surrounded by barbed wire. There was a large open square with a big native village around it. The whole male population were naked, the women nearly so.

We spent three days here issuing stores and ammunition and getting everything into perfect order before starting. Some of our friendly carriers showed us their skill with the bows and arrows which they all carry: wicked looking little barbed arrows with poisoned heads similar to those carried by the hostile tribe. Their aim was pretty accurate up to about fifty yards range; a

useful indication of what might be an advisable distance to keep away from an Agar Dinka.

3.—*The Agar Dinkas.*

Major Sherwell, D.S.O., commanded the force which altogether consisted of four companies of Sudanese infantry, my three troops of Arab and Sudanese mounted infantry, Egyptian medical, veterinary and supply units, and about two hundred and fifty friendly savages acting as carriers, guides and trackers.

His plan of operations was as follows:—Morton, in command of one of my M.I. troops, one company of infantry and details, was to march twenty miles northward to Wol Makwei. The rest of the force, except for one company of infantry suffering from chickenpox and left as a garrison in Rumbek, was to move north-east to L'Well, Matiang's former capital, and there form an advance base. We heard that Matiang, being warned by spies of our concentration, had moved out of it. It was decided, before starting, to try and drive any of Matiang's herds and fighting men towards the force at Wol Makwei and so surround them. In such a wild, unknown country it was well-nigh impossible to make any elaborate plans. Everything turned on the information we could get as we went along, the amount of resistance we might meet, and the all-important question of water supply.

On starting off my two troops, accompanied by a native guide, moved half a mile in advance of the main column, and formed a protective screen. The column moved in square formation with transport and non-combatants roughly enclosed by the infantry. Pairs of my M.I. were used as flankers, and rear-points spaced out round the column.

After leaving the environs of Rumbek we came into more open country with many fine trees in full foliage and areas of grass ten feet high. We bivouacked the first night at a *marah*, a series of shelters for cattle, each built on stakes set in a circle and supporting a dome-shaped roof made of dried mud (see Photo 5). We were almost choked that night by the smoke of innumerable little fires kindled by the carriers, and had to make better

arrangements on future occasions. Next day we came upon tracks of large numbers of cattle that had been driven eastwards the previous day, and my men saw about twenty of the enemy. They fled at our approach. The ground about there was so knobbly and rough that it was difficult to get a horse out of a walk and pursuit was therefore out of the question. A large herd of giraffe, of all sizes and ages, that was evidently making for some water, galloped straight at us, and nothing daunted went clean through the middle of the column. Buffalo and roan antelope were also viewed that day. We burnt an evacuated enemy village named Winiteet and captured an ox, its sole inhabitant!

Beyond here lay unsurveyed and almost unexplored country. Our maps were quite useless and I mapped all new features as we progressed. When a day's march was over we always had to build a thorn zariba round the bivouac, clear the ground inside it to enable us to peg down the horses and outside it to give ourselves a clear field of fire. Then grass had to be cut for the animals, and guards and sentries posted, after which the advanced guard had to be called in, nosebags filled and put on the horses and evening meal prepared. This daily routine took a long time, especially when thorn bushes were scarce, as they often were, and had to be dragged for long distances.

On the third day L'Well was reached and, as we had expected, was empty (see Photo 6). It consisted of a clearing in the scrub about a mile long and two or three hundred yards broad, sprinkled with little *tukls* each with a little patch of *dura* cultivated around it. A mile or two beyond it we came upon many more cattle *marahs* which had just been evacuated. One old man, however, popped up out of the long grass and struck at one of men's mules with a fish-spear, after which he was taken prisoner and cross-examined. He amused us considerably by saying that he had nothing whatever to do with the war and was merely on his way from an adjoining district to stay with friends for a few days' fishing! Perhaps he spoke the truth since there were plenty of fish of a sort in the ponds and swamps in front of us. It seemed that the enemy could hardly escape much further eastwards where the country became more and

more swampy, and we understood that these swamps stretched continuously all the way back to the Bahr el Gebel, over fifty miles away. They might have slipped northwards if our western column failed to gain touch with them. If they went southwards we would probably have got news of them crossing the Shambe-Rumbek track. In any case it began to dawn on us that the whole business was like looking for a needle in a hay-stack.

O'Malley, our chief political officer, sent out a spy whilst we made a bivouac. He came back in the evening and reported that Matiang's own cattle were half-way between our bivouac and Aton Water which, he said, lay seventeen miles north of Winiteet. A report like that took hours of cross-questioning to produce. The Dinka language was remarkably difficult even for our translators to understand. It consisted of a series of gurgles and grunts; many of those noises only represented exaggeration or even lies. The Dinkas idea of distance was quite fantastic; they gauged time only by the position and movement of the sun and stars, and very roughly at that.

At sunrise next day I left the bivouac with my two troops, accompanied by O'Malley, to try and round up these cattle. It was soon found that the infantry would be too slow to be of any use for this work and so they were generally employed in making the zaribas and guarding any prisoners or cattle my M.I. could secure. All the real fighting and movement thereafter devolved upon the mounted troops.

We started off at a trot with our Dinka guides. They were wonderful runners and kept with us all day long. Some of them wore narrow leather belts with little goat's tails dangling from them. By way of politeness to an officer they carefully arranged these goat's tails to cover their posteriors when running in front of us, but always remembered to twist them round to the front to cover some of their nakedness when facing us !

After some miles we took two prisoners and an enemy scout was killed. On we went, often along foot-wide tracks through grass as high as our heads when mounted. All the ground was deeply pitted by elephant tracks, holes two feet across and a foot deep, at that time all hard and dry. It was cruel work for the

horses and mules; a more hopeless country in which to try and track cattle would be difficult to imagine. We tried, by beatings and threats of death, to extract information from our prisoners, but all we could discover was that Matiang's, and someone called Ding's, cattle went northwards yesterday, but Heaven only knew where to! Having covered about fifteen miles we found a pond and rested. I had been ordered to return to the zariba by nightfall so we had this time to "give them best." Whilst returning we captured a hundred sheep and goats, their attendants fleeing as usual. We set fire to the grass all the way back. It burnt well and spread a long way to the west, thus making it more difficult for the enemy to hide. Next we came to a small tobacco plantation tended by two filthy naked old men, both with deformed fingers. These we christened "Lambert and Butler" and left them to their harmless solitude!

It was a real problem for Sherwell. He had insufficient spies, and our Dinka friendlies were quite useless as they were afraid to go out unescorted to seek information. He eventually decided to push on part of his force to the pond we had found. There we built a zariba and named it "Kirring."

O'Malley continued his cross-questioning of prisoners. They were positively unable to give a direct answer to the simplest question; rather than say "yes" or "no," they prevaricated to such an extent that he became exasperated and confessed himself defeated. When talking, a Dinka invariably stood on one leg like a stork, resting the sole of his foot on the thigh of the supporting leg, and thus he could balance for as long as he wished.

From Kirring, O'Malley and I set off once again. We trotted northwards most of the time and occasionally sent one of our so-called guides up a tree to scan the horizon. After about two hours one of them thought he saw cattle in the far distance. We pressed on and after a further half an hour heard the lowing of oxen. Thrilling moment! On we went faster and faster over cruel, knobbly and elephant-pocked ground, crossed a wide belt of burnt-up grass and charred trees, then through more long grass, and by 8.15 a.m., when about eighteen miles north of Kirring, my advanced guard reported that they had come in contact with the enemy. We raced past three small ponds and

found shields and spears, bowls of *dura*, rolls of leather and a large assortment of odds and ends, giving evidence that our enemies had at last been surprised. We understood this place was called Kabour. For the next hour or so, the little I saw of what followed was unusual to say the least of it. O'Malley and I got on to an ant-heap about five feet high and sitting on my horse on top of it I could just see over the grass. Clusters of little black dots were the heads of the savages running away; vague masses of horses interspersed with other little black dots, were the cattle and their keepers; behind all this, swarms of little hats bobbing about indicated my men in pursuit. They fired into the throng and killed most of the enemy tending the cattle. A few spears were thrown and one or two of my horses were clubbed, but the fight was soon over and the rest of the Dinkas did their usual vanishing act into the grass. We rounded up about three hundred cattle and I then sent most of my men in various directions to see if they could pick up any more. Meanwhile we burnt the grass all round and started huge fires that spread for miles, the idea being to give as clear a space as possible in which to collect up and drive cattle and make it more difficult for the enemy to ambush us, if he were so minded.

Whilst waiting here we saw some of the enemy congregating on ant-heaps and realised with much apprehension that we were likely to be attacked whilst only about twenty of my men were still with us. We therefore gave discretion its full proportion of valour and started homewards. It was desperately slow work driving this huge herd of cattle, amongst which were many young calves. To add to our troubles we frequently had to pass through the roaring fires we ourselves had kindled; all this in the middle of the tropical day under a scorching sun. We were only making about two miles an hour, the cattle straggling out and lowing in a most melancholy manner. They were led by their "Majok," which is the name given by the Dinkas to the best black and white bull in each herd. All "Majoks" had bunches of sheep's tails tied on to one of their horns. If obtainable horses' tails were used, for each of which the Dinkas gave no less than four fat cattle. The "Majok" is a kind of God. He is treated with sincere respect and the Dinkas dance and sing

round him in true heathen fashion. He thoroughly appreciates his position and never allows another ox to usurp his place at the head of the herd. In the cattle marahs he has his own special peg to which he goes by himself to be tied up. "Majoks" are invariably huge and magnificent specimens with horns about three feet long.

It was an anxious procession back to the zariba with so few men available and the enemy collecting in our rear, but by good fortune they did not attack us and we got back to the zariba four hours after darkness fell. My lost troopers had rejoined us at dusk with another herd of cattle. This brought our day's total to about 100 bulls, 300 cows, and 200 calves, all of which were put into a special zariba adjoining ours. During that day we had been sixteen hours in the saddle and covered between forty and fifty miles of really bad going, a foretaste of many even more strenuous days ahead of us, but the result was certainly worth it, especially as most of the cattle belonged to Matiang himself.

The next few days were spent in wild-goose-chases after cattle that never materialised. The odds against success were about the same as if two troops of cavalry had been dumped somewhere in Warwickshire and told to search for a herd of cattle somewhere in England. O'Malley occupied his time trying, hopelessly to "suck" intelligible information out of friendlies, spies and prisoners. With the passing of each day the water in our pond got more and more foul, and it was not to be wondered at considering all our captured cattle, also the horses, mules and donkeys and all the natives used it for drinking and washing. We four British officers had to do likewise. The flavour was indescribable; we boiled it, put alum in it and mixed it lavishly with lime juice, but the result was very little better. No wonder we had many of the men down with fever and assorted stomach troubles, and thanked God for the milk from the captured cows.

One day cattle were heard lowing quite close to our zariba. "Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show" wasn't in it! Police, transport drivers and all available men under a native staff officer clapped blankets on to any available animals and galloped off out

of the zariba one by one as they were ready. Not a second was to be wasted on those occasions. We had learnt that surprise was the main essential for capturing Dinka cattle. They went miles eastwards into the swamp; the lowing got fainter and fainter; our troops saw nothing and had perforce to come back empty handed.

That night, Colman with a detachment that had gone out to Kirring the previous day, returned to the zariba with the welcome addition of six hundred cattle. They had followed them up all day. The Dinkas, driven to desperation by his relentless pursuit, had driven their herds right away out into the swamps. Once again the M.I. had proved their worth. As the detachment got into deeper and deeper water, the infantry could not keep pace and the M.I. went on alone. Their mules fell down right and left owing to the deep slippery mud under the water but they kept on, encountered a few Dinkas, dispersed them and finally drove the cattle back to the infantry—a fine performance.

O'Malley, whose duty it was to advise Sherwell as to how much punishment to inflict on the Dinkas, now came to the conclusion that enough had been done.

We were more than thankful to make a permanent move. Plagues of flies by day and mosquitoes by night, added to the smell of an over-used zariba and the unspeakably foul water, had nearly brought us to the end of our tether. Most of our mounts were getting in a very bad state owing to the cumulative effect of the hours spent in swamps, which brought on severe cases of cracked heels, and the alternative hard rough "going" on sun-baked elephant-pocked ground which almost tore the frogs out of their feet. I had had stout leather discs nailed across most of the mules' feet which helped to protect them, but even so they all suffered terribly.

So at last the whole column started back for Rumbek. We passed through an interesting *marah* known as Lang which seemed to have been the Agar Dinkas' show place. There were the usual mushroom-shaped shelters where the Dinkas slept at night lying in fires made of cow-dung, or rather the hot ashes of the same, in amongst their dogs and calves. Here, the women

lived in tiny, beautifully-made round-topped *tukls*, like glorified dog kennels with doors about two feet high. All the trees round the *marah* had been shorn of their boughs and killed by rings cut round the bark. This is another strange Dinka custom. Nearly all the trees round *marahs* we had seen had been similarly treated. We never discovered the reason for it. O'Malley thought they did it to make the tree trunks resemble giant bull's horns, perhaps somewhat after the fashion in civilized countries of putting up huge statues, but the savage mind is indeed difficult to fathom. Further on O'Malley and I came across thousands of whistling teal which we tried to "take on" with Service rifles! We knelt and fired volleys at them with indifferent success, but "bagged" five after a heavy expenditure of ammunition. We also saw wart-hogs, baboons, hartebeest, tiang, waterbuck and white-eared cob, and so had a bit of shooting as well as plenty of meat for the "pot."

The captured cattle were sent under escort to Lau Post. Here they were entrusted to the police force till arrangements could be made to sell them by auction to the friendly tribes.

Before reaching Rumbek we were caught in a series of violent thunderstorms and finished our march in a permanently drenched condition. The ground became a slithery mass of greasy slime and the deep pot-holes filled with water. The animals fell about in all directions but by now they were hardened to troubles of that sort and struggled gamely on. On arrival at Rumbek we found Morton, Turton (the political officer who had gone with him to Wol Makwei) and Sewell, the transport officer, already there. Morton's force made further captures which brought our grand total to fifteen hundred cattle and a thousand sheep and goats; a good achievement in thirteen days and everybody seemed satisfied with themselves and with each other. Little did we then realise that Morton would meet his end only a few days afterwards.

Numerous attempts had been made to discover the whereabouts of Matiang, but we had felt from the outset that there was little hope indeed of ever setting eyes on him. As events turned out he was to re-appear far sooner than anybody anticipated.



of a portion of AFRICA, showing, in a circle,

tories of the AGAR DINKAS and
AFAK ATWOTS_

Before leaving the Bahr el Ghazal we had to deal with another recalcitrant tribe, the Afak Atwots, whose characteristics were almost identical with those of the Agar Dinkas. These operations will form the subject of another article.

(*End of Part One.*)



A SUGGESTED METHOD OF HANDLING REMOUNTS BASED ON THE LICHTWARK PROCEDURE

By MAJOR S. H. PERSSE, 15th Lancers.

By permission of the United Service Institution of India.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN HORSE TRAINING

"THE trainer must aim at gaining the confidence of the horse, which he can do by kindness. . . . ."*

The object of "breaking" is "to prepare the horse's character . . . . . so that he will be fit . . . . . to respond to the demands which will be made upon him"† during training.

The object of training is "to acquire complete control over the horse's mental . . . . powers."†

Brave words these, but, as many people have found to their cost, very difficult to put into practice. The problem of the army remount is further complicated by the fact that, unlike any other animal, his training does not begin until he has reached full strength.‡ The majority of unhandled horses, too, have little cause to like man, and memories of the pain of branding and the discomfort of rail and possibly sea journeys must make them regard him more as a potential enemy than a friend. With all animals of the lower order, physical contact seems to be a necessary preliminary to obtaining the mental counterpart; but how are we to establish the former with a horse, infinitely more powerful than ourselves, which regards, not only us, but everything that we do with mistrust. "By patience" answer the "Yes-men" and promptly come into direct conflict with the framer of training programmes, who can only allot "X" hours for remounts, instead of the "N" which patience invariably demands.

* Manual of Horsemastership, etc. (1929), Section 51 (1).

† *Ibid*, Section 49 (3).

‡ Fillis deals with this point at length, in his "Breaking and Riding" pages 215—225. Two-year old thoroughbreds in England are broken by a lad of about five foot high, with very little trouble.

Any method of handling the young horse, therefore, which results in his confidence being won quickly and permanently must commend itself to all those who realise that remount training, important as it may be, is only one of the many duties which the mounted soldier has to perform.

THE SUGGESTED METHOD.

The method to be described has been in use for about four years and has been applied to several hundred horses. It has been the subject of discussion, criticism, many demonstrations and a great deal of correspondence. The results, however, are convincing and there is a growing school of thought which favours its extension throughout the Army. The saving of time being of great importance, the method has advantages over the normal procedure, in that all remounts can be mounted and ridden before they leave the paddock in which they are segregated for one month after arrival in the unit.

The originator : Professor Lichtwark.—It is believed that he was an Austrian, who some time in the 1880's went to Australia to see if he could not "break" and train the wild horse. It has been suggested that he was an exponent of " Haute Ecole."

His principles.—Three in number, are simple, incontrovertible and must be remembered throughout the succeeding paragraphs.

1. It is better to avoid a fight than to run the risk of losing one.
2. The horse, by nature, is a timid animal; the bulk of the trouble, therefore, which may be experienced during "breaking" and training is directly attributable to fear.
3. The horse is not frightened of that which he has seen, smelt and fed off.

His method.—To put the horse into such a physical condition that his nervousness cannot be translated into resistance. He can then be approached without danger, fed, petted and generally " made much of " in order that his natural fear of man and all other strange objects and sounds may be overcome.

His tackle.—It is obvious that such a condition cannot be reached without the use of suitable tackle. The following articles are essential :—

(*a*) A 6-foot pole with a soft leather "blob" at one end.

(*b*) A 19-foot rope with shackle, quick release and "D" for use on the fore legs.

(*c*) A blanket apron to hang round the neck and protect the chest.

(*d*) A 23-foot rope with shackle, quick release and "D" for use on the hind legs.

(*e*) The safety rein and crupper.

All ropes are covered with *numnah*, where necessary, to prevent galling.

THE GAINING OF CONFIDENCE.

In order to give the assistant a greater chance of checking a "break-away," the horse is held by a webbing long-rein. Both trainer and assistant keep well to the front of the horse, in order that he may see all that they are doing. The trainer's nose bag is full of lucerne or any green stuff. This is preferable to grain which a number of young horses—the Waler in particular—have never seen before.

Although not absolutely necessary, it is advisable, from the start, to introduce the horse to the 6-foot pole, the sole object of which is to enable the trainer to rub various parts of the horse's body without danger to himself. He puts a handful of lucerne on the "blob" and pushes it forward towards the nose. At first, there is great suspicion, but a well-known smell overcomes fear; and within a short time, the pupil is not only looking forward to the next mouthful but is actually allowing his nose to be stroked, first by the "blob" and then by the trainer's hand. From the nose to the eye is but a short distance, and the object of all this is to enable the teacher to tickle the corner of the eye and the forehead. There is no doubt that horses like this, for those that have been accustomed to it will frequently stretch their heads forward to have it done. From a number of possible explanations, the most probable one is, that when a foal is born, the dam will, as often as not, stand over it and lick it round the

No. 1—After two days.



No. 2—After two days.



No. 3—After two days.

eyes. A repetition of this in later life may possibly strike a chord of pleasant memory in the animal's brain. Be that as it may, the fact remains that when once the pupil permits his face and head to be stroked and tickled, the trainer has progressed an appreciable way towards winning his confidence. It is from this basis that all subsequent work emanates and to which a return must be made if set-backs occur in later training. It is important that it should be thorough and practice should, therefore, be continued until all signs of fear have vanished.

THE EXPLOITATION OF CONFIDENCE.

From the forehead, the rubbing with the hand—in difficult cases with the "blob"—is carried on slowly over the top of the head and down the neck to the withers. If the horse shows any signs of fright, the trainer must return to the nose and eyes and start all over again. In difficult cases it may take an hour or two to reach the forelegs, but the work must not be rushed. In this, as in all other handling, the object must be attained by permission of the horse and not against his will.

(*a*) *Lifting a foreleg.*—As soon as the trainer can rub both forelegs as far down as the coronets, the horse is introduced to the 19-foot rope. *He is allowed to smell it and feed off it* (*coiled up*); *it is then rubbed against his nose and forehead, and finally passed right over the top of his head, down his neck to his withers.** The rope is allowed to fall on both sides of him, the shackle being on the same side as the hoof which the trainer intends to lift. During this, and all subsequent operations, the assistant is holding the horse's attention by feeding him with small pieces of lucerne and rubbing his eyes and head. A little more stroking of the coronet and pastern—the shackle is fastened and unfastened several times round the latter—the slack end of the rope is passed through the "D"—and all is ready for lifting the leg. But the trainer does not lift it; any display of strength

* The horse is always introduced to articles of tackle and saddlery in the same way. He is allowed to see them, smell them and feed off them. They are then rubbed against his nose, eyes and forehead. Finally, they are passed over the top of his head and down his neck to the part of the body required. If the horse shows any signs of nervousness, the trainer must go back to the nose and start all over again.

To avoid repetition, this procedure is not described in detail again. It is referred to as "*the Lichtwark manner.*"

at this stage would undoubtedly awaken fear. He therefore makes the animal lift it himself by making him take a half-stride forward. As the hoof comes off the ground, the rope is tightened and fastened off with a slip-knot and the leg stays up. It is surprising how very quietly the majority of horses take this. Provided that his attention has been sufficiently distracted by the assistant, it seems as if he forgets altogether about the leg which went up, but didn't come down!

He is too weak to stand on three legs for long and so, after a minute or two, he is persuaded to lower his leg to the ground himself. The trainer slips the quick release and holds the hoof in his hand. He gradually lessens his lift and the animal, realising, so to speak, that his leg has returned, takes the weight himself and lowers it to the ground. What a credulous animal! Agreed, but let us, at least, take advantage of the fact where we can.

After a short rest, the other leg is lifted in similar fashion. During this stage, first lessons in shoeing are given by tapping the hoof gently with a hammer. Any cuts and abrasions resulting from the train journey can now be attended to.

Finally, the snaffle—a straight-barred one, placed high in the mouth to check any attempt at getting the tongue over it—is fitted.

The main object of raising a foreleg is to enable the trainer to approach the hindquarters without danger. (Photograph No. 1.)

(*b*) *Lifting a hind leg.*—With a foreleg lifted, the blanket apron is fitted in "*the Lichtwark manner*" so that it hangs squarely across the horse's chest as shown in photograph No. 9. This accomplished, the trainer gradually moves backwards, patting, stroking and talking, until sooner or later—if necessary, through the medium of the "blob"—he is rubbing the hind leg and pastern. Returning to the front end, the hind leg rope (23-foot) is then introduced in "*the Lichtwark manner*"; and, if the preliminary work has been well done, the horse will not be unduly disturbed when the shackle is fastened round his leg, just above the fetlock. If, however, he does attempt to kick it off, he can do but little as his foreleg, on the same side, is still off the ground. When he has settled down, the slack end of the

rope is passed forward between the forelegs, through a loop or runner on the rope of the blanket apron, and back to the "D" of the shackle. The horse is persuaded to lower his foreleg in the way described above. The trainer then makes him take a half-stride forward and just before the hind hoof is lowered to the ground, the rope is tightened and fastened off with a slip-knot."*

The hindquarters are now immobilised and should the horse attempt to resist—this is one of the few occasions when he may be expected to do so—he can achieve little. He can neither rear nor kick, and only with difficulty move forward. More important than this is the fact that the trainer and assistant can both stand right up to him, and by patting, talking and feeding will convince him, within a very short time, that there is nothing whatsoever to be frightened of. In actual fact it is surprising what a small amount of trouble this raising of the hind leg causes, provided that the preliminary work has been properly carried out. If, as often happens, the horse takes it all quietly, the trainer confirms his mastery and the inability of the horse to resist by deliberately shoving the quarters sideways and pushing the animal off his balance. He staggers and may fight for a moment or two, but the comforting process will soon calm him down. When all other fears have been overcome by kindness, why should not this one be too?

With a hind leg raised,† further lessons in shoeing can be given, wounds attended to, docility training carried out, the blanket and saddle put on, and ultimately the horse mounted without danger.

Prior to this, however, there is a small matter to be attended to which, unbelievable as it may seem, is nevertheless of extreme importance; the horse's tail!

THE RAISING OF THE TAIL.

Professor Lichtwark is rumoured to have said that if the horse is made to relax his tail muscles he will cease to resist; or,

* Graduates of the Equitation School will note the slight resemblance which this bears to the Baldock Tackle. There is, however, a marked difference in the way the same result is achieved, and in the object.

† For several days to come, it will be necessary to raise a foreleg as a preliminary to lifting a hind one.

in other words, he will give his confidence to his trainer. As soon, therefore, as a hind leg has been secured, the trainer raises and lowers the tail until he has turned it right up. A comparison between photographs 1, 2, and 3 (particularly), and number 4 is instructive. In the former it will be noticed that the tail is tightly clamped down and that the whole attitude is one of mental resistance. In the latter, resistance has vanished and submission is plainly shown.

Many reasons for this change have been advanced; the most probable one seems to be that in equine etiquette this lifting of the tail is such an undignified procedure that the poor animal gives up the unequal contest in sheer disgust. Whatever the reason may be, there is no doubt that from now onwards the horse seems to realise that man is, and intends to remain, master; and further, judged by the feeding and petting that has gone on, he is a friend rather than an enemy. Submission to, or the placing of confidence in, his trainer is only another way of saying that he is ready to allow his character to be prepared.

Henceforward, tail lifting is a regular feature of the day's work.

It has been suggested that this "indignity" tends to break the animal's spirit. Nothing could be further from the truth. Firstly, in a well-managed stable, every horse should have his tail lifted during grooming. Secondly, the behaviour of a Lichtward-handled horse on a Monday morning is exactly comparable to that of any other horse after twenty-four hours holiday. A horse which "plays up" from *joie de vivre* can hardly be said to have a broken spirit.

DETAILS OF FURTHER TRAINING.

Subsequent work, speaking generally, follows the lines laid down in the Manual of Horsemanship, etc, a few differences are noted and commented on.

The rider's weight.—As the horse is mentally ready long before he is physically fit to carry his rider, a good deal of time is spent in rectifying the latter deficiency. Still adhering to the principle of avoiding a fight, the trainer lifts a hind leg; from first one side and then the other, he is lifted until he is lying

across the horse's back. This is continued for increasing periods each day, in order that the muscles may be prepared for the weight they will shortly have to carry.* (See photograph No 5.)

By way of a diversion, the trainer also mounts over the tail and, finally, over the head. Photograph No. 6 was taken on the sixth day after training had commenced; those who attribute the ability to do this to the action of the hind leg rope will note that it is so slack that the horse's hoof is actually on the ground. Undoubtedly, he could have "humped his back" if he had wanted to do so.

Saddling.—The blanket, safety rein and crupper, and saddle are then fitted in "*the Lichtwark manner,*" and photograph No. 7 clearly shows the last item being passed over the horse's head. He is then turned loose in the paddock and allowed to wander about and graze, in order that he may get fully accustomed to the feel of the saddle before the trainer attempts to mount. Although free, no difficulty is experienced in catching him, which is further proof that the trainer has captured his confidence.

Mounting.—Accustomed to both the weight of the rider and the feel of the saddle, there is no reason why the horse should object to a combination of the two. However, in order to make quite certain that no set-back occurs, a hind leg is raised before the trainer is lifted into the saddle.

First forward movement.—As soon as it is seen that the horse has no objection to make to his rider being "on board," the hind leg is lowered until he can take his weight on it, but not sufficiently to enable him to take a full stride. He is then made to take a few half-steps forward and, by a gradual progression from day to day, backing has been accomplished without incident. During this stage, the horse is taught to obey words of command.

Docility training.—This is carried out with the object of confirming the victories already won. Mounting and dismounting over the tail and head have already been done but are continued. Crawling between the fore and hind legs—strange

* It is, of course, open to argument whether this method, or the one of long-reining advocated in the "Manual of Horsemastership," etc., 1929, Sec. 53, is the better for preparing the horse to carry weight. Time is an important consideration.

sights, such as umbrellas, lance pennons and maps (photograph No. 8), strange sounds, such as the rattling of tins and the clatter of clipping machines, are all introduced. At this stage, too, the horse is prepared for the paraphernalia of "marching order." Soft sacks of hay are hung from the saddle and from the tail; he is then turned loose in the paddock and it is a ridiculous sight to see a batch of newly-arrived Walers wandering about, looking like complete Christmas trees but quite unconcerned about it all.

From here to the end of the chapter is a short story and the final picture shows the finished article, as far as handling and mounting are concerned. The rider is "on board"—all four legs are on the ground—and the horse, surrounded by apron, sacks and umbrella looks as if he had spent months in the army and not a bare three weeks. (Photograph No. 9.)

THE SAFETY REIN AND CRUPPER.

So far, no detailed mention has been made of this and the reason is that its object is sufficiently important to warrant special comment.

It consists of an ordinary crupper to which are joined two thin ropes; these pass forward between the bars of the saddle, either side of the horse's neck, through the rings of the snaffle, and back to the rider's hand. (Photographs Nos. 7 and 9.)

The action of the crupper under the tail is obvious; it serves as a gentle, yet firm reminder of "tail-lifting" and that man intends to remain master. Its effect can be increased or diminished—according to the way the horse is behaving—by a subsidiary rope which is fastened to the front arch of the saddle.

The object of the running rein is not so plain, and has given rise to a great deal of discussion regarding the precise purpose for which Professor Lichtwark intended it. There are two schools of thought.

The first advances the theory that it was designed to give a sharp lesson at each end, if the horse, when mounted, played up or tried to buck. This is sound as far as the crupper is concerned; but a "jab in the mouth" is so inconsistent with Lichtwark's principle of eliminating fear in order to gain confidence, that it may be dismissed.

No. 4—After five days.

No. 5—After six days.



No. 6—After six days.



No. 7—After seven days.



No. 8—After twenty days.



No. 9—After twenty days.

These photographs are of a direct-issue Waler remount which arrived on 20th November, 1934.

The subject-matter of each photograph is explained in the text. Under each is shown the number of days after training had commenced, on which the picture was taken.

The second school maintains that, provided the preliminary handling and preparation for mounting has been thoroughly done, the crupper itself is all that is required to prevent bucking; and that the running rein is simply for the purposes of "mouthing." There is a great deal to support this theory. Firstly, it conforms to the underlying principle of gentleness. Secondly, it is consistent with the suggestion that Lichtwark was an exponent of "Haute Ecole" for which a greater bend from the poll is required than in the case of the ordinary riding horse. The effect of a running rein is to increase the horizontal, but decrease the vertical action of a snaffle in a horse's mouth. It is not impossible that Lichtwark was a disciple of Baucher and was concerned with getting the exaggerated bend which that horseman taught.* This could have been obtained (but not necessarily was) by a running rein. Confirmation of this can be had by reference to many of the old prints of famous riders of the past. Apart from the fact that the crupper was a permanent fixture to the saddle, many are shown as using a running rein, and the horses have that incorrect—judged by present day standards—bend which Baucher advocated.

Be all that as it may, there is no doubt that the safety rein should be used carefully and sparingly; otherwise it tends to produce symptoms of "overbend."

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

With the single exception of the question of loss of spirit, which has been answered above, it is not proposed to deal with any of the many criticisms which have been made about this method of training. It will suffice to say that some have been very helpful, some very amusing and some purely destructive.

THE EFFECT ON THE MEN.

Let us be honest and admit that there are very few of us who, when given a raw Waler remount to handle, are not rather frightened of him. In fact, it is debatable as to which is the more frightened—man or horse. If physical contact is difficult,

* *Cf.* Fillis "Breaking and Riding," page 63.

A reference has been made to the Spanish Riding School in Vienna with the object of clearing up several points regarding Professor Lichtwark. It is regretted that the answer has not been received in sufficient time to be incorporated.

mental contact must be nearly impossible to achieve. By minimising the danger—real or imaginary—to the trainer, his fear is eliminated, and mutual confidence between man and horse is no longer an ideal, but a fact, easy of attainment.

There is no particular necessity to teach the procedure in detail to each individual man. As most of the preliminary work is stationary, one supervisor can stand in the middle of a dozen horses and handlers and control them. It is, of course, necessary for the supervisor to know not only what he is going to do, but also what must be attained at each step before he passes on to the next one.

THE EFFECT ON THE HORSES.

In general, this method of handling produces horses :—

(*a*) Which become and remain friendly throughout their service.

(*b*) Which carry condition above the average. There is little doubt that unless and until a horse is on good terms with his rider, he is likely to fret and may lose condition.

(*c*) Which are very steady in the ranks.

In particular, they are fully up to the standard laid down for the trained horse in the Manual of Horsemanship, etc.

THE FINANCIAL EFFECT.

Admissions to hospitals.—It is not possible to give full comparative figures of the number of casualties due to kicks, bites and struggling in the lines. This method, however, produces horses which are noticeably quiet and well-disposed towards one another in the stables, and there is sufficient data to justify the statement that its adoption should result in a definite drop in the number of these injuries.

Castings for vice.—Before this is dealt with it is necessary to make certain postulates regarding the reasons why horses go wrong and become "outlaws."

It is contended that, in his natural state, no horse* is vicious. The "Manual of Horsemastership" seems to differentiate between *bad habits*† and *general vice.*‡ It is, however, suggested

* Entires, not being allowed in the army, are not considered.
† "Manual of Horsemastership," etc. (1929), Sec. 68 *et seq.*
‡ *Ibid*, Sec. 76.

that the two are inter-connected and that the former is only the precursor of the latter; both are the outcome of lack of confidence in the trainer and an uncertainty as to whether he is friend or enemy. In short, they are both due to fear, the forerunner of frenzy in the horse, but " . . . . . the parent of cruelty " in man.

It is suggested, therefore, that the majority of castings for vice can be traced to a lack of sympathetic handling in the early stages, by men, who for a variety of reasons—insufficient time, personal fear, bad temper, lack of patience or sheer inability—cannot win the animal's respect by kindness and attempt to achieve their object by harshness. Conversely, if a method of handling can be devised which enables all trainers to obtain a result without having recourse to severe methods, the risk of vice appearing in after-service should be very small.

The method advocated does fulfil the above condition, and for this reason, coupled with actual experience, it is claimed that it can eliminate vice. As bad habits cannot be predicted, it is necessary, not only that all horses should be subjected to it, but that this should be carried out when they are remounts. Considerable time, therefore, must elapse before this state of affairs is reached.

The answer to the question " Can vice be cured? " must of necessity be evasive. The problem is not unlike that of attempt- to cure a drunkard. In both cases, the prevention of a relapse after cure, is more difficult than the cure itself. In the case of the drunkard, it the man himself who must do this; in the case of the horse, it is the owner.

As must be plain, this method of handling was designed to prevent, and not to cure. Nevertheless, a number of horses* with bad habits have been put through a course of training, and the results show that vice can be cured; but no guarantee can be given that the improvement will be permanent. The history of two such cases is given.

No. 1.—A charger, sold back to Government and issued as a troop horse, refused to allow himself to be shod or have his mane "hogged." He had obviously won many battles and had a

* All the horses referred to were of reasonably young age. The "old sinner," confirmed in his habits, has not been considered.

shrewd idea of his strength. His mental resistance was most marked. It took a month before he became in any way friendly, and six weeks before he would allow his feet to be picked up. When rehandling ceased he was a normal horse, but, within a month, showed signs of relapse. He was put back for further training, with this difference, that his actual rider in the squadron was made to carry this out, and not the N.C.O. who had done it in the first place. It is hoped that this will lead to a permanent cure.

No. 2.—Sent for training from another unit. His particular faults were "bucking," striking with his forelegs, and refusal to allow more than one man to go up to him. He came to hand very quickly, and was shown as a reformed character to H.E. The Commander-in-Chief during his visit to Jubbulpore in July, 1935. In this case, the animal was not returned to his unit at once: his owner was made to come each morning and ride and groom him in the same place and under the same conditions in which rehandling had taken place. It is not known as yet whether a lasting cure has been effected or not.

WAR.

Whatever the advantages of this method of "breaking" young horses may be in peace, it is plain that it is well suited to conditions of war. During operations it will often be necessary for horse casualties to be replaced by raw remounts and these must be able to be ridden in the ranks with a minimum of delay. Finance, then, does not play the all-important part that it does in peace, and, if the plan demands it, horses will have to be ridden and increased wastage risked, long before they are properly trained and physically fit. The determining factor is the ability of the rider to remain "on top." By this method it is claimed that hitherto "unbacked" horses could, if necessity arose, be ridden in the ranks well within one month of the date of landing.

CONCLUSION.

There is no method of training in the world which is fool-proof, and the success which it attains must depend very largely

on the care and attention to detail, with which it is carried out. Experience has shown that Lichtwark's principles are sound. Based on these, his method of handling is logical and consists of a gradual progression, each step being consolidated before the next is taken. Any attempt, therefore, to curtail the full programme either to save more time, or because a particular horse appears to be coming to hand so well, will inevitably lead to unsatisfactory results. The method must be completed in every respect, and not only in those which appear to MAN to be of value; the horse may hold totally different views. Lichtwark's teachings cater for both, and as he has obviously studied the workings of the horse's brain very deeply, his method is recommended in its entirety and in that way only.

Note.—Since this article was written information has been received from the Commander of the Spanish Riding School in Vienna, that Professor Lichtwark was not an Austrian. A further suggestion has been made that he was a Bohemian who learnt his equitation in Prague before going to Australia.—Ed.

CAVALRY AND TANKS WITH MOHFORCE, 1935.

By Lieutenant-Colonel L. Lawrence-Smith,
18th K.E.O. Cavalry I.A.

Once again a British Force has crossed the Nahakki Pass into the stronghold of the Upper Mohmand tribesmen the promised land of many a frontier soldier. The last occasion for such a punitive expedition was in 1908 when General Sir James Willcocks with a force of three Infantry Brigades, Pack Artillery and a Cavalry Regiment entered this fastness on May 13th and from that date till June 1st occupied the country and subdued the various tribal sections. These include the Kamalai Halimzai, Isa Khel, and those truculent clans, the Khwawai and Baizai, whose territory is more than half across the Afghan Border and who are always ready to furnish contingents to help any lashkar raised against us.

The firebrand of the present day is Badshah Gul I, the eldest son of the Haji of Turangzai. He is middle-aged and a typical tribesman in appearance, but better dressed and better educated than most, which means that he can read and write Persian and talk Hindustani, but not English, To meet he is a pleasing personality and amongst the tribesmen he has a reputation for boldness and leadership. He has two younger brothers both of whom are called Badshah Gul, who lead lashkars of their own. The old Haji lives in this part of the Frontier near Lakarai, for on leaving Turangzai, which is in British territory near Charsadda, N.W.F.P., he acquired land and settled up here. He has nursed a grievance against the British for the last twenty years or so and has inspired all connected with him with extreme anti-British feelings.

Another disturber of the peace is the Fakir of Alingar who earlier in the year made trouble on the Malakand Frontier at

Loe Agra. He is a very different type to Badshah Gul. His antecedents are unknown, but he first attracted attention in the village of Alingar in Bajaur in 1928. He carries no arms but goes about with the Lashkars almost naked. It is astonishing that such a man should have influence with the tribes.

The recent " causa belli " with the tribesmen was the Gandab road which was made in 1933 and was kept in order by allowances to certain important " maliks." Some of the young hotheads of the tribe concerned, the Burhan Khel, not managing to get a share out of these allowances, determined to make trouble. Badshah Gul I, with a party of Upper Mohmands now intervened in the quarrel and ordered the destruction of the road. Later on the Fakir of Alingar and all the Upper Mohmands also joined in. The destruction of the road drew upon them the Peshawar Mobile Column, which moved out of cantonments on August 15th, 1935 and was gradually increased to what was styled "Mohforce" or the Mohmand Field Force under Brigadier Auchinleck and later under Major-General Muspratt. The Force comprised four Infantry Brigades, those from Peshawar, Nowshera, Rawalpindi and Jhelum, the 18th Cavalry, two Brigades of Artillery, several Field Companies S and M, the 15th Medium Battery, tractor drawn, and a Company of Light Tanks. The last two brought new ideas to frontier warfare where such weapons had never been used before. The total strength of the force was about 15,000 men and 5,000 animals, the maintenance of which was no mean problem in an arid and inhospitable country.

The main operations lasted from the 18th September to the 3rd October, after which date an armistice was declared to make terms for peace. This was concluded at a big " jirga " held at Wucha Jawar on October 15th at which every section of the Mohmand tribes was for once represented.

In 1933 the road reached Yusuf Khel a few miles north of Ghalanai and during the present operations it was decided to push it forward over the Nahakki Pass which is 3,124 feet high and separates the more amenable lower Mohmands from the die-hard Upper Mohmands. The Pass rises steeply about 600 ft. over rocks and stones from Wucha Jawar village and then drops

700 ft. to Nahakki. Khazana Sar nearly 5,000 ft. high dominates the range.

Looking down from the pass one sees a gradually widening valley, cut by deep nullahs and dotted with outlying hills and villages. Hardly a green thing is to be seen at this time of year. Very little water is available, most villages have wells but in many cases over 200 ft. deep.

Directly across the valley runs the Nushkul Khwar, a wide stony nullah which in the event of rain, drains the whole area to the north-east into the Swat River. On the East rise the hills of the Isa Khel and on the West are the hills beyond which is Afghanistan. In the centre, overlooking the broken ground of the Nushkul Khwar, a hill rises 200 ft. above the plain which was captured by the 18th Cavalry on September 18th when the Peshawar Brigade, after a night advance, covered on their left by the Nowshera Brigade, captured the Nahakki Pass.

The Bombay Grenadiers were the first to cross the Pass closely followed by the 4th Pack Battery and the 18th Cavalry. In spite of the difficulties of the rocky track over the pass, the Cavalry negotiated it in good style, with their Vickers Berthier pack horses following their leaders on lengthened reins over the rocks and boulders.

On reaching the bottom of the Pass the Cavalry supported by the Battery pushed forward and occupied a line across the valley to cover the construction of piquets and the organisation of camping and water arrangements by the Brigade.

The line reached ran roughly East and West 1½ miles North of Nahakki, was about 3 miles long, and was held by two squadrons which occupied outlying tactical features across the valley with their forward troops and V.B. Guns, while the Headquarter Wing V.B. Guns remained in reserve with Regimental Headquarters in the vicinity of Nahakki village until the time for withdrawal. They were then pushed forward to assist their two squadrons back, as it was anticipated that the tribesmen might appear in strength at that time to profit by any error of judgment which we might make.

The Jirga at Wucha Jawar, on October 15th.
18th Cavalry Escort in background.

Regimental Headquarters. Jacob's Piquet in background.

18th Cavalry Headquarters, September 22nd.

The Peshawar Brigade had meantime constructed a perimeter camp in a re-entrant below the pass with sufficient camp piquets for its protection.

The H.L.I. and all the animals of the Brigade joined the 18th Cavalry in Nahakki village, where the high loop-holed walls of the Pathan courtyards enabled the post commander to protect them from the inevitable sniper. By nightfall all were tucked away in comparative safety, if not in comfort, and all approaches were blocked with "sangars" or covered by fire from the night posts. Desultory sniping took place throughout the night and sleep was difficult owing to this noise and the discomfort of heat and the sandflies which were infinitely worse than the mosquitoes.

A few remarks about the difficulties of the terrain for Cavalry and Tanks will be necessary before alluding to any subsequent operations.

The chief obstacle to any rapid movement for either arm was the network of deep and narrow nullahs which run northwards into the Nashkul Khwar. These are absolutely impassable for Cavalry or Tanks except at the track crossings used by the local inhabitants and any movement except by such tracks is extremely difficult without previous reconnaissance. In many places the sides of the nullahs are as much as 50 ft. high and almost vertical. Patrolling for Cavalry proved extremely difficult and dangerous as the "point" of the patrol, no matter how alert could do nothing if it met enemy in the broken ground past which it had to move.

Outlying features such as low hills were never occupied by the tribesmen for long when Cavalry advanced on them, but no feature connected with any main range of hills was ever given up so rapidly.

The villages in the immediate vicinity of Nahakki had all been evacuated by the tribesmen, but during reconnaissances signs were seen of their occupation by night and even ploughs and other agricultural implements were noticed in the fields which had obviously been used during the hours of darkness. In many places in the nullahs there were caves some of which held as many as a dozen charpoys and were furnished with

water and food. In other places where the caves were smaller, the charpoys were left in the nullah bed, while personal belongings, food and water were stored in the caves.

Throughout our occupation of Nahakki the enemy were collected in considerable numbers in the villages of the Gumbata valley, Khwaja Kuhai and in all the villages and caves along the Nushkul Khwar and nullahs leading into it, especially Lakai, Darwazagai and Zanawar China, which last was the Headquarters and "supply depot" for the lashkar occupying pt. 4080 and the ridge from there to the Khapak Pass.

Throughout the operations the Nushkul Khwar was the line beyond which bombing operations were scheduled to take place, and in consequence no troop movement was allowed across it, This very definitely limited the action of the Cavalry and Tanks, as the farthest they could go north of Nahakki was only about four miles.

The only possible way for Tanks to move without obstruction was down the bottoms of the nullahs and even the track crossings were generally impossible for them without improvement. The tribesmen talked of digging pits to trap the Tanks but none were actually encountered in the area of the operations.

The tactics of the tribesmen, so far as the Cavalry were concerned, appeared to be to keep at a fairly safe distance and employ accurate long range fire, at which they were extremely good. In fact at the Jirga one of the Khwaezai who had a very good French Lebel rifle told me that he and the men of his village often practised at a mark at 1,500 yds. When Cavalry occupied any outlying hill feature, the tribesmen endeavoured to introduce themselves between the men on the feature and their horses at the bottom, but they only once succeeded in effecting their object. On that occasion they managed to stampede the led horses of a troop, killing two of them. On every other occasion their intention was frustrated by moving the led horses to a different part of the hill as soon as the advance of the tribesmen was spotted.

As usual the tribesmen invariably collected in force whenever a feature had to be evacuated during a retirement. They were remarkably quick in getting on it and bringing accurate

fire to bear on our retiring troops. It was found that the proximity of Tanks, however, damped their ardour and enabled us to get back more easily. To ensure satisfactory co-operation it appeared essential for the Tanks to be under the command of the Cavalry leader, and for good results the Tank section and sub-section leaders should be imbued with the so-called "Cavalry spirit."

Throughout the Mohmand operations, owing to the special type of country and peculiarity of the enemy, Tanks had to be employed in unorthodox ways. Instead of keeping them in reserve in the early stages of an advance they were sometimes used to precede the Cavalry and were accompanied as far as possible by Cavalry patrols as ground scouts. The strength of such patrols was one English speaking N.C.O. and two men.

Half the moral effect of a Tank was gone when the enemy could see it or when it was halted, so they were best used in the nullah beds and kept on the move. Several of the tribesmen referred to this when spoken to after the Jirga. One also volunteered the information that if we would leave our Tanks, aeroplanes and guns behind they would give us a really good fight. I daresay he was right!

It was found in this broken country that the Tank personnel were extremely blind and it was difficult for them to pick up targets even when the enemy were actually firing. On one occasion we saw some really excellent shooting by a Tank at a line of boundary stones!

One danger of mechanical vehicles was exemplified in the Toratigga valley when the track slipped off one of the Tanks working with a squadron of the Regiment. The repairs necessitated a delay of nearly an hour, while the Cavalry kept the enemy at a distance on one flank and the remainder of the Tank section formed "lager" close round the cripple until the necessary repairs had been carried out.

Having referred to a Tank casualty I will touch on our experience of Cavalry casualties. For every operation of any importance we had stretchers and personnel attached to the Regiment from the Field ambulance. Owing to the short distance from Nahakki at which operations took place, these and

the signallers with the wireless pack mule, could accompany us on foot. It had to be remembered however, when it came to retirement to send them back with the first parties to go from Regimental Headquarters.

On every occasion but one, our dead and wounded were taken back to camp by the field ambulance stretcher bearers. As far as the Regimental aid post they were carried, or brought on their horses. Several quite badly wounded men got back on quiet horses without disastrous results. On the one occasion referred to, a Tank succeeded in reaching and bringing back the body of a man who had been killed on patrol at a dangerous corner in the bed of a nullah. After that lesson we patrolled these nullahs with success and without loss, in the following manner. Instead of the usual patrol a whole troop with its V.B. gun was employed and the nullah was "worked" much in the manner of clearing a trench in France. The V.B. gun was put into action half-way up the side, but not at the top, of the nullah to cover the advance of the leading section to the next corner. Meanwhile the ground at the top of the nullah was watched by the other section of the troop. As soon as a corner was reached the V.B. gun was pushed up to it and when in position was followed by the other section. The same performance took place to reach the next corner, and so on.

With Tanks, work was speeded up, as a sub-section could "bound" along the bottom of a nullah with ease and little danger followed by the Cavalry patrol.

On more than one occasion parties of enemy could be seen from the high ground, moving up the nullahs leading into the Nushkul Khwar, as the Tanks advanced ahead of us. Unfortunately the ground was so broken and afforded so much cover that the tribesmen could get away without much difficulty.

An outline of the various Cavalry engagements with the enemy may be interesting.

September 20th.

The Regiment was employed holding a line across the Nahakki valley, roughly Cavalry Hill—Forward Hill—Twin Hills. The occupation of this line by Cavalry supported by a Pack Battery, saved the employment of two Infantry Battalions each

day, and made a number of men available to work on the road in addition to the cooly gangs. The line was held from 0900 hours till 1630 hours, when the troops were withdrawn to Nahakki.

During that afternoon tribesmen successfully stalked the led horses of our right troop on "Cavalry Hill." Later we had some difficulty in the withdrawal from that flank, which was only affected with the assistance of the Regimental V.B. guns.

September 22nd.

Based on our experience of the previous few days, an operation was carried out in conjunction with the 5/10th Baluch Regiment who moved before light and lay up in the hills to our right. The Regiment went out, more or less as usual, offering a bait to lure the tribesmen from their villages on to Cavalry Hill. The ruse was successful for as soon as the Cavalry left Nahakki a Pathan "lookout," stationed at the col connecting Cavalry Hill with the main spur, was heard to call out in his own language "Come on you fellows, here come the Cavalry." A party of enemy were shortly afterwards successfully caught by the Baluchis machine guns. Subsequently the Regiment engaged the enemy and reconnoitred the Gumbata valley. Our withdrawal was again followed up and we had several casualties but luckily none killed.

September 24th.

To cover the construction of "Jacobs piquet" by the Baluchis, the Regiment was again detailed to hold the line across the Nahakki valley, and a troop from our left squadron occupied "Twin Hills" throughout the day. They noticed considerable enemy activity in the direction of Darwazagai village and along the Darwazagai ridge. A party of enemy were spotted moving from the village down the nullah which led to the left edge of Twin Hills. It was anticipated their intention was again to cut us off from our led horses, so these were immediately moved to the right of Twin Hills. Our fears were well-founded for directly our withdrawal began the enemy occupied the left of Twin Hills and opened heavy fire on our troops. The effect of this fire was however, mitigated by our V.B.'s, and by the Baluchis' M.G.'s behind us.

The following day it was anticipated trouble would again be awaiting us on Twin Hills. Therefore, instead of sending a troop to occupy them first thing, the troop was sent to a flank and the Twin Hills were shelled. About an hour later a party of disappointed enemy were seen moving off those hills towards Darwazagai which showed that a warm reception would have awaited us!

September 28th.

For several days our troops had been heavily sniped from hills and villages to our left flank, especially from Muzi Kor village, and on this particular day the squadron on that flank had a very difficult time, owing to the accuracy of the fire, during the construction of a Tank track and in subsequent withdrawal.

September 29th.

Instigated by the truculent behaviour of the tribesmen round Muzi Kor, it was decided that the Peshawar Brigade should destroy the village and blow up its tower. The Cavalry Regiment and Tanks moved off before light to a rendezvous in a nullah East of Twin Hills where a Tank crossing had been made. It was hoped by a rapid advance of the Cavalry and Tanks to the Nushkul Khwar that any enemy in Kasai or in the cave area West of Twin Hills might be rounded up. Unfortunately owing to the proximity of the Nushkul Khwar the tribesmen had time to get away to the Darwazagai Ridge. In fact when waiting at our rendezvous before light we heard a Pathan calling out on the Darwazagai Ridge warning the tribesmen that the Tanks were coming from Nahakki. The destruction of Muzi Kor was quite successful, but the Nowshera Brigade on the hills above got unexpectedly involved on Hill 4080 where the Guides took part in hand to hand fighting. By the time details reached Force Headquarters the withdrawal of the Peshawar Brigade to Nahakki had been almost carried out. It is a matter for conjecture whether or not a counter-attack with Cavalry and Tanks up the Ata Khel valley, with the Peshawar Brigade on the hills to their left would have been a feasible operation and of assistance to the Nowshera Brigade.



October 1st.

The Cavalry and Tanks covered the left flank of a reconnaissance towards Gumbata.

The enemy were encountered by patrols in considerable numbers in the Nushkal Khwar, but scattered when a sub-section of Tanks supported by a troop were sent against them and did not appreciably press our withdrawal later in the day.

October 3rd.

The Cavalry and Tanks covered the right flank of the Baluchis who were sent out to improve a track for Tanks from Nahakki to the North-east.

In spite of the presence of a Jirga in Wucha Jawar, the enemy opened fire at the Highland Light Infantry who were on the foot-hills to our left. This was the prelude to a long range fire fight right across our front, which increased when we began to withdraw.

Until the firing began, the tribesmen had been coming down from Darwazagai Ridge and lining the edge of the Nushkul Khwar in front of us, while our Trumpet major was exchanging calls with their Bugler on the Ridge. Within ten seconds of the opening shot however, there was not a soul to be seen!

This was the last occasion Peshawar Brigade were "in action" as an Armistice was agreed on at the Jirga.

Terms were finally settled on October 15th and troops began to return to their peace stations shortly afterwards.

THE GOLDEN AGE OF CAVALRY.

By MAJOR E. W. SHEPPARD, O.B.E., M.C.,
Royal Tank Corps.

WHATEVER future role the goddess of war may hold in her lap for the cavalry arm, she has reserved for it some magnificent pages in her record of the past. Most of us are more or less familiar with the more recent of these—the great deeds of Cromwell's Ironsides and Frederick's riders, of Napoleon's epic charges of horse at Marengo, Austerlitz and Borodino, the immortal story of the Light Brigade, Bredow's death ride at Vionville—to mention but a few. But before ever the earliest of these feats of arms came to emblazon the rolls of military history, there had been a long period of over a thousand years when the history of war was little but a long record of cavalry achievement—the great colourful epoch of the Middle Ages, to which many of us, and not soldiers only, look back as if with relief from the somewhat drab and sordid realities of the modern world. A brief account of the military methods and manners of those days may therefore fittingly find a place in these pages; the more so as, though there are a few lengthy and learned books on the subject, the period is one which the general run of military historians are overmuch inclined to skip over lightly, as comprising nothing beyond a purposeless and featureless "scuffling of kites and crows," quite unworthy of attention —a view which we believe, and hope to show, is very far from the truth.

The thousand years' heyday of cavalry may be said to have begun on a fateful day in the year 378, when a force of those Roman Legions, which for centuries had held the proud position of the finest military machine in the world, was overthrown

with appalling slaughter by the sudden onslaught of a force of Gothic heavy horse, which came hurtling in on its flank as it was engaged in a frontal attack on a hostile entrenched camp. The Emperor, all his chief officers, and forty thousand men slain, were the material fruits of this cavalry victory; but more important still were the resulting modifications in the military methods of Europe, which swiftly followed from this striking proof of the hitherto unsuspected or forgotten potency of heavily-armoured mounted men against even the sturdiest and best trained foot-soldiery. It was a lesson which the Romans themselves were not slow to take to heart; but the approaching collapse of their Imperial power, for reasons in the main other than military, gave them little opportunity of applying it before their empire was overwhelmed by a never-ceasing tide of successive barbarian invasions, which cast all Europe into that welter of political and social confusion known to history as the Dark Ages, and from which she began to emerge only with the coming to power of Charlemagne four hundred years later, in the middle of the eighth century. Following this came the raids of the Northmen and the Magyars, and the still fiercer onrush of the Moslems, which so gravely imperilled the whole of our civilisation, and at the same time exemplified still further the importance of the horseman under existing conditions of war. It is only in the middle of the eleventh century that we can see in full blossom the methods of war which history regards as essentially mediaeval, and which had as their basis the supremacy of armoured mounted soldiers, now becoming known as the knighthood or the chivalry.

Every military system, if it is to endure, must have its roots in the social institutions of its time; and in the early Middle Ages social conditions were all in favour of the cavalry arm. The great nobles who formed the ruling caste had as the basis of their power large landed possessions, which they held in return for service under arms. For so much land they had to produce so many armed men, either horsemen or foot soldiers, or both, in proportion to the size of their estates. As only the wealthiest and most powerful could afford the expensive equipment—mail coat, helmet and shield, sword, lance, and war horse

—necessary if they and their subordinates were to serve as mounted warriors, it followed that the feudal cavalry contained the best elements of the army and of society, and that only the inferior classes, who were unable to equip themselves with horses or expensive weapons, were to be found in the infantry. This of itself was a factor powerfully making for the superiority of the horseman, who found himself, when opposed to infantry, better armed than they, and with the moral superiority on his side that then inevitably went with better birth and breeding. In addition it must be remembered that the mediæval nobleman was trained constantly from his youth up to horse and arms, and was usually a better man physically and at his weapons than the foot soldier, who took up arms only when enrolled from time to time as part of the traditional national levy which every state had the right to call out in its defence at need. As in most mediaeval campaigns armies consisted for the most part of hurriedly summoned diverse elements, inadequately trained and disciplined, with little cohesion or mutual knowledge, the advantage was all with the mailed horseman, who had at least his individual skill at arms, weight, and speed on his side, as against the raw, slow-moving, ill-equipped foot soldiery. Thus it is easily to be understood that the annals of early mediaeval warfare contain some examples of successes of small bodies of cavalry over immensely superior masses of foot, which, if the disproportion of numbers only were taken into consideration, would appear to pass the limits of the credible.

Nevertheless a proportion of infantry was an essential part of every army, even in those days of accepted cavalry supremacy; they were required at least as hewers of wood and drawers of water, and also to play their part in the sieges of castles and fortified towns, which formed, to a far greater extent than battles in the open field, the most characteristic feature of mediaeval warfare. Since the infantry were required in any case, it began gradually to be realised by mediaeval commanders how valuable an auxiliary to the feudal cavalry they might be made if properly armed and trained and used; and the whole history of the warfare of the later Middle Ages

is the story of the gradual increase in the military value of infantry, until at length it became, first a valued and indispensible auxiliary to the mounted arm, then its rival, and finally its supplanter as the queen of the battlefield. At this triumphant goal, however, it arrived only by the aid of the new missile weapon, the firearm, which came into general use only at the very end of the mediaeval epoch of warfare, and indeed of the Middle Ages themselves, and this lies beyond the limits of the period with which we are dealing here.

The epoch when the art of mediaeval warfare was at its best may be roughly placed in the 13th century—the zenith of the Middle Ages in every respect, alike as regards its arts, its architecture, its philosophy and its social and political achievements. It is unhappily a period during which our own country suffered a temporary eclipse of importance in the eyes of Europe; the English Kings had lost their territories in France; the island was a prey to prolonged internal civil strife; and the conclusion of the period was devoted to a series of only partially successful attempts to enforce by arms the supremacy of England over the lesser realms of the British Isles. Hence the methods by which the Continent had perfected the art of war in these years remained without influence or counterpart in this country. England re-entered the European arena only in the middle of the succeeding century, then to make a contribution to the art which, startling and important as it was, was a departure rather than a derivation from hitherto accepted practice, and indeed marked the beginning of the end of the characteristically mediaeval war. It is to the Continental battlefields of the 13th century that we must go to see such war at its best.

Several causes had combined together to bring the art to the high state of perfection that it had then attained. From the tactics of Roman times, as seen through the medium of the classic textbook of Vegetius, the mediaeval commanders had deduced certain fundamental principles; the suitability of cavalry for the offensive role and of infantry for the defensive; the value of the parallel or linear order of battle; and the elementary formations proper to infantry. Hard on these lessons had come the many valuable ones taught to Western

European soldiers by their experiences in the Crusades. Upon these campaigns against a lightly armed, mobile, and handy enemy they had embarked with a powerful, well-armed, though somewhat ponderous and slow-moving cavalry, but with an infantry quite unfitted to play the role laid down for it by the Roman tradition, as described by Vegetius. They quickly modified their forces to suit the new conditions. The supply of heavy European war horses no longer being available, the Crusading cavalry had to mount itself more lightly and modify the weight of its armament and equipment accordingly; its fighting methods followed suit, and by the end of the 12th century the new cavalry of the armies of the Cross had as much mobility as solidity, and a vastly enhanced power of manoeuvre to compensate for its loss of weight in the charge. The methods taught by the school of warfare in the East of course quickly penetrated to Western Europe through the medium of returning Crusaders; and now it was not only the cavalry arm that found itself thus being impregnated with new ideas and a new efficiency. The value of a good solid infantry to serve as support, cover and stiffener for the horseman, had made itself even more evident; so much so that the later Crusading armies never took the field without such a contingent of foot; and the success or failure of their battles came to turn principally on whether the co-operation of the mounted and the dismounted arms had been closely observed or neglected. The theoretical lessons taught by Vegetius had thus received sanction and proof on the battlefields of the Holy Land; and the methods there perfected in the school of experience, transplanted into Europe, brought the art of mediaeval warfare to its highest pitch of perfection.

The cavalry still remained, and was to remain for another hundred years, the decisive arm, the queen of the battlefield. It comprised at this time two categories of personnel—the well-horsed and fully armed knights, the nobility, who formed the flower of the army, from the ranks of whom were drawn its chiefs and subordinate leaders, and who fought in the front rank in charge and the mêlée—and the lesser men, known as the *servientes* or serjeants, who made up the bulk of the

cavalry. These latter were drawn usually from the smaller landed tenants and were present in a high proportion to the number of knights—never less than three or four, sometimes as many as ten or even twenty, to one. At first every sergeant followed into battle the knight to whom he owed direct allegiance; and thus we get the typical formation of a mediaeval body of horse, a front rank entirely of knights, followed by a second of their personal squires (aspirants to knighthood), then a succession of ranks formed by the serjeants, all following their own knights in a sort of formation, making up a solid body of horse at a depth of not less than five and anything up to twelve or more ranks. Later, when the practice grew up by which the kings took money payments in exchange for personal service, and used the funds so obtained to raise and pay mercenary troops, the serjeant lost his personal contact with an individual knight as leader, and began to play an independent role until at last we come to the epoch when the professional soldier, the *condottiere*, makes up the bulk of the armies, and the knight becomes a leader and a commander only.

We have already seen that the demands of Eastern warfare had tended to lighten the horse and his load, and called for manoeuvring power and mobility to compensate for what had been lost in the form of weight and momentum. Armour was allowed only for a certain proportion of the cavalry, was made as light as possible, and was only donned just before an action; the remainder of the horsemen moved and fought as light cavalry, and some were armed with arbalests and cross-bows to add fire effect to shock tactics. This hardy, swift-moving cavalry was capable of charging in successive bodies, each one withdrawing to flank or rear after its effort to make way for the one following; of feigned retirements to lure an over-eager foe to break his formation by pursuit; of combined attack from different directions on a body of infantry massed in squares or clumps; of wheeling in line or column at speed; and of combining a frontal and flank attack on a moving or stationary adversary. The proof of its capacity for these various and complicated movements and manoeuvres is to be found in the military history of the period.

The progress made by infantry by this date had been perhaps even more marked than that of cavalry. The raw feudal levies had given place to solid, well trained, disciplined bodies of mercenary or civic bands, well armed with pike and cross-bow, capable of stubborn and prolonged resistance even to the fiercest charges of mailed cavalry and able to change formation from line to square, clump, or wedge, and back again at need, endowed with not inconsiderable fire power—a most valuable and indispensable element in any armed force of the time. The art of mediaeval generalship was to get the best results from the combination of these two powerful arms, the one the defensive pivot, the other the offensive lever; and very striking were some of the results thus obtained.

The epoch knew two principal types of battle order: the parallel order in which the army, divided into centre and two wings, was deployed in one or two lines in face of the enemy, with or without a second or third line as reserve; and the perpendicular or column, in which a succession of deployed bodies engaged one after the other, the remainder waiting their turn or rallying after their effort. The parallel order was that usually adopted where infantry formed the more numerous portion of the army; arrayed in front line behind their hedge of pikes, they afforded valuable support for their own cavalry, who could find safety and breathing space after their attacks behind the shelter of the foot soldiery. Each opposing commander would make his main effort either by the centre, so as to break in and burst asunder the hostile array, and so be in a position to turn with superior force on one or each in turn of the dissevered wings; or on one or both wings, so as to be able eventually to outflank or surround the enemy's centre. The decision fell to him whose troops were best arrayed and handled and fought best, inspired often by the commander himself, on whom it was incumbent to be soldier as well as general.

One of the most interesting examples of the employment of these tactics in afforded by the battle of Steppe in 1212. The forces of the warlike Bishop of Liege and of Henry of Brabant were drawn up facing each other in parallel order, infantry in the centre, cavalry on the wings. Henry decided to use his

Brabant infantry, one of the finest corps of their kind in the world, to break through the middle of the Bishop's lines; his adversary, allowing them to advance at leisure, pushed forward with his right, and compelled Henry to use his cavalry reserve on that flank; he then threw in his own reserve on the opposite wing, crushed his immediate adversaries, wheeled right round behind the Brabant infantry to take their left wing in rear, and disperse it, and finally returned to deliver an enveloping attack from three sides against the hitherto victorious hostile centre, which was completely broken up and destroyed with a loss of 7,000 killed and captured. The battle was in fact a repetition of Cannae on a smaller scale, though no one has yet raised the fame of the Bishop of Liege to a level with that of Hannibal, or given the name of Steppe to a system of war, after the manner of the German Von Schlieffen.

The columnar or perpendicular order on the other hand was pre-eminently suited to armies composed principally of cavalry. The various bodies normally delivered a series of successive attacks, but commanders soon learned the enhanced value to be derived from a combination of simultaneous frontal and flank attacks, particularly where the latter could be made by a concealed route and thus secure the added advantage of surprise. Some of the most remarkable victories of the Middle Ages were gained by the skilful use of these methods, among the most astonishing, yet the least known, being that of Muret, fought in the year 1213 between the forces of the Albigensian Crusaders under Simon de Montfort and the combined armies of Raymond of Toulouse and King Pedro of Aragon.

The Spanish and Toulousan forces, numbering in all some 4,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry, were besieging Muret, which de Montfort, who had available only some 1,000 mounted and 700 dismounted men, had hurried up to relieve. The besiegers, hoping to capture him and his forces with the town, sent forward one body to assault and storm the walls, keeping the rest of their cavalry, divided into two bodies, well back and with a wide distance between them, in the plain to the north, and the remainder of their infantry in their camp to the north-east. De Montfort threw open the north gate of the town, allowing

part of the storming column to penetrate into the streets where they got entangled, and were checked by his infantry; meanwhile he led out his cavalry from the west gate and wheeled them about round the back of the town as if to commence a retreat. But instead of actually doing so, he came up unperceived by the enemy on the east side, hurled his two foremost lines of cavalry at them, rode them down, and passing straight through charged the first of the two hostile cavalry masses. A fierce melée ensued, during the course of which de Montfort, leading forward in person his third line, swung wide out to the east and south, came in on the rear of the hotly engaged enemy and completely defeated them. The remaining cavalry corps drew off without venturing to strike a blow. The infantry who, believing the battle won, had left the shelter of their camp and gone forward to plunder the town, were then attacked in rear by the triumphant Crusaders; they put up a poor resistance, and were dispersed with great slaughter. De Montfort, who admittedly owed much to his adversaries' faulty dispositions, had deserved his amazing success by his brilliant *coup d'oeil*, leadership and readiness to seize a fleeting opportunity.

The best of the mediaeval generals also understood well how to make the best use of ground. Mountainous country, where movement was possible only to long columns on a narrow front, afforded them opportunities such as that so skilfully manufactured and taken by John of Ibelin at Agridi, in 1232. An Imperialist army was covering the siege of a mountain castle, which Ibelin was endeavouring to relieve. He pressed up the pass to front his enemy, then withdrew back towards the plain, meantime sending a detachment round by another path to lie in ambush above the road. As soon as the Imperial vanguard following him up had gone by, the detachment came down and blocked the road between it and the main body. By the time the detachment had been driven off, the isolated vanguard, attacked by superior numbers, had been destroyed and the main body hurrying up to rescue it, suffered a like fate. Equally well thought out, and successful, was the method by which St. Louis, by means of feints on a wide front, and a sudden massed attack

on the ford of Taillebourg, drove the English from the line of the Charente in 1242. Ablest and most noteworthy of all perhaps was the device employed by Charles of Anjou in 1270 at the action of Carthage. He had his left, the enemy their right, on the cliffs along the sea coast; he moved out as if to attack them, and then, feigning a retreat, pivoted rearward on his right, until he had drawn the enemy forward into a position with their backs to the cliffs, then a right about and vigorous charge broke them and hurled them over the edge to death and ruin, so that hardly a man escaped.

Well understood too, and generally practised, was the suitable handling of a reserve, on which the result of many a hard fought battle finally turned. The commander who could induce his adversary to use his reserve prematurely, or wrongly, as did the Bishop of Liege at Steppe, could usually assure himself of victory, provided he did not, like the Allies at Muret, delay employing his own till the day was too far gone to be retrieved. Even however, when all seemed lost, the vigorous attack of fresh troops might still retrieve the day, as was shown by the same Charles of Anjou at Tagliacozzo, where, after the Imperialists had utterly destroyed his first two divisions, he fell on them with his reserve as they were in the act of rallying, and as at Marengo, turned a battle lost into a battle won.

Enough has perhaps been said to show the really high level at which the art of war stood in the 13th century at the zenith of the Middle Ages. It was based, as we have seen, on the skilful combination of the offensive with the defensive arm; on the speed and manoeuvring power of cavalry and the steadiness of the infantry. But in a few years' time, cavalry began slowly to lose its value as an offensive arm, and the defensive strength of infantry to increase beyond measure. This was due principally to an increase in infantry fire power, due to improved missile weapons—the long bow in the hands of the English, the cannon and hand gun as adopted by Continental armies.

The first effect of this increase of infantry fire power was to cause the mounted knight to seek protection against it by armouring himself more completely, in the plate armour which at the

beginning of the 14th century was just coming into fashion. But this in turn necessitated a heavier horse to carry the increased weight—a horse no longer able even to move at a gallop, still less to turn and wheel swiftly; bodies of cavalry thus lost their power of manoeuvre and became mere ponderous projectiles which could only be hurled head on against a halted enemy. Moreover, if the rider had become more or less invulnerable, his mount had not; the latter could not be completely protected by horse-armour and the attempt to do so even partially tended still more to increase the growing clumsiness and slowness of cavalry. The knight's horse thus became the target both for the sword and lance thrusts of his adversary in a mounted *melée* and for the pikes and arrows of infantry in an attack on the latter; Crecy proved once for all that a charge of heavy cavalry could no longer get home against infantry in position armed with the long bow. The device was therefore tried of dismounting the knighthood and making them attack on foot; but their heavy armour so hampered their movements that they proved physically unequal, even when they had closed, to a hand to hand encounter with more lightly equipped adversaries, as was shown at Poitiers, and fifty years later, when the same tactics were tried again, at Agincourt. None the less, the French, after a series of unsuccessful experiments, evolved methods of dealing satisfactorily with the problem. An enemy, armed with the long bow, was formidable only if one accommodated him, first of all, by allowing him ample time to select and prepare a defensive position, and then by attacking him frontally. The English gains from their victories at Crecy and Poitiers were wrested from them by Bertrand du Guesclin and his colleagues, by the simple expedient of refraining from such costly and hopeless attacks, and resorting to skilful guerilla tactics, a war of posts and surprises, which by slow degrees, and by methods which according to the standards of the day were unheroic and almost unchivalrous, got back all that had been lost, and freed French soil of the enemy. The other method was that so well employed by Joan of Arc at Patay—to keep closely in touch with the enemy, conceal one's own movements, and overwhelm him by a sudden surprise on-

slaught before he had time to settle into a strong defensive position. But it was in fact a newer weapon even than the long bow, the cannon, which eventually proved the true counter to it; by shattering the archers arrayed in line for defence, and exposing them to an attack and defeat by waiting cavalry, as at Formigny; or by neutralizing their fire, and then shattering to pieces the columns of men at arms attacking without proper fire support, as at Castillon.

At the same time another people whose military reputation had hitherto been of little account made their mark in the development of the art of war. The Swiss, with their hardiness, mobility, and strict discipline, revived once more the tactics of the phalanx of Alexander the Great; their chief weapon the twenty-foot long pike made them equally formidable in hand to hand fighting on foot. In combat they proved themselves more than a match for the famous chivalry of Austria and of Burgundy; and in a few short years of victorious warfare in their native mountains won for themselves a somewhat exaggerated reputation as the first soldiery of their day. Swiss mercenary troops fought for pay in every army in Europe; but their era of invincibility was actually short-lived, for in their densely packed formations the new cannon and hand gun found all too easy a target. Both the Swiss pikemen and the English archer represented in fact interludes in the development of the art of war, the next stage of which was set for "villainous saltpetre," and foreshadowed in the elementary cannon, said on somewhat dubious authority to have made its first appearance in Europe contemporaneously with the long bow, on the field of Crecy.

The long thousand years of the golden age of cavalry had then come to an end, and were to be succeeded by two hundred of comparative eclipse, until Gustavus Adolphus and Cromwell came to call the arm back to those first principles, in which, in the Middle Ages as in later times, was to be found the secret of cavalry victory. The great cavalry leaders of the Middle Ages, such as Richard I, de Montfort, Charles of Anjou, and the rest, for the telling of whose deeds no space could be found here,

followed out the same principles as those laid down since their day, in a thousand training manuals in every tongue, for the government of the mounted action of cavalry. Individual skill at arms and horsemanship, the European chivalry of the Middle Ages could always bring to the field; but control by the commander, discipline, speed, handiness, manœuvre and surprise were also achieved, not without considerable difficulty arising from the military and social conditions of the time, by these great soldiers whose deeds bear witness to their talents. The mediaeval cavalry at its best was as formidable a mounted arm as any known to history; when it found leaders who knew well how to make use of its fine qualities, it achieved great results, which helped to save Europe from the manifold alien perils which beat upon her from within and without, and to fashion civilization as we know it today.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY OF FRENCH CONSULATE AND EMPIRE.

By THISTLE.

WHILE Napoleon was only a Republican General his influence on French Cavalry organisation was restricted to such small bodies as were included in the armies placed under his command by the Government.

In the first Italian Campaign cavalry played a minor role. In Egypt at first the cavalry was too weak to play an important part in the fighting. As it gradually improved it became more formidable in action, and at Aboukir it was largely responsible for the decisive character of the victory.

When the General became First Consul he initiated a new organisation. The cavalry with infantry formations was reduced to the minimum light cavalry necessary for their security, and all the available horse was allotted to what was termed the "Reserve Cavalry." Napoleon did not invent this name, it had been commonly used before. He, however, gave a new conception to the duties of the body of cavalry designated by this term. In his armies the "reserve cavalry" was an important portion of the striking force of the Army. It was employed as the Commander-in-Chief considered best; and was formed in a cavalry division or corps which was directly under his orders.

Even when he, as Ruler of France, entered Italy on his Second Italian Campaign, he had not control of the best or strongest army of the French Republic. He had to be satisfied with one organised from remnants left in garrison after an army under Moreau had been formed to operate in Germany. The best of the French Cavalry went to Germany with Moreau.

Napoleon at that time had not even achieved the reputation of being the best General of the Republic, Moreau still had the greater fame. Napoleon apparently had originally intended to assume supreme command of the French forces; but, apart from the constitution forbidding the First Consul to command an army, Moreau was so full of pride that he refused to serve under Napoleon's orders. The latter, at that time not being yet sufficiently well established to quarrel with the most popular general of the Republic, gave up temporarily the project of exercising supreme command, and contented himself with controlling operations in the secondary theatre of Italy. To evade the provisions of the Constitution the Army of Italy was placed under the nominal command of Berthier, his Chief of Staff.

The cavalry of the Army of Italy was composed of four brigades, commanded by Champeaux (killed), Rivaud (later an infantry General-of-Division), Dubigneau and Kellerman (later a cavalry corps commander). These formed a division of some six thousand sabres under Murat. Each brigade had two horse artillery guns attached to it.

This cavalry division was not employed in battle as a tactical unit. Charges such as Kellerman's were made by brigades. Perhaps Murat himself knew that he, as yet, had insufficient experience to handle effectively a cavalry division in battle; or perhaps it was realised that the individual training of the French cavalry of that time was still of too low a standard to allow of its manoeuvre in a divisional mass. Probably it was a combination of several reasons. The cavalry was, however, organised as a division and was termed the "Reserve Cavalry." From now on Napoleon reserved the main cavalry mass for his own direct orders.

Napoleon, as First Consul, was at first largely dependent on his popularity with the Army for the security of his rule. He probably realised the indifferent training of the cavalry, but drastic changes are never popular in military organisations; they were particularly unlikely to be accepted placidly in an army like that of Republican France, which was so impregnated with the prejudices of the Revolution. Slight changes in

organisation and training were made gradually. After Austerlitz, when, as Emperor, with his authority consolidated, the constant wars in which he was engaged gave him little opportunity of retraining the cavalry. So until the end of his reign the French cavalry lacked discipline and harmony in mass movements.

At the beginning of the Consular régime there were in the French Army some eighty-four cavalry regiments. The light cavalry regiments numbered about thirty-five, the heavy cavalry twenty-five, and the remainder were dragoons. Napoleon, in his reorganisation, appears to have slightly reduced the number of regiments of heavy and light cavalry, and to have increased the strength of the dragoons; but the total number of regiments in 1805 shews a decrease on the former total. Probably during the reorganisation Napoleon weeded out those regiments which were known to favour his rival Moreau.

From 1805 on, additions were made in the form of ten regiments of light cavalry and two of heavy. The cavalry of the newly organised Imperial Guard continued to grow in numbers, and a new variety of medium cavalry, denominated Lancers, was organised. Napoleon re-raised Cuirassiers in addition to Lancers, evidently agreeing with Marshal Saxe that armour was of some importance, and that the lance was a deadly weapon.

It is believed that Napoleon's underlying reason for providing armour for the heavy cavalry was that he considered it necessary to give them protection from fire during their slow charge. The French heavy cavalry did not pretend to be either mobile or fast moving. Its pace, at the charge, was only a fast trot. It would have required years and years of training to have made the clumsy heavy horses of the Cuirassiers controllable at any faster pace. The advantage of protection from bullets, etc., was rediscovered in the Great War, and all nations put soldiers into steel helmets; there were many who favoured the introduction of the "breast and back pieces" on a pattern designed by Hiram Maxim which is said to give considerable protection even against modern firearms.

Napoleon's cavalry reached its greatest strength at the time of the Russian campaign, but then it included many non-French elements.

Moreau in his Campaign of 1800, had been directed to introduce the plan of combining several "divisions of all arms" into temporary corps. These were then termed the "Right Wing," the "'Left Wing," the "Centre," and the "Reserve." Jomini states that this innovation was brought about by the direct orders of Napoleon himself, shortly after he had become First Consul. Napoleon later further elaborated this idea, and took advantage of the interval of peace, between his second Italian Campaign and the Campaign of Austerlitz, to re-model the higher organisation of the whole French Army. The size of his armies so exceeded any employed in Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, that drastic improvements in military organisation and administration had to be introduced as a matter of necessity.

During the period prior to Austerlitz the main field army was assembled for regular training in the "Ocean Camps of exercise," nominally preparing for the invasion of England. This type of collective training was an innovation in itself, and one is tempted to believe that the invasion of England was perhaps a blind to prevent complaints about the introduction of training camps, which must have seemed a novel idea to the soldiers of the day. There is no doubt, however, that the interval between the conclusion of peace of 1802, and the opening of Austerlitz Campaign, was used to the best advantage by the French Cavalry. In 1805, it had attained a higher standard of efficiency than in former years.

He replaced the system of "divisions of all arms" by that of "army corps." Each Army Corps contained several infantry divisions, and was commanded by an experienced marshal or general to whom was delegated authority, to an extent never previously contemplated. In fact each army corps was a miniature army in itself. Cavalry was withdrawn from the establishment of divisions, but one or more brigades of light cavalry were put at the disposal of the corps commanders. This cavalry was, however, only attached to the army corps; it did not form an integral part of it. The number of cavalry

brigades or divisions attached to a corps varied according to the task that the Emperor had given to the corps commander.

The cavalry of the Imperial Army was divided into: the cavalry of the army corps, which was light cavalry, and the "reserve cavalry" which was composed of both heavy and light. The latter, in some ways, was what is now termed a mobile reserve. It was under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This was generally the Emperor, who from the time of the establishment of the Empire, commanded his main field army in person.

This terminology of "reserve cavalry" has given rise to continual misunderstandings. Many imitators of Napoleon have not only organised "reserve cavalry" formations, but have also insisted on making them live up to their name by remaining in reserve. The Emperor meant this term to denote those cavalry formations which were reserved for the use of the General-in-Chief. The "reserve cavalry" was employed during a campaign, as the situation for the time being demanded; either covering the front or the flanks, carrying out a special role, or remaining in readiness to carry out any task required by the Emperor.

The real cavalry reserve of the army was the cavalry of the Imperial Guard. This was kept in reserve for shock action, and was only used by the Emperor in battle or exceptional occasions, such as Austerlitz.

There was no hard and fast division however between the cavalry of the army corps and the "reserve cavalry." The Emperor allotted to each army corps commander such cavalry as he thought the corps required for the task allotted to it; subsequently he increased or reduced this number as he considered circumstances demanded. As a result there was no uniformity in the strength of the cavalry attached to the army corps; one corps might contain a great number, and another very few.

The heavy, light and medium cavalry of Napoleon's army were organised in brigades of these categories. In fact the heavy, light and medium cavalry were treated as almost separate branches; and officers were not usually transferred from one category to another. Napoleon, himself, actually issued orders

that transfers should not ordinarily be carried out. The "reserve cavalry" was usually made up of all three categories.

For tactical and administrative purposes the cavalry was further organised in cavalry divisions; here again the categories were kept distinct. Some of the light cavalry was detailed as army corps cavalry, and the rest were allotted to the "reserve cavalry." At first this consisted of one cavalry corps; but later, as the army grew, other cavalry corps were formed. At the beginning of the disastrous campaign in Russia, four cavalry corps formed part of the army.

In the Ulm campaign the "reserve cavalry" under Murat consisted of four divisions of heavy cavalry, four divisions of dragoons and six horse artillery batteries. However, at the beginning of the campaign some of the dragoons were without horses. The strength of the "reserve cavalry" was about twenty-two thousand sabres; besides this there were also some eighteen thousand light cavalry allotted to the army corps. Later on in this campaign, the reserve cavalry was reinforced by two brigades of light cavalry taken away from the army corps.

In the Jena Campaign the total cavalry strength was sixty-five thousand. Of these the reserve cavalry had grown to about twenty-eight thousand, the increase being due to two brigades of light cavalry (Milhaud's and Lasalle's) transferred to the reserve cavalry. During the subsequent winter campaign in Poland the cavalry with the army corps was increased at the expense of the reserve cavalry.

After Tilsit, the War in Spain caused a drain on the cavalry; Murat was employed there, and in 1809, we find the reserve cavalry (now under Bessiers), had sunk to nine thousand, while the strength of cavalry with the army corps was only slightly over twenty thousand.

These instances are in conformity with the previously mentioned principle, the Emperor allotted the cavalry to the various roles as he considered the situation demanded.

In the Russian Campaign of 1812, Murat rejoined the Grand Army, and the reserve cavalry now consisted of about two hundred and twenty-four squadrons (the exact figure seems to be uncertain). It was organised in four cavalry corps; one

of about sixty squadrons commanded by Nansouty, another of sixty squadrons commanded by Montburn, Grouchy had also about sixty squadrons, and Latour Maubourg had about forty-four. Murat was the chief cavalry commander controlling the operations sometimes of two corps, and sometimes of three. The cavalry with the army corps consisted of ten divisions and an odd brigade. Colonel Maude in "Cavalry: its Past and Future," says five hundred and twenty-six squadrons in all were available to accompany the Grand Army to Russia; apparently, however, all did not go.

After the disasters of the Russian Campaign the reserve cavalry, (now consisting of three cavalry corps) was again brought up to a strength of between twenty and twenty-two thousand; but the strength of the cavalry with the army corps was very substantially reduced. The efficiency of the units had now deteriorated to such a very low standard that the value of the cavalry became greatly reduced. The command of the reserve cavalry was now given to Grouchy and he proved a most capable leader at Vauchamps and Craonne. If he had been placed in command of the cavalry at Waterloo, things might have turned out differently.

At the time of Waterloo the reserve cavalry was organised in four corps, although it was only about eleven thousand strong. Including the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, which numbered about three thousand six hundred, there was also cavalry of a strength about ten thousand distributed amongst the army corps.

CAVALRY IN INDIA IN 1804

THE cavalry and mounted troops in India in 1804 may be subdivided as under:—

The King's Regiments of Light Dragoons.
The Company's Horse Artillery, which was confined to Bengal—the present "F" Battery, R.H.A.
The Company's regular native cavalry.
The irregular horse, permanently embodied.
The irregular horse engaged for the war.

In describing the Company's troops we are prone to picture the Indian Army much as it is now, with no inter-Presidential feeling, and not as it was, with this feeling so intense at times that the troops of the different Presidencies might turn out and fight each other on very small provocation. The Armies were distinct formations, with numerous divergent regulations and conditions of service and differing from each other in racial composition absolutely. The sole binding factor was the British officer, and even among these there was often much jealousy, the troops of the Bombay Presidency, for instance, not getting a fair deal from a Bengal officer or *vice versa*. The Board of Control at Leadenhall Street certainly exercised a general control, and in major matters the organisation was similar, but in detail, the armies were very distinct.

The chief obstacle to the formation of regular cavalry in India had always been the remount factor, especially when it came to mounting British dragoons. It was a matter of the greatest difficulty to obtain animals of even fourteen hands of any stamina, and the vast majority were 13.3 at the best. Nearly the whole of these, moreover, had undergone the super-economic modes of feeding usual with natives, namely, starva-

tion when fodder was scarce, and gorging with green stuff when it was plentiful. Grain feeding had been negligible. Animals were worked long before they were fit for it and a great heavy man would think nothing of riding a three year old continually. In addition, nearly the whole had undergone a course of cruelty and were vicious to a degree. The whole being stallions, for mares were only to be found in the irregular horse and the custom of gelding troop horses did not come in until 1816, close order drill was complicated by the prospect of animals fighting. In the Horse Artillery the animals were not only muzzled, but were blinkered as well. In addition, it would appear that syces were usually at hand to hold the brutes when the battery came into action. In the Bengal Horse Artillery it was customary for the gunners to ride the off horses, but this practice did not apply either to the Madras or Bombay Horse Artillery, which worked on the same principle as the Royal, with the gunners on outriders.

The savagery of the horses was not conducive to their riders becoming friendly with them, and the British soldier, an indifferent horsemaster at the best of times, in general regarded his horse as his enemy rather than as a friend.

The Madras Army was the better off, for the Kathiawar and Gulf markets produced quieter and better animals than Bengal, which Thorn, of the 29th, describes as " a savage Jungal Tawsi breed." In a big stampede which occurred he tells us that many people were killed merely by the animals savaging them. It was owing to the difficulty in obtaining suitable horses that the Company's artillery was for so long bullock drawn only, and, in the Pindari War of 1817 the superiority of bullocks over horses was so marked that the provision of horses was delayed for some years. Lake, however, was so impressed with the value of the galloper guns and the Horse Battery that he sanctioned an expenditure of Rs. 1,100 per horse for the purchase of suitable animals.

The Madras Army had started a stud farm in 1800, and the Bengal Army followed suit with one at Pusa, but the output of remounts for the Mahratta War cannot have been great. The

animals, in consequence, had been purchased in the open market.

The Light-Dragoons

There were in India, in 1803, five regiments of Light Dragoons the 8th, 19th, 25th, 27th and 29th. The four last named had been raised specially for service in the East Indies, but were, none the less, King's troops, and not those of the Company. They differed, therefore, from the "Dumpies" raised just after the Mutiny, and the present 19th (15th/19th) has no real connection with the old "Terrors of the East." The Dumpies were Company's troops and comprised the scum of England. The 19th had come to India in 1781, and was then numbered the 23rd. Fortescue confounds this with the 23rd of the Talavera campaign. The 25th, 27th and 29th had arrived in India in 1794, and all four, so far from being composed of scum and street sweepings, had been made up in the main from drafts from regiments in England. While a proportion of the men may have been characters Corps wished to unload, the majority were the pick of the regiments, men out for adventure and sick of the police work which was the normal lot of the cavalry at home.

The cavalry officers in India were men, for the most part, who had but small private means and took soldiering seriously. We know, for instance, that Floyd and Rollo Gillespie were poor men, and both were cavalry soldiers of the first water.

The 19th had a brilliant record, and such was its fame in Southern India that many of the local Rajas came specially to see it. Upon its system of training, as enforced by Floyd, the whole training of the Madras and Bombay regular cavalry was based. Its instructors had even gone to Bengal. It was the first cavalry unit in India to import the practice of riding home sabre in hand in accordance with Marlborough's precept at Blenheim, and has the honour of being the only corps ever referred to in native literature. One Pandurang Hari, a Mahratta officer, thus describes it in a charge at Assaye: "At Assaye we fought a renowned British general. We charged and cut up a regiment of gora log (the 74th) when we were charged in our turn by the English cavalry. These (the 19th) are large powerful

men, mounted on big horses, veritable war tigers. They knocked us down by merely riding against us. I fell among the rest and only escaped by feigning death." Its last service in India was the suppression of the mutiny at Vellore in 1807, when, headed by Rollo Gillespie, it acted in full accordance with its traditions. Although in England during the Peninsular War, it proceeded to Canada and took part in the bloody fighting with the Americans, being finally disbanded in 1822.

The 25th, 27th and 29th (later the 22nd, 24th and 25th) were good regiments but had seen little or no service when the Mahratta War broke out.

The 8th had, from the moment they joined the Grand Army in October, 1803, been gravely handicapped by "having done but little in the riding way." The regiment had come from the Cape and had spent over six months either on board ship or on boats coming up the Ganges. To attempt mounting the men on savage stallions, therefore, would have been absurd. Fortunately, that milch cow of the Company, the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, had a number of ancient animals grandiloquently termed "white Arabs," so worn out that the "gora log" could ride them in reasonable safety. Shortly after receiving them the regiment was heavily engaged at Laswari, and the horse casualties had been very severe, with the upshot that the 8th had contributed nearly as many men to the Dismounted Dragoons as the 27th and 29th combined. It is not likely that the unfortunate regiment had very much chance to get its men worked up in riding by the time the Grand Army reassembled the following September.

The dragoon in general was an abominable horsemaster, and a very drunken creature into the bargain. Waited upon, hand and foot, it is probable that he both knew and cared less for his mount than his confrere at home. We know that the Irish nobleman of the Bengal Horse Artillery (the royal descent of these heroes is indicated by the constant recurrence of such names as O'Hagerty, Hannagan and Doolan in the records of that famous corps) need hardly have dusted his boots prior to mounting his horse, for an obsequious syce would oblige by bringing the beast round to the barrack plinth, while a second

grovelling servitor would proffer his lordship his matutinal noggin of arrack to sustain him in his day's labours.

There was one factor, however, which would have made the most feckless of dragoons with the Grand Army in late 1804 very careful of his mount, and that was the recollection of the terrible hot weather marches which had only terminated four months before, with the men dropping from heat stroke and other attendant horrors. The Dismounted Dragoons had contributed enormously to the casualties.

The whole training of the cavalry was Frederican, and directed to the shock of battle only. Reconnaissance, even very local reconnaissance, was hardly considered, and dismounted work was contemned as being the function of the mud crunching infantry. "Jack boot" prejudice ordained that the cavalry soldier was capable of fighting on horseback in terrain varying from the highest Alps to the densest forest of Borneo.

Within these narrow limits, however, the dragoons in India excelled the finest cavalry in Europe, and were immeasurably superior to the British Cavalry at home, where regiments were strewn about the country in troops, short of horses and with little or no terrain over which to work. Above all, officers in India, without question, took a good deal of interest in soldiering, for the shadow of war was ever present. The cavalry in India, in addition, were not cursed with the presence of Regency Bucks, who were the very bane of the service at home. This is accounted for by the simple fact that service in India until long after the Mutiny, meant prolonged banishment from England, an ordeal of course no Buck could endure.

The native regular cavalry—all termed "Light Cavalry" a few years later—were far more "dragooned" than the regiments of the present day. Thackeray's Colonel Newcome, it will be remembered, was a colonel of "black dragoons." The system of training, and, it would seem, to a great extent of disciplining also, was rigid to a degree, and was facilitated by the presence in each regiment of a British sergeant major, a quartermaster sergeant and two sergeants. Later on there was a riding master as well, while the proportion of British officers was as high as

three per squadron. In Lake's day, moreover, this high establishment of British officers had not been depleted by officers being taken away for outside jobs. The men, in 1804, had not yet adopted those absurd travesties of European kits, which were to make the native cavalry the butt of so many a few years later—the short light blue dragoon jacket, leather breeches, shako and, still more ridiculous, leather gloves. It is significant that Arthur Wellesley, in advising on the kits for the Bombay Cavalry just being raised, states, "Let them wear the red jacket, cut in the Hindustani pattern," and there is every reason to suppose that the Madras and Bengal Cavalry were thus clad.

The Madras Cavalry, having been regularised and in close association with the 19th Dragoons for over twenty years, and having seen much service, were, without question, more efficient than the Bengal.

The conduct of the 4th Madras Cavalry, in close conjunction with the 19th, at Assaye, had been brilliant in the extreme, for the gunfire experienced that day had never had its like in India, and it may be doubted whether it was even equalled in the Sikh wars.

The Bengal regular native cavalry were comparatively new formations. The 1st and 2nd had been converted from irregulars in 1796 and were decidedly none the better for this irregular tradition. As irregulars, incidentally, they had seen a great deal of service. The 3rd and 4th had been raised in 1796, on a regular basis, free from the irregular taint, and were evidently good regiments. We hear much of the 3rd in later years and it was reckoned the crack corps of the Bengal cavalry right up till that fatal day of May, 1857, when it started the ball rolling at Meerut.

None of the six Bengal regiments had seen any service to speak of before 1803, and there is some doubt whether they had had the advantage of close association with the 27th and 29th Dragoons much before Lake's Camp of Exercise at Kanouj early that year, though we know that the internal regimental routine of the 3rd was carried out on very "regular" lines, with British orderly officers at evening stables and "riding drill."

The racial composition of both the Madras and the Bengal comprised Mussulmans in the main—and the Deccani Mussulman is as good a man as the Hindustani.

In the Bengal Army, where even in 1804 there was much pandering to caste, the recruitment of Hindus as cavalry soldiers was limited, though certain regiments had them. In the newly raised troop of Bombay cavalry, on the other hand, the bulk of the men were Mahrattas. An order had appeared, it is worthy of note, that if men of the Madras cavalry objected to grooming their horses they were to have their pay cut to provide syces, and, after 1792, no men were to be recruited unless they undertook the duty. The percentage of syces allowed was, none the less, extremely high, being one to three horses. If native cavalry were allowed this number, what, we may ask, was the percentage allowed for his majesty the dragoon? Small wonder that the reckoning of camp followers for a dragoon regiment with the Bengal Army was as high as 5,000.

In comparing the old regular native cavalry with that of the present day it should be noted that there was no class squadron recruitment. The Rajput stood, cheek by jowl, with the Jat and the Mussulman, with the result that, when the upheaval of the Mutiny took place the unfortunate sepoy who wished to remain loyal had no sheltering body to which he could rally. How many of us Indian Army officers have not blessed the present system in times of doubt?

In 1803, there was, in the whole of India, only one corps of irregular horse permanently embodied. This was Frith's Hindustani Horse, stationed in Rohilkand. In contradistinction to post Mutiny days, this limited number of irregulars is worth noting. Our great great grandfathers had had much experience in war, and had found that irregulars were useless when it came to serious business. Cornwallis even stated that "he would rather fight them than pay them." Cavalry work in the Mutiny amounted only to bush whacking and attacking mutineers and badly armed rebels who could be routed by any stout hearted collection of mounted men. To suppose that even the more famous of irregular corps who made their name in the Mutiny

would have stood up to a severe general action is to venture on improbabilities. John Jacob, commanding a crops disciplined far above the average, was by no means too certain of the attitude of his men even under the excessively mild Baluch gunfire of Meanee.

Frith's corps would be reckoned as one far above the average, for included therein was the Bodyguard of the great de Boigne, an exceedingly well mounted and equipped body, dressed in smart light blue kit. The great efficiency of this Bodyguard persuaded the authorities to allow it to remain irregular when other corps were being regularised into the 1st and 2nd Native Cavalry. One Twining, who saw the regiment when under de Boigne, tells us it was mounted on Persian, Turki and Tazi horses, all much above the run of animals.

de Boigne sold it to the Company for three and a half lakhs, for a Bodyguard was recognised as being personal property of these adventurers. No adventurer, indeed, could reckon himself safe unless he had certain henchmen as his personal guard.

Frith's corps had been sent down to reinforce Monson on his retreat. In accordance with the traditions of these irregulars, however, the moment things became nasty it either dispersed or went over to Holkar. There is no reason to suppose that either Skinner's or Hearsay's corps, in like circumstances, would have proved any more staunch.

Irregular corps raised during a war, like Skinners, were merely a collection of men riding quadrupeds of sorts, camels included. The animals were personal property and formed the chief stock in trade. If a man lost his horse he lost his job until he could find another. This, and the fact that in irregular corps there was no provision for maimed or invalided men, made irregulars extremely reluctant to engage in any actions involving risk either to man or horse. In this connection, however, the wise and astute Hyder Ali of Mysore had, many years before, arranged for compensation for troopers of the Mysore irregular horse, and this custom was handed down until after 1817. For this reason the Mysore horse were far above the normal run of such corps. The personnel in irregular horse, as a general rule, was good enough, and was

reckoned as being of better class than that of regular native cavalry in a social sense. In a fighting sense the matter may be queried.

None the less, the fact must be recognised that natives of the better-to-do type have an extreme objection to serving under and in close contact with Europeans they do not deem to be "sahibs," and, in many of the old regular native cavalry regiments the British sergeants were evidently very rough, given to low abuse and undue use of the rattan, just as though they were dealing with the dragoon, who was, of course, accustomed to them. The attraction for service in the irregular horse, in contradistinction to the regular cavalry, lay chiefly in the fact that there was more scope for loot in time of war, while in peace, the man could make money by keeping his horse on the minimum of grain compatible with its appearance. He could mooch and slouch about in whatever kit suited himself best provided it came within the very easy limits laid down for irregular corps. He did no work, or next to no work, and we even have the suggestion put forward that the class of man recruited in the regular cavalry would be improved by limiting even the very limited number of parades in which the regiments of the day indulged. The name of the irregular corps, taken as a whole, rested on the skill at arms of a few fancy men who could advertise the unit by tent-pegging or some equestrian feat, but it is perfectly obvious, from a study of the literature of the day, that the proximity of irregular horse was not appreciated by folk in general.

There was no love lost between regular cavalry and irregulars and one or two regrettable incidents in the regular cavalry were promptly seized upon as indications that irregulars were superior.

The first was at Kotah, in 1821, when two squadrons of 4th Bengal Light Cavalry reined in, with the result that the commanding officer, Ridge, was killed. Ridge, curiously enough, had evidently been a pleasant and popular enough officer in his youth and had been all through Lake's great actions. He is constantly referred to in Pester's journal as a sportsman. In the court of enquiry, however, he was shown as being exceedingly

unpopular with the native rank and file as a "barnchute banaouer"—an officer of violent temper given to low abuse. The 4th was then reckoned a good regiment, and the affair is worthy of note. We, personally, can recall four instances when native troops deliberately let down officers they did not like.

A second occurrence was in Afghanistan in 1840, when two squadrons of the 2nd did the same thing. It was a most disgraceful affair and we have the picture of the British sergeants, riding serrefile, striking the men with the flats of their swords to get them to face the miserable crowd opposed to them. The whole of the 2nd, very properly, were "broke." It had never been a corps of much repute. The protagonists for "irregulars," as we have seen, made much of these affairs, but the question is, would irregulars, with unpopular British officers, have done any better? Emphatically not, for the officers might have already been murdered by their own men.

As against one regrettable incident in which regular native cavalry were involved, it is possible to bring forward almost innumerable instances where irregulars were—and our great great grandfathers knew it. Between the years 1783 and the end of the Sikh wars there was hardly a major action fought in which these old regular native cavalry did not play a very honorable part, sometimes in conjunction with British cavalry, but more often by themselves. In this connection, however, it is important to remember that, when a British regiment was present, it was always given the post of honour, and got nearly all the glory. The fighting did not occur frequently enough to allow the present day custom of giving each corps, British or native, its chance in turn. The Bengal regular cavalry, it must be confessed, lost much of its good name in the Sikh wars, where all the Bengal troops fought erratically, but the Bombay regular cavalry, on the other hand, remained excellent, and it was to their intense disgust that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry were irregularised during the craze for everything irregular which followed the Mutiny.

It is as well to remember that the Indian cavalry who made their name in the Great War had completely thrown off the

irregular cult. By 1916 the regiments in France were every whit as regular as any dragoon, and many of us who served in pre-war days, know quite well, in our heart of hearts, that the service, when war broke out, was far from being equal to any great or prolonged strain.

A final taunt hurled at the old regular native cavalry was that irregulars remained staunch in the Mutiny while the regulars mutinied. No statement is farther from the truth. Of the twenty irregular corps of the Bengal line no fewer than fourteen mutinied. Of the balance, only two corps, including Skinners, which had a racial composition identical with the mutineers, remained staunch. The remaining four were recruited from Sikhs and Punjabis who had nothing in common with them.

The violent "jack boot" prejudice to which we have referred had no very ill effects in fighting in Europe, where all cavalry was much alike. In India, on the other hand, the practice of native horse was to snipe at ranges from one hundred yards and under. Many, indeed, were exceedingly expert and could inflict quite appreciable loss, while the moral effect on our troopers, armed with miserable carbines with a range not exceeding twenty yards, was sometimes serious. Pester gives two instances when piquets of our regular native cavalry were driven in by only three or four of the enemy sniping thus. The consequence was the introduction of the galloper gun, and the crews would seem to have been continually on duty for the guns were regularly on piquet. There is much evidence for supposing that in the Deccan, the gallopers were far less in use and far less efficient than with Lake's army. Arthur Wellesley had no great experience of them and it is significant that, when the 23rd Light Dragoons, who had a number of officers and men who had served in the 19th and 29th in India, landed in Portugal for the Talavera Campaign with a couple of galloper guns, he said he preferred to use the horses for draught wagons than for guns.

By late 1804, in consequence, the galloper guns with Lake's army had attained an exceedingly high standard of efficiency and it was the ambition of the smartest subalterns and rank

and file to serve with them. This standard persisted in the Bengal Army until 1817 at all events.

Sir John Hearsay, "the Boy of Sitabaldi," in his memoirs, gives us a most vivid picture of the brilliant fight put up by the 6th Bengal Light Cavalry at the crisis of that battle. The native officers, knowing they were "up agin' it," threw sand on their heads preparatory to the charge, but their high spirit, and, above all, the admirable conduct of a number of troopers he had in his squadron who had served with the galloper guns saved the day.

In 1804 the 8th Light Dragoons were handicapped, as we have stated, owing to their having done but little riding, and had no gallopers. The regiment had been allowed to put forward the argument that handling guns was the job of the artillery and not that of cavalry soldiers, and Lake, not wishing to cause unpleasantness, allowed it to stand.

While the galloper guns were exceedingly efficient, there are grounds for supposing that the Experimental Horse Battery was still a very scratch formation. It had taken part in Baird's expedition to Egypt as a curious medley of four six-pounder and two three-pounder guns, with British gunners, but with drivers from the Governor General's Bodyguard, very badly mounted. Since the battery's formation, therefore, it had spent most of its time on board ship or marching about and had had but little time for steady training. The gunners, incidentally, had not yet adopted the famous helmets and blue jackets.

In connection with both galloper guns and horse artillery, it is as well to note that the Marquis Wellesley, inspired, we may be certain by his brother, Arthur, put forward a note to Lake suggesting a reduction in gallopers and no increase in the horse artillery. Lake replied that his idea was that the gallopers should be increased to three, or even four, per regiment, while more horse artillery should be raised.



THE HUSSAR BUSBY.

By Lieut.-Colonel J. E. N. Ryan, T.D.

It is generally assumed that as the hussar uniform is essentially Hungarian in origin, that the busby of British Hussars has been copied from one worn at some period of their history by the Magyar Cavalrymen. That this idea is incorrect, except in a very general sense, appears from a consideration of the evolution of this head-dress.

The original hussar headgear worn by the Hungarian horsemen at the seige of Vienna in 1683, was a conical red cloth cap with the top falling over to one side and surrounded by a narrow fur rim. In later years this fur border deepened, until by the middle of the eighteenth century during the reign of the Empress-Queen Maria Theresa (1740-1780), the cap had assumed the form shown in illustration Ic, which depicts a German Hussar busby of the type worn from 1850 till the Great War. This is a close copy of the Hungarian Hussar busby of the Theresean era, the only differences being that the fur is opossum instead of racoon skin, and that a badge, cockade and scale chinstrap have been added. As can be seen this cap is quite different in shape from the British Hussar busby shown in illustration Ia, being flatter and splayed out at the top with a straight lower border.

From 1770 and during the reign of Joseph II, son of Maria Theresa, the fur *kalpak*—a word of Turkish origin to which language the Magyar tongue is related—gave place amongst the Hussars of the Austrian army to a high cylindrical felt cap, to which a peak, for which the Hungarian word is *csák*, was added in 1798, thus originating the *csákó* (shako).

The shako in various forms, cylindrical and bell-topped, continued to be the Hungarian Hussar head-dress till 1865. It was copied by the French and our own Hussars during the Napoleonic wars. In a room of the new *Hadimuzeum* (Army

I.



a. Busby—
British Hussars

b. "Kalpak"—
Royal Hungarian
Life Guards
(or Hungarian Generals)

c. "Kalpak"—
German (or Hungarian)
Hussars

II.



a. Shako—
Hungarian Hussars

b. "Colback"—
Belgian Guides
(or French Hussars)

c. "Caciula" (or
"Kucsma")—
Rumanian (or Hungarian)
Hussars

Museum) in Budapest which the writer was privileged to view last year, are displayed on opposite sides the uniforms of the Hussars of the opposing Austrian and French armies during this period, showing their striking similarity. From 1865 to 1867 a small lambskin cap called a *kucsma* was adopted by the Hungarian Hussars. Illustration IIc shows the astrakhan head-dress (*caciula*) of Rumanian Hussars as worn from 1866 till the Great War, which was copied from the Hungarian *kucsma*. This *kucsma* was revived in 1904 as the headgear for a newly-raised bodyguard for duty at the Court of Vienna, known as the Royal Hungarian *Trabanten* Life Guards (corresponding to our Yeomen of the Guard) who were quite distinct from the historic Royal Hungarian Life Guards to be alluded to presently. They continue their service to-day as the Royal Castle Guard in Budapest.

After 1867 the Hungarian Hussars reverted to the shako, which finally assumed the form shown in illustration IIa. It should be noted that a cap line encircles the shako ending in tassels on the right side, this being known as the "vitéz kötés" or "hero's knot."

The first British Hussar head-dress came in with the Hussar Brigade formed by the conversion of some Light Dragoon regiments prior to the Corunna Campaign of 1808. In 1805 it had been ordained that the 7th Light Dragoons should be clothed as Hussars, and the 10th, 15th and 18th Light Dragoons were later similarly uniformed. As they had already adopted the braided jackets of the Hungarian Hussars, the principal changes of kit required were the addition of a slung jacket or pelisse and different headwear. The fur-crested Light Dragoon helmet was accordingly superseded by a high cylindrical fur cap, which only later came to be called a busby. It had a coloured cloth bag on the right side, red for the first three regiments and blue for the 18th who continued to be designated Light Dragoons. The plume for officers was of ospreys, and hanging down on one side were gold cords termed "flounders" with tassels at the ends. There was no chin-strap.

It seems beyond doubt that the model for this British head-dress was not that previously worn by the Hungarian Hussars of

the Line, but the quite distinct one of the Hungarian Life Guards, a corps formed by Maria Theresa in 1760 for service at her Court, whose uniform remained almost unaltered during their nearly one hundred and sixty years of existence till the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian State in 1918. Illustration Ib shows the modernised version of this head-dress which was made slightly lower than the original when the corps was reorganised in 1867 as the Royal Hungarian Life Guards on the formation of the Dual Monarchy.

This head-dress is of marten fur akin to the sable of the busby for officers of British Hussars, and the shape together with the hanging cords and tassels is also similar to the original British Hussar busby. The cords and tassels survived as the "vitéz kötés" on the modern Hungarian hussar shako. This fur *kalpak* is still worn with a gold-braided scarlet tunic and breeches and white pelisse trimmed with marten fur, by Generals of the present Hungarian army in full dress, and was recently seen in London at the funeral of King George V.

To complete the story we must glance at the changes which distinguish the British Hussar busby as now worn from its predecessor at the beginning of the last century. These are due to the influence of French sartorial taste during the period of the Second Empire. Illustration IIb shows a *colback* (a word derived from *kalpak*) of the Belgian Guides as worn till 1914, which resembles that of the French Hussars of the Second Empire except that the fur is longer bearskin. Now the fur cap of British Hussars had in 1812—following the French fashion of the day—given place to a shako, but the former head-dress was officially restored in the Dress Regulations of 1846.*

*At this date there were still only five British Hussar regiments, instead of the twelve before the reorganization of 1922 which reduced that number to the present nine. Of the original four—7th, 8th, 15th and 18th—the 18th were disbanded in 1821, but a year later the 8th Light Dragoons were converted to Hussars, and the 11th in 1840.

The 15th Hussars did not adopt the busby till 1856, being distinguished from 1812 till then by a scarlet shako. The 18th were again raised as Hussars in 1858, making six Hussar regiments. The busby bag was green instead of the original blue, but the former colour was restored in 1878. Distinctive busby plumes were authorized in 1857 instead of the red and white plume common originally to all Hussars.

The busby was subsequently introduced for the remaining six Hussar regiments on their conversion from Light Dragoons in the following years—3rd, 4th, 13th and 14th in 1861, and 19th and 20th in 1862. The 21st Hussars wore a busby as Hussars from 1862 till 1897. The new Dress Regulations of 1934 authorize the wear of the busby bag and plume of the senior regiment in each case, in the now amalgamated 13th/18th, 14th/20th and 15th/19th Hussars.

Actually the 11th Hussars had from 1840 worn a busby as part of the hussar kit conferred on them by Her Majesty Queen Victoria when they formed an escort from Dover for the Prince Consort on his arrival in England for his marriage. After the Crimean War the British Hussar busby was made lower like its Hungarian counterpart, and the ornamentation found on the French Hussar *Colback* was added, the busby-bag being braided with gold cord, and its appearance otherwise enhanced by the addition of a gold boss and corded chin-chain. In this form, except for the substitution after the South African War of a higher ostrich feather plume for the former aigrette of ospreys, it has remained unaltered to the present day.

THE CHARGE OF THE HEAVY BRIGADE AT BALACLAVA, OCTOBER 25th, 1854.

By ALFRED TENNYSON.

I.

The charge of the gallant three hundred, the Heavy Brigade!
Down the hill, down the hill, thousands of Russians,
Thousands of horsemen, drew to the Valley—and stay'd;
For Scarlett and Scarlett's three hundred were riding by
When the points of the Russian lances arose in the sky;
And he call'd "Left wheel into line!" and they wheel'd and obey'd.
Then he look'd at the host that had halted he knew not why,
And he turned half round, and he bade his trumpeter sound
To the charge, and he rode on ahead, as he waved his blade
To the gallant three hundred whose glory will never die—
"Follow," and up the hill, up the hill, up the hill,
Follow'd the Heavy Brigade.

II.

The trumpet, the gallop, the charge, and the might of the fight!
Thousands of horsemen had gather'd there on the height,
With a wing push'd out to the left, and a wing to the right;
And who shall escape if they close? but he dashed up alone
Thro' the great gray slope of men,
Sway'd his sabre, and held his own
Like an Englishman there and then;
All in a moment follow'd with force
Three that were next in their fiery course,

Wedged themselves in between horse and horse,
Fought for their lives in the narrow gap they had made,
Four amid thousands; and up the hill, up the hill,
Gallopt the gallant three hundred, the Heavy Brigade.

III.

Fell like a cannonshot,
Burst like a thunderbolt,
Crash'd like a hurricane,
Broke thro' the mass from below,
Drove thro' the midst of the foe,
Plunged up and down, to and fro,
Rode, flashing blow upon blow,
Brave Inniskillings and Greys
Whirling their sabres in circles of light!
And some of us, all in amaze,
Who were held for a while from the fight,
And were only standing at gaze,
When the dark-muffled Russian crowd
Folded its wings from the left and the right,
And roll'd them around like a cloud,
O mad for the charge and the battle were we,
When our own good redcoats sank from sight,
Like drops of blood in a dark-grey sea,
And we turned to each other, whispering all dismay'd,
Lost are the gallant three hundred of Scarlett's Brigade!

IV.

"Lost one and all" were the words
Mutter'd in our dismay;
But they rode like Victors and Lords
Thro' the forest of lances and swords
In the heart of the Russian hordes;
They rode, or they stood at bay—
Struck with the sword-hand and slew,

Down with the bridle-hand drew
The foe from the saddle, and threw
Underfoot there in the fray—
Raged like a storm or stood like a rock
In the wave of a stormy day;
Till suddenly shock upon shock
Stagger'd the mass from without,
Drove it in wild disarray,
For our men gallopt up with a cheer and a shout
And the foemen surged, and waver'd, and reel'd
Up the hill, up the hill, up the hill, out of the field,
And over the brow and away.

V.

Glory to each and to all, and the charge that they made!
Glory to all the three hundred, the Heavy Brigade!

Note.—The "three hundred" of the "Heavy Brigade" who made this famous charge were the Scots Greys and the 2nd Squadron of the Inniskillings; the remainder of the "Heavy Brigade" subsequently dashing up to their support.

The "three" were Elliot, Scarlett's aide-de-camp, who had been riding by his side, and the trumpeter and Shegog the orderly, who had been close behind him. (Macmillan's Magazine Vol. 45, 1882, p. 337).

ALFRED WELBY, Lt.-Colonel.

A BARROW LOAD OF TROUBLE

By "TURNIP."

TALL and slim and Scottish was our Squadron Leader. He loved to have everything in and about the Squadron in apple-pie order, neat, and efficient, and so he bought four brand new wheelbarrows for the stables, one for each Troop. They were painted blue and had "C Sqdn.—Hussars" painted on them in white letters by the Squadron artist. They appeared one day at mid-day stables and were duly admired by all concerned.

The following morning at reveille there was alarm and despondency in "C" Squadron of His Majesty's —— Hussars. One of the wheelbarrows was missing. Search and inquiry revealed no trace of the missing article and even Corporal X, who ventured to walk over to "B" Squadron on some pretext or other, and incidentally to stroll through their lines, failed to identify anything resembling it.

At mid-day stables our Squadron Leader was informed by a Sergeant-Major, whose face wore the look of a man who bore the burden of some tremendous state secret, that a crime had been committed during the night by some person or persons at present unknown and that one of the wheelbarrows was adrift and could not be traced. The Squadron Leader said that it was a serious matter and must be inquired into. The Sergeant-Major looked knowing and repeated the same sentiments. They were in turn echoed by the Quarter-Master-Sergeant, the Squadron Orderly Sergeant, the Orderly Corporal, and even the Orderly Trumpeter looked blue.

But our Squadron Leader was a man not easily daunted. He bought another wheelbarrow, had it adorned like its three companions, sent it down to the lines, and spent a considerable amount of time, ink, and paper inditing orders as to the use, abuse, disposal during the day, and storage during the hours of darkness of those wheelbarrows.

The following day Lieutenant B—— was on duty as Orderly Officer. Going his rounds at midnight, accompanied by the Sergeant of the Guard, he entered "C" Squadron horse lines.

"Stable Guard!" called the Sergeant. No reply.

"Stable Guar-r-rd!" Still no reply.

"STABLE GUAR-R-RD!" accompanied by bang, bang, bang with his whip on a resounding bit of woodwork. Still the silence of the grave.

"We'd better take a walk round and see where he is," said Lieutenant B——, remembering the sad fate of another sentry who was found a few years before that lying behind a horse with his skull kicked in.

The pair walked round the stuffy stable. A few horses were lying, the rest were standing, and one or two turned round and blinked sleepy eyes at the Sergeant's lantern.

At the far end of the stable were the four wheelbarrows. In an empty stall beside them was a pile of straw. On this straw lay the sentry. In his right hand he grasped his rifle; in his left he grasped the neck of a bottle whose cork was missing, also the contents.

"Now then, sentry, waken up," called the Sergeant of the Guard, pulling the man's sleeve. This elicited no notice from the sleeper, nor did several nudges.

"Better put him in one of the wheelbarrows and take him to the Guard Room," said Lieutenant B——.

"Very good, Sir," said the Sergeant, grinning.

While being lifted into the wheelbarrow by the Orderly Officer and the Sergeant of the Guard the sentry showed no sign of life: his limbs were all floppy and he breathed heavily, but on the way to the Guard Room, some 300 yards off, the fresh, frosty air of a November night cooled his heated brow and brought his seven senses nearer to their normal condition.

Number 3087652, Private G. L. ——, Oosars, C. of E., opened first one eye, then both; then he looked round and felt the side of the wheelbarrow; then he gave vent to this speech: "Oh, so you are the beggars what steals our wheelbarrows, are you? You won't 'arf cop it this time!"

HOME AND DOMINION MAGAZINES.

The July *Army Quarterly* contains this year's military prize essay by Lieutenant-Colonel Burns, a Canadian officer. The subject was the possibility of restricting the action of fighting services against non-combatants in war, and the effect such restrictions would have on our own armed forces. The author's conclusion is that the most urgent need of the moment is to prevent indiscriminate air attacks on civilians, which in his opinion are unlikely to achieve decisive results, and will only cause unnecessary damage and suffering. This, he considers, can only be done through the League of Nations, by the imposition of sanctions against the offending belligerents—not a very hopeful prospect, it will seem to most readers. He considers it may be necessary for us to increase our defensive power against new methods of warfare, which might threaten our vital centres. Major-General Wavell contributes a discriminating appreciation of the late Lord Allenby, whom he considers to have been in most respects the finest soldier of the Great War, and one who would have been a great general in any age and under any conditions.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. de Watteville concludes his study of the Italo-Abyssinian war, one effect of which he considers should be to revise our current ideas concerning overseas expeditions, with particular reference to use of the air arm, and the size of the armies necessary for victory. Lieutenant-Colonel Garwood discusses the much disputed question of the dearth of army recruits, and offers some practical suggestions for making the army seem more attractive to the prospective soldier. Another

article by Mr. Murray on "A Day with the Recruits" seems to show that there is not really much wrong with the army in this respect.

The Fighting Forces for June contains an article by Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode on the responsibilities of British officers under the new Reform Act in India. This responsibility, he says, is immense. Only by their unselfish efforts can the great difficulties of creating an Indianised army be overcome. In the event of failure, full self government for India will remain a dream, Indian discontent will increase, and the country will become a liability instead of an asset to the Empire. Commander Hills, R.N., gives a useful sketch of Admiralty Administration to-day. Lieutenant-Colonel Burne describes the battle of the Yalu, the opening battle of the Russo-Japanese war, with special reference to the part played by the human factor in inducing the Russian commander to stand and fight, and in causing the Japanese, after having captured the hostile positions, to let the defeated enemy get away without pursuit. There are two articles of interest of retired officers; the one describes silver fox farming, and the other the advantages of Southern Rhodesia from the point of view of settlement. Captain Tuke gives an attractive sketch of the work done at the Army Vocational Training Centre at Chisledon, in fitting the soldier for civil life on leaving the service.

In the August number, Commander Hills follows up his June article with an equally interesting sketch of the development of the Naval War Staff before the Great War. Lieutenant-Colonel Burne, in discussing the Russian High Command in 1904, illustrates the disastrous divergence of views between the Viceroy in the Far East and the military Commander-in-Chief. An interesting anonymous article questions whether the recent development of scientific armaments, particularly in the air, has not outrun the capabilities of human nature to handle them. It is doubtful if the percentage of breakdowns among airmen, for instance, under the terrific physical and mental strain of wielding these high speed weapons, will not so greatly increase

as to rob these weapons of much of their value. Mr. Scott describes Kenya from the settlement point of view.

The Journal of the Royal Artillery contains an interesting article on the future of the Territorial Army by Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, and it may be noted that some of the many suggestions that he puts forward have actually been embodied by concessions announced by the War Office last spring. Another topical article deals with the problem of national mobilisation in the event of war, under the broad headings of Finance, Labour, Industry, Raw Materials, Shipping, Aircraft, and Mechanical Transport. On all of these he has useful suggestions to make. Three historical articles deal with the little known action of Chrysler's Farm in the war of 1812-14, between Britain and the United States of America; the experiences of a surgeon in the Royal Artillery in Egypt during Abercromby's Egyptian Expedition in 1801; and some recollections of Marshal Foch by the French writer Colonel Grasset.

The Canadian Defence Quarterly contains a long article by Lieutenant-Colonel Burns on the Canadian defence problem, and the safety of Imperial communications and export trade. Canada, he thinks, must have her own air force and navy, and she should be prepared to furnish, in case of need, an expeditionary force of cavalry division, and two infantry divisions. Three writers contribute to a series on the origin and cause of war, and Lieutenant-Commander Houghton outlines the terms of the new London Naval Treaty and the course of negotiations that led to its conclusion.

In *The Royal Air Force Quarterly* the long disquisition on air strategy by the Russian Lieutenant-General Golovine is continued, and the Empire's needs in bombers, air-fighters, and scouting aircraft, are outlined in considerable technical detail. Flight-Lieutenant May describes the navigation problem of an air striking force, to which he considers insufficient attention has hitherto been paid. There is an anonymous article giving

a vivid description of a night's work with the armoured cars of the Transjordan Defence Force. Major Pemberton concludes his straightforward outline of the progress of Indian reform, giving an account of the Simon Commission and the Round Table Conference, which prefaced the introduction of the recent Reform Act.

All these magazines contain many other interesting articles besides those referred to here, and it is impossible to pick up any one of them without finding amusement and profit somewhere in its pages.

The Editor acknowledges with thanks the receipt of the following :—

The Crossbelts. Journal of the VIII King's Royal Irish Hussars, 1935. 11th Hussars Journal. July, 1936.

The Fifteenth Lancers Quarterly I.A. July, 1936.

Faug-a-Ballagh. Royal Irish Fusiliers Gazette, July,

Royal Tank Corps Journal. July, August and September, 1936.

The Springbok : R.C.D. Quarterly. July, 1936. 1936.

FOREIGN MAGAZINES.

THE May-June number of the United States "Cavalry Journal" devotes a large number of its pages to discussing various aspects of the cavalry manœuvres which have just been held near Marfa in Texas, close to the Mexican frontier, which is there formed by the (River) Rio Grande. This country should, in most respects, be ideal for the joint movements of mounted troops and of mechanized forces; its nature in fact verges on that of a semi-desert although it supports some permanent vegetation and a few trees. But it suffers seriously from lack of water. Nevertheless it is curious to note that the manœuvre area maps show an appreciable extent to have been "out of bounds." In this area the 1st Cavalry Division was assembled, chiefly by rail, a most expensive proceeding since the distances to be covered were great. A further source of considerable outlay was the provision of water whereof a large volume could only be supplied to the troops by the employment of railway cistern-trucks left standing on the sidings. Spectators could only be housed at Fort D.A. Russell in the officers' club whence they were sent out daily in artillery reconnaissance cars.

The object of the manœuvres was to practice the handling of brigades as units within the division and, most important, the handling of the division as a unit. To this end the manœuvres were divided into three phases: the first consisted of a three-day operation in which brigade was pitted against brigade; the second comprised exercises to test the work of an entire division, complete with its mechanized adjuncts and controlled by W/T; the third phase consisted of an exercise in which one regiment was charged with the task of delaying the advance of the whole division and was to last four days. Unfortunately water difficulties caused the third phase to be curtailed. The entire manœuvres can be regarded as the consummation of two years of

careful preparatory training, and were thus invested with a special significance. The entire aim of the General commanding the division had for the past two years centred on the attainment of a high degree of mobility by all units. From the results obtained at the manœuvres this object was thought to have been achieved. Cavalry brigades, artillery and attached cars, all worked at high speed and without any appreciable hitches. The description of these manœuvres, illustrated by photographs, convey the impression that the troops performed extremely well, and also that they are being trained for work on country such as is found in the south-western States or in the Middle West, rather more than for a campaign in enclosed agricultural country. Anyhow the manœuvres gained greatly from the extent of the area at the disposal of the troops.

It is not proposed to describe the various exercises in detail, but to pick out a few of the lessons stated to have been learned. "The mounted advance," said the director, "differs from a mounted attack, which moves on its objective with all speed. For when the enemy is firing and falling back, we cannot exhaust our horses abortively by charging at speed at a target that falls back continuously. We can merely press him hard by continuous advances, sometimes trotting, sometimes galloping over exposed spaces, sometimes walking to recover strength and wind." "The wisdom of organizing our machine guns in each regiment, so that they can be trained and operated under one command, was practically established and had much to do with the celerity and speed with which our units were handled and deployed for action." "Our units tend to over-extend and over-deploy during approach marches. Especially when operating against cavalry or mechanized force, the effect of such extension is to increase the difficulties of control to the point where control does not exist. . . . Deployments made to avoid hostile fire result in loss of control to a degree. . . . Commanders should take every opportunity to re-assemble under cover and to have units in hand when an actual attack is launched. Against infantry greater dispersion may be permitted. Against cavalry any dispersion is dangerous."

The description of the actual manœuvres is followed by a series of short articles on such subjects as were illustrated by the entire exercises; these include: the work of the Cavalry Division Railhead at Marfa, the work of the Ordnance Company; the march of the 1st Cavalry Brigade to Marfa (275 miles); the use of the compressed hay cube for forage (one-inch cubes). The latter article is of importance and should be studied by all who may be interested in this manner of feeding horses.

The number for July-August contains an interesting article by Colonel Charles L. Scott on progress in "Scout Car developments," in which a comparison is made between the American cavalry scout car of 1926 and the similar modern vehicle of 1936. The latter is a highly efficient car of excellent performance that carries not less than 800 lbs. of armour: it is built on a 1½ ton lorry chassis. Cheapness and rapidity of production have been studied in the evolution of the design. The bulk of the number is filled with details concerning the tactical use and training of cavalry that are admirable in themselves but not of outstanding value to British officers. The number also contains a translation of an article entitled, "The Apprentice Strategist," by the French General, Hubert Camon. Admirers of this well-known writer should study the translation which may be specially recommended to students for staff college and similar examinations. The last article is the story of a tank participating in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918. It is a remarkable tale, exceedingly well told. But it is difficult to make out whether the writer, Captain James A. McGuire, who declares himself to be an Irishman, is an American or British citizen. Anyhow his corporal in the tank, a man called Reed, is described "a simon-pure fighting man from Ohio."

The French "Revue de Cavalerie" for May-June is filled chiefly with a long historical study of the battle of Jaroslawice (21st August, 1914). This was one of the most important and decisive cavalry engagements of the Great War, and the interest of the present description is derived from its authorship; it is written by Colonel Grobicki of the Polish Army, who as an

Austrian cavalry lieutenant actually fought in the battle. Moreover he has had the advantage of comparing notes with other Polish officers who, in 1914, were serving in the Russian cavalry and participated in that event.

The battle of Jaroslawice is perhaps unique as presenting what may perhaps well be the last encounter of two cavalry divisions in the old style. The participants unanimously state that if cavalry formations meet again—and this in Eastern Europe is perfectly possible—such an encounter will be fought differently to that of Jaroslawice. Hence the value of a study of that engagement as a lesson of what to avoid.

The Austrian 4th Cavalry Division had been ordered to support the frontier guard detachments round Zloczow. On the other side, the Russian 10th Cavalry Division had been instructed to make a reconnaissance and break the frontier cordon in that same vicinity; the 9th Cavalry Division moving in that identical direction was to work with the 10th Division. On 20th, General Zaremba, commanding the Austrian division, hearing that the frontier had been crossed by a Russian force, moved towards it. In addition an infantry force was also sent from the Austrian XI Corps to hold up the invader. Both opposing cavalries reconnoitred rather clumsily and failed to obtain any clear idea of the enemy's location or intentions. On the morning of 21st August the Austrian infantry was surprised by Russian artillery fire and driven back at Jaroslawice; the same fate overtook the 4th Cavalry Division, then advancing in mass. A stampede took place and was only checked to the west of Jaroslawice. The Russian 10th Cavalry Division followed. The stage was now set for the ensuing cavalry battle. The Austrian General, Zaremba, seeing the Russians hesitating in their pursuit, gave the order to his division to charge. The resulting situation was highly critical since the Russians were virtually surprised and wavered under the impact. At that moment General Keller, commanding the Russian division, put in his last reserve, 60 men of his personal escort, against the Austrian flank. Simultaneously, a regiment of cossacks, ordered to take the Austrian artillery, arrived on the scene,

charged the Austrian dragoons, broke them up and then, with some assistance, succeeded in driving the Austrian guns off the field. The author sums up at length the causes for the Austrian débâcle: he concludes that it was mainly due to faulty reconnaissance and to the different conduct of the two opposing generals. The Austrian, Zaremba, rode with his advanced troops and utterly failed to control the action; the Russian, Keller, did precisely the reverse. But Keller, was, in fact, saved by the faulty conduct of his enemy, since the original Austrian manœuvre was far better combined than the Russian. The battle, the author states, shows that cavalry engagements will be possible in future war, but that skill in leadership, in face of increased fire power, will be infinitely more important than of old.

Captain Grosjean writes of motor-cycles in war. He is a fervent supporter of the side-car armed with a light automatic. He prefers this two-man combination to any form of *unarmoured* vehicle. He makes the interesting suggestion that in any unit equipped with side-cars, half the vehicles should be left-handed, and half right-handed: this would enable a complete arc of fire to be obtained in the unit.

The July-August number opens with an article by Captain du Jonchay, which deals with "armoured" cavalry. The writer begins by stating that Germany is now organizing three such armoured divisions; France possesses only one. Germany is likely to organise further troops of the same type. The author, who is an enthusiastic partisan of the tank, maintains that these armoured formations will actually be able to pierce a hostile front and then proceed to exploit the success. That is to say, that armoured vehicles should possess all qualities needed for penetrating the front with reserve power for distant action thereafter. There must, therefore, be two types of tanks:—(1) swift tanks, weighing 8 tons or over, capable of doing 120 miles in a day and proof against 20 or 30 mm. projectiles; (2) heavy tanks, weighing anything up to 100 tons and capable of withstanding 3 inch projectiles.

It is by this penetration that the action of "armoured" cavalry will become possible. As no instance of such action can be found on the Western Front during the recent war, it is necessary to have recourse to ancient warfare to illustrate such an operation. From history the author then deduces that the task of the armoured cavalry of the future will have to be: first, to defeat the hostile cavalry and then to fall on the rear and on the communications of the opposing army as a whole. For this purpose the armoured cavalry must be superior to the opposing armoured troops, and it must, therefore, be equipped with a view to overcoming the resistance of these armoured troops. In this connection it is worth noting that the author does not believe very much in the power of obstacles and destructions to hold up fast armoured troops, whilst he draws special notice to the fact that the new German armoured division comprises a detachment of 3 companies of anti-tank guns; each company being composed of 3 sections, each of two A.T. gun-tanks and one machine-gun tank. (18 tanks armed with 2 anti-tank guns apiece.)

The German "Berliner Monatschrift" for April, June and July contains three successive articles on the Russian, Belgian and French mobilization of 1914 respectively. The article dealing with Russian mobilization tries to show that the whole of that process has been purposely misrepresented and possibly rests on forged documents. The German case is that the Russian "armed neutrality," such as would have been declared in the event of Germany taking no counter-measures, was designed to bring 28 infantry divisions and 9½ cavalry divisions on to the frontiers of East Prussia. The article on the Belgian mobilization shows that on the outbreak of war Belgium lacked any definite strategic plan. If General de Ryckel's plan had been adopted, it would probably have been impossible for the German *coup de main* on Liége to have been carried out. But before the plan could be elaborated, de Ryckel was succeeded as Chief of the General Staff by General de Moranville. The latter did not agree altogether with his predecessor's plan.

Nevertheless, the rearrangement of the Belgian mobilization and the early order to mobilize went very near to upsetting all the German General Staff's plan for the seizure of Liége.

The article on the French mobilization does not give anything that we do not know of the German views on France's attitude to war. It is claimed that on July 25th precautionary measures were set in motion and that from that day, which coincided with the date of Russia's first preparatory war measures, the French measures for mobilization were allowed to proceed without interruption. France in the summer of 1914 was at the height of her military preparedness and did not shrink from allowing war to become a reality.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

"The City of London Yeomanry (Rough Riders)." By A. S. Hamilton, M.M. With a foreword by General Sir George de S. Barrow, G.C.B., K.C.M.G. With illustrations and maps. (The Hamilton Press). 13s. 6d.

This book, besides being an interesting account of the Roughriders' experiences in Egypt, Gallipoli, Sinai, Macedonia, Palestine and France, goes a good deal further than could be anticipated from the title. It gives a clear and concise account of the operations of the Yeomanry Mounted Division in Palestine —the one theatre of war in which the Cavalry, as such, was given a chance of distinguishing itself. "The Author," as Sir George Barrow remarks, "has performed his self-imposed task in a manner which calls for the gratitude of all who served with the Regiment"—one might add too all those who served in the 2nd Mounted Division and the Desert Mounted Corps, in which the fortunes of 18 Mounted Yeomanry Regiments were so closely interwoven. Anyone who served in one of these units will be struck by the meticulous accuracy of Mr. Hamilton's stirring narrative, and the absence of exaggeration and unmerited criticism. His book may be recommended as an antidote to books like "Desert Column" by Ion Idriess of the 5th Australian Light Horse.

The City of London Yeomanry, raised during the South African War, was incorporated in the 2nd Mounted Division soon after mobilization. In the Gallipoli Campaign it took part in the Battle of Scimitar Hill (August 21st) when the Division lost 30 per cent. of its strength. Like other Yeomanry units it received no drafts on the Peninsula, and gradually dwindled in numbers. On October 31st (the day the Division left Gallipoli) the strength of the Regiment was 5 officers, 11 sergeants and 35 other ranks; and of the latter 34 had been commandeered

by Division for fatigues. One can sympathise with the C.O. "who had received orders to form up his Regiment in rear of the trenches in Brigade mass and was puzzled to know how he was to take up this formation with his one man." The Turks, however, solved the problem by wounding the man. Next day, as the remnant of the Regiment (debilitated by dysentery and exposure) staggered along, with frequent halts, to its camp three miles from Mudros, it was greeted by a highly polished staff officer who exclaimed "My God! What is all this rabble?" On reaching Cairo (and their horses) the Roughriders sent a squadron to the short Senussi campaign, and then renewed their acquaintance with the Turks during expeditions from Ayun Musa (near Suez), before playing their part in the Battle of Romani (August, 1916) in Northern Sinai. During this engagement the Regiment formed part of a mobile column which, acting on the right of our main body, harried the flank of the Turkish Army as far South as Bayud and Maghara. Mr. Hamilton's description of this fighting is of considerable interest since little has been written about it. After another two months' outpost duty and patrolling in the desert the Regiment embarked for Salonika. The Macedonian interlude was short and on the whole uneventful, and by June, 1917, the Roughriders had joined the Yeomanry Mounted Division on the Gaza-Beersheba outpost line.

The epic defence of the Buggar Ridge (October 27th) when the London Mounted Brigade so gallantly withstood the onslaught of 5,000 Infantry, 2 Cavalry Regiments and 12 guns, is graphically described. It was the Roughriders who prevented the enemy's attempt to break through the gap after the Middlesex Squadrons had been destroyed.

In the advance up the coastal plain (after Gaza III) the Regiment took part in the Battle of El Mughar, capturing Yebnah and Kubeibe.

During the bitter fighting in the hills North-West of Jerusalem, when the Yeomanry Mounted Division was nearly overwhelmed, the Roughriders lost severely; "boots were ripped to ribbons, horse shoes were broken off, camels' pads were

cut until they bled." Wearing only drill, without blankets or greatcoats, soaked by the December rains, sore and very short of rations, the Yeomen fought continually for twelve days (and nights) in a mountainous and roadless country against a determined enemy. Sir George Barrow considers that the fighting and hardships of those twelve days "are at least comparable to those experienced by Sir John Moore's men during the famous retreat from Corunna."

The Regiment did not see the final advance through Syria in the Autumn of 1918, being one of many Yeomanries which proceeded to France in the Summer as Machine gun units, where it added "France and Flanders 1918" and "Pursuit to Mons" to its other Battle Honours.

Mr. Hamilton writes with a fine detachment and, although some of the incidents he describes are but the trivial experiences of a soldier's life (if the loss of £16 worth of beer in the middle of the Sinai desert can be a trivial incident !), yet they mirror to those who shared them the daily anxieties and hopes deferred which preceded the final victory.

His book will be read with interest by Yeomen and others who served in the Near East during the Great War. O. T.

"An Outline of British Military History. By Major D. H. Cole and Major E. C. Priestley. (Sifton Praed.) 12s. 6d.

Major Cole, who is an instructor at Sandhurst, and Major Priestley, who holds a similar post at Kitchener College, Newgong, have collaborated to produce a book in which there is much to commend and much to criticise. The period covered ranges from the Civil War to the present day, and it is no small feat to have got this into little more than four hundred pages of text. The maps are excellent, and a useful series of appendices covers such miscellaneous subjects as the dates of formations of regiments and corps, the development of small arms, and the War Office. A narrative of all the important campaigns of the Army is given, and the various stages in its organisation get adequate treatment.

Criticism unfortunately finds much to lay hold of. There is no adequate military sketch of Cromwell, or of Wellington as a

general. The account of Naseby fails to mention the twofold numerical superiority of the victors. Dunbar and Worcester are merely mentioned. The importance of the battle of Buxar seems not to be realised. The treatment of Wolfe's Quebec operations is full of inaccuracies. Hasting's great campaign in Central India in 1817-1818 is badly described and dealt with. The real importance of the Crimea as an example of the range and value of an army based on sea power is not mentioned. These points are only some among many.

Admittedly it is impossible in 400 odd pages to complete the whole story adequately. But the compression into less than the twenty pages here allotted to it of the political and diplomatic prelude to the Great War, would have allowed the authors more elbow room. The wisdom of including detailed narratives of battles, for the understanding of which no maps are provided, is doubtful.

In short, the book, though a meritorious attempt on a difficult theme, might, one feels, have been much better done, had the authors thought out their task and plans for dealing with it more in detail beforehand. This is a pity, for there is much in it of interest and value.

"The Australian Victories in France, 1918." By General Sir John Monash. (Angus and Robertson, Sydney and Australian Book Company, 37, Great Russell Street, W.C.1.) 6s.

This is a cheap edition of a book published originally at 24s., giving the Australian Corps Commander's own account of the achievements of his troops in the last year of the war in the West. The price seems to have been reduced principally by cutting out all the admirable maps of the previous edition—that is by depriving it of at least half its value as a military history. No doubt, however, in its present form the book will find many new purchasers and readers here and in Australia.

"The War of the Guns." By A. Wade. (Batsford). 7s. 6d.

Mr. Wade was a gunner who crossed to France as a signaller of the Territorial Horse Artillery, in a battery converted to form part of an army field brigade, early in 1917. He went

through the fighting at Hill 60, the battles of Messines and Passchendaele, the March retreat of 1918, and the subsequent advance, being wounded and evacuated in October—a month before the Armistice.

Personal narratives of the war from the point of view of a gunner-private are none too common, and those who are inclined to think that the P.B.I. had the monopoly of the discomforts and terrors of the campaign, will find this story a useful corrective to that delusion. The artillery had long spells in the forward zone, less protection against the enemy's fire, incessant day and night work, and few periods of rest; and their casualties in men, horses, and material, often attained a cripplingly high figure.

Mr. Wade's narrative is written with no undue striving after effect, is always vivid, and bears the obvious stamp of truth. His story of the March retreat, in my opinion, deserves to take its place beside any yet published about that much-described episode. In addition to this, the book contains an excellent selection—not always confined to strict relevance of the text—from the wealth of war photographs lying largely untapped in the Imperial War Museum. Some of these are horrible in the extreme, but they represent facts, and show us war as it really is. There is no trace of anti-war propaganda in the book, but the pictures tell their own tale more vividly than any words could do.

The including of these illustrations, we are informed by the publishers, necessitated considerable curtailment of Mr. Wade's own story, which is to be regretted, and we hope that some day it will be possible for the whole of it to be given to the world.

"The Liao-Yang Campaign." By Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Burne. (William Clowes). 5s.

Lieutenant-Colonel Burne has written in brief compass a most admirable little history of the first phase of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. He has based himself largely on the Russian Official History which appeared shortly before the Great War. Never having been translated into English, it is little

known in this country, and supersedes many of the accepted histories which appeared before its publication.

The maps are simple but sufficient, and his story, which concerns itself less with technical details than with the personal factors of the campaign, is one of remarkable vividness and insight.

Particularly valuable is his account of the conflict of policies between Alexeiev, the Russian Viceroy in the Far East, and, General Kuropatkin, the Russian Commander-in-Chief. The former's plan was a stubborn defensive, contesting the ground at every possible point, and giving up no territory voluntarily. General Kuropatkin, was unwilling to offer battle till he had concentrated sufficient forces to give him superiority over the Japanese, which he calculated would not be possible south of Liao-Yang. Neither of these policies were consistently followed, and the evil moral results of repeated defeats, followed by retreats, had a disastrous influence on the Russian commanders and their troops. The result was, that when Kuropatkin got his superiority in numbers, his battle and his chance of inflicting defeat on the enemy, for which he had planned and worked, his weapon at the critical moment broke in his hand, and the hoped-for victory eluded him. The Japanese, on the other hand, following a consistent and resolute plan, triumphed over all their difficulties, and won through to success. The story of how this came about is admirably told in these pages.

Lieutenant-Colonel Burne is to be congratulated on having written a most entrancing little book, inspired by true historical insight, and packed with valuable lessons for every military reader.

"The Elements of Imperial Defence." By A. G. Boycott. (Gale & Polden.) 12s. 6d.

This is a second edition of an admirable book, originally published some years ago, dealing with the geographical features, material resources, communications, and organization of the British Empire, with particular reference to Imperial defence. Each of the Dominions and areas is studied in turn

from this point of view, and other chapters deal with communications by sea, air, cable, and wireless between the various parts of the Empire. There are twenty-three valuable appendices, giving statistical details and important documents, and so up-to-date are these as to include the figures for 1935, and the statement relating to Defence published in March of that year. There is, in addition, a series of clear and excellent maps.

"Journey to the Western Front Twenty Years After." By R. H. Mottram. (Bell.) 7s. 6d.

Mr. Mottram probably knows as much about the Western front in the war days as anyone now writing, and a good deal more than most of us about the changes that have occurred since. In this book, which includes a selection of official photographs, and a couple of end-paper maps, on which practically every place mentioned in it is given, he describes the whole of the British area in France and Flanders, starting from the North Sea coast on the left, and ending with the Oise valley on the right. He gives details of the really remarkable work of renovation that has been carried out by the Belgians and the French in all this large tract of country. Towns such as Ypres, Bailleul, Armentières and Albert, which were almost completely levelled with the ground, and others such as Béthune, Arras, Cambrai and Péronne, which were badly damaged, have all been rebuilt, and are once more flourishing centres of life and industry. In some cases even the centuries-old buildings and churches have been reproduced in the form and style in which the War found them. Everywhere the trenches have been filled in, the War dead have been collected into handsome well-kept cemeteries, and over wide stretches of land the only visible reminders of those four years of death and destruction are the many national, divisional, and unit memorials erected by loving hands in honour of fallen comrades. Even Mr. Mottram, with his detailed knowledge of every sector, seems often to have found himself at a loss to identify localities well-known to him and to many of us twenty years ago. From all of this he draws the comforting reflection, that it is not so easy to obliterate life as many people believe. "Inanimate nature makes short work

of our exhausting efforts to turn her into a mortuary," and even human nature soon forgets and renews itself. All our comrades did not die in vain, for their deaths have made humanity immeasurably more awake than it was twenty-five years ago.

"The English Castle." By Hugh Braun. (Batsford.) 7s. 6d.

Works on our English castles are not very common, and in this book the author has combined a wealth of pictorial illustrations with a concise and not unduly technical account of the development of the English castle from its earliest genesis as a mere palisade and mound of earth, to the elaborate masonry constructions of the later Plantagenets.

The final chapter of the book covers the transformation of the great stone fortresses of Edward I and his successors, into the fortified manor houses of the Tudors and Stuarts, where comfort and beauty took precedence over strengh, and the final destruction of many of these and of their feudal predecessors in the Civil Wars.

Up to the end of the eleventh century castles were usually constructed of earth and timber, and only with the twelfth century there began to arise those massive stone towers and walls, which we instinctively connect with the name of castle.

Mr. Braun deals in detail with the main features and progressive improvements of these great fortresses, and also describes the men that garrisoned then, and the somewhat primitive and ineffective ways by which they were attacked in the days before gunpowder came to sound their death knell. This latter part of his work might perhaps have been extended, to the reduction of some of the technical details of construction, which, even with the wealth of illustrations he has given us, are not always easy to follow. This could have been again improved to some extent by an account of some of the famous sieges of English castles that took place from time to time in our medieval history. But Mr. Braun has written an excellent book, from which nobody interested in our military history from the Middle Ages, can fail to learn and derive enjoyment.

E.W.S.

"The Perfect Hunter and Saddle Horse." Written and Illustrated by J. McBryde. Reviewed by Lt.-Col. Sidney G. Goldschmidt. (Country Life.) 8s. 6d.

Miss McBryde has not only studied the methods of her successful groom, Joe Hillier, but has also had the opportunity of enjoying the results of his expert horse-breaking. When I visited her stable I saw an imposing row of hunters of such exceptional conformation, balance and manners that it was obvious that here was something out of the ordinary in efficient horsemanship and horsemastership.

This book contains a wealth of clear, concise information to which the illustrations are a fitting complement. Both are from the pen of a master of detail. The first is devoted to the handling and early education of the foal, yearling, two and three year old and is, moreover, something new in horse literature, most writers having assumed that the young horse has already learned to lead and to submit to handling generally. However meticulous the reader may find the instruction, there is nothing redundant or superfluous and there is no way of shortening it other than by ocular demonstration and alas, there are not many Joe Hilliers available.

The chapters following deal with Bridled Carriage, Balance and the way to obtain and maintain them. They show how little variation there is between methods whether these are learned in riding schools or result from a wide experience.

The rider's seat when jumping is described and illustrated and here the author is wise not to revive the time-worn controversy on the forward seat.

The distribution of weight and the lightening of the horse's forehand is admirably described on page 72. The mathematical and mechanical explanation of the action of the double bit is interesting even if it does not shed much light on the obscure problem of the suitable bit.

There are, of course, many controversial points where horsemen will differ. I fancy, for instance that cavalrymen will find fault with the instruction "The reins must always he held in both hands."

This book is an attractive addition to the horseman's library and it is hard to imagine a happier combination of clear, artistic drawings and well written instruction.

"Bridleways through History." By Lady Apsley. (Hutchinson & Co., Ltd.). 16s. net.

Although everybody knows that hunting originated in the search for food and has been in vogue from times immemorial. yet few understand the diverse stages that have shaped its development till the modern "Fox Hunting" has emerged. Lady Apsley describes these evolutionary stages, not only of hunting in its more general sense, but also of horses, hounds, equitation and saddlery, from the dawn of history through the triumphant days of the Greek and Roman Empires, through the Age of Chivalry, through the Middle Ages, till the sport of to-day is reached.

How few riders have studied, or even know of, the apt sayings of Xenophon—one of the first authors on the art of riding—who is largely quoted in this book.

From the days of the Normans to those of the Plantagenets, hunting—i.e., the chase of the red deer—was technically a royal sport, which gradually opened its doors to the nobility, the squires and eventually the country folk. The wearing of scarlet in the hunting field is probaly due to this royal association in early times.

Lady Apsley emphasises what is not generally known, i.e., that Hunting, as practised now in England, owes much to Royal France, which was largely responsible for the interest taken in the evolution of hounds. "Bridleways through History" is written in no light-hearted manner, but is the result of hard study of a most fascinating subject. A list of the many authors quoted is included in the book and this will prove a great help to those, who wish to probe further into the origin and development of hunting. Lionel Edwards has contributed some excellent illustrations and the photographs of old tapestries depicting hunting, hounds and horses show how far "The Sport of Kings and Princes" has progressed.

O.J.F.F.

"The Young Riders Picture Book." By Golden Gorse. (Country Life.) 7s. 6d. net.

"Riding for Children." By Shirley Faulkner-Horne. (Country Life.) 3s. 6d. net.

"Country Life" is to be congratulated on the way it is fostering the teaching of the children of to-day how to ride. We know and indeed are certain that the results of its policy will be beneficial and we look forward to improved knowledge and riding, not only in the present generation of children, but also in their children. The excellent range of instructional books now available and the existence of so many Pony Clubs that have become so popular throughout the country, are proving of inestimable value.

The two volumes at present under review deal with the subject in different ways. Golden Gorse supplements his more extensive treatise "The Young Rider" by "The Young Riders Picture Book" the object of which is to teach children the art of riding through the eye, i.e., by means of 185 photographs, which illustrate both the right and wrong types of children's ponies and the right and wrong ways of riding. Sufficient reading matter is included in the book to supplement the lessons depicted by the photographs.

"Riding for Children" is a book written by a girl of 15 and is remarkable in its way for the knowledge which it imparts. As the Chairman of the Institute of the Horse and Pony Club remarks: "It is a child speaking to a child in words that a child cannot fail to understand." Children often fail to understand the words and teachings of the adult rider, but this book with its lessons should be clear to any child.

Incidentally both of these books will be of great benefit to grown-ups, who desire to teach the younger generation the art of riding. O.J.F.F.

The following have also been received:—

Lord Kitchener, by Arthur Hodges. Thornton and Butterworth. 15s.

Polo. The Earl of Kimberley. Editor. With one hundred illustrations. The Seeley Service. 25s.

The Nations at War, by Ludendorf. Translated from German by Dr. A. S. Rappoport. Hutchinson & Co. 8s. 6d.

SPORTING NEWS

BISLEY, 1936, CAVALRY SUCCESSES.

The following are the principle Cavalry Successes at this year's gathering:—

Army Rifle Association.

Prize Winners.

Roupell Cup—Class A.

L/Sjt. Capper	3rd Carabiniers.
S.I.M. Hillier	3rd Carabiniers.
S.S.M. Douglas	Royal Scots Greys.
2/Lt. Widdrington	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.

Class B.

Tpr. Bowater	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
Tpr. Payne	4th/7th Dragoon Guards.
L/Cpl. Brunton	3rd Carabiniers.
Tpr. Lothian	Royal Scots Greys.

Class C.

L/Cpl. Turner	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
Tpr. Whelan	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
Tpr. Wrotham	4th Hussars.
Tpr. White	Royal Scots Greys.
L/Cpl. Haynes	3rd Carabiniers.

Roberts Cup—Class A.

S.I.M.Hillier	3rd Carabiniers.
2/Lt. Widdrington	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
Sgt. Pickers	4th Hussars.
S.S.M. Douglas	Royal Scots Greys.
Sjt. Haystead	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.

Class B.

Tpr. Buckley	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
Cpl. Whalley	Royal Scots Greys.
L/Cpl. Newton	3rd Carabiniers.

Class C.

Tpr. Whelan	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
Tpr. White	Royal Scots Greys.
Tpr. Spalding	Royal Scots Greys.
L/Cpl. Turner	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.

Army Hundred Cup.

S.I.M. Hillier	3rd Carabiniers
Tpr. Buckley	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
S.S.M. Douglas	Royal Scots Greys.
Sjt. Riches	4th Hussars.
Sjt. Haystead	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
Lt. Readman	Royal Scots Greys.
2/Lt. Widdrington	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
L/Sjt. Capper	3rd Carabiniers.

CAMBRIDGE SHIELD.

1st	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards	1,432
2nd	Royal Scots Greys	1,372
3rd	3rd Carabiniers	1,301

REVOLVER—ARMY THIRTY CUP.

PRIZE WINNERS.

Major D. S. Frazer ..	15th/19th Hussars.
Sjt. Knight	4th Hussars.

METHUEN CUP.

Cavalry Team was 7th of 18 Teams.

Team :—

Capt. W. Barnes (*Capt.*) ..	5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.	
Major D. S. Frazer ..	15th/19th Hussars ..	159
Tpr. J. Buckley	5th Royal Inniskilling D.G.'s	159
S.I.M. F. Hillier	3rd Carabiniers	155
S.S.M. H. Douglas ..	Royal Scots Greys ..	153
2/Lt. A. Widdrington ..	5th Royal Inniskilling D.G.'s	146
Lt. A. Readman	Royal Scots Greys ..	144
Sjt. A. Pickers	4th Hussars	136
Sjt. A. Haystead	5th Royal Inniskilling D.G.'s	133
		1,185

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION.

Major D. S. Frazer, 15th/19th Hussars, was again selected to Captain the Mother Country Kolapore Team, which he did successfully and we offer him our congratulations.

2/Lt. E. A. F. Widdrington, 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, was the most successful Cavalry competitor, winning the Stock Exchange and Wimbledon Cups and finishing close up in the Grand Aggregate.

In the Services XX Match the following Cavalrymen were in the Army Team.

Major D. S. Frazer (*Captain*).	
Lt. Col. A. S. Turnham, O.B.E. ..	10th Hussars.
Major T. G. Upton, O.B.E., D.C.M.	11th Hussars.
2/Lt. E. A. F. Widdrington ..	5th Royal Inniskilling D.G.'s.

The following shot in the National Trophy, English Team :—

Major T. G. Upton, O.B.E., D.C.M.	11th Hussars.
2/Lt. E. A. F. Widdrington ..	5th Royal Inniskilling D.G.'s.

WHITEHEAD REVOLVER CUP—CAVALRY TEAM.

Major D. S. Frazer ..	15th/19th Hussars (*Captain*) (also shot).
Captain W. Penny	4th Hussars.